감시에 너무 의존한 실패

[백선호]

미국이 중재하는 이스라엘과 사우디 아라비아의 관계 정상화를 막기 위해 이란이 부추겨 감행한 것으로 보이는 하마스의 공격에 이스라엘이 전혀 대비되지 않았던 것은 감시에 너무 의존하고, 수많은 공격 징후들에 모두 대응할 수 없는 한계 때문이라는 의견이 있네요.

정보 수집이 문제가 아니라 (정보는 수많은 감시 수단들로부터 감당하지 못할 정도로 수집되어 쏟아져 나옴) 정보를 분석해서 판단하는 것이 문제라고 합니다.

... there are always Hamas operatives talking about credible plans to attack the IDF. So Israel can't respond with force to every threat, even every credible one. They'd be at a heightened state of alert or actively engaged all the time, and that's probably actually worse for security.”

방벽을 따라 설치된 카메라와 레이다가 24/7로 감시해도 영상을 보고 바로 조치를 취하지 않거나 조치를 취할 병력이 없으면 카메라와 레이다가 있으나마나가 되지요.

https://www.wired.com/story/israel-hamas-war-surveillance/

Israel’s Failure to Stop the Hamas Attack Shows the Danger of Too Much Surveillance

Israel’s Failure to Stop the Hamas Attack Shows the Danger of Too Much Surveillance
Hundreds dead, thousands wounded - Hamas’ surprise attack on Israel shows the limits of even the most advanced and invasive surveillance dragnets as full-scale war erupts.

THE GAZA STRIP is one of the most densely populated areas on the planet. It’s also one of the most heavily locked down, surveilled, and suppressed. Israel has evolved an entire intelligence apparatus and aggressive digital espionage industry around advancing its geopolitical interests, particularly its interminable conflict in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Yet on Saturday, Hamas militants caught Israel unaware with a series of devastating land, air, and sea attacks, killing hundreds of people and leaving thousands wounded. Israel has now declared war.

Hamas’ surprise attack on Saturday is shocking given not only its scale compared to previous attacks, but also the fact that it was planned and carried out without Israel’s knowledge. Hamas’ deadly barrage underscores the limitations of even the most intrusive surveillance dragnets. In fact, experts say the sheer quantity of intelligence that Israel collects on Hamas, as well as the group’s constant activity and organizing, may have played a role in obscuring plans for this particular attack amid the endless barrage of potentially credible threats.

“There's no doubt that the scale and scope of this Hamas attack indicate just a colossal intelligence failure on behalf of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] and in Shin Bet, the internal security agency,” says Raphael Marcus, a visiting research fellow at King’s College London’s Department of War Studies who focuses on the region. “They have such technical prowess and also a legacy of excellent human source capability.”

Israel is known for heavily monitoring Gaza and anyone who could be connected to Hamas using both traditional intelligence-gathering techniques and digital surveillance like facial recognition and spyware. Israel has proved its hacking skills and technical sophistication on the global stage for years, participating in the development of innovative malware for both digital espionage and cyber-physical attacks. The fact that Hamas was able to plan such an unprecedented and complex attack speaks to the limitations and inevitable blind spots of even the most comprehensive surveillance regime.

Jake Williams, a former US National Security Agency hacker and current faculty member at the Institute for Applied Network Security, emphasizes that when you have a firehose of intelligence streaming in from an array of sources, and when the climate is as fraught as that between Israel and Palestine, the challenge is organizing and parsing the information, not gathering it.

“Intelligence in an environment like Israel isn't finding a needle in a haystack - it's finding the needle that will hurt you in a pile of needles,” Williams says. “Given the number of Hamas members involved in the invasion, it's not plausible to me that Israel missed every human intelligence reflection of the planning. But I feel confident that there are always Hamas operatives talking about credible plans to attack the IDF. So Israel can't respond with force to every threat, even every credible one. They'd be at a heightened state of alert or actively engaged all the time, and that's probably actually worse for security.”

Though details of exactly how the attack happened are still emerging, it seems that oversights related to grappling with this signal-and-noise conundrum played a role.

“In retrospect, there was some information, but, like happens in all intelligence failures, it wasn't given sufficient consideration. It was misunderstood,” says Chuck Freilich, a former Israeli deputy national security adviser. “I think in the last days, from my understanding, there were some warning signs. And actually, the intelligence establishment had been warning for the past about half-year that there was going to be a significant conflict with Hamas, that they were bent on escalating the situation. But then they misread the signs.”

Colin Clarke, the director of research at the Soufan Group, an intelligence and security consultancy, says the Hamas attack would have “required months of preparation” and intelligence failures likely happened with both human intelligence and signals intelligence, where electronic and communications data is collected. “I’m still astonished that a breakdown in intelligence occurred at this level,” Clarke says. “I don’t think anybody, including the Israelis, were prepared for an operation this complex and multi-pronged.”

Crucial intelligence oversights could have happened as the result of numerous intersecting failures, says King’s College London’s Marcus. The Israeli intelligence apparatus may have misunderstood Hamas’s intentions, misread the context of crucial leads, been distracted by Israel’s political efforts with Saudi Arabia, or been grappling with domestic challenges. Israeli forces have complained, for example, of a brain drain from the IDF as individuals get pulled toward the private sector.

“I think that this wasn't just a military failure - I think that this was a dramatic failure of national leadership,” says Freilich, who authored Israel and the Cyber Threat: How the Startup Nation Became a Global Cyber Power. The ambush calls to mind the outbreak of fighting during Ramadan in October 1973 in which an Arab bloc targeted Israel with a surprise attack on the Jewish holy day Yom Kippur to set off nearly 20 days of fighting.

Palestinians in occupied territories, including the West Bank and Gaza Strip, have faced surveillance and controls for years, with many calling the conditions an apartheid. In September 2021, Israeli forces announced the completion of a 40-mile-long barrier around the Gaza Strip - the sliver of land between Israel, Egypt, and the Mediterranean Sea - that is essentially a “smart wall” equipped with radar, cameras, underground sensors, and an array of other surveillance instruments.

“Palestinians are subjected to multi-layered surveillance,” says Mona Shtaya, a non-resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy. “Various surveillance technologies are employed against Palestinians, including drones, mobile bugs (spyware) that have previously been uncovered as being injected into electronic devices prior to entry into the Gaza Strip.”

Shtaya adds that CCTV cameras are placed at entrances to the Gaza Strip, and that there is “continuous” online surveillance of people in the occupied areas. “It would not be an exaggeration to say that Palestinians are under surveillance in nearly every facet of their lives,” she says.

Such persistent surveillance can make people change their behaviors and limits freedom of expression‎ and speech. “We can observe this phenomenon when people communicate with their families over phone calls or when they post content online, as they may alter certain keywords,” Shtaya says.

As Hamas attacked Israel on Saturday, videos emerged of a brute force approach: a bulldozer breaking through portions of the fence as hundreds of militants stormed into Israel using motorbikes, boats, and apparently paragliders. Haaretz reported on Sunday that Hamas was able to gain so much ground because of IDF logistics issues in addition to intelligence failings.

While Israel’s technology industry has helped create many surveillance capabilities and pushed the global industry forward, Hamas, which is sanctioned as a terrorist organization in the US, also uses some digital tools in its operations. The group has leaned heavily on distributing its propaganda through radio and TV to legitimize its rule in Gaza, while it utilizes social media to a lesser extent, according to a review by the Center for Strategic and International Studies earlier this year. Still, Hamas has used fake Facebook accounts to lure Israeli soldiers into downloading data-stealing apps, and has distributed fake dating apps that are really spyware. In 2019, Israeli forces bombed a building they claimed housed a Hamas hacking group.

Multiple sources tell WIRED that they suspect Iran was involved in helping Hamas carry out its assault on Saturday, given the sophistication and intricacy of the attack. Iran has long-standing ties to Hamas, and its officials have praised the recent attacks.

As the conflict ramps up into full-scale war, there is significant concern about the number of civilians impacted, with Amnesty International saying it is “deeply alarmed” by the civilian deaths in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank. The Hamas assault has killed at least 700 and injured more than 2,000 Israelis on Saturday, according to the latest available figures. Video footage and reports shared online depict Hamas gunmen killing civilians, leaving bloody bodies scattered through the streets, and taking dozens of hostages. In response, Israel is launching large-scale airstrikes against Hamas targets in Gaza, while working to retake militant-controlled areas and preparing for offensive actions, including a possible ground invasion of Gaza. At least 370 Palestinians in Gaza have been killed and more than 2,000 wounded so far.

Israel Defense Forces say women and children have been taken hostage. Israel has also cut power to Gaza and internet monitoring firms say there has been a decrease in connectivity. As the fog of surveillance gives way to the fog of war, the current situation in Israel serves as an important illustration that unrelenting surveillance does not equate to or guarantee security.

Additional reporting by Morgan Meaker

-----

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/07/world/middleeast/israel-defense-hamas-gaza.html

Israel’s defense failures may change strategy toward Hamas and Gaza.

Israel’s defense failures may change strategy toward Hamas and Gaza.
The broad attack by Palestinian militants, which Hamas viewed as mostly successful, revealed some significant failures.
By Ronen Bergman
Reporting from Tel Aviv
Published Oct. 7, 2023
Updated Oct. 8, 2023, 5:44 a.m. ET

Hamas’s attack on Saturday took Israeli intelligence officials by surprise, particularly the methods the militants used to enter and leave Israel, according to a senior defense official familiar with the information collected about the group.

The broad attack, mostly successful from Hamas’s point of view, revealed some significant failures by the Israeli defense establishment. It also may change Israel’s overall strategic approach to Hamas and the Gaza Strip, said the official, who asked not to be identified when discussing security matters.

And that could have a far-reaching effect on the entire Middle East.

Until now, Israel has contained Hamas and Gaza with a strategy that hinged on an intelligence network that would warn against Hamas’s moves, and on the power of the Israeli Army to repel a ground invasion by Hamas. In the Hamas attack on Saturday, these two safeguards failed.

Israel is traditionally perceived as the strongest intelligence power in the region, with extensive coverage of the Gaza Strip. And in recent months, Israeli intelligence did repeatedly warn that a military conflict could flare up because Iran and affiliated militias have perceived Israel as weakened by the nation’s profound divisions over the judicial overhaul being pursued by the ultraright governing coalition of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, according to four senior defense officials.

Still, while Israeli intelligence collected some indications that Hamas was planning a major operation, they were far from forming a clear picture, one of the officials added.

Israel, the official said, did not pick up on the elaborate preparations that were most likely needed for the 250 Hamas militants tasked to lead the assault, and target military bases, cities and kibbutzim.

American officials, too, said that both Israel and the United States had known a Hamas attack at some point was possible, or even likely. But they said there was no specific tactical warning of the strikes on Saturday, no sign that would have allowed Israel to take specific measures.

Many questioned why Israel and the United States were blindsided. Mick Mulroy, a former C.I.A. officer and senior Pentagon official, said the complexity of the attack by Hamas indicated that it would have required much preparation.

“There were likely indications of the buildup of munitions and the preparation of the assault force, and there was cyber activity in Israel prior to the assault,” Mr. Mulroy said.

Since the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005, Hamas has transformed from a militant organization to the leader of a territory with many characteristics of a state. The group has started rounds of fighting with Israel every few years, which usually have not lasted more than a week. These attacks include firing rockets on Israeli cities and trying to kidnap or kill Israelis. But nothing has been as extensive as the Saturday attack.

For its part, Israel in past years has responded with its enormous firepower, usually from aircraft, against targets in Gaza and has tried to assassinate the organization’s senior officials. But it has launched very limited ground maneuvers.

The Israeli strategy has been to contain the fighting against militants in the Gaza Strip, as long as Israel’s fatalities were not too high, which might oblige it to engage in an all-out ground invasion.

Four successive Israeli prime ministers decided that the price of invading and occupying the Gaza Strip to crush Hamas rule would be too high, in the lives of Israeli soldiers and Palestinians, and that the toll of governing millions of residents there would be too costly.

Israel continued to act this way even though it knew that both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have received funding, training, weapons and advanced combat and intelligence gear from Iran, three officials said, and that the militant groups were becoming stronger.

The surprise attack on Israel came almost 50 years to the day to the start of the Yom Kippur War, which began with a surprise attack by Syrian tank columns and Egyptian brigades. That made it even more surprising that Israel was not more on guard.

The defense official said this was most likely not a coincidence but a careful choice by Hamas to pick a date perceived as a national trauma. The intelligence surprise, as well as Hamas’s ability to cross the border and cause heavy losses, is strikingly reminiscent of the 1973 war.

Israel has invested enormous resources in getting intelligence about Hamas, gathering significant information about most of its initiatives and targeting many of its leaders.

But Saturday was not the first time that Hamas has managed to surprise Israeli intelligence. In June 2006 when a Hamas squad entered Israel, attacked a group of soldiers, killed two and kidnapped the soldier Gilad Shalit, Israeli intelligence did not know about the attack, or where Shalit was being held for more than five years. Israel eventually paid the highest price it had ever paid to secure a P.O.W.

That deal brought intense controversy within Israel, which could flare again with reports that dozens of Israeli soldiers and civilians had been captured.

The Israeli Defense Forces, even though they were aware of the possibility of a ground invasion by Hamas to seize military bases and civilians along the border, were slow to reach the scenes of violence. Many residents were forced to defend themselves.

The videos Hamas took during the operation and which were immediately distributed on social media presented the Israeli defense establishment as weak, surprised and humiliated.

Israel is now likely to respond with force, and possibly with a ground invasion of Gaza, in the belief that Hamas did not leave it any choice, a senior defense official said.

One key question, which will determine how the crisis unfolds, is whether Hezbollah, the Lebanese militant group, stays on the sidelines or if it activates its fighters to attack Israel. If Hezbollah becomes directly involved the fighting it is likely to become some of the most intense in the region in years.

Julian E. Barnes contributed reporting from Washington.

Ronen Bergman is a staff writer for The New York Times Magazine, based in Tel Aviv. His latest book is “Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations,” published by Random House. More about Ronen Bergman

----------

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-security-forces-face-questions-after-hamas-attack-lays-bare-intelligence-2023-10-08/

Israel's security forces face questions after Hamas attack

Middle East
Israel's security forces face questions after Hamas attack
By Emily Rose
October 8, 20236:32 PM GMT+9Updated 15 hours ago

JERUSALEM, Oct 8 (Reuters) - As Israel reeled from a deadly attack by Hamas militants who broke through barriers around Gaza and roamed at will, killing scores of civilians in Israeli towns, defence chiefs faced growing questions over how the disaster could have happened.

A day after the 50th anniversary of the start of the 1973 Yom Kippur war, when Israeli forces were caught off guard by Syrian and Egyptian tank columns, the military appeared once again to have been surprised by a sudden attack.

"It looks quite similar to what happened at that time," said retired General Giora Eiland, a former head of Israel's National Security Council. "As we can see it, Israel was completely surprised, by a very well coordinated attack," he told a briefing with reporters.

An army spokesman said there would be discussions on the intelligence preparation "down the road" but for the moment the focus was on fighting. "We'll talk about that when we need to talk about it," he told a briefing with reporters.

Israel has always regarded Hamas as its sworn enemy, but since inflicting heavy damage on Gaza in a 10-day war in 2021, Israel had adopted a mix of carrot and stick to maintain stability in the blockaded enclave.

It offered economic incentives including thousands of work permits allowing Gazans to work in Israel or the occupied West Bank, while maintaining a tight blockade and the constant threat of air strikes.

For the past 18 months as violence has raged across the West Bank, Gaza had been relatively quiet, apart from sporadic cross border clashes mainly involving the smaller Islamic Jihad movement with Hamas remaining largely on the sidelines.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's right-wing government has always made great play of its security credentials and taken an uncompromising stance towards the Palestinian militant factions including Hamas, which has controlled Gaza since 2007.

"INTELLIGENCE FAILURE"

However when the time came, Israel's security apparatus appeared to break down as a force of Hamas gunmen estimated in the hundreds by the military broke through security fences and scattered into towns.

"This was an intelligence failure; it could not be otherwise," said Jonathan Panikoff, the U.S. government's former deputy national intelligence officer on the Middle East, who is now at the Atlantic Council think tank.

"It was a security failure, undermining what was thought to be an aggressive and successful layered approach toward Gaza by Israel," he said.

For Israelis, images of dead bodies lying in the streets or groups of civilians being driven or marched into captivity in Gaza came as a profound shock.

More than 250 Israelis were killed and over 1,500 wounded, an unprecedented number of Israeli victims in a single day. The military suffered significant losses and Palestinian militant groups said they had captured dozens of soldiers.

The gunmen also seized security posts including a police station in the southern town of Sderot and overran the Erez crossing, a high security facility that channels people entering and leaving Gaza through a tight series of controls.

On Saturday, Hamas media circulated footage showing fighters ranging through abandoned offices and running past the high concrete walls of the site.

"They've been planning this for a long time," said former Israeli National Security Advisor Eyal Hulata. "Obviously this is a very coordinated attack, and unfortunately they were able to surprise us tactically and cause devastating damage."

Additional reporting by Matt Spetalnick in Washington; Writing by James Mackenzie; Editing by Chris Reese

[Minowski(김유철)]

국경 감시체계와 아이언돔 방공체계, 트로피 방호체계의 성과를 너무 믿고 있었던 듯 합니다. 병력자원 부족과 방사포 위협, 그리고 저가 드론의 위협...... 정말로 남의 이야기가 아닙니다. 정말로......

[백선호]

넵 양쪽이 다 병력이 부족할 때도 공격을 결심한 쪽이 몰래 병력을 집중해서 치면 뚫릴 수 밖에 없을 것 같습니다.