호주가 잠수함 지원함을 건조해야 한다는 제안

[위종민]

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/could-a-submarine-tender-enhance-the-adfs-offensive-power/

Could a submarine tender enhance the ADF’s offensive power? | The Strategist

향후 10년 동안 주전력으로 남아있을 콜린스급의 운영 지원을 위해 USS 프랭크 케이블과 유사한 잠수함 지원함을 건조하고, 콜린스급 잠수함에 토마호크 미사일 운용 능력을 부여해야 한다는 주장입니다. 

잠수함 지원함을 운용하면 콜린스급을 코코스 제도나 크리스마스 섬 등지에 전빈배치가 가능하며, 이 경우 남중국해로 가는 항로가 2000해리 정도 줄어든다고 합니다. 

USS 프랭크 케이블은 1979년 취역한 에모리.S.랜드급 잠수함 지원함으로 만재 22,826톤급의 함정입니다. 현재는 괌에 배치돼 활동중이네요. ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Frank_Cable ) 

Could a submarine tender enhance the ADF’s offensive power?

15 Sep 2022|James Garlick

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A significant proportion of defence commentary these days is focused on quickly and cost-effectively enhancing the Australian Defence Force’s lethality in the context of China’s growing power and assertiveness. Much of this discussion is concerned with defence in the literal sense—that is, the protection of Australian territory, life and property. A favourite notion of notable pundit Greg Sheridan, for example, is stationing thousands of missiles in northern Australia. Other suggestions include laying smart sea mines to block the choke points on Australia’s approaches.

These commentators are concerned with a scenario reminiscent of 1942 when we’re faced with an enemy on our doorstep and our allies are on the back foot. Considering such a scenario is all well and good, but are we there yet? I suggest that the best way to deter a revisionist power from initiating conflict or, failing that, to win a war is to maximise the forces that can neutralise the adversary’s ability to wage war.

Here, history teaches important lessons in Australian strategy that the government’s strategic review should consider. Since the late colonial era of the 1870s–1890s, Australia has had two broad defence objectives. The first was obviously to defend Australia (even if it was not yet a unified country). The second was less self-evident. It derived from Australia’s position as a small dominion of the British Empire, dependent on maritime links for trade and access to British capital for its economic development. The problem was that Australia was dependent on a stable and friendly world order but didn’t have the capacity to maintain such an order on its own. Historically, few countries ever do. Australia did, however, have the capacity to add substantial forces to those maintained by Britain and could assist it to defeat a revisionist power. The same conditions prevail today in our alliance with the United States.

It’s important to consider both of these historical objectives because it’s hardly adequate to establish ‘fortress Australia’ if our strategic environment becomes hostile and impinges on the country’s prosperity. As former minister and governor-general Paul Hasluck wrote, ‘[To keep oneself from being overrun is not exactly the same as winning the war.’

So, the ADF needs to operate on two tiers. It needs the capability to defend Australia and expeditionary forces to assist its allies. That means the object of enhancing the ADF’s lethality quickly and cost-effectively should also be applied to its offensive expeditionary capability. Some might argue that the nuclear submarines being acquired under AUKUS, the Hobart-class air warfare destroyers and the Canberra-class landing helicopter docks, along with associated ground forces, have the expeditionary side of the equation well in hand. However, the AUKUS submarines in particular will only materialise in the long term. While the idea of additional destroyers has been floated, if approved, they will also take years to deliver.

There are a multitude of options, but the one I want to focus on involves augmenting an existing platform: the stalwart Collins-class submarine. The Collins will be Australia’s primary manned submarine capability for at least a decade. Analysts are still discussing the potential need for another conventional submarine to plug a capability gap in the transition to nuclear submarines. So, relatively small investments into the conventional submarine fleet are not ill-advised.

My argument is twofold. First, the government should equip the Royal Australian Navy with a dedicated submarine tender similar to USS Frank Cable. Second, it should equip the Collins with Tomahawk missiles, something the navy has said it is looking into the feasibility of. Both of these moves could be made quickly and cost-effectively. The RAN’s new replenishment ship, HMAS Supply, was laid down and commissioned in less than three years.

A tender would be a powerful force multiplier because it would permit the Collins to be forward-deployed to the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Christmas Island or Manus Island. Currently, the offensive utility of the Collins is limited by its slow transit speed and relatively short range. Forward-basing them at these locations would shave almost 2,000 nautical miles off the transit to the South China Sea, thus reducing the transit time to patrol areas and increasing the time the submarines can spend on mission. If this were done on a regular basis, it would save considerable wear and tear on the ageing submarines. Such a move would certainly require some diplomatic smoothing with Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, however.

Arming the Collins with Tomahawks is possible and would drastically enhance the submarines’ offensive firepower. The Collins is equipped with 21-inch torpedo tubes for the Mk48 torpedo, similar to those that could launch earlier versions of the Tomahawk. Reports suggest there would be few complications in equipping the Collins with Tomahawks. The Block V would be the best option since it has a range of more than 900 nautical miles—likely around triple that of the planned long-range anti-ship missiles, or LRASMs—and has an anti-ship capability. Coupled with forward basing, Tomahawks will give the Collins the ability to project power into the South China Sea, providing a deterrent effect and the ability to add to allied offensive forces in a conflict.

[백선호]

지원함에서 토마호크를 쏴요???

[위종민]

쉼표를 안 붙였네요. 1) 지원함을 건조하고 2) 콜린스급에 토마호크 운용 능력을 부여해야 한다는 제안이었습니다. 수정했습니다 ^^

[백선호]

넵 어쩐지... ^^

참고로 옛날 서독해군은 발트 바다의 고속함/잠수함 재보급을 위한 무장한 군수지원함 13척을 건조했는데 이는 전쟁이 나면 기지를 적에게 뺏길 것으로 생각하고 스웨덴 영해같은 곳으로 가서 재보급을 하며 싸울 생각을 했기 때문입니다.

https://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/5q4/231

[Minowski(김유철)]

저라다 좀 더 앞으로 보내서 작전해야한다고 생존성 높인다고 스텔스 설계하고 방공능력 붙여야한다고 할거 같은데요.....

[위종민]

차라리 저기서 언급한 섬에 시설을 만들어버리는 게 어떤가 싶기도 합니다.