미해군은 서해에서 중국해군에 대응할 필요성이 있음

[위종민]

서해는 2012년 기준 중국 무역 물동량의 57%, 한국 무역 물동량의 70%가 지나가는 요충지이고, 중국 인민해방군 북부전구사령부가 위치하는 곳입니다만 미해군은 오랫동안 서해를 중국 해군에 내줘왔고, 최근엔 서해 잠정조치 수역에 물리적 구조물을 설치하는 등 한국과의 갈등 수위가 높아지고 있습니다. 미해군이 최근 서해에서 실시한 훈련은 한국 연안에 국한돼왔고, 인민해방군 북부전구의 활동구역에서는 활동하지 않았었다고 하네요. 

북부전구는 항모 2척 중 1척을 보유중이며, 대만침공과 관련해서도 쓰시마 해협 확보 등의 임무를 수행할 것이며 지금같은 환경에서는 아무런 방해를 받지 않고 대만침공을 위한 전력 증원이 가능합니다. 

이 때문에 서해에서 미해군이 해군력을 증강해 서해에서 절대적인 기동의 자유를 누리고 있는 인민해방군 북해함대를 견제해야 된다는 주장입니다. 

https://cimsec.org/fill-the-vacuum-establish-a-sustained-naval-presence-in-the-yellow-sea

Fill the Vacuum: Establish a Sustained Naval Presence in the Yellow Sea | Center for International Maritime Security

Notes to the New Administration

Fill the Vacuum: Establish a Sustained Naval Presence in the Yellow Sea

January 28, 2025 Guest Author 2 Comments

Notes to the New Administration Week

By William Martin

The Yellow Sea is a vital maritime lane for trade and security in Northeast Asia. A 2012 CNA study found that “nearly 57 percent of China’s total trade volume and over 70 percent of South Korea’s total trade volume emanates from the Yellow Sea.”1 It is also home to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Northern Theater Command (NTC).

Despite the strategic significance of these waters, for too long the United States has ceded maneuver space in the Yellow Sea to the PLA Navy. In recent years, China has increased its aggressive activity in this vital maritime lane, to the detriment of U.S. interests, the security of allies, and the maintenance of a free and open Indo-Pacific. The United States and its allies must increase force presence along this key maritime terrain to disrupt PLA confidence in freely maneuvering through these waters as they conduct operations counter to U.S. interests.

China has begun installing physical structures in international waters that represent overlapping claims with South Korea, a major U.S. ally.2 This is reminiscent of actions in the South China Sea that allowed China to increase control of sea lanes there in violation of international law. Tensions between China and South Korea have been on the rise for years, including Chinese incursions across the 124th meridian, which has been a maritime control line between the two for decades.3 The PLA NTC routinely exercises with its carrier in the Yellow Sea, and has conducted joint exercises with Russia in the Sea of Japan, further raising tensions in the region.4

Although the U.S. Navy has conducted some recent exercises in the area, they have been restricted to the Korean coast and directed against the DPRK, without reference to PLA aggression.5 The U.S. Navy has long been absent from the broader areas where the PLA NTC is based, including international waters that are critical to U.S. allies and fundamental to regional stability.

Not only does the PLA NTC pose a significant and unaccounted-for threat in any contingency on the Korean Peninsula, those forces are also essential to the PLA’s Taiwan plans.6 The PLA NTC has already been seen performing vital missions during Taiwan scenario exercises, such as securing the Tsushima Strait.7 Moreover, the NTC controls one of the PLA’s two active carriers, several cruisers, scores of 5th generation fighter aircraft, and China’s most powerful destroyer variants.8 All of these assets could easily be sent to reinforce a Taiwan invasion, and the sea lanes they transit would remain largely uncontested. Increasing U.S. and allied presence in these international waters will strongly affect the PRC decision calculus regarding offensive operations against Taiwan.

It is critical for the United States to increase its naval presence in the Yellow Sea to disrupt the PLA’s belief in a near absolute freedom of maneuver through these critical waters. This requirement is not unlike ongoing actions to maintain allied freedom of action in the South China Sea and elsewhere.9 Such presence is fundamental to maintaining “peace through strength” in Northeast Asia.

William Martin is a pseudonym for a senior joint information planner and policy advisor for the Department of Defense. He holds a master of arts degree in history with a focus on East Asia.

The views presented here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the United States Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

References

1. Michael A. McDevitt, Catherine K. Lea, Abraham M. Denmark, Ken E. Gause, Bonnie S. Glaser, Richard C. Bush III, and Daniel M. Hartnett, The Long Littoral Project: East China and Yellow Seas, A Maritime Perspective on Indo-Pacific Security (CNA, September 2012).

2. Lee Min-seok, Kim Dong-hyun, and Park Su-hyeon, “Exclusive: Beijing Resumes Disputed Installations in West Sea amid S. Korea’s Turmoil,” The Chosun Ilbo, January 10, 2025, https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/01/10/2VZWCDVB2JEOBKDIM5TOW5S634/.

3. Lee Chul-jae and Park Yong-han, “Beijing Ships Cross the Line Again,” Korea JoongAng Daily, January 26, 2021, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2021/01/26/national/defense/China-124th-meridian-Yellow-Sea/20210126183100580.html.

4. Choi Hyun-june and Gil Yun-hyung, “As Theater for Shows of Force, Korea’s East Sea Becomes a New Powder Keg,” The Hankyoreh, November 30, 2024, https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/1101036.html.

5. David Choi, “US, South Korean, Canadian Warships Train in Yellow Sea Ahead of Incheon Anniversary,” Stars and Stripes, September 15, 2023, https://www.stripes.com/branches/navy/2023-09-15/trilateral-naval-drill-yellow-sea-incheon-11383145.html.

6. Ashton H.S. Cho and Yuan-Chou Jing, “Tipping the Balance? China’s PLA Northern Theater Command and the Korean Peninsula,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 36, no.2 (2024), https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/ci/sereArticleSearch/ciSereArtiView.kci?sereArticleSearchBean.artiId=ART003084667

7. Ki-Yong Kim, “China’s Shandong Performs 5-Day Blitz Exercise Against Taiwan,” Donga Daily, September 18, 2023, https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20230918/4434721/1.

8. Marielle Descalsota, “Take a Look at China’s Biggest Destroyer, a $920 Million Cruiser That’s Said to Be the 2nd Most Powerful in the World After the USS Zumwalt,” Yahoo News, June 21, 2022, https://www.yahoo.com/news/look-chinas-biggest-destroyer-920-063256052.html.

9. Lt. j. g. Rebecca Moore, “Netherlands, US Naval Forces Conduct South China Sea Operations,” US Navy’s Pacific Fleet News, accessed January 21, 2025, https://www.cpf.navy.mil/Newsroom/News/Article/3784611/netherlands-us-naval-forces-conduct-south-china-sea-operations/.

Featured Image: SEA OF JAPAN (Oct 6, 2022) The Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62), front, the Republic of Korea navy destroyer ROKS Sejong the Great (DDG 991) and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer JS Chokai (DDG 176) transit the Sea of Japan during a trilateral ballistic missile defense exercise. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Gray Gibson)

[백선호]

“securing the Tsushima Strait”면 한국-일본 뱃길을 차단한다는 것일까요?

[강준구]

https://neverfeltbetter.wordpress.com/2011/05/18/nfbs-decisive-battles-of-the-world-tsushima/
쓰시마 해협은 쓰시마와 큐슈 사이 해협이고, 쓰시마와 부산 사이가 부산 해협인데, 그리고 부산과 큐슈 사이가 대한해협(Korea Strait)이네요.
쓰시마 해협을 차단하는 게 큰 의미가 없으니, 아마도 대한해협을 차단한다는 소리 같은데, 여기를 막아봤자 일본 4개 호위대군 중 마이즈루 해군기지에 있는 제 3호위대군만 틀어막는 꼴입니다.
또, 해군도 1함대 뿐이구요.

소련의 태평양 함대가 태평양으로 진출하는 것을 막기 위해 쓰루가 해협과 대한해협을 자위대/미군이 차단한다는 얘기는 들어봤지만, 중국이 대한해협을 굳이 차단할 이유과 여력이 있는지는 모르겠네요.

[위종민]

부산-규슈에 기뢰를 싹 깔아 막아놓는다고 쳐도 군함들은 일본 동쪽으로 내려가면 그만이라 굳이 막을 이유가 있긴 하나 싶습니다. 1함대는 어차피 대만 증원 못 나갈 거고.

중국 해군, 중-러 해군 합동훈련을 검색해봐도 쓰시마 해협을 지나갔다는 얘긴 있어도 거기서 뭔가를 한 것 같다는 소식은 안 걸리네요. 각주의 소스는 동아일보 영문판인데, 산동 항모전단의 훈련 기간 중 북해함대가 군함 여러 척을 보내 쓰시마 해협을 초계했다는 내용입니다. ( the PLA’s Northern Theater Command sent several vessels to the Tsushima Strait for patrol,” )

[ssn688]

조직확대에 편리한 보기 좋은 아이템에 매달려 있는 나라의 특정 군종부터가 정신을 차려야 할 터인데요... ; 대만침공에 대한해협을 확보한다는 건, 주한미군이 대만침공 저지에 동원될 거라고 보기 때문일까요?

[위종민]

한국 해군 기동함대의 항모야말로 만들어놓으면 뭐에다 쓸 지 알 수 없는 물건이 될 것 같아 보입니다.

[백선호]

동해에서 북쪽으로 올라가 거기서 함재기 날려 북한의 탄도탄 부수겠다는 것이 해군의 주장같습니다.

[위종민]

공군은 "그럴 돈으로 전투기 더 사고 공중급유기 더 사면 그 임무 더 잘 할 수 있는데???"라고 주장할 것 같긴 합니다. 평시 시현효과는 항모가 더 크지만..

[백선호]

항모가 이미 있으면 그런 임무에 쓰는 것에 why not? 이지만,

그런 임무에 쓰기 위해서 “새로” 만들겠다면 쫌 그렇죠.

[위종민]

124도 30분 선은 백령도 바로 서쪽을 지나가네요.

우러전쟁의 교훈을 살려 북해함대를 A2/AD할 방법을 한국 해군과 해병대가 같이 연구해야 될 것 같습니다.

[위종민]

RUSI에서도 서해가 새로운 지정학상 핫스팟이며, 아시아의 지중해라고 주장하는 사설이 실렸네요. ( https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/yellow-sea-overlooked-geopolitical-hotspot )

서해의 동쪽으로 미국 측의 행동의 자유가 제한되면 한반도 서부의 군사자산 방어태세가 약화되고, 이것이 규슈-오키나와-대만으로 이어지는 도미노 효과를 불러일으킬 수 있다고 주장합니다.

[위종민]

"the strategic balance in the region will ultimately shift in China’s favour, leaving the allies’ freedom of action restricted to a fraction of the Yellow Sea. This gradual shift would first weaken the defence posture for critical military assets along the west coast of the Korean Peninsula, gradually followed by Kyushu, Okinawa and ultimately Taiwan, triggering a domino effect"

[Minowski(김유철)]

발해만을 위협할 수 있느냐, 북해함대를 산둥반도 내해로 가둬버릴 수 있느냐를 묻고 있는것 아닌가 싶네요.

[위종민]

서산과 군산, 오산과 평택에 주한미군 기지가 깔려있는데 양안전쟁 발발시 북해함대가 서해를 유유히 지나 대만 지원하러 가게 놔두는 것도 말이 안 되긴 하고요.