쿠르스크 전장에 투입된 북한군; 막대한 사상자, 발전하는 전술

[위종민]

북한군은 2024년 10월 이후 3개월만에 11,000명 중 40%(사망 1천명, 전투불능 부상 3천명 이상)를 잃었고, 재편성과 증원을 위해 후방으로 물러났습니다. 

쿠르스크에 투입된 북한군 부대는 후방침투 및 교란작전 임무를 수행하는 부대였음에도 UAV가 주류가 된 전장에 적응하는 데 실패했다고 합니다. 3인 1조로 1명이 드론을 유인하면 2명이 드론을 격추하려는 전술을 개발했다고 하는데, 물론 비참한 실패로 돌아가 쿠르슈티나 전투에서 우크라이나군이 북한국 77명 사살, 40명 부상을 기록하기도 했다고 하네요. 이런 식으로 전장에 적응을 하지 못하자, 성공못할 게 뻔한 상황에서 공세를 펼치거나 지뢰밭 강행돌파 임무를 맡는 등 소모되기 시작해, 철수하지 않았다면 4월 안에 11,000명 전부가 전멸했을 거라고 하네요. 

그럼에도 혹독한 훈련의 결과로 체력수준이 높고, UAV 탐지를 위한 전방관측소를 설치하는가 하면 20명~30명 수준의 소부대로 편성해 6명 단위로 공격하는 새로운 전술을 개발하는 등의 발전도 있다고 합니다. 

North Korea’s Military Intervention in Kursk: A High Casualty Learning Curve - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea

North Korea’s Military Intervention in Kursk: A High Casualty Learning Curve - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea

North Korea’s Military Intervention in Kursk: A High Casualty Learning Curve

• By: Samuel Ramani
• February 19, 2025
• Military Affairs

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(Source: Korean Central News Agency, February 2023)

On February 8, North Korea’s (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un issued his strongest statement of support yet for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. By vowing to “invariably support and encourage the just cause of the Russian Army,” Kim implicitly acknowledged North Korea’s direct participation in the Ukraine War. Kim’s comments followed warnings from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that Russia-North Korea cooperation would continue to expand and reports that a second wave of North Korean force deployments to Russia’s Kursk region was imminent.

While it appears as if North Korea is staying the course, its military performance thus far should give it room for pause. During the first three months after their arrival in October 2024, North Korea lost 40 percent of its 11,000-strong force contingent. An estimated 1,000 of those troops perished while 3,000 more were too severely injured to continue fighting. Presumably due to these staggering rates of attrition and urgent needs for additional training, North Korean troops were noticeably absent in Kursk in mid-January.

North Korea’s heavy casualties can be attributed to their unfamiliarity with high-intensity frontline combat, technological shortcomings and morale crises. Despite this troika of countervailing forces, North Korea’s security partnership with Russia will likely continue to strengthen. While much attention is paid to potential Russian assistance to North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, aid to its conventional forces could be much more consequential.

The Challenges Afflicting North Korea’s Military Performance in Kursk

Despite mounting evidence of high North Korean casualties in Kursk, Russian officials and state-aligned commentators have engaged in a systematic deny-and-deflect campaign. Shortly after North Korean forces arrived on the frontline, State Duma Deputy Konstantin Zatulin accused Zelensky of invoking the North Korean “bogeyman” to scare the West into providing additional support to Ukraine. Russian ultranationalist commentator Kirill Fedorov attacked reports that North Korean supplied Russia with multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) disguised as ordinary trucks and called them “shamefully done” fakes of “practically static objects.” North Korea augmented this cover up by telling families of dispatched soldiers that they were participating in military exercises.

As these denials were increasingly implausible, some Russian commentators made a complete 180-degree-pivot and hailed the purported battlefield successes of North Korean troops. Russian ultranationalist media outlet Tsargrad hailed North Korea’s delivery of camouflaged MLRS systems and claimed that it learnt from innovations by Iran-aligned militias in Iraq and Syria. Russian commentators rushed to congratulate North Korean troops for their triumph over Ukraine in Plekhovo. War correspondent Vladimir Romanov described the North Korean victory in especially propagandistic terms, declaring “They passed through like a hurricane, did not take prisoners. The enemy lost more than 300 servicemen,” and boasting that North Korean Special Operations Forces won in two hours.

This narrative of North Korean military strength is detached from realities on the ground. Since the 1950-1953 Korean War, North Korean forces have been deployed to a wide range of combat theatres. These include North Vietnam, Egypt during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Syria during the post-2011 civil war and African countries like Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In these battlefields, North Korean troops have served as force multipliers for local militaries, provided specialized military training and engaged in aerial operations as fighter pilots. The North Korean Storm Corps that were deployed to Kursk are trained to infiltrate and conduct sabotage operations behind enemy lines.

This experience, while valuable, does not equate with modern offensive warfare. This discrepancy has caused North Korean troops in Kursk to fall back to antiquated Korean War-era offensive techniques. Konoval Ihor Ihorovych (aka Sahara), the commander of the reserve group of the 4th Company of Ukraine’s 33rd Assault Regiment, quipped that North Korean forces would charge forward from tree lines “like in a World War II movie.”

Due to their lack of experience in modern warfare, North Korean troops were unprepared for Ukraine’s extensive utilization of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in Kursk. When UAVs moved in their direction, North Korean forces reportedly formed groups of threes to foil their path. Via this trio formation, one North Korean soldier would lure the drone in his direction in the hopes of stopping its advance and his compatriots would attempt to shoot the drone down. This logistically clumsy strategy to shoot down UAVs yielded disastrous results. On December 23, Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces claimed that they killed 77 North Korean troops and injured 40 more in the battle of Kurshchyna. Ukrainian UAV operators have also recorded a friendly fire exchange as North Korean troops frantically sought to shoot down UAVs.

As North Korean forces were overwhelmed by mechanized warfare, they were implored by their commanders to engage in high-risk missions. On December 27, White House National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby claimed that North Korea were using “human wave tactics” in Kursk. Kirby highlighted incidences of North Korean forces engaging in offensive operations when there were no apparent indicators of success. To expedite the military momentum of Russian troops, North Korean personnel have been sacrificed as “human mine detectors.” These tactics caused the Institute for the Study of War to conclude that North Korea’s entire 11,000-strong contingent would have been obliterated by April without a drawdown or strategic transformation.

North Korea’s Capacity for Tactical Adaptations on the Battlefield  

Due to the underwhelming performance of their forces in Kursk, familiar tropes about the North Korean military have resurfaced. The most pronounced stereotypes are that North Korean troops are too brainwashed and inflexible to become more potent frontline combatants. Kirby linked North Korea’s reliance on human wave tactics to ideological indoctrination. Aside from the highly-trained Storm Corps, some North Korean troops sent to Kursk were farm and construction workers who have been exposed to state propaganda since childhood. A devotion to service to the Supreme Leader, which detaches them from familial obligations, drives North Korean forces to fight in a far-off land.

This ideological fanaticism triggers seemingly irrational actions on the battlefield and reinforces a totalitarian command structure. Ukrainian servicemen have vividly described how North Korean troops opt to self-immolate with grenades to evade capture. This dashed Ukraine and South Korea’s churlish optimism that psychological warfare could lead to mass battlefield defections. Ihorovych recounted how North Korean forces shuttled inexplicably between buildings as the Ukrainian military fired artillery barrages at them from 500 meters away.

Despite this supporting evidence, are these stereotypes about the North Korean army accurate? A closer examination suggests that they are dangerous oversimplifications. North Korean forces have a degree of resilience that cannot be explained by indoctrination and adaptability that defies the stereotype of command structure rigidity. Even though North Korean troops undergo rigorous training in mountainous terrain that does not resemble Kursk, that experience provides them with a high degree of physical fitness. Ukrainian Armed Forces spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Yaroslav Chepurnyi has also extolled the small arms capabilities of North Korean forces. Yuriy Bondar, a Ukrainian soldier from the 80th Separate Airborne Assault brigade, declared “compared to the soldiers of the DPRK, Wagner mercenaries circa 2022 are just children.”

North Korean forces have made numerous command structure shifts since entering Kursk. They have established observation posts to more effectively pre-empt Ukrainian UAV strikes. By congregating in small units of 20-30 forces and advancing in units of six at a time, North Korean forces can stealthily carry out military operations. Ukraine’s GUR military intelligence agency chief Vadym Skybytskyi acknowledges this tactical transformation. Skybytskyi anticipates that the next tranche of North Korean forces will perpetuate it and enhance their UAV capabilities.

How Russia will Help Enhance North Korea’s Combat Capabilities

After North Korean forces arrived in Kursk, they swiftly found themselves fighting as subordinates to Russian commanders. This role did not go to plan. Aside from recordings of racist language from Russian soldiers to North Korean troops, the food shortages and logistical challenges that impeded Russia’s war in Ukraine undermined the efficacy of North Korean forces. In early December, Russian Major General Mevlutov provided emergency redistributions of rations from Russia’s 111th Separate Air Assault Brigade to North Korean troops. Russia’s attempts to showcase its military technology also failed, as North Korean forces were often better-equipped than their Russian commanders.

Despite these travails, there are still gaps in North Korea’s conventional military capabilities that Russia is well-equipped to fill. After North Korea expressed alarm about South Korea’s alleged ability to drop propaganda leaflets on its territory, Russia shipped anti-air missiles to Pyongyang. Building on its conversion of Iranian Shahed drones into domestically mass-produced Geran-2s, Russia is reportedly helping North Korea ramp up its UAV production. The Russian military’s enhancement of the precision of KN-23/Hwasong-11Ga ballistic missile strikes, which can be fired from 500 miles away, has overwhelmed Ukraine’s air defence systems. This advance provides a valuable advantage for North Korean forces. These contributions, which are paired with grain and hard currency deliveries, torpedo the United Nations sanctions regime against North Korea and leave Pyongyang better equipped for a future conventional war in Northeast Asia.

While Ukraine can claim victory over the first tranche of North Korean forces, the war is far from over. Through tactical innovations and enhanced Russian assistance, North Korea is accruing critical combat experience. As President Donald Trump seeks out a path to re-engage with North Korea on regulating its nuclear weapons program, the US must pay equal attention to the expansion of Pyongyang’s conventional weapons capabilities.

[백선호]

흐미 40% 사상이면 전투력을 잃는다고 하던데...

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전투지원부대 비율이 낮을 것 같지만 그래도 40% 손실에 손실 중 25%가 사망이면 사망자 비율도 정말 높은 것 같습니다.

[ssn688]

애초에 지상에서 공중의 물체를 쏴 맞추는 게 어려운 일이고... 원래 항공전에서도 방공포병과 요격기만으로 온전히 방어가 수행될 수 없으며 궁극의 솔루션은 공세제공이었죠. 소형 드론은 요격뿐 아니라 애초에 공세제공을 할 방법이 딱히 없다는 게 문제겠습니다. 전략폭격으로 생산기반을 없애버릴 수도 없고요. 역시나 1차대전의 방어진지×기관총과 같은 존재네요.

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기관총에 맞아도 끄떡없는 전차가 해결책이었으니, 보병이 FPV 드론 따위는 신경 안써도 되게 만드는 강화복이나 무인전투병 실용화가 답일까요 ㅋㅋㅋ