수에즈 위기 이후 가장 큰 도전에 처한 미-유럽 관계

[위종민]

1956년 수에즈 위기 이후 미-유럽 관계가 가장 큰 도전에 처했다고 분석하는 기사입니다. 

이 기사에 따르면 1956년 수에즈 위기를 틈타 러시아가 동구권 블록에서 이탈하려고 시도했던 헝가리를 손봐줬다고 합니다. 

Transatlantic alliance enters most challenging period since Suez crisis - Atlantic Council

Transatlantic alliance enters most challenging period since Suez crisis

Transatlantic alliance enters most challenging period since Suez crisis

By Edward Verona

The conclusion that many observers are drawing from the 2025 Munich Security Conference is that the United States, at least during the Trump presidency, is no longer willing to guarantee European security. Whether this is actually the case, as opposed to being simply a tactic to motivate increased European defense spending, matters less than the fact that for the first time, doubt has been cast on the cohesion of the NATO alliance.

Until now, NATO’s deterrent power has been largely based on an article of faith, or more precisely on Article 5 of the alliance’s charter document, the “all for one and one for all” commitment to mutual defense. Americans would do well to remember that Article 5 has only ever been invoked once in the alliance’s history, by the United States in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. NATO members responded on that occasion by giving their unanimous support, with many member countries sending troops to fight alongside the United States in Afghanistan.

French President Emmanuel Macron responded to last week’s US statements by hosting an emergency meeting of his European colleagues in Paris. While this impromptu summit did not produce any major decisions, participants did agree on the need for the continent to take far greater responsibility for its own security. If US President Donald Trump’s objective is to ensure bigger European defense budgets, his approach may be working.

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The recent change in tone from across the Atlantic has certainly jolted many European leaders out of their complacency, but awareness of the need for Europe to transition from trading bloc to military and geopolitical power has actually been growing for some time.

Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and annexation of Crimea in 2014 galvanized the nations of Eastern Europe and the Nordic region, but did not dissuade other European countries from increasing their dependence on Russian oil and gas. It was only after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 that the European political establishment finally heard the alarm bells and begin to take concrete action, at least in the economic sphere. However, despite an overall rise in European defense spending over the past three years, the continent has remained largely dependent on the United States for its security.

Coming to terms with a new reality and doing something about it are two very different things, of course. Europe now appears to acknowledge its own vulnerability in the face of the threat posed by a revanchist and expansionist Russia, and recognizes the need to act in response to the apparent US foreign policy pivot away from Europe toward Asia. However, the questions raised by that epiphany are manifold.

Are Europeans really willing to vote for larger defense budgets at the expense of the social safety nets that so many rely on? Are European leaders ready to consolidate their defense manufacturing industries and eliminate wasteful redundancy in weapons programs by forming EU-wide consortia? Indeed, will any new collective European defense strategy be structured around the EU, with its notoriously cumbersome decision-making processes, or would it be more efficient to form some kind of new grouping specifically for military-related matters? The answers to these questions will provide an indication of Europe’s true commitment to defending itself.

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Europe’s leaders are not the only ones who must answer tough questions. US policymakers should also carefully consider the implications of a new European security strategy. The United States, Britain, Germany, and most of the new NATO members in Eastern Europe have long opposed calls for a more autonomous European defense capability. Their reasoning has typically been that a separate European command would undermine NATO guarantees, dilute available military resources, and create a top-heavy bureaucratic structure that would add nothing to the continent’s security. Many in Europe now believe those arguments have been rendered moot by the stance of the new Trump administration.

How comfortable would the United States be with an independent European security policy? The US usually calls the shots within NATO, with European armies generally acquiescing to American weapons standardization. Could European defense manufacturing pose a challenge to US dominance? How would Washington react if an autonomous European military force chose to act independently in a regional crisis, such as in 2020 when France sent warships to back up Greece and Cyprus against Turkey over Aegean gas field discoveries?

The last major example of European powers acting independently of the United States was the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis, which illustrated the potential costs of a weakening in the transatlantic partnership. US President Dwight Eisenhower demanded the withdrawal of Anglo-French forces from Egypt, leading to the humiliation and resignation of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden. While the Suez crisis was underway the Soviet Union invaded Hungary, putting down a popular revolt against the country’s Kremlin-installed communist leadership. The divided West did nothing to support the Hungarian freedom fighters.

Edward Verona is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center covering Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe.

[백선호]

당시 미국 문서에도 나오네요.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d511

... the Soviet Union is exploiting the situation propaganda-wise. That is the problem—the allied action in Suez has made it possible for the Soviet Union to divert attention from its own misdeeds in Hungary.

[위종민]

두 사건이 동시에 벌어졌었네요. 영-불 입장에선 헝가리에 개입할 능력도 모자랐지만 그럴 겨를도 없었겠습니다.

[백선호]

The Economist 오늘 기사입니다.

https://www.economist.com/leaders/2025/02/20/how-europe-must-respond-as-trump-and-putin-smash-the-post-war-order

The problem is that if Europe comes under Russian attack and seeks American help, Mr Trump’s first and deepest instinct will be to ask what is in it for him. ... Mr Trump’s readiness to trade everything away is precisely the problem. NATO’s deterrence rests on the certainty that if one member is attacked the rest will come to its aid. Doubt is corrosive; it leaves Europe dangerously exposed.

[백선호]

Europe’s urgent task is to relearn how to acquire and wield power; it must be prepared to confront adversaries and sometimes friends, including America, which will still be there after Mr Trump. Instead of cowering, it needs an objective appraisal of the threat. Russia is a war machine with a vast arsenal of nuclear weapons, but also a medium-size economy that is declining. Europe also needs an equally objective appraisal of its own strengths: although it is slow-growing, Europe is still an economic and trade giant with great reserves of talent and knowledge.

[백선호]

If Europe cannot rely on America, it must have its own heavy-lift aircraft, logistics, surveillance: the lot. Talks must start on how Britain and France can use their nuclear weapons to shield the continent. All this will cost a fortune. Defence spending will need to rise to the 4-5% of GDP that was normal during the cold war.