러시아에 대한 북한의 원조 물량

[위종민]

2023년 10월 미국 정부 추산 컨테이너 2천 개, 2024년 10월 한국 추산 컨테이너 2만개가 선적됐고, 2만 개의 컨테이너를 모두 152mm 야포탄으로 채우면 940만 발이라고 합니다. 2024년 말 서방 정부 소식통 추산으로는 러시아가 발사한 포탄의 절반, 우크라이나 정보부 추산 60%를 북한이 제공한 것으로 추정했네요. 

1. 포탄 및 야포: 122mm, 130mm, 152mm, 박격포탄 및 170mm 자주포와 포탄. 물량은 막대하지만 품질이 의심스럽고, 170mm 자주포의 경우는 사격 속도가 느리고 정확도가 떨어진다고 합니다. 

2. 화성-11 계열 탄도미사일: 2024년 10월 한국 정보당국 추산 100발. 2025년 우크라이나 군사정보 책임자 추산 2024년 148기 공급, 2025년 150기 인도 예상. 파편 분석 결과 유도시스템에서 북한 외부에서 생산된 부품이 발견됐으며, 초기에는 정확도가 저열했으나 2025년 1월 초 정확도가 개선됐다고 알려짐. 

3. 단거리 SAM: 1월 초 러시아의 TOR형 SAM 원판의 북한산 단거리 SAM 시스템이 러시아의 아군 오사에 피격됐었음. 

4. 240mm 유도/무유도 다연장로켓: 우크라이나 군사정보 책임자 추산 2024년 11월 ~ 2025년 1월에 다연장로켓 120대 공급. 

추후에 대전차미사일과 MANPADS, MRBM 및 드론, 중장거리 SAM, 155mm 자주포, 300mm 유도 다연장로켓, 600mm 다연장로켓 시스템의 제공 가능성도 있다고 분석하네요. 

링크된 화성-11 탄도미사일 파편/잔해 분석 기사를 보니, 이 미사일에는 북한 외부에서 생산된 전자부품 290개 가량이 포함돼 있고, 75%는 미국이 본사인 회사의 브랜드에서 3년 이내에 생산된 부품이었다고 합니다. 다 썩은 재고 물건을 보낸 거 아니냐~는 얘기도 있었는데, 부품 이력 추적 결과 2024년 1월 발사된 미사일 생산연도는 2023년 3월 이후에 조립된 것이었다고 하네요. 

North Korea's Lethal Aid to Russia: Current State and Outlook - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea

North Korea’s Lethal Aid to Russia: Current State and Outlook

• By: Tianran Xu
• February 14, 2025
• Military Affairs, WMD

Like all foreign military aid to a warring party, North Korea’s (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) lethal aid to Russia largely falls into two broad categories. First, old and/or surplus equipment and ammunition sent to replenish Moscow’s depleted stocks. Second, new weapons and main battlefield equipment that can be field-tested in Ukraine. If the war drags on, North Korean weapon provision to Russia is most likely to escalate further. The combat performance of these hardware in Ukraine will give Pyongyang a valuable opportunity to eval‎uate and refine its domestic weapon systems. In return for Pyongyang’s lethal aid, Moscow will likely reciprocate with weapons and/or military technologies, further strengthening North Korea’s offensive and defensive capabilities on the Korean Peninsula and beyond.

Old Weaponry and Ammunition 

North Korea’s ammunition deliveries to Russia were first revealed by the US government in October 2023, when Pyongyang allegedly provided Moscow with over 1,000 containers of military equipment and ammunition. By October 2024, South Korea estimated that North Korea had shipped around 20,000 containers to Russia, which could carry approximately 9.4 million 152 mm shells when fully stocked. Some Western intelligence sources estimated in late 2024 that North Korea supplied “half of the shells used by Russia in Ukraine,” while the Ukrainian intelligence estimated that 60 percent of shells fired by Russian army were provided by North Korea. Given the sheer quantity of shells provided, this ammunition is critical to Russia’s war efforts.

To date, the old equipment and ammunition have included:

• 122 mm artillery shells, 130 mm artillery shells, 152 mm artillery shells, mortar shells, North Korean militia version 122 mm multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) and MRL rockets: These weapons and ammunition originated from the Soviet Union and have been mass-produced in North Korea for decades. Frontline reports suggest North Korean ammunition is of poor quality and unreliable—consistent with its performance during the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island shelling, where about 25 percent of North Korean artillery shells and rockets that landed on the island failed to detonate.
• 170 mm self-propelled guns (SPGs) and shells: The “Koksan gun” developed by North Korea to target the greater Seoul area is considered outdated, with a low rate of fire and alleged poor accuracy. According to Ukraine’s military intelligence chief Budanov, North Korea supplied Russia with 120 such SPGs between November 2024 and January 2025. These SPGs have already reached the frontline. In early February, South Korean defense ministry stated that the North had sent 200 pieces of long-range artillery to Russia but did not specify the types.

New Weaponry

New and/or more powerful weapons have also been sent to Russia. The provision of these weapons not only helps reinforce the Russian army’s capabilities, but also allows North Korea to assess the real-world combat performance of its domestic weapon systems. So far, there has been evidence or allegations of the following systems:

• Hwasong-11 series ballistic missiles. These represent North Korea’s new generation of short-range (aero-) ballistic missiles (SRBMs). Citing South Korean intelligence, Bloomberg reported in October 2024 that about 100 Hwasong-11 missiles had been detected on the battlefield in Ukraine. In January 2025, Ukraine’s military intelligence chief claimed that Pyongyang is expected to deliver 150 Hwasong-11 missiles to Russia in 2025, in addition to the 148 missiles already supplied in 2024. Debris of a Hwasong-11 series SRBM recovered in Ukraine in early January 2024 included more than 290 non-domestic electronic components, most of which were found in the missile’s guidance system. Despite the use of non-domestic electronics, the accuracy of conventional DPRK missile strikes appears to be low, as Ukraine’s top prosecutor claimed that only two among the 24 DPRK ballistic missiles fired at Ukraine in early 2024 were “relatively accurate.” This may be due to a large quantity of counterfeit parts identified in the wreckage of the Hwasong-11 missiles.[1] However, in early January 2025, Reuters reported that the North Hwasong-11 missiles fired at Ukraine since late December 2024 had a “marked increase” in accuracy in comparison to missiles fired over the past year, which, according to senior Ukrainian officials, suggests that North Korea is successfully using the battlefield to refine its missile technology.[2]
• New type of short-range surface-to-air missiles. In early January, a North Korean short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system was allegedly struck by Russian friendly fire in the Kursk region. The system, modeled after the Russian Tor SAM, was first showcased during a military parade in Pyongyang in October 2020. In November 2024, it was displayed at a defense equipment exhibition in Pyongyang, with information boards showing the system conducting test fires (Figure 1). If the provision of this new-type SAM system is confirmed, its performance on the battlefield will provide North Korea the opportunity to further eval‎uate and improve this system.
  
  
  Figure 1. Left: The SAM system hit by Russian-friendly fire in early January 2025 shares a close resemblance to North Korea’s newly-developed short-range SAM system. Right: Information displayed at a weapon exhibition in November 2024 in Pyongyang suggested that the North Korean SAM had already undergone test fires. (Images: Left: Militarnyi, Right: Korean Central News Agency)
• Alleged provision of guided and/or unguided 240 mm MRLs. Ukraine’s military intelligence chief stated that North Korea supplied Russia with 120 such MRLs between November 2024 and January 2025. Although the unguided 240 mm MRL is as old as the 170 mm SPG, it remains a key asset for the Korean People’s Army due to its high rate of fire and ability to cover a large area quickly. Meanwhile, the guided version is expected to have significantly improved accuracy, making it far more effective against smaller, fixed targets—though it is highly unlikely to match the precision of US M270/HIMARS guided rockets. According to the Financial Times, guided 240 mm MRLs have already been sent to Russia. However, no publicly available evidence currently confirm‎s North Korea’s provision of 240 mm MRLs (Figure 2).

Figure 2. A partially-censored video frame showing the transportation of at least two 170 mm SPGs and what appears to be a 240 mm MRL in Russia. A more positive identification of the 240 mm MRL is not possible with available information.

What Might Come Next

For North Korea, providing lethal aid to Russia offers multiple benefits, such as: 1) disposing of outdated ammunition with questionable quality and replacing it with newly-produced stock under presumably better quality control, 2) field-testing new and main battle weaponry under realistic combat conditions, 3) receiving foreign currency, energy, goods, services, and technology transfers from Russia in return, and 4) reducing Pyongyang’s isolation and breaking international sanctions. If the war in Ukraine drags on, Pyongyang may supply more modern weapons to the battlefield. Depending on Russia’s needs, these could potentially include:

• Anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). These modern North Korean weapons have already been proliferated to the Middle East, but their combat performance remains unclear. The provision of a North Korean ATGM system might have already taken place. On July 30, 2024, a Telegram channel reporting on the war on Ukraine published a video frame showing a purported new-type North Korean anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) system spotted inside Russian territory near Ukraine’s Kharkiv region. The quality of the video frame was too poor for a more positive identification. However, according to documents obtained by Bloomberg in October 2024, South Korean intelligence service seemed to assess that North Korean ATGMs had been used by the Russian army.[3]
• Possible provision of Pukguksong-2 mid-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). A video clip that surfaced online in December 2024 suggests that North Korea may have sent at least five tracked vehicles armed with Pukguksong-2 MRBMs to Russia, along with 170 mm SPGs. If verified, this would mark Pyongyang’s first MRBM transfer to Russia. The Pukguksong-2 was flight-tested only twice in 2017 before Kim Jong Un declared it operational. Field-testing this MRBM in Ukraine would allow North Korea to better assess its performance and reliability.[4]
• Kim Jong Un has emphasized the importance of drones in modern warfare, and has personally inspected flight demonstrations of various North Korean drones. In early February 2025, NHK reported that North Korea will start the co-production of several types of drones with technical help from Russia.
• Mid- to long-range SAMs. North Korea has been developing new mid- to long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. At the November 2024 weapons exhibition, a previously unknown mid- to long-range SAM was unveiled alongside two other domestically developed SAMs (Figure 3). As Russia seems to struggle to intercept Ukrainian drones striking deep into its territory, Pyongyang may consider deploying its new SAM systems inside Russia. A rear deployment would make them less vulnerable to electronic intelligence gathering by Ukraine and NATO compared to forward deployment.
  
  
  Figure 3. A previously unseen type of SAM (in yellow box) was displayed during the November 2024 Pyongyang weapon exhibition, along with two types of 별찌-1-2 (Pyoljji-1-2/Meteor-1-2) SAMs (in red box) developed by North Korea. This new type SAM appears to be wider in diameter, and has a simpler layout than the Pyoljji-1-2/Meteor-1-2. (Image: Korea Central News Agency)
• 155 mm SPGs. North Korea developed this modern SPG using the NATO-standard 155 mm caliber, making it incompatible with Soviet/Russian 152 mm shells. However, the deployment of 170 mm SPGs—a caliber not used by the Russian army—already demonstrates that Russia does not mind interoperability issues when it comes to North Korean aid.
• 300 mm guided MRLs. North Korea’s 300 mm guided multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) have been overshadowed by the more advanced 600 mm MRLs, likely due to their inability to carry North Korea’s tactical nuclear warheads (estimated at ~460 mm in diameter) and alleged low cost-effectiveness.[5] However, Russia may still welcome this system as its own 300 mm MRL rocket stocks appear to have been largely depleted.[6]
• 600 mm guided MRLs. The 600 mm guided rockets are de-facto SRBMs. The rockets can be fitted with both nuclear and conventional payloads and could complicate missile defense with its high firepower density.[7] The 600 mm caliber offers enough space to accommodate large conventional warheads. This system has become a prized weapon in North Korea.[8] Pyongyang may be willing to have it field-tested on the battlefield.

In addition to the possible provision of new weapons, Pyongyang is highly likely to continue supplying Russia with ammunition from stockpiles, along with other older weapon systems, depending on their availability and Russia’s needs. These may primarily include older tanks, towed artillery and armored vehicles (including older SPGs). The provision of liquid-propellant SCUD SRBMs (Hwasong-5/6）and MRBMs (Mainly the Hwasong-7) remains a low possibility, as Russia no longer has the personnel or infrastructure to support the operation of liquid-fuel SRBMs and MRBMs. However, Pyongyang could choose to send Strategic Rocket Force personnel to operate these missiles.

Conclusion

As demonstrated by: 1) receiving North Korean arms and troops, 2) providing Pyongyang with more oil than the annual cap set by UNSC resolutions, and 3) disbanding the UN Panel of Experts (PoE), Russia has effectively abandoned arms control and non-proliferation norms regarding North Korea. Consequently, Moscow is highly likely to reciprocate with weapons and/or military technologies.[9] Although the war in Ukraine has depleted much of Russia’s weapon stockpiles, and both Russian and North Korean weaponry rely heavily on foreign electronics, Moscow still possesses a considerable amount of hardware, expertise, and technology that it could offer in return.

North Korean missile relies on recent electronic components

North Korean missile relies on recent electronic components

8-10 minutes

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Ukraine Field Dispatch, February 2024

Conflict Armament Research

Conflict Armament Research (CAR) has determined that a ballistic missile produced by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and recovered in Ukraine includes more than 290 non-domestic electronic components. CAR investigators, documenting missile remnants after an attack in Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, found not only that many of these components bear the brands of companies based primarily in the United States but that a large number were produced within the last three years. North Korea's ability to produce and transfer advanced weapons, while acquiring material internationally to fuel its missile programme in spite of long-standing United Nations sanctions, is the latest evidence of countries undermining global non-proliferation regimes.

North Korea, just like  Iran  and the  Russian Federation , relies on the global semiconductor industry to acquire components that are critical to its military production. CAR’s findings show how difficult it is to effectively control the export of commercial electronic components, but also just how reliant these countries are on non-domestic technology.

CAR investigators, documenting missile remnants after an attack in Kharkiv, found not only that many of these components bear the brands of companies based primarily in the United States but that a large number were produced within the last three years.

This dispatch, CAR’s 13th since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, marks the first public identification of North Korea’s reliance on non-domestic technology for its missile programme. As CAR is closely working with industry to trace the missile components and identify the entities responsible for their diversion, this report will not identify the companies linked to their production.

The missile’s electronic components

On 27 January and 1 February 2024, a CAR field investigation team physically documented the remnants of a North Korean ballistic missile recovered in Kharkiv on 2 January 2024. CAR has previously documented other remnants from the missile, probably a KN-23 or a KN-24, first reporting on the  use of North Korean missiles  in the conflict in January 2024.

CAR documented electronic components among the missile remnants, primarily forming parts of the navigation system. CAR’s documentation shows that the North Korean missile includes many recently manufactured components bearing the marks of companies mostly based in the United States. 

Remnants of a North Korean missile documented by CAR on 27 January and 1 February 2024 in Ukraine

 CAR has withheld markings on some components shown in this image in accordance with its tracing methodology. 

CAR documented more than 290 components, comprising 50 unique models. From marks observed on these components, CAR identified 26 companies, headquartered in eight jurisdictions (China, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United States), that are linked to the production of these components.

Seventy-five per cent of the components documented are linked to companies incorporated in the United States.

Sixteen per cent of documented components are linked to companies incorporated in Europe.

Nine per cent of documented components are linked to companies incorporated in Asia.

CAR will dispatch trace requests to these companies. The findings in this report are based on the marks documented by CAR. Observations may change based on the responses CAR receives from the identified companies during the tracing process.

Half the components documented bore identifiable date codes, and more than 75 per cent of those codes indicated production between 2021 and 2023. Based on those production dates, CAR concludes that the missile recovered in Kharkiv could not have been assembled before March 2023. This illustrates the recent production of the missile and the short window of its  reported  transfer to the Russian Federation before being used in the Kharkiv attack in January 2024. 

Based on those production dates, CAR concludes that the missile recovered in Kharkiv could not have been assembled before March 2023.

This chart shows the year of manufacture for components documented among the missile remnants in Ukraine on 27 January and 1 February 2024, for which CAR could identify a date of production.

A critical point for non-proliferation regimes

CAR’s discovery of recently produced, non-domestic electronic components in a North Korean ballistic missile used in Ukraine highlights the significant challenges currently facing global non-proliferation regimes. This finding has three important dimensions:

• It shows that North Korea has been able to produce advanced weapons, integrating components produced as recently as 2023, in spite of  United Nations Security Council sanctions  in place since 2006 that prohibit the production of ballistic missiles by North Korea.

• It shows that, despite long-standing international sanctions on such activities, North Korea could have transferred the weapon to the Russian Federation after the start of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

• The presence of a large proportion of recently produced non-domestic electronic components in a North Korean ballistic missile strongly suggests that the country has developed a robust acquisition network capable of circumventing, without detection, sanction regimes that have been in place for nearly two decades.

CAR’s findings highlight once again how critical field documentation and monitoring is to the effectiveness of any export control and sanction mechanism. CAR’s findings also demonstrate the challenges associated with effective regulation and control of the export of commercial semiconductor components. This is a recurrent theme, as seen in previous documentation by CAR of large quantities of recently produced commercial components in  Russian  and  Iranian  weapons used in Ukraine. The presence of these components also illustrates just how reliant Iran, North Korea, and the Russian Federation are on non-domestic technology for the sustained production of their war materiel.

The presence of a large proportion of recently produced non-domestic electronic components in a North Korean ballistic missile strongly suggests that the country has developed a robust acquisition network capable of circumventing, without detection, sanction regimes that have been in place for nearly two decades

While the vast majority of the documented components bear the brands of companies headquartered in Western jurisdictions, the global nature of the semiconductor industry and its reliance on third-country distribution channels should also raise concerns for the export control and sanctions compliance of other Member States bound to implement these regimes.

CAR will continue to document evidence of the use of North Korean ballistic missiles and will report further on any new findings regarding arms and related materiel recovered in Ukraine.

About Conflict Armament Research

Established in 2011, Conflict Armament Research generates unique evidence on weapon supplies into armed conflicts in order to inform and support effective weapon management and control.

CAR field investigation teams document illicit weapons, ammunition, and related materiel in conflict-affected locations and trace their supply sources. The teams inspect weapons in a variety of situations—whether recovered by state security forces, surrendered at the cessation of hostilities, cached, or held by insurgent forces. They document all items photographically, date and geo-reference the documentation sites, and incorporate contextual interview data gathered from the forces in control of the items at the time of documentation.

CAR occasionally uses information and photographs from social media as background information but does not base its investigations on them, since the provenance of such data is often difficult to verify. Moreover, open-source information does not always provide the detailed physical elements—notably external and internal markings required to trace weapons and ammunition.

For more information on CAR's methodology, go to www.conflictarm.com

[Minowski(김유철)]

다시 확인되는 대북제재의 빈틈이네요. 도대체 어떻게 세탁해서 서방제 반도체를 수입해가는건지 원..

북한의 경우 러시아 지원에 생각보다 성의를 보인 것도 확인된 셈이고...

[위종민]

중국이나 러시아, 조총련 통한 일본 제품들이 많을 줄 알았는데 미국 본사인 업체 물품들이 75%라..

포탄 절반 이상이 북한제일 정도면 사실상 북한은 이번 전쟁을 공동으로 수행한 샘이네요.

[강준구]

우크라이나 전쟁에서 사용된 북한산 무기 품질과 이스라엘 타격에 사용된 이란산 유도무기(탄도탄 및 순항미사일)의 수준을 보면, 정밀 타격은 한참 먹었다는 걸 보여주지 않나 싶습니다.

[위종민]

단거리 탄도탄 정확도가 개선된 게 50~100m 수준이라 하니 MRBM, ICBM 정확도는 여전히 km 단위를 넘어가지 않을까 싶습니다. 미국 입장에선 안심될 것 같고, 한국 입장에선 단거리 탄도탄의 정밀도가 향상된 게 기분이 나쁜 상황이네요.