[아카데미 수상 다큐] 월가와 Fed의 실체-투자자들이 알아야 할...

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[아카데미 수상 다큐 -인사이드 잡] 투자자들이 알아야 할 월가와 Fed의 실체

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XZldDU20aiQ 

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[Music]

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the regulators didn't do their job

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they they had the power to do every case

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that i made when our state attorney

0:12

general they just didn't want it

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september 2008 the bankruptcy of the u.s

0:18

investment bank lehman brothers and the

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collapse of the world's largest

0:21

insurance company

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aig triggered a global financial crisis

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this crisis was not an accident it was

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caused by an out-of-control

0:30

industry since the 1980s the rise of the

0:34

u.s financial sector

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has led to a series of increasingly

0:37

severe financial crises

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each crisis has caused more damage

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while the industry has made more and

0:45

more money

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after the great depression the united

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states had 40 years of economic growth

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without a single financial crisis

0:57

financial industry was tightly regulated

1:00

most regular banks were local businesses

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and they were prohibited from

1:04

speculating with depositors savings

1:07

in 1981 president ronald reagan chose as

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treasury secretary

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the ceo of the investment bank merrill

1:14

lynch donald regan

1:15

the reagan administration supported by

1:18

economists and financial lobbyists

1:20

started a 30-year period of financial

1:22

deregulation

1:25

in 1982 the reagan administration

1:28

deregulated savings and loan companies

1:30

allowing them to make risky investments

1:32

with their depositors money

1:34

by the end of the decade hundreds of

1:36

savings and loan companies had failed

1:39

this crisis cost taxpayers 124 billion

1:43

dollars

1:44

and cost many people their life savings

1:46

it may be the biggest bank heist

1:48

in our history thousands of savings and

1:51

loan executives went to jail for looting

1:53

their companies

1:54

one of the most extreme cases was

1:56

charles keating

1:59

in 1985 when federal regulators began

2:02

investigating him

2:03

keating hired an economist named alan

2:05

greenspan

2:07

in this letter to regulators greenspan

2:09

praised keating's sound business plans

2:11

and expertise

2:12

and said he saw no risk in allowing

2:14

keating to invest his customers money

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[Music]

2:18

keating reportedly paid greenspan forty

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thousand dollars

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[Music]

2:24

charles keating went to prison shortly

2:26

afterwards

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as for alan greenspan president reagan

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appointed him chairman of america's

2:32

central bank

2:33

the federal reserve greenspan was

2:35

reappointed

2:36

by presidents clinton and george w bush

2:41

during the clinton administration

2:43

deregulation continued under greenspan

2:45

and treasury secretaries robert rubin

2:48

the former ceo of the investment

2:50

bank goldman sachs and larry summers

2:53

a harvard economics professor the

2:56

financial sector wall street being

2:58

powerful

2:58

having lobbies having lots of money step

3:01

by step

3:02

capture the political system you know

3:04

both on the democratic and republican

3:06

side

3:08

by the late 1990s the financial sector

3:11

had consolidated into a few gigantic

3:13

firms

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each of them so large that their failure

3:16

could threaten the whole system

3:19

and the clinton administration helped

3:20

them grow even larger

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it's the end the cold war a lot of

3:25

phys former physicists mathematicians

3:28

decided to

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apply their skills not on you know cold

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war technology

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but on financial markets and uh together

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with investment bankers and

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creating different weapons absolutely

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you know as warren buffett said you know

3:41

weapons of mass destruction regulation

3:43

of derivatives transactions that are

3:46

privately negotiated

3:47

by professionals is unnecessary that it

3:51

will be possible to

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move this year on legislation that in a

3:56

suitable way

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goes to create legal certainty for

4:01

otc derivatives

4:10

i wish to associate myself with

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all of the remarks of secretary summers

4:16

in december of 2000

4:18

congress passed the commodity futures

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modernization act

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written with the help of financial

4:23

industry lobbyists it banned the

4:26

regulation of derivatives

4:28

by the time george w bush took office in

4:30

2001

4:31

the u.s financial sector was vastly more

4:34

profitable

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concentrated and powerful than ever

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before

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in the old system when a homeowner paid

4:41

their mortgage every month

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the money went to their local lender and

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since mortgages took decades to repay

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lenders were careful in the new system

4:52

lenders sold the mortgages to investment

4:54

banks

4:56

the investment banks combined thousands

4:58

of mortgages and other loans

4:59

including car loans student loans and

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credit card debt

5:03

to create complex derivatives called

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collateralized debt obligations

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or cdos the investment banks

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then sold the cdos to investors

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now when homeowners paid their mortgages

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the money went to investors all over the

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world

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the investment banks paid rating

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agencies to eval‎uate the cdos

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and many of them were given a triple a

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rating which is the highest possible

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investment grade

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this made cdos popular with retirement

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funds

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which could only purchase highly rated

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securities

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this system was a ticking time bomb

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lenders didn't care anymore about

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whether a borrower could repay

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so they started making riskier loans the

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investment banks didn't care either

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the more cdos they sold the higher their

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profits

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and the rating agencies which were paid

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by the investment banks

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had no liability if their ratings of

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cdos proved wrong

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in the early 2000s there was a huge

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increase in the riskiest loans called

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subprime but when thousands of subprime

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loans were combined to create cdos

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many of them still received triple a

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ratings

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suddenly hundreds of billions of dollars

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a year were flowing through the

6:25

securitization chain

6:27

since anyone could get a mortgage home

6:30

purchases and housing prices

6:31

skyrocketed the result was the biggest

6:34

financial bubble

6:36

in history real estate is real they can

6:39

see their asset

6:40

they can live in their asset they can

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rent out their asset

6:43

through the home ownership and equity

6:45

protection act the federal reserve board

6:48

had broad authority to regulate the

6:50

mortgage industry

6:51

but fed chairman alan greenspan refused

6:54

to use it

6:55

the ratio between borrowed money and the

6:57

bank's own money

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was called leverage the more the banks

7:02

borrowed

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the higher their leverage

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in 2004 henry paulsen the ceo of goldman

7:10

sachs

7:11

helped lobby the securities and exchange

7:13

commission to relax limits on leverage

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allowing the banks to sharply increase

7:18

their borrowing

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in 2005 ragurum rajan then the chief

7:23

economist of the international monetary

7:25

fund

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delivered a paper at the annual jackson

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hole symposium

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the most elite banking conference in the

7:31

world who is in the audience

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it was uh i guess the central bankers of

7:36

the world

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um ranging from mr greenspan himself

7:42

ben bernanke larry summers was there

7:45

tim geithner was there the title of the

7:47

paper was essentially

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is financial development making the

7:51

world riskier

7:53

and the conclusion was um it is

7:58

rajan's paper focused on incentive

8:00

structures that generated huge cash

8:02

bonuses

8:03

based on short-term profits but which

8:06

imposed no penalties for later losses

8:09

rajan argued that these incentives

8:11

encouraged bankers to take risks that

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might eventually destroy their own firms

8:16

or even the entire financial system

8:22

it's very easy to generate performance

8:24

by taking on more risk

8:26

and so what you need to do is compensate

8:28

for risk-adjusted performance

8:30

summers was was vocal

8:33

he basically thought that i was

8:36

criticizing the

8:38

change in the financial world and was

8:41

worried

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about uh you know regulation which would

8:45

reverse this whole

8:46

change so essentially he accused me of

8:48

being a luddite

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he wanted to make sure that we didn't

8:54

bring in a whole new set of regulations

8:56

to constrain the financial sector at

8:57

that point

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[Music]

9:03

goldman sachs sold at least 3.1 billion

9:05

dollars worth of these toxic cdos in the

9:08

first half of 2006.

9:10

the ceo of goldman sachs at this time

9:13

was henry paulsen

9:14

the highest paid ceo on wall street

9:20

good morning welcome to the white house

9:21

i'm pleased to announce that i will

9:22

nominate henry paulsen

9:24

to be the secretary of the treasury he's

9:26

a lifetime of business experience he has

9:28

an intimate knowledge of financial

9:30

markets

9:30

he's earned a reputation for candor and

9:34

integrity

9:40

the article came out in october of 2007.

9:44

already a third of the mortgages

9:46

defaulted

9:48

now uh most of them are gone

9:52

one group that had purchased these now

9:54

worthless securities

9:56

was the public employees retirement

9:58

system of mississippi

9:59

which provides monthly benefits to over

10:01

80 000 retirees

10:04

they lost millions of dollars and are

10:06

now suing goldman sachs

10:23

by late 2006 goldman had taken things a

10:26

step further

10:27

it didn't just sell toxic cdos it

10:30

started actively betting against them at

10:32

the same time it was telling customers

10:34

that they were high quality investments

10:38

by purchasing credit default swaps from

10:40

aig

10:41

goldman could bet against cdos it didn't

10:44

own

10:44

and get paid when the cdos failed

10:49

goldman sachs bought at least 22 billion

10:51

dollars of credit default swaps from aig

10:55

it was so much that goldman realized

10:57

that aig itself

10:58

might go bankrupt so they spent 150

11:01

million dollars

11:02

insuring themselves against aig's

11:04

potential collapse

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then in 2007 goldman went even further

11:10

they started selling cdos specifically

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designed so that the more money their

11:14

customers lost

11:15

the more money goldman sachs made

11:24

600 million dollars of timberwolf

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securities is what you sold

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before you sold them this is what your

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sales team were telling to each other

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boy

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that timberwolf was one shitty deal

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this was an email to me in late june

11:43

right and you stole the timberwolves no

11:46

no you sold timberwolf

11:47

after as well we did trades after that

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yeah

11:51

okay the next email take a look july 107

11:55

tells the sales force the top priority

11:57

is timberwolf

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your top priority to sell is that shitty

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deal

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if you have an adverse interest to your

12:03

client you have the duty to disclose

12:05

that to your client

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to tell that client of your adverse

12:08

interest that's my question sure mr

12:10

chairman i'm just

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trying to understand no i think you

12:12

understand that i don't think you want

12:13

to answer what do you think about

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selling securities what your own people

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think are

12:19

crap does that bother you

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i think they would again as a

12:25

hypothetical

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no this is real well then i don't we

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heard it today well

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we heard it today this is a shitty deal

12:32

this is crap i i heard nothing today

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that makes me think anything went wrong

12:39

is there not a conflict when you sell

12:42

something

12:42

to somebody and then are determined

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to bet against that same security

12:49

and you don't disclose that to the

12:51

person you're selling

12:53

you see a problem in the context of

12:55

market making that is not a conflict

12:57

when you heard that your employees and

12:59

these emails said god what a shitty deal

13:02

god what a piece of crap do you feel

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anything

13:05

i i think that's very unfortunate to

13:08

have on email are you

13:11

and very unfortunate i don't i don't

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email to please don't take that how

13:15

about

13:15

feeling that way i think it's very

13:16

unfortunate for anyone to have said that

13:18

in any form the lawsuit alleges that

13:20

morgan stanley knew that the cdos were

13:23

junk

13:23

although they were rated aaa morgan

13:26

stanley was betting they would fail

13:28

a year later morgan stanley had made

13:31

hundreds of millions of dollars

13:33

while the investors had lost almost all

13:35

of their money

13:36

you would have thought that pension

13:38

funds would have said those are

13:40

subprime why am i buying them

13:43

and they had these guys at moody's and

13:45

standard emporers who said that's a

13:47

triple-a

13:48

none of these securities got issued

13:50

without the imprimatur

13:52

you know the good housekeeping seal of

13:53

approval of the rating agencies the

13:55

three rating agencies

13:56

moody's s p and fitch

13:59

made billions of dollars giving high

14:01

ratings to risky securities

14:04

moody's the largest rating agency

14:06

quadrupled its profits

14:08

between 2000 and 2007.

14:11

moody's and s p get compensated based on

14:14

putting out ratings reports and the more

14:16

structured securities they gave a

14:18

triple-a rating to the higher their

14:20

earnings were going to be for the

14:20

quarter

14:22

[Music]

14:24

what is the worst case scenario if in

14:26

fact we were to see

14:28

prices come down substantially across

14:30

the country

14:31

well i guess i don't buy your premise

14:33

it's a pretty unlikely possibility we've

14:35

never had a decline in house prices

14:36

on a nationwide nationwide basis ben

14:39

bernanke became chairman of the federal

14:41

reserve board in february 2006.

14:44

the top year for subprime lending

14:47

but despite numerous warnings bernanke

14:50

and the federal reserve board

14:51

did nothing as early as 2004

14:54

the fbi was already warning about an

14:57

epidemic of mortgage fraud

14:59

they reported inflated appraisals

15:01

doctored loan documentation

15:03

and other fraudulent activities they

15:05

keep growing okay

15:07

and obviously i'll say it if you

15:10

keep if you're growing you're not in

15:11

recession right i mean we

15:13

we all know that

15:19

nothing about our actions today in any

15:21

way reflects a changed view

15:23

of the housing correction or the

15:25

strength of other u.s

15:27

financial institutions two days later

15:30

lehman brothers announced record losses

15:31

of 3.2 billion dollars

15:33

and its stock collapsed

15:40

paulson and bernanke had not consulted

15:42

with other governments

15:43

and didn't understand the consequences

15:45

of foreign bankruptcy laws

15:47

neiman brothers london continued to

15:49

empty that under british law

15:51

lehman's london office had to be closed

15:53

immediately

15:54

all transactions came to a halt and

15:56

there are thousands of thousands and

15:58

thousands of transactions

15:59

the hedge funds who had had assets with

16:01

lehman in london

16:02

discovered overnight to their complete

16:04

horror that they couldn't get those

16:06

assets back

16:08

lehmann's failure also caused a collapse

16:10

in the commercial paper market

16:11

which many companies depend on to pay

16:13

for operating expenses

16:15

such as payroll that same week aig

16:18

owed 13 billion dollars to holders of

16:20

credit default swaps

16:22

and it didn't have the money aig was

16:25

another hub

16:26

if aig had stopped you know all planes

16:29

may have to be

16:30

you know stopped flying on september

16:31

17th aig is taken over by the government

16:34

and one day later paulson and bernanke

16:37

asked congress for 700 billion dollars

16:40

to bail out the banks coming together

16:42

they warned that the alternative

16:44

would be a catastrophic financial

16:45

collapse the hand that was dealt me

16:48

a lot of what i'm dealing with you know

16:51

i'm dealing with the consequences of

16:52

things that were done

16:54

often many years ago secretary paulson

16:56

spoke throughout the fall

16:57

and all the potential root causes of

16:59

this and there are plenty

17:01

he called him uh so i i'm not sure

17:03

you're not being serious about that i am

17:05

being serious

17:06

what would you have expected uh what

17:08

what were you looking for that you

17:09

didn't see

17:10

he was the senior advocate

17:13

for prohibiting the regulation of credit

17:16

default swaps

17:18

and also lifting the leverage limits on

17:20

the investment banks

17:22

so again he mentioned those things i

17:24

never heard him mention those things

17:26

could we turn this off for a second when

17:29

aig was bailed out

17:31

the owners of its credit default swaps

17:33

the most prominent of which was goldman

17:35

sachs

17:36

were paid 61 billion dollars the next

17:38

day

17:40

paulson bernanke and tim geithner forced

17:42

aig

17:43

to pay 100 cents on the dollar rather

17:46

than negotiate lower prices

17:48

eventually the aig bailout cost

17:51

taxpayers over 150 billion dollars

17:54

160 billion dollars went through aig

17:58

14 billion went to goldman sachs at the

18:01

same time

18:02

paulson and geithner forced aig to

18:04

surrender its right to sue goldman and

18:06

the other banks

18:07

for fraud isn't there a problem when the

18:11

person

18:11

in charge of dealing with this crisis is

18:14

the former ceo of goldman sachs someone

18:16

who had a major role in causing it

18:20

well i think it's fair to say that the

18:21

financial markets today

18:23

are incredibly complicated

18:27

the men who destroyed their own

18:28

companies and plunged the world into

18:30

crisis

18:31

walked away from the wreckage with their

18:32

fortunes intact

18:34

the top five executives at lehman

18:36

brothers made over a billion dollars

18:38

between 2000

18:39

and 2007 and when the firm went bankrupt

18:43

they got to keep all the money stan

18:45

o'neil

18:46

the ceo of merrill lynch received 90

18:49

million dollars in 2006 and 2007 alone

18:52

after driving his firm into the ground

18:55

merrill lynch's board of directors

18:56

allowed him to resign

18:57

and he collected 161 million dollars in

19:00

severance

19:01

in the u.s the banks are now bigger more

19:04

powerful

19:05

and more concentrated than ever before

19:09

after the crisis the financial industry

19:11

harder than ever to fight reform

19:14

the financial sector employs three

19:16

thousand lobbyists

19:17

more than five for each member of

19:19

congress

19:21

the financial industry also exerts its

19:23

influence in a more subtle way

19:25

one that most americans don't know about

19:30

it has corrupted the study of economics

19:32

itself

19:33

since the 1980s academic economists have

19:36

been major advocates of deregulation

19:39

and played powerful roles in shaping u.s

19:41

government policy

19:43

very few of these economic experts

19:45

warned about the crisis

19:47

and even after the crisis many of them

19:49

opposed reform

19:51

martin feldstein is a professor at

19:53

harvard and one of the world's most

19:55

prominent economists

19:56

as president reagan's chief economic

19:58

advisor he was a major architect of

20:00

deregulation

20:02

and from 1988 until 2009

20:05

he was on the board of directors of both

20:07

aig

20:08

and aig financial products which paid

20:11

him millions of dollars

20:13

you have any regrets about having been

20:16

on aig's

20:17

no comments no i have no regrets about

20:19

being on aig's board taught at

20:21

northwestern chicago harvard and

20:23

columbia

20:24

glenn hubbard is the dean of columbia

20:26

business school

20:27

and was the chairman of the council of

20:29

economic advisors under george w

20:31

bush do you think the financial services

20:34

industry has too much

20:35

uh political power in the united states

20:39

i don't think so no i certainly you

20:41

certainly wouldn't

20:42

get that impression by the drubbing that

20:44

they regularly get

20:45

uh in washington were ralph chiafi and

20:48

matthew tannen

20:50

bear stearns hedge fund managers

20:52

prosecuted for securities fraud

20:54

after hiring the analysis group both

20:56

were acquitted

20:58

glenn hubbard was paid 100 000 to

21:00

testify in their defense

21:03

do you think that the economics

21:05

discipline has

21:07

a conflict of interest problem

21:10

i'm not sure i know what you mean do you

21:12

think that a significant fraction of the

21:14

economics discipline number of

21:16

economists

21:17

have financial conflicts of interest

21:19

that

21:20

in some way might call into question or

21:22

color oh i see what you're saying i

21:23

doubt it you know most academic

21:25

economists uh you know aren't wealthy

21:28

business people hubbard makes 250 000

21:32

a year as a board member of metlife and

21:34

was formerly on the board of capmark

21:36

a major commercial mortgage lender

21:38

during the bubble which went bankrupt in

21:40

2009.

21:42

he has also advised nomura securities

21:44

kkr financial corporation

21:46

and many other financial firms

21:49

larry summers who as treasury secretary

21:52

played a critical role in the

21:53

deregulation of derivatives

21:55

became president of harford in 2001.

21:58

while at harvard he made millions

22:00

consulting to hedge funds

22:02

and millions more in speaking fees much

22:04

of it from investment banks

22:07

does harvard require disclosures of

22:09

financial conflict of interest in

22:10

publications

22:12

um not to my knowledge do you

22:15

require people to report the

22:17

compensation they've received from

22:19

outside activities

22:20

no don't you think that's a problem i

22:22

don't see wrong

22:24

martin feldstein being on the board of

22:25

aig laura tyson going on the board of

22:27

morgan stanley uh larry summers making

22:30

10 million dollars a year consulting to

22:31

financial services firms

22:33

irrelevant hmm yep uh yeah

22:37

basically irrelevant you've written a

22:39

very large number of articles about

22:41

a very wide array of subjects you never

22:44

saw fit

22:44

to investigate the risks of unregulated

22:48

credit fault swaps

22:50

i never did same question with regard to

22:53

executive compensation

22:55

uh the regulation of corporate

22:57

governance the effect of

22:59

political contributions i don't know

23:01

that i would have anything to add

23:03

to those discussions i'm looking at your

23:06

resume now it looks to me as if the

23:09

majority

23:10

of your outside activities are

23:13

uh consulting and directorship

23:14

arrangements with the financial services

23:16

industry is that

23:17

would you not agree with that

23:18

characterization no to my knowledge i

23:20

don't think my consulting clients are

23:22

even on my cv

23:23

so uh who are your consulting clients i

23:26

don't believe i have to discuss that

23:27

with you

23:28

okay uh you have a few more minutes and

23:32

the

23:32

interview's over they include other

23:34

financial services firms

23:37

possibly you don't remember

23:40

this isn't a deposition sir i was polite

23:42

enough to give you time

23:43

foolishly i now see but you have three

23:45

more minutes

23:47

give it your best shot in 2004

23:50

at the height of the bubble glenn

23:52

hubbard co-authored a widely read paper

23:54

with william c

23:55

dudley the chief economist of goldman

23:57

sachs

23:59

in the paper hubbard praised credit

24:01

derivatives in the securitization chain

24:03

stating that they had improved

24:05

allocation of capital

24:06

and were enhancing financial stability

24:09

he cited reduced volatility in the

24:11

economy

24:12

and stated that recessions had become

24:14

less frequent and milder

24:16

credit derivatives were protecting banks

24:18

against losses and helping to distribute

24:21

risk

24:23

a medical researcher writes an article

24:26

saying

24:27

to treat this disease you should

24:29

prescribe this drug

24:32

turns out doctor makes 80 of personal

24:34

income

24:35

from manufacturer of this drug does not

24:37

bother you

24:38

i think it's certainly important to

24:40

disclose the

24:42

um the um

24:48

well i think that's also a little

24:50

different from cases that we're

24:52

talking about here because um

24:58

um

25:11

i first came to office i thought taxes

25:15

were too high

25:16

and they were the most dramatic change

25:18

was a series of tax cuts designed by

25:21

glenn hubbard

25:22

who at the time was serving as president

25:23

bush's chief economic advisor

25:27

the bush administration sharply reduced

25:29

taxes on investment gains

25:31

stock dividends and eliminated the

25:33

estate tax we had a comprehensive plan

25:36

that when acted has left nearly 1.1

25:38

trillion dollars in the hands of

25:40

american workers families investors and

25:42

small business owners

25:44

most of the benefits of these tax cuts

25:46

went to the wealthiest one percent of

25:48

americans

25:52

for the first time in history average

25:54

americans have less education

25:56

and are less prosperous than their

25:58

parents

26:02

the era of greed and irresponsibility on

26:05

wall street

26:07

and in washington has led us to a

26:10

financial crisis as serious as any that

26:12

we faced

26:13

since the great depression when the

26:15

financial crisis struck just before the

26:17

2008 election

26:18

barack obama pointed to wall street

26:20

greed and regulatory failures

26:22

as examples of the need for change in

26:24

america a lack of oversight in

26:26

washington

26:27

and on wall street is exactly what got

26:29

us into this mess

26:31

after taking office president obama

26:34

spoke of the need to reform the

26:35

financial industry we want a systemic

26:37

risk regulator

26:38

increased capital requirements we need a

26:40

consumer financial protection agency we

26:43

need to change wall street's culture

26:45

but when finally enacted in mid 2010

26:48

the administration's financial reforms

26:50

were weak and in some critical areas

26:53

including the rating agencies lobbying

26:55

and compensation

26:57

nothing significant was even proposed

27:00

there's very little reform how come

27:06

it's a wall street government

27:10

obama chose timothy geithner as treasury

27:12

secretary

27:14

geithner was the president of the new

27:16

york federal reserve during the crisis

27:18

and one of the key players in the

27:19

decision to pay goldman sachs 100 cents

27:22

on the dollar

27:22

for its bets against mortgages the new

27:25

president of the new york fed is william

27:27

c

27:27

dudley the former chief economist of

27:29

goldman sachs

27:30

whose paper with glenn hubbard praised

27:32

derivatives

27:34

both martin feldstein and laura tyson

27:36

are members of obama's economic recovery

27:38

advisory board

27:40

and obama's chief economic advisor is

27:43

larry summers

27:46

the most senior economic advisors are

27:48

the very people who are there who built

27:50

the structure

27:51

the obama administration resisted

27:52

regulation of bank compensation

27:54

even as foreign leaders took action in

27:58

september of 2009

27:59

christine lagarde and the finance

28:01

ministers of sweden

28:02

the netherlands luxembourg italy spain

28:06

and germany called for the g20 nations

28:09

including the united states

28:10

to impose strict regulations on bank

28:12

compensation

28:14

and in july of 2010 the european

28:17

parliament

28:18

enacted those very regulations the obama

28:21

administration

28:22

had no response and that is why i am

28:25

reappointing him

28:26

to another term as chairman of the

28:28

federal reserve

28:29

thank you so much in 2009 barack obama

28:32

reappointed ben bernanke thank you mr

28:34

president

28:37

as of mid-2010 not a single senior

28:40

financial executive had been criminally

28:41

prosecuted

28:42

or even arrested no special prosecutor

28:45

had been appointed

28:47

not a single financial firm had been

28:48

prosecuted criminally

28:50

for securities fraud or accounting fraud

28:53

the obama administration has made no

28:55

attempt to recover any of the

28:56

compensation given to financial

28:58

executives during the bubble

29:02

for decades the american financial

29:04

system was stable and safe

29:07

but then something changed the financial

29:10

industry turned its back on society

29:13

corrupted our political system and

29:16

plunged the world economy into crisis

29:19

it won't be easy

29:21

[Music]

29:23

but some things are worth

29:35

foreign