스크랩 헤커 "北 핵위협 아직은 초보적…최악상황 올 수도"

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헤커 "北 핵위협 아직은 초보적…최악상황 올 수도"

2013-02-05 07:52

세계적 핵물리학자인 지그프리드 헤커 박사는 5일 북한의 핵위협 수준에 대해 "북한의 위협적 언사에도 불구하고 아직은 초보적 단계(in its infancy)"라고 평가했다. 

지난 2010년 북한 영변 핵시설을 직접 방문, 우라늄농축 시설을 최초로 확인한 헤커 박사는 이날 연합뉴스와 미 스탠퍼드대 아태연구소(APARC)가 공동 주최한 동북아 국제심포지엄에서 이같이 밝혔다. 

헤커 박사는 그러나 "한미 양국의 새 행정부가 북한의 핵위협을 억제하는데 초점을 맞춘 정책들을 마련하지 않는다면 최악의 상황이 올 것"이라고 경고했다.

그는 "핵위협 억제 정책은 경제, 교육, 자원, 문화, 교류와 같이 더욱 광범위한 이슈에 초점을 맞출 때 가장 효과적으로 작동할 수 있다"고 강조했다.

그는 "북한은 핵무기가 협상 대상이 아니라고 주장하고 있다"며 "그러나 한미 양국은 핵무기가 지속적이고 영구적인 상수(常數)가 아니라 임시적 대응 방편에 그치도록 하는데 초점을 둬야 한다"고 말했다.

헤커 박사는 2002년 이후 진행된 북핵 협상과 관련, "북한의 비핵화를 겨냥한 한미 당국의 대응은 북한의 핵 프로그램 강화 행보를 저지하는 데 실패했다"고 지적했다.

<연합뉴스>

http://sports.chosun.com/news/utype.htm?id=201302050000000000001903&ServiceDate=20130205

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2013/02/05 09:30 KST

S. Korea, U.S. urged to draw up new policy to limit N. Korea's nuke threat

SEOUL, Feb. 5 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States must lay out a new policy aimed at limiting North Korea's nuclear threat before the North's nuclear ambitions become "an increasingly menacing and permanent fixture," a prominent U.S. scientist said Tuesday.

   Siegfried Hecker, a nuclear scientist at Standford University who was shown North Korea's modern uranium enrichment facility during a visit to the country in late 2010, estimated that the North's nuclear threat is "still in its infancy."

   Hecker made the remarks during a security forum in Seoul hosted by Yonhap News Agency and the Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) of Stanford University.

   "American and South Korean policies since 2002 designed to denuclearize North Korea have failed to halt the North's relentless march to enhance its nuclear programs -- from nuclear reactors, to uranium enrichment, to nuclear tests and its long-range missile capabilities," Hecker said.

   "Yet, in spite of the North's threatening rhetoric, the nuclear threat is still in its infancy -- the worst is yet to come, unless the new administrations formulate policies that focus on limiting the threat," he said.

   North Korea has vowed to conduct its third nuclear test in response to the U.N. Security Council resolution tightening sanctions against it as punishment for its December rocket launch. The country had previously detonated nuclear devices in 2006 and 2009.

   Officials in Seoul have said North Korea has completed all preparations and could detonate a nuclear device at any time.

   Many analysts have raised doubts over Washington's so-called "strategic patience" approach toward North Korea, a policy of shunning direct talks with the North until it agrees to abide by past nuclear commitments.

   "North Korea has now categorically stated its nuclear weapons are not negotiable," Hecker said. "South Korean and American actions must focus on those weapons being a temporary hedge rather than an increasingly menacing and permanent fixture."

   The six-nation talks, involving the two Koreas, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan, have been dormant since April 2009, when the North quit the negotiating table and conducted its second nuclear test a month later.

   Pyongyang claims the uranium enrichment program is for peaceful energy development, but outside experts believe it will give the country a new source of fission material to make atomic bombs, in addition to its widely known plutonium-based nuclear weapons program.

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/02/04/69/0301000000AEN20130204011300315F.HTML

북한의 핵위협 수준에 대해 "북한의 위협적 언사에도 불구하고 

아직은 초보적 단계(in its infancy)"

여러분들.....

위 연합 찌라시 기사를 읽고 지그프리드 해커 박사가

말하고자 하는 진정한 의미가 도대체 무엇인지....명쾌히 이해하셨나요?

만일....명쾌히 이해가 안되었다면.....다시 한번 위 기사를

자세히 음미해 보세요.

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자.....이제 해커 박사가 하고자 하는 말이

진정으로 무슨 내용인지....이제 명쾌히 이해가 되었나요?

아마도 위 찌라시 기사를 읽고 해커 박사가 말한 내용을

명확히 이해하기란....대부분의 독자들에게 쉽지 않을 것입니다.

심지어 우리 카페 회원님들에게 조차도 그건 쉽지 않을 것입니다.

하물며, 우리 카페 회원이 아닌 일반 무지랭이 독자들이야

해커 박사가 한 말의 진정한 의미를 정확히 이해하기란

더더욱 어려운 일이겠지요.

도대체 왜 그렇게 된 것일까요?

그 이유는 매우 간단합니다.

찌라시가 영문을 엉터리로 번역했기 때문입니다.

북한의 핵위협 수준에 대해 "북한의 위협적 언사에도 불구하고 

아직은 초보적 단계(in its infancy)"

 "Yet, in spite of the North's threatening rhetoric, 

the nuclear threat is still in its infancy -- the worst is yet to come,

즉,  still in its infancy 부분을 "초보적 단계"라고 멍청하게 번역해버렸고

나아가 바로 이어지는 부분인 the worst is yet to come 부분을 

바로 이어서 번역하지 않았기 때문에

해커 박사가 말하고자 하는 내용의 진정한 의미를 

독자들이 이해하기 어렵게 되어 버린 것이지요.

물론, 대부분의 영문에서 still in its infancy 부분을 

"초보적 단계" 또는 "유아적 단계" 등으로 번역할 수도 있습니다.

그러나 현재의 맥락에서 해커 박사가 말한 부분을 그런식으로

번역해서는 결코 안되지요.

왜냐면 여기서 그런식으로 번역하면 자칫

북한의 현재의 핵위협은 그저 무시할 수 있는 수준의

별볼 일 없는 것이라는 인상을 주기 쉽기 때문입니다.

그러나 여기서의 문맥은 결코 그런 의미가 아니지요.

즉, 북핵 위협 수준이 매우 심각한 상황이지만....그것마저도 사실은 

아직 시작 단계에 불과하고, 곧 더 심각한 최악 상황이 도래할 것이라는

의미로 해커 박사는 그렇게 말한 것입니다.

따라서 제대로 번역하려면 아래와 같이 번역해야만 합니다.

즉, still in its infancy  부분을 "이제 겨우 시작 단계일 뿐"이라고 번역해야만 합니다.

그리고 바로 이어서 그 뒷부분도 번역해주어야만 합니다.

즉, the worst is yet to come 부분을 

"더욱 최악의 상황은 이제 곧 닥치게 될 것이다" 라고 번역하여

덧붙여 두었어야 했다는 말입니다.

그러면 독자들이 도대체 무슨 내용인지 몰라 헷갈리는 일은 없었을 것입니다.

그러니까....해커 박사의 말인즉

북한의 현재 핵위협은 그야말로 이제 시작단계에 불과하고

시간이 조금만 더 지나면 그야말로 최악의 상황이 곧 닥치게 될 것이니

그것을 지금 대비해서 막지 않으면 안된다는 미국정부에 대한 경고입니다.

그렇다면 미국은 도대체 어떻게 대처해야 하는 것일까요?

해커 박사는 그 해결책을 아래와 같이 제시하고 있습니다.

핵위협 억제 정책은 경제, 교육, 자원, 문화, 교류와 같이 더욱 광범위한 이슈에 초점을 맞출 때 가장 효과적으로 작동할 수 있다

위 말의 의미가 도대체 무엇일까요?

말하자면, 미국은 북한의 모든 요구들을 들어주어

북미국교정상화를 하고, 그래서 전 분야에 걸쳐 대대적인 대북지원을

해주어야만 한다는 말입니다.

참고로.....

영변의 첨단 우라늄농축 시설을 보고온 해커 박사는

소위 " 3 No, 1 Yes" 정책을 미국정부에 북핵문제 해결책으로

이미 제시한 바 있지요.

그 의미는.....미국정부가 북한의 모든 요구들을 들어주고

그대신 핵무기를 더 이상 제조하지 않고, 핵기술을 수출하지도 않고

핵실험도 하지 않겠다는 약속을 북한으로부터 받으라는 말입니다.

물론, 현재 북한이 보유한 핵무기에 대해서는 모르는채 해두는 것을

전제로 한 말이지요.

결국.....우리 카페가 이미 태고적부터 예측해온

북미대결의 종착점인 북미국교정상화 수순으로

갈 수 밖에 없음을 해커 박사도 지적하고 있는 것이지요.

아마 올해엔 북미가 그런 방향으로 움직일 것이 틀림없습니다.

밑에 성김 대사의 "관여"(engagement)라는 말은 바로

북미대화를 의미합니다. 그리고 위에서 해커 박사가 말한 내용을

의미하기도 합니다.

성김 美대사 "北 도발중지해야..미국, 관여할 준비돼"

기사입력 | 2013-02-05 10:36:31

김 대사는 이날 연합뉴스와 미국 스탠퍼드대 아태연구소(APARC)가 공동 주최한 동북아 국제심포지엄 환영사에서 "버락 오바마 미국 대통령은 한국과 긴밀한 협력을 계속하고 북한에 관여할 준비가 돼 있다"면서 이같이 말했다. <연합뉴스>

http://sports.chosun.com/news/utype.htm?id=201302050000000000002038&ServiceDate=20130205

현재 북미관계의 상황이...위와 같이 흘러가고 있는데도

한국의 통일부인지 통일반대부인지의 류 아무개는

헛소리나 픽픽하고 있지요.

물론, 한국정부의 다른 관리들도 대북강경정책을 취해야

한다며 길길이 날뛰고 있지요. 아마도 그들은 머지않아

곧 찌부러질 수 밖에 없을 것입니다.

왜냐면 북미가 강경대북정책이 아니라, 북미국교정상화 수순으로

갈 것이 100% 확실하기 때문입니다.

참고로.....

해커 박사의 기고문이 발견되어 관심있는 분들을 위해

전문을 퍼다가 아래 소개하고자 합니다.

What to Expect from a North Korean Nuclear Test

Pyongyang is about to make some more trouble. 

Here's what to look for when Kim Jong Un debuts his new bomb.

BY SIEGFRIED S. HECKER | FEBRUARY 4, 2013

Pyongyang lashed out harshly at the United States following the most recent U.N. Security Council resolution condemning its December missile test. The Kim Jong Un regime threatened to increase its nuclear deterrent both quantitatively and qualitatively and vowed to conduct a third nuclear test at a "higher level." So what might we expect from another test? Why, what, how will we know, when, and what difference will it make?

First, why test? Without additional nuclear tests, North Korea is greatly limited in its ability to miniaturize a nuclear device to fit on one of its missiles. The 2006 and 2009 tests demonstrated that North Korea can build a nuclear device, but that its nuclear arsenal is likely limited to bulky devices that would need to be delivered by plane, boat, or van, thereby greatly limiting their deterrent value. To make its nuclear arsenal more menacing and provide the deterrent power Pyongyang's vitriolic pronouncements are aimed to achieve, North Korea must demonstrate that it can deliver the weapons on missiles at a distance.

During my previous visits to the Yongbyon nuclear complex, which housed both its plutonium production and its uranium enrichment facility, North Korea's nuclear specialists told me that the first two nuclear devices tested used plutonium as the bomb fuel. Pyongyang voluntarily suspended its plutonium production in 2008 and I estimate it has only 24 to 42 kilograms of plutonium, sufficient for 4 to 8 primitive nuclear devices, with no more in the pipeline. Yet with only two plutonium tests, one successful and one only partially successful, they need more tests to have confidence that they can build a smaller nuclear warhead.

The next test, however, could just as well be designed to demonstrate a highly enriched uranium (HEU)-fueled bomb. For years, Pyongyang had consistently denied having a uranium enrichment program, but in 2010 North Korean officials showed my Stanford University colleagues and me a modern centrifuge facility for uranium enrichment, ostensibly dedicated to making low-enriched uranium reactor fuel for electricity production. Based on what we were shown and our subsequent analysis of the time scales for constructing this facility, I concluded that Pyongyang must have a covert centrifuge facility, and that it has likely also produced HEU. I believe the amount of HEU produced to date is relatively small, but quite likely sufficient for a nuclear test.

What will they test? The most likely choice is an HEU device. Pyongyang threatened to increase the size of its nuclear arsenal; it can only do so with HEU, but it has a limited plutonium inventory and has decided to suspend plutonium operations. One can only speculate why it made that choice. Its plutonium facilities could have continued to produce one bomb's worth of plutonium per year. It is possible that the North Koreans believe they can develop a significantly larger HEU production capacity. In addition, the reactor operations necessary to produce plutonium are fully visible from satellite imagery because the reactor's cooling tower emits a visible steam plume, whereas the location and operations of uranium centrifuge facilities cannot be monitored from a distance, as was clearly demonstrated when we were shown the previously undiscovered Yongbyon centrifuge facility.

The apparent decision to pursue HEU devices is also puzzling because plutonium bomb fuel is more suitable for miniaturized nuclear devices than HEU (which is why the modern nuclear arsenals of established nuclear powers use plutonium). Yet Pyongyang may have decided it would require too many tests and too much plutonium, which is in short supply, to demonstrate a miniaturized plutonium device. And, it is likely that A.Q. Khan sold the North Koreans a Pakistani HEU design that could be mounted on some of North Korea's short or medium-range missiles. If Khan provided both design and test-performance data, Pyongyang may have decided that HEU, albeit less effective than plutonium, was a quicker and more certain route to miniaturized nuclear devices.

In an article co-authored last summer with Frank Pabian in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, we speculated that it is possible that the North Koreans may decide to test both plutonium and HEU devices -- simultaneously in one test tunnel. One more plutonium test provides valuable information on the yield-to-weight ratio, critical for miniaturized designs. An HEU test allows them to move to a possibly expanded future arsenal. Multiple simultaneous tests have been conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union, and most recently in 1998 by India and Pakistan. Such tests have some technical limitations and are more challenging to conduct, but they have the huge advantage of not incurring additional political cost -- in other words, they can get two for the price of one.

Pyongyang had previously announced that it has mastered nuclear fusion technologies, prompting some observers to predict that the next test could be a fusion-boosted device or possibly even a thermonuclear device, typically referred to as a hydrogen bomb. North Korean nuclear specialists are undoubtedly familiar with these technological advancements and likely have tried their hand at designing such devices, but I consider application of these concepts to be still out of reach of their specialists, unless they are prepared to conduct multiple nuclear testing campaigns.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/04/what_to_expect_from_a_north_korean_nuclear_test

How will we know? A successful nuclear test will be easily detected because its seismic signals will be monitored around the world by the International Monitoring System established under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to monitor potential clandestine nuclear tests anywhere in the world. Both the 2006 and 2009 tests gave indisputable seismic evidence of nuclear tests. This one may be even easier to detect because Pyongyang has vowed to test at a higher level.

But what exactly did Pyongyang mean by a "higher level?" Was it just a higher explosion yield? That is possible, because much of the international community dismissed the 2006 test as a failure and the 2009 test as not very successful. The yield of the 2006 test is estimated at somewhat less than 1 kiloton (1,000 tons of TNT equivalent). Experts are still divided on the yield of the 2009 test; our best estimate is between 2 and 7 kilotons. In any case, if the North Koreans can explode a device with a yield in that range, then they most likely can produce a Nagasaki-like bomb with a yield of 20 kilotons. Perhaps that is what Pyongyang means by a higher level.

More likely, however, and consistent with Pyongyang's pronouncement that it will also increase its nuclear deterrent qualitatively, is an attempt to test a more sophisticated, miniaturized design. How will we know? Pyongyang will almost certainly claim that the test was successful and will tout its sophistication. It will be difficult to distinguish truth from propaganda, but experience shows there is often a nugget of truth in North Korea's claims. It will also be difficult to discern from seismic signals if one or two devices were tested if they are simultaneous and closely spaced.

Aside from seismic signals, which tell us only the size of the explosion and do not allow us to differentiate between plutonium and HEU, nor tell us anything about the sophistication of the device, there are only a few other signals that can be monitored. If the nuclear blast carried out in the tunnel deep underground causes sufficient fissures in the overburden rock, then gaseous fission products can escape and may be detected by airborne instruments or radiological monitoring stations around the world. The U.S. government reported that it picked up such signals after the 2006 test with offshore airborne monitors. It announced that these signals gave definitive proof that North Korea had detonated a nuclear device, but did not specify whether it was plutonium or HEU. There are different telltale signatures for HEU and plutonium devices, but they must be detected and analyzed very rapidly to allow conclusive identification. There were no reports that anyone detected radiological signals after the 2009 test. This could likely be a result of better containment or just bad luck of not having the detectors in the right place at the right time.

If a next test is well contained, then we may learn nothing about the device detonated. However, one of the risks Pyongyang takes in trying to demonstrate a test at a higher level is that they may produce fissures that allow radioactive seepage or possibly cause a major blowout from the tunnel. The U.S. testing program experienced such problems even after having conducted hundreds of tests. Unrecognized complex geological conditions apparently led to a blowout during the 1970 underground Baneberry nuclear test at the Nevada Test Site. The blowout released a radioactive cloud nearly 10,000 feet high. Were something similar to happen in North Korea's next test, we would be more likely to learn technical details about the type of device detonated due to radiological contamination. However, spewing a radioactive cloud over the skies of Northeast Asia would create an enormous political storm from the nearby countries.

When will they test? Overhead imagery of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site demonstrates conclusively that North Korea is prepared to test. A third test tunnel, identified by the south portal, has been ready for nearly a year. It has been kept prepared through summer floods and winter snow. There has been a flurry of recent activity there and at the west portal, site of the 2009 test, and a nearby support area. Security appears particularly strict around the west portal, potentially indicating that the test device is or will be housed there until emplacement into the south tunnel. Everything we can see indicates North Korea is technically ready to test with little notice. When to test is now largely a political decision.

What difference will a test make? A successful test will make Pyongyang's nuclear weapons appear more threatening and make its deterrent more credible because it may then possess a missile-deliverable nuclear weapon. It may also set North Korea on a path of substantially expanding its nuclear arsenal through stepped-up HEU production. It may make Pyongyang more aggressive and provocative in dealing with South Korea and Japan. However, one more test does not fundamentally change the security threat North Korea poses. Pyongyang can threaten South Korea, Japan, or U.S. regional assets, but it can only use its nuclear weapons if it is prepared to accept the destruction of the regime.

A successful test will, however, destabilize the region -- precisely the scenario China has tried to avoid by supporting Pyongyang over the years, and the reason it is in China's interest to use all its influence to stop the test. The combined military forces of South Korea, Japan, and the United States will be forced into higher alert status. A test will likely drive them to increase their ballistic missile defense protection against North Korea, which will clearly complicate relations with China.

One of the most damaging results of another test will come from potential cooperation with Iran. Sharing Pyongyang's nuclear test experience with Tehran similarly to how it has shared missile technologies will greatly increase the Iranian nuclear threat. Iran now has the capacity to enrich uranium to weapons grade, although it has claimed to have enriched it only to lower levels for peaceful purposes. It would be very difficult for Iran to continue its peaceful nuclear facade if it tested to further its nuclear weapons capabilities. However, if Pyongyang were to involve Iran or share its testing experience, that would change the picture dramatically. Should Iran make the decision to build nuclear weapons, it is more likely to do so without necessarily testing its own device.

But perhaps the greatest impact of another North Korean nuclear test is that it will signal that the new regime, like its predecessors, has chosen bombs over electricity. Another nuclear test will make it impossible for the new South Korean government or the second Obama administration to look for resolution of long-standing enmities by focusing on issues beyond the nuclear dispute. Normalization of relations, a peace treaty, access to energy and economic opportunities -- those things that come from choosing electricity over bombs in the nuclear arena and have the potential of lifting the North Korean people out of poverty and hardship -- will be made much more difficult, if not impossible, for the next five years, if not longer.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/04/what_to_expect_from_a_north_korean_nuclear_test?page=0,1