AUKUS Pillar 1의 폐기 가능성 및 대안들

[위종민]

트럼프의 취임 이후로 미국이 호주에 콜린스급을 대체할 SSN을 건조해 인도한다는 AUKUS Pillar 1의 붕괴 가능성이 높아져 플랜B가 제안되고 있나 봅니다. 

핵추진잠수함이 반드시 필요하다면 버지니아급 대신 프랑스에서 쉬프랑급 SSN을 사거나, SSN 대신 디젤 잠수함 ( 일본의 소류급/타이게이급, 독일의 212/214, 한국의 KSS-III, 스페인의 S-80과 스웨덴의 블레킹에급)을 도입하는 대안들이 검토되네요. 

일본은 잠수함을 수출해 본 적이 없고, 일본도 잠수함이 급해서 호주에 넘겨주거나(소류급) 판매할 잠수함을 추가건조할 여력이 없으며 훈련 및 유지보수 시스템이 상이하고, 독일 잠수함은 독일/노르웨이, 싱가폴의 주문 때문에 건조가 밀릴 수 있고, 한국은 납기는 빠르겠지만 호주 내부의 절차 때문에 의사결정이 밀려 인도에 8년 이상 걸릴 수 있고 일본처럼 훈련 및 유지보수 시스템이 다르다는 문제가 있다고 합니다. S-80이나 블레킹에급은 조달여력이 적고 너무 늦어 후순위라고 평가합니다. 

All Or Nothing - Australia And Its AUKUS Submarine Dilemma

All or Nothing – Australia and its AUKUS submarine dilemma

• Published on 18/03/2025
• By Alex Luck
• In News

USN, RAN and RN personnel attending the visit of USS Minnesota to HMAS Stirling in February this year. Image Australian Defence.

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The Australian debate on considering alternatives to AUKUS regains traction. Naval News looks at perceived options for a “Plan B” and offers an assessment on plausible outcomes.

The arrival of the second Trump-administration in the United States prompted wider reflections over American commitment to its global network of alliances and partnerships. NATO and the Russian invasion of Ukraine are the present focal point. However, American partners in the Pacific region have also taken note of comments by officials of the Trump-administration regarding expectations on defence spending and frictions affecting the American military posture. Australia may be particularly exposed, as the country aims to resolve the dilemma of replacing the ageing Collins-class submarine-fleet with nuclear powered boats through the AUKUS “Pillar 1”-agreement.

USS Minnesota arriving at HMAS Stirling in February 2025. Australia is set to receive three Virginia-class submarines under the AUKUS agreement. Image Australian Defence.

The AUKUS-partnership intents to furnish RAN with nuclear powered submarines to replace their legacy conventional powered Collins-class submarines. The Collins-class presently reaches the end of their useful life, and as a consequence of protracted and disrupted Australian efforts to replace them with a new class of submarines, is now at the early stage of a “Life of Type-Extension” (or LOTE). LOTE intends to add ten years of useful service life to Collins, which notionally enables the type to serve into the second half of the 2030s. RAN Virginia-class submarines would begin a seamless transition from Collins, from the early 2030s onwards.The United States intent to transfer two Virginia Block IV from its active force, and later sell a Virginia Block VII, newly produced for Australia. The “SSN-AUKUS”-submarine developed between the UK and Australia, with assistance from the US, would conclude this transition, arriving by the 2040s.

Critics of AUKUS Pillar 1 point to language in American legislation mandating that both the transfer of active service boats and additional production of submarines for Australia must not result in a detrimental force posture for the United States Navy. Since both current production and maintenance throughput lag behind targeted figures, the expectation among sceptics is that the United States will end up not delivering Virginia-class boats. Such a development would leave AUKUS compromised at best and a complete failure at worst. Recent commentary on this problem therefore suggested variations of a “Plan B”, ie a different approach to replacing Collins.

Rendering of SSN AUKUS, the next generation nuclear powered attack submarine for Australia and the United Kingdom. Image BAE Systems.

Naval News will attempt to assess the viability of suggested alternatives and provide a conclusion on what constitutes a major dilemma for the Australian submarine force posture.

Back To France – The Suffren-Class

One recent suggestion acknowledges the requirement for nuclear powered submarines in Australian service. The proposal therefore is to abandon AUKUS and instead order the French Suffren-class SSN. France currently is in the process of procuring six Suffren-class submarines for the Marine Nationale, replacing Rubis-class SSN. A conventionally powered variant, dubbed “Shortfin Barracuda”, was the original winner of the Australian SEA 1000 tender. Canberra cancelled the contract with Naval Group in 2021 and launched AUKUS instead. Notably the French government has not publicly signalled in any way that such an offer is on the table. The end of SEA 1000 also caused considerable political damage to the bilateral relationship at the time.

France is acquiring six Suffren-class submarines before moving on to production of the future SSBN. French Navy picture.

Importantly, the French shipbuilding dynamic is timed carefully to transition from producing the Suffren-class to SNLE-3G. This next generation ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) will provide the future nuclear deterrent for Paris. Additionally France is also pursuing PA-NG, its next generation nuclear powered aircraft carrier. Naval Group and the French defense procurement agency (DGA) will likely treat these efforts as a priority of supreme national and strategic importance. The French deterrent has gained addtional prominence in recent months over European concerns related to NATO and, ironically, the Trump-administration. An ad hoc-order from Australia for additional Suffren, even disregarding other technical or political aspects, appears unfeasible in this context. France here faces similar dynamics to the United States or the UK. All three governments need to carefully balance their SSN-development and production with their strategic SSBN-programs.

Conventional Thinking – Diesel-Submarines

A common alternative suggestion centers on abandoning the nuclear-powered pathway entirely acquiring another conventionally powered submarine instead. The usual candidates are Japan for the Soryu- and Taigei-class, Germany for Type 212CD or a variation of Type 214 and Korea for the KSS-III. Less plausible candidates include the French Orka-program underway for the Netherlands, the Spanish S-80 or the Swedish Blekinge-class.

Japan – SEA 3000 Redux

The Japanese suggestion faces many of the same frictions currently affecting the SEA 3000 frigate-procurment for Australia. Japan has never exported one of their submarine designs, which were purposefully developed for the JMSDF. Soryu-class boats are out of production and would have to come from the active force. Japan is also keen to increase submarine availability over concerns vis a vis the Chinese Navy. Sacrificing even a single submarine for Australia may face similar scrutiny to the issues the USN is dealing with over AUKUS. If Australia were to buy newly produced Taigei-class submarines, significant questions arise over delivery timelines and adaption for Australia operations including training and maintenance. All of these points make a timely availability of a Japanese-sourced product, before Collins goes out of service, questionable.

JS Raigei, a Taigei-class submarine of JMSDF. The type remains in production for the Japanese Navy. Picture by Taki Yoshihisa.

Germany – First Come, First Served

Germany is an established and successful builder and exporter of submarines. As such the country is a default consideration also for Australian requirements. Submarine builder TKMS presently engages in the bilateral Type 212CD next generation submarine program for the German and Norwegian navies. Additionally TKMS has recently wrapped up delivery to Singapore of four Type 218SG-submarines.

The Type 212CD is under construction for the German and Norwegian navies, for up to twelve units. TKMS image.

Questions for a German-sourced product center on the availability of the Type 212CD, which so far is only offered to NATO-members. Alternatively Australia would need to select the Type 214/218 family. Notably, TKMS faces a high likelihood of additional orders from other countries. This demand would be of consequence for a notional Australian delivery date. The Type 212CD is a contender for a Canadian requirement replacing the Victoria-class. Singapore intends to order two more Type 218SG. TKMS also appears set for a downselection also in the long-running Polish effort to acquire new submarines. Should Australia consider a German design suitable to its needs, Canberra could therefore find itself at the back of the queue for any such order.

South Korea – Very Quick May Not Be Quick Enough

South Korea can notionally deliver a new submarine design at very brisk pace. Hanwha Ocean’s promoted delivery schedule for the Polish Orka-program may serve as approximate guideline. The builder previously assured delivery of a first hull to the Polish Navy in six years from contract signature. Subsequent boats would arrive every 18 months. Such a schedule would ostensibly suit the Australian urgency for maintaining an uninterrupted submarine capability.

KSS-III submarine in service with the Korean Navy. The design is notable for its ballistic missile capability (ROK Navy photo).

This schedule however serves to illustrate that even the best case-outcome is likely to fall short of requirements. Additional time will pass before contract signature. Even assuming the AUKUS-agreement would fail by the end of this year, the effort in Australia to enact the political and procurement process towards a different submarine capability may well consume two years or more. The current SEA 3000-effort, aiming for a very brisk pace, illustrates the related issues. Even a tightly executed purchase is likely going to take eight years or more from market survey to delivery. This timeframe does not consider additional difficulties absorbing a system the RAN is unfamiliar with. Such issues, as noted with the Japanese option, include related infrastructure, training and operational planning-requirements.

Other Contenders – Too Little, Too Late

Candidates like the Spanish S-80 or the Swedish Blekinge-class incur the same issues as the examples named above, but in magnified proportions. Spanish builder Navantia has not exported the S-80 before, and the submarine has suffered developmental troubles as well.

Swedish Saab would likely be keen to net another customer. However, its existing construction infrastructure is sized around the very modest procurement for the Swedish Navy. Delivery of the Blekinge-class has already experienced a delay of over five years to now 2028, illustrating related difficulties. Aside operational suitability of either design for Australian requirements both builders would likely struggle meeting the expected aggressive delivery timeline.

Rendering of the Swedish Blekinge-class. Saab offered the type unsuccessfully to the Netherlands. (Credit: Saab Kockums)

Finally French builder Naval Group is also delivering yet another conventionally powered variant of Suffren to the Netherlands under the Dutch Orka-class program. This bilateral effort is still at a very early stage of development, aiming for first delivery to the Dutch Navy by the mid-2030s. Again, the timeframe is the primary concern, even if substantial political and industrial challenges are overcome.

No AUKUS, No Submarines

This analysis gave a cursory overview of alternate options meeting the now difficult timeline for a future Australian submarine capability. The issues for each alternative consideration relate primarily to timely delivery of a notional replacement and render any notional “Plan B” implausible. Given scheduling restraints outlined above, any of the supposed “Plan B”-suggestions would have had to begin planning for a replacement of Collins, even considering the LOTE-effort, at least two or more years ago.

Should AUKUS fail to provide Australia with a new submarine-fleet, a disruption to operational readiness of the RAN submarine service now appears to be very likely. The issue is magnified by the Collins-LOTE effort appearing increasingly fragile. The ADF would then need to enact workarounds partially addressing a capability gap. Nevertheless submarines offer a particular set of uses. No individual or aggregate compensation by other assets is likely to meet the resulting shortfall. Fallbacks may include more airborne ASW and reconnaissance and more emphasis on the surface fleet assuming ASuW- and strike-roles.

New Zealand and Australian P-8A Poseidon ASW aircraft. Airborne ASW and surveillance capability would likely be expected to partially fill the capability gap, should the Australian submarine-program fail. Image NZDF.

Importantly, no new or “game changing” capability including any range of uncrewed systems in existence meets the key performance indicators to summarily replace crewed submarines as operational asset. This factor is key for other states revisiting their related force postures. Increased investment in submarine capabilities is now an observable global trend.

The Australian Navy has experienced systemic deficits in recapitalising materiel beyond the Collins-class replacement. This wider phenomenon may create additional friction compensating for the lack of operational submarines. Should AUKUS falter, “like butter spread too thin over too much bread”, the ADF could well feel too thin and stretched to meet its operational obligations.

Tags

• AUKUS, Australia, Royal Australian Navy, Submarines

Alex Luck

Alex Luck is a freelance writer & analyst, with a focus on German military modernization, NATO and naval programs worldwide, particularly with the Chinese Navy (PLAN). Originally from Germany, Alex is presently based in Brisbane, Australia.

[provide07]

호주는 차라리 항모 만드는 게 더 빠를 듯...

[위종민]

그냥 콜린스급 대체할 SSK 사고 B-21이랑 P-8을 더 사는 게 낫지 않나 싶기도..

[ssn688]

호주나 캐나다는 해역 조건으로 보나, 인력 사정으로 보나... 애초에 쉬프랑급이 합리적이지 않았나 싶습니다. 호주야 상업 원전 기반도 없으니 원잠을 들인다는 게 쉽지는 않았겠는데, 정작 캐나다는 왜 저러는지 이해가 가지 않을 정도입니다.

[위종민]

호주는 그냥 빨리 도입할 수 있는 SSK (네. KSS-III ㅎㅎㅎ) 도입하고 아낀 돈으로 B-21이랑 P-8 더 사는 게 낫지 않나 싶습니다. 캐나다가 SSN을 안 사는 이유는, 미국의 방해와 자국의 의지 결여 아닐까요?