역사 1977년 - 백파이어 논쟁; 전략폭격기인가, 전술폭격기인가?

[위종민]

1970년대 중반의 백파이어 논쟁에 대한 글입니다. 

공중급유시 항속거리는 Tu-160과 거의 비슷한 걸로 추정돼 미공군은 백파이어를 전략폭격기로 간주했지만 구소련의 공중급유기 전력은 크게 보강되지 않았고, CIA는 미공군 대비 백파이어의 항속거리도 많이 짧게 추산했네요. 

CIA와 미공군의 분쟁으로 1970년대 당시 Bill Sweetman이 2D 사진에서 3D 도면을 추산하는 기법을 이용해 항속거리를 계산했는데, 추정 탑재 연료량을 50톤(실제 54톤)으로 추정해 CIA 측에 가까운 항속거리를 계산했다고 하네요.

" “증거는 결론을 내리기에 불충분하고, 불확실성 범위는 크며, 관련 분석 방법론은 극도로 복잡하고, 얻어지는 답은 출발점으로 삼는 가정에 의해 상당 부분 결정된다.”[12]"는 말은 비단 정보분석뿐만 아니라 각종 의사결정에도 시사하는 바가 많네요. 답정너... 

백파이어 폭격기 논쟁
드웨인 A. 데이
2025년 12월 22일 월요일

백파이어는 내부 및 외부 폭탄을 탑재할 수 있고, 대함 미사일을 포함한 순항미사일도 탑재할 수 있다. (출처: Dmitry Terekhov Wikimedia Commons)

2025년 6월 1일, ‘스파이더스 웹’ 작전의 일부로 발사된 우크라이나 드론이 이르쿠츠크 인근 벨라야 공군기지에 대한 공격에서 Tu-22M 백파이어 폭격기 최소 4대를 파괴했고, 최소 1대에 손상을 입혔다. 이후 공개된 드론 영상에는 가변익 항공기들이 야외에 노출된 채 불타는 모습이 담겼고, 하루 만에 위성 영상이 중거리 폭격기들의 잔해를 드러냈다.

백파이어
2025년 6월 러시아에서 우크라이나 드론에 타격당하기 직전의 백파이어 폭격기. 공격 동안 최소 4대의 백파이어가 파괴됐고, 다른 2대는 손상됐다. (출처: Wikimedia Commons)

백파이어
맥사(Maxar)와 플래닛(Planet)의 위성 이미지가 파괴된 백파이어 폭격기들을 보여준다. 러시아 공군에 남아 있는 백파이어의 정확한 수는 공개적으로 알려져 있지 않지만 수십 대뿐이며, 아마도 60대 미만이다. 우크라이나 전쟁에서 약 10대가 파괴된 것으로 알려졌다. (출처: Maxar and Planet)

백파이어는 오래전부터 운용돼 왔고, 50년도 더 전에 폭격기들의 위성 사진이 미국 정보 공동체 내에서 분쟁을 촉발하는 데 도움이 됐다. 논쟁은 수년간 지속됐고 국제적 파장을 낳았는데, 이는 CIA와 군 정보 분석가들이 정보 자료 해석을 두고 충돌한 여러 사례 가운데 하나였다. 분쟁의 핵심은 폭격기가 얼마나 많은 연료를 탑재할 수 있는가였고, 이는 얼마나 멀리 비행할 수 있는지를 결정하며, 따라서 전술 폭격기인지 전략 폭격기인지, 그리고 국제 군비 제한 조약의 대상이 되는지를 좌우했다. 이 논쟁이 격화되던 1970년대 내내 미국 정찰 위성은 백파이어에 대한 자료를 수집하는 데 중요한 역할을 했다. 1950년대 후반의 폭격기·미사일 격차 논쟁, 그리고 1960년대 소련 SA-5 지대공미사일을 둘러싼 분쟁과 마찬가지로, CIA 분석가들은 한 가지 자료 해석을 주장한 반면, 군 당국자들은 훨씬 더 경각심을 자극하는 입장을 취했다.

백파이어
Tu-22M 백파이어는 1960년대 후반에 처음 비행했고 1970년대에 생산에 들어간 중거리 폭격기였다. CIA와 미 공군은 이 폭격기의 항속거리를 두고 논쟁했다. 이 기체는 오늘날에도 여전히 운용되고 있지만, 마지막 생산은 30년도 더 전에 이뤄졌다. (출처: Alexander Beltyukov Wikimedia Commons)

KAZAN-A
서방에서 MiG-21, MiG-25 폭스배트, MiG-29만큼 유명하지는 않지만, 백파이어는 더 잘 알려진 소련 폭격기 가운데 하나인데, 주된 이유는 고(故) 톰 클랜시 덕분이다. 제3차 세계대전을 가정한 클랜시의 소설 『붉은 폭풍의 부상(Red Storm Rising)』에는 “뱀파이어들의 춤(The Dance of the Vampires)”이라는 악명 높은 장이 등장하며, 소련 공군이 백파이어 등을 동원해 미 해군을 상대로 교묘한 기습을 수행해 상당한 피해를 입힌다. 클랜시 소설을 바탕으로 한 2002년 영화 『썸 오브 올 피어스(The Sum of All Fears)』에서는 백파이어 편대가 항공모함 USS 존 C. 스테니스에 큰 피해를 주는데, 클랜시는 해군이 영화 촬영에 협조한 조건이 영화에서 백파이어가 그 함선을 침몰시키지 않는 것이라고 말했다고 전했다.

백파이어
이륙 준비 중인 백파이어 폭격기들. 소련은 백파이어 폭격기를 거의 500대 건조했다. 이들은 중거리 폭격과 해군 타격 임무로 나뉘었다. (출처: Alexander Beltyukov Wikimedia Commons)

프로펠러가 달려 있고 둔중해 보이는 더 크고 오래된 형제 Tu-95 베어 전략 폭격기와 달리, 백파이어는 가변익과 활처럼 날렵한 형태를 지녔고, 전력으로 활주로에서 상승할 때 엔진이 보라-푸른 화염—황 함량이 높은 연료로 인해 때로는 노란 연무가 뒤따르기도 하는—을 뿜어낸다. 백파이어는 ‘끝내주는 킬러’처럼 보인다.

백파이어
백파이어는 거의 어떤 각도에서 봐도 인상적이다. 애프터버너로 작동하는 두 엔진은 극적이다. (출처: Andrej Shmatko Wikimedia Commons)

백파이어
백파이어에는 항공기 뒤로 들어오는, 그럴 만큼 어리석은 적을 상대하기 위한 꼬리 기관포가 장착돼 있다. (출처: Clemens Vasters Wikimedia Commons)

Tu-22M은 1960년대 중반부터 투폴레프 설계국이 개발했다. 초기 명칭이 Tu-22 블라인더 중거리 폭격기와 같았지만, 이는 정치적 술책이었다. 미국 군이 정치적 승인과 예산을 확보하기 위해 전작과 표기만 조금 바꾼 거의 완전히 새로운 항공기를 만든 사례가 때로 있었던 것처럼(예를 들어 F/A-18E/F 슈퍼 호넷), 소련 군도 가끔 같은 일을 했다. Tu-22M 역시 가변익을 갖고 있었지만 블라인더와 비교하면 완전히 새로운 항공기였다. 이 항공기는 두 가지 임무를 위해 설계됐다. 중거리 폭격, 그리고 미국 항공모함 공격이다.

백파이어
1972년 미국 정찰 위성 사진에 담긴 카잔 항공기 생산 시설은 많은 냉전기 폭격기 생산을 담당했다. 오늘날에도 여전히 가동 중이지만, 생산 속도는 믿을 수 없을 정도로 낮다. (출처: Harry Stranger)

1969년 8월, 미국 정찰 위성이 카잔 기체 공장 고르부노프 22에서 새로운 가변익 폭격기를 포착했다. 국가사진판독센터(NPIC)는 이 폭격기에 KAZAN-A라는 명칭을 부여했고, 이 명칭은 수년간 유지되다가 나토 명칭인 백파이어를 얻게 됐다. (명확성을 위해, 이후에는 백파이어로 통일해 사용한다.)

백파이어
1960년대 말 미국 정찰 위성이 최초의 백파이어 폭격기를 촬영한 카잔 항공기 생산 시설. 1973년 위성 사진에서는 최소 1대의 백파이어가 보인다. (출처: Harry Stranger)

1970년 3월, KH-4B 코로나다(CORONA) 위성 1109-1 임무가 다시 카잔 기체 공장을 촬영했다. 임무 보고서는 위성 사진이 그 위치나 모스크바 인근 라멘스코예 비행시험센터에서 어떤 폭격기도 드러내지 못했다고 밝혔다.[1] 1970년 6월, KH-4B 코로나다 1111 임무는 더 성공적이었는데, 사진 판독을 통해 카잔 기체 공장에서 ‘아마도’ 세 번째 시제 백파이어가 확인됐다. 다른 두 대의 백파이어는 라멘스코예에서 목격됐다.

라멘스코예는 러시아인들에게 주콥스키로 알려져 있었으며, 신형 군용기 비행시험이 이뤄지는, 소련판 에드워즈 공군기지와 같은 곳이었다. 또 다른 항공기가 1971년 4월 아흐투빈스크 비행시험센터에서 관측됐다. 이들은 모두 백파이어 A형이었지만, 정보 분석가들은 곧 A와 B라는 구분을 낳게 될 새로운 형식이 나타날 것이라는 사실을 알지 못했다. 이후 위성 사진에서 A형은 훈련 비행장들에서만 관측됐고, 작전 기지에서는 한 번도 관측되지 않았다. NPIC 평가는 A형이 7대만 생산됐다고 했으며, 1983년까지 이들 전부는 더 이상 비행하지 않고 정적 전시 상태가 됐다고 했다.[2]

백파이어
모스크바 외곽의 라멘스코예는 소련의 에드워즈 공군기지에 해당하는 곳이었다. 이곳에서 백파이어의 많은 시험이 수행됐다. 1980년 미국 정찰 위성 사진(상단)에는 여러 대의 백파이어가 보인다. 그러나 1982년 위성 사진(하단)에서는 더 적은 수가 보이는데, 아마도 그 무렵 항공기가 대량 생산에 들어가 시험 비행이 더 이상 많이 필요하지 않았기 때문일 것이다. (출처: Harry Stranger)

1971년 11월, 미국 위성이 카잔에서 백파이어 B로 지정된 기체를 촬영했다. 이 기체는 날개폭이 늘었고, 백파이어 A에 있던 커진 포드가 없었다. 이 포드들은 원래 착륙장치 포드로 생각됐지만, 실제로는 공기역학적 구조물이었고, 이점이 없다는 것이 분명해지자 제거됐다. 1972년 5월, 라멘스코예에서 백파이어 B가 관측됐고, 같은 해 9월에는 아흐투빈스크 비행장에서도 관측됐다. 1974년 4월과 5월이 되어서야 백파이어 B가 랴잔/댜길레보 비행장과 니콜라예프/쿨바키노 비행장 훈련 기지에서 목격됐다.[3]

백파이어
1980년 우크라이나 니콜라예프 공군기지에 전개된 Tu-22M 백파이어 폭격기들. 항공기가 서부 소련에 배치된 것은, 미국을 공격하는 전략 임무가 아니라 유럽을 공격하는 중거리 임무를 염두에 둔 것임을 시사했다. 이 우크라이나 비행장은 2022년에 러시아에 의해 파괴됐다. (출처: Harry Stranger)

세 번째 형식인 백파이어 C는 1977년 8월 라멘스코예에서 처음 식별됐고, 1978년 4월 카잔에서도 포착됐다. 이 기체는 개조된 기수와 공기 흡입구를 갖고 있었다. 시제기는 라멘스코예에서 화재로 파괴됐다. 랴잠/댜길레보 훈련 기지로의 초기 전개는 1981년 3월에 이뤄졌다.[4]

이 시기에 공개된 미국 위성 사진 가운데 백파이어가 담긴 것은 코로나다 및 이후의 헥사곤(HEXAGON) 정찰 위성에서 나온 것뿐이지만, 항공기들은 훨씬 더 강력한 갬빗(GAMBIT) 위성에 의해 거의 확실히 촬영됐을 것이다. 1970년대 중반까지 갬빗 영상은 지상 해상도 30센티미터보다 더 나은 수준을 제공하고 있었고, 이를 통해 사진 판독자들은 폭격기의 동체 폭 같은 촬영 대상의 물체를 점점 더 정밀하게 측정할 수 있었다. 백파이어 같은 항공기는 Tu-95 베어처럼 치수가 정확히 알려진 다른 항공기 등 비행장 내의 다른 물체들과 비교될 수도 있었다. 이러한 영상과 항공기 공학 원리에 대한 지식을 바탕으로, 연료를 담을 수 있는 항공기 내부 용적이 얼마나 되는지 계산해 최대 연료 탑재량을 추정할 수 있었다. 그리고 이 추정치와 엔진 효율 및 비행 프로파일에 관한 가정을 통해 항공기의 항속거리 추정치를 도출할 수 있었다. 그러나 바로 그 계산들이 논쟁을 낳았다.

백파이어
1984년 위성 사진은 네 대의 백파이어 폭격기에 대한 엔진 시험을 보여주는데, 눈이 날려 나가 노출된 부분에서 기체들이 확인된다. 폭격기의 연간 최대 생산은 약 연 30대였고, 1990년대 초 생산이 중단될 때까지 총 생산은 500대에 조금 못 미쳤다. (출처: Harry Stranger)

1970년대 동안 위성은 백파이어에 대해 두 가지 주요 유형의 정보를 제공했다. 처음에는 항공기 자체에 대한 기술 정보를 제공했고, 이후에는 그것이 전략 비행장에 배치되는지 혹은 유럽 주변부에 배치되는지 등, 어떻게 배치되고 있는지를 보여주는 단서들을 제공했다.

항속거리 추정치
백파이어의 항속거리를 둘러싼 논쟁은 1971년에 시작돼 수년에 걸쳐 계속됐다. 이 문제는 1973년에 더 첨예해졌는데, 그때 백파이어가 고위급 국가정보추정(National Intelligence Estimate)에 포함될 예정이었기 때문이다. 백파이어가 얼마나 멀리 날 수 있는지에 대한 추정치 범위는 다양했지만, 공중급유 장비가 갖춰진다면 백파이어는 확실히 미국 본토 내 표적에 도달할 수 있었다.[5] 그러나 미 공군과 달리 소련은 급유 전력이 매우 제한적이었고—전략 항공기를 급유할 수 있는 공중급유기가 많지 않았다.

1970년대 초반에는 여러 미국(및 외국) 정보 기관들이 대체로 백파이어의 항속거리에 대해 합의하고 있었다. 하지만 1976년에 이 문제는 미국 정보 공동체 내부에서 끓는점에 이르렀다. 원인은 CIA가 백파이어의 최대 항속거리에 대해 새롭게, 그리고 상당히 더 낮은 추정치를 내놓았기 때문이다.

군의 더 긴 항속거리 추정치를 밀어붙인 핵심 인물은 미 공군 정보 담당 차장(Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence)인 조지 키건(George Keegan) 소장이었다. 키건은, 『닥터 스트레인지러브』에 나오는 가상의 “벅” 터지드슨 장군처럼, 언제나 커다란 공산주의자 음모를 맡아내는, 골수 냉전주의자였다. 뉴욕타임스 기자 윌리엄 버로스는 훗날 “조지 키건은 러시아를 걱정하고 그들을 깊이 불신한다. 그러나 그는 CIA를 경멸한다”고 썼다.[6] CIA는 그를 격분시키려 하고 있었다.

백파이어
1970년대 중반 미 공군 정보의 수장이었던 조지 키건 소장. 그는 백파이어 폭격기의 항속거리를 포함해 여러 주제에서 CIA와 충돌했다. 그는 틀렸다. (출처: Wikimedia Commons)

1976년까지 CIA는 최신 정보에 근거해 백파이어의 성능을 추정하기 위해, 아직 기밀로 남아 있는 한 조직을 참여시켰다. CIA는 또 다른 분석을 위해 항공우주 계약업체 맥도널 더글러스(McDonnell Douglas)도 고용했는데, 이 계약업체는 다른 부서가 만든 입력값을 사용했을 수도 있으며 자체적으로 산출한 것은 아닐 수도 있다. CIA는 폭격기의 항속거리를 2,222킬로미터(1,200해리)로 추정했는데, 이는 이전 추정치보다 낮았다. 군, 특히 공군은 이 결론에 반대했다. CIA의 새 항속거리 추정치는 노스아메리칸 록웰, 제너럴 다이내믹스, 영국 공군, 그리고 공군 해외기술부(FTD)가 이전에 산출한 추정치보다 상당히 낮았다. 이는 키건을 크게 짜증 나게 만들었는데, 그는 다른 모든 추정치가 일관되게 더 높게 나오는 반면 CIA만 현저히 더 낮은 이유를 궁금해했다. 키건은 CIA에 서한을 보냈다.[7]

새 분석을 감독한 CIA 부서는 키건의 편지에 대해 상세한 답변을 작성했다. 그 답변은, 이전 추정치들이 모두 같은 가정에 기반해 있었음을 지적했다. 즉, 이용 가능한 내부 용적의 대부분이 연료로 배정돼 있다는 가정, 엔진의 추력 특성이 출력이 향상된 SST 엔진과 같다는 가정, 최적 이륙 및 순항 공기역학이 적용된다는 가정이었다. 그러나 이 가정들은 검증되지 않았다. 한편 새로운 정보가 확보되면서, 그러한 가정들을 바꿔야 하는 상황이 됐다. 그 새로운 정보가 정확히 무엇인지는 기밀 해제 보고서만으로는 분명하지 않다. 다만 보고서의 보안 표기는, 위성 영상에서 파생된 정보와 통신 정보가 포함돼 있음을 보여준다. 보고서는 또한 백파이어의 착륙장치 설계를 언급했는데, 착륙장치는 위성으로 보이지 않으므로, 이는 CIA가 아마도 착륙·이륙 중인 항공기를 촬영한 다른 사진을 갖고 있었음을 시사한다. 한 출처에 따르면 CIA는 백파이어의 비행시험 텔레메트리에도 접근할 수 있었다고 한다. 최근 기밀 해제된 문서는 1971년 초 SAVANT II 위성이 항공기 텔레메트리를 수집하고 있었다는 사실을 보여주지만, 어떤 종류의 항공기 텔레메트리인지는 명확하지 않다.[8]

백파이어
SAVANT 계열 신호정보 위성 두 대가 1970년대 후반 미국에 의해 발사됐다. SAVANT II는 소련 항공기 시험의 텔레메트리 신호를 가로챘다고 알려져 있으며, 초기 백파이어 비행도 포함됐을 가능성이 있다. 미국 정보 공동체가 백파이어 시험 비행의 텔레메트리를 가로챘다는 징후가 일부 있다. (출처: NRO)

때로 키건의 논증(명백히 그의 참모들이 개발한)은 다소 난해하게 보였는데, 예를 들어 항공기가 활주로에서 이륙할 때 기수가 들리는 회전 각도, 그리고 이륙 중 지면 효과(ground effect)를 통해 이득을 볼 수 있는지 같은 문제였다. CIA 분석가들은 이런 문제들이 항공기의 최대 항속거리에 거의 영향을 미치지 않는다고 보았다. 키건은 또한 정보 분석의 대표적 금기를 저지르는 듯했는데, 능력과 의도를 혼동한 것이다. 그의 글 일부는 어떤 상황에서는 백파이어가 전략적으로 사용될 수 있으니 소련이 전략적으로 사용할 것이라고 주장했지만, 소련이 실제로 그렇게 할 계획이라는 증거(예를 들어 공중급유 전력 증강)는 없었다.

한 정보 장교는 문제를 이렇게 요약했다. “증거는 결론을 내리기에 불충분하고, 불확실성 범위는 크며, 관련 분석 방법론은 अत्य도로 복잡하고, 얻어지는 답은 출발점으로 삼는 가정에 의해 상당 부분 결정된다.”

키건은 또한 신형 백파이어 B가 더 큰 날개와 포드 제거로 항속거리가 더 길어졌다고 주장했다. 그러나 CIA는 더 큰 날개가 항력을 늘려 그러한 이점을 상쇄한다는, 공개되지 않은 NASA 연구를 인용했다. 그는 더 나아가 생산 공장 규모가 커졌다는 점이 백파이어 생산 증가를 뜻한다고 주장했지만, CIA는 공장 바닥 면적이 20% 늘었다고 해서 자동으로 폭격기가 더 많아지는 것은 아니며, 그 공간이 완성 기체의 출고 후 정비에 배정될 수도 있다고 반박했다.

1976년 8월, 백파이어 논쟁이 언론에 유출되며 CIA에 원치 않는 주목을 불러왔다. 당시 중앙정보국장이었던 조지 H.W. 부시는 포드 대통령의 국가안보보좌관 브렌트 스코크로프트에게 서한을 보내, 기관의 입장을 설명하고 키건 장군의 주장들을 반박했다.[9]

백파이어
1976년 백파이어 항속거리 분쟁이 공개적으로 번졌을 때 CIA 수장이었던 조지 부시. 그는 CIA의 분석 권위를 약화시키는 팀 B 정보 평가 실험에 동의했다. (출처: Wikimedia Commons)

8월 중순이 되자 키건은 CIA의 분석에 대해 다시 불만을 제기했고, CIA 분석에 대한 독립 평가에 참여할 두 명의 항공우주 업계 임원을 추천했다. CIA는 이 제안을 수용했지만, 기관과 키건 소장 사이에는 분명 적대감이 존재했다.[10]

키건의 최신 불만에 대응해 한 정보 장교는 논쟁을 설명하는 내부 메모를 작성했다. 그는 정보 공동체 대부분이 여전히 백파이어가 주변부(peripheral) 공격 역할에 적합하다고 믿고 있었지만, 공군은 백파이어가 대륙간 공격을 포함한 다양한 임무를 수행하도록 설계됐다고 주장하고 있다고 적었다.[11]

항공기의 전체적 외형은, 이전 소련 폭격기들과 비교했을 때 가변익과 뾰족한 형태가 시사하듯, 방어가 강한 지역을 초음속 돌파하고 저고도로 침투하도록 설계됐음을 보여주는 듯했다. 공군의 입장은 부분적으로, 항공기가 고고도에서 아음속으로 비행하면 더 긴 항속거리를 가질 수 있다는 가정에 기반했다. 또한 그 시점까지 관측된 모든 백파이어는 공중급유 프로브를 갖고 있었는데, 이는 항공기가 장거리 비행을 염두에 두고 설계됐다는 공군의 주장을 뒷받침했다. 만약 항공기가 미국에 더 가까운 곳에 전진 배치되고 일방(one-way) 임무로 비행한다면, 당연히 미국을 공격하기 위해 훨씬 더 멀리 갈 수 있다.

백파이어
초기 백파이어 폭격기들은 급유 프로브를 장비하고 있었다. 이는 CIA와 미 공군 사이에서 논쟁의 원천이 됐다. 항공기가 급유를 받는다면 미국의 많은 표적에 도달할 수 있다. 그러나 소련이 빈약한 공중급유기 전력을 백파이어 지원을 위해 증강하고 있다는 징후는 없었다. 소련은 이후 군비통제 합의의 일부로, 백파이어에 급유 프로브를 장착하지 않기로 동의했다. (출처: Erik Gundersen Wikimedia Commons)

결론을 내리기 어려웠던 이유는, 백파이어가 1974년부터야 작전 운용에 들어가 소련의 의도를 판단하기가 더 어려웠기 때문이기도 했다. 지금까지는 주변부 및 해상 타격 역할로만 배치돼 있었다. 미 해군 소속으로 일했던 한 정보 장교는 문제를 이렇게 요약했다. “증거는 결론을 내리기에 불충분하고, 불확실성 범위는 크며, 관련 분석 방법론은 अत्य도로 복잡하고, 얻어지는 답은 출발점으로 삼는 가정에 의해 상당 부분 결정된다.”[12]

1976년 10월까지 CIA는 백파이어에 대한 새로운 결론에 이르게 된 경과를 설명하는 내부 메모를 작성했고, 정보 공동체의 다른 구성원들은 이미 1년 반 전인 1975년 4월에 그 새 분석을 알고 있었다고 지적했다. 백파이어 분쟁은 최근 몇 달 사이 공개적 논쟁이 됐다. CIA 국장은 CIA가 재분석을 수행하기 전에도 의회에서 항공기의 항속거리에 대해 여러 차례 증언했으며, 더 최근에는 “정보가 행정부 정책을 뒷받침하기 위해 왜곡됐다”는 주장을 담은 기사들이 언론에 등장했다.[13]

백파이어
1976년 말 국가정보추정에서 CIA와 다른 정보기관들이 제시한 항속거리 추정치. 백파이어의 실제 항속거리는 CIA 추정치의 하단에 가까운 것으로 드러났다. (출처: CIA)

1976년 12월에 작성된 국가정보추정 NIE 11-3/8-76은 소련 프로그램의 현재 동향에 대한 핵심 판단을 포함했다. 보고서는 “백파이어 폭격기가 미국을 상대로 운용된다면 소련의 대륙간 타격 능력이 증가할 것이다. 백파이어는 다양한 비행 프로파일을 사용해 유라시아 주변부의 지상 및 해상 표적에 대해 작전을 수행하는 데 매우 적합하며, 고고도 아음속 프로파일로 미국을 상대로 작전할 수 있는 일부 능력도 가지고 있다”고 밝혔다.

이어 “국방정보국(DIA)과 미 공군 정보 담당 차장(Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force)은 백파이어가 공중급유 없이도 미국을 상대로 작전할 수 있는 상당한 능력을 갖고 있다고 추정한다. 중앙정보국(CIA)과 국무부는 같은 조건에서 미국을 상대로 한 능력이 미미하다고 추정한다. 공중급유가 있다면, 백파이어는 최저 성능 추정치의 경우에도 대륙간 작전 능력이 상당히 증가할 것이다. 또한 백파이어는 항속거리를 개선하기 위해 여러 방식으로 개조될 수 있다”고 덧붙였다.[14]

백파이어
국방부 간행물 『소련 군사력(Soviet Military Power)』에 수록된 여러 소련 폭격기의 항속거리 추정치. 급유가 없으면 백파이어는 미국 대부분 지역에 도달할 수 없었다. 문제는 소련이 백파이어 편대를 급유할 수 있는 공중급유기가 많지 않았다는 점이었다. (출처: Department of Defense)

“우리는 백파이어가 계속해서 전구(theater) 및 해군 임무에 배정될 가능성이 높다고 본다. 그리고—DIA, ERDA, 육군, 공군을 제외하면—대륙간 임무에 배정될 가능성은 그에 상응해 낮다고 본다. 만약 소련이 상당수의 백파이어를 미국을 상대로 한 임무에 배정하기로 결정한다면, 그들은 거의 확실히 항공기의 성능을 업그레이드하거나, 이를 지원할 호환 가능한 신형 공중급유기 전력을 전개할 것이다. 국방정보국, 에너지연구개발청(ERDA), 육군 정보 담당 차장, 공군 정보 담당 차장은, 백파이어 운용에 관한 उपलब्ध한 증거가 주변부 및 해상 공격이 현재의 주된 임무라는 점만을 시사한다고 본다. 소련이 백파이어의 대륙간 능력을 자의적으로 사용할 수 있다는 점을 근거로, 이들 기관은 호환 가능한 공중급유기 전력을 전개하거나 항공기 성능을 업그레이드하지 않더라도, 백파이어가 분명히 미국에 대한 위협을 제기한다고 믿는다. 공군 정보 담당 차장은 더 나아가 백파이어 전력의 일부가 미국 본토(contiguous U.S.)를 상대로 한 임무를 가질 것이라고 믿는다.”[15]

CIA와 국무부는 백파이어의 항속거리를 3,525~4,150해리(6,528~7,686킬로미터)로 계산했고, 따라서 전략 무기가 아니라고 봤다. 공군은 5,400해리(10,001킬로미터)로 판단했고, 따라서 미국 본토에 도달할 수 있는 능력이 있다고 봤다. 급유가 있다면 항공기는 훨씬 더 멀리 비행할 수 있었다.

1977년 3월, 중앙정보국장은 TV 프로그램 “페이스 더 네이션(Face the Nation)”에 출연할 예정이었고, 워싱턴 스타(The Washington Star)의 최근 칼럼이 이 이슈를 제기했기 때문에 백파이어에 대한 질문을 받을 가능성이 있었다. 국장은 SALT 협상에서 미국의 공식 입장이 백파이어가 바이슨(Bison) 중폭격기와 동급이며 중폭격기로 산정돼야 한다는 것이고, CIA의 수정된 항속거리 추정에 대한 입장은 공개된 적이 없다는 점을 안내받았다.[16]

폭격기 산정과 팀 B
소련 폭격기는 이전에도 미국 정보 공동체 내 논쟁의 대상이었다. 1950년대 중반에는 소련이 보유한 전략 폭격기 수를 둘러싸고 논란이 있었는데, CIA가 과대평가됐음을 입증하기까지는 수년과, U-2 정찰기가 소련 비행장을 상공에서 촬영한 자료가 필요했다.[17]

냉전기의 팀 B 실험은, 정보 분석가들이 제공하는 결론이 마음에 들지 않으면 누군가가 자기 마음대로 전문가 패널을 꾸릴 수 있다는 선례를 세웠기 때문에, 정보 공동체 내부의 많은 사람들에게 경각심을 불러일으켰다.

1976년 말 국가정보추정이 나오기 전부터, 소련 무기 능력에 관한 더 큰 분쟁이 정보 공동체 내부에서 벌어지고 있었다. 1976년 5월, 제럴드 포드 대통령은 CIA가 보고 있던 것과 같은 자료를 검토하고 대안적 해석을 제시할 외부 전문가 그룹을 नियुक्त하는, 이른바 “팀 B” 프로젝트를 만들었다. 이는 CIA가 소련 무기 생산을 지속적으로 과소평가해 왔다는 आरोप에서 비롯됐다.

팀 B 보고서는 CIA 결론보다 훨씬 더 경각심을 자극하는 내용이었고, 소련 무기 생산과 능력이 훨씬 더 크다고 추정했다. 팀 B는 백파이어 항속거리에 대한 자체 추정을 하지는 않았다. 그들은 단지 CIA와 미 공군이 산출한 항속거리들을 비교했을 뿐이다.

팀 B 보고서는 원래 연습으로만 의도됐지만, 지미 카터가 대통령이 된 직후 유출됐고, 소련이 CIA가 평가해 온 것보다 더 큰 위협이며 더 빠르게 성장하고 있다는 주장을 펴는 데 여러 사람에게 활용됐다. 이는 더 큰 미국의 국방력 증강을 정당화하는 데 사용됐다.

냉전기의 팀 B 실험은, 정보 분석가들이 제공하는 결론이 마음에 들지 않으면 누군가가 자기 마음대로 전문가 패널을 꾸릴 수 있다는 선례를 세웠기 때문에, 정보 공동체 내부의 많은 사람들에게 경각심을 불러일으켰다. 이는 CIA를 약화시키고 정보 분석을 정치적 조작에 더 취약하게 만들었다.

돌이켜보면 팀 B 보고서는 매우 부정확했고, CIA의 추정치가 현실에 훨씬 더 가까웠음이 드러났다. 예를 들어 팀 B는 1984년까지 소련이 백파이어 500대를 보유할 것이라고 예측했다. 그러나 1983년에 NPIC는 1982년 7월 15일부터 1983년 7월 15일까지 소련의 생산 속도가 연 30.5대였다고 판단했는데, 이는 단기간에 수백 대를 생산할 만큼 높은 속도가 아니었다.[18] 팀 B가 1984년까지 500대라고 예측한 것과 달리, 실제 수는 235대였고, 1993년에 생산이 마침내 중단됐을 때에도 500대에 조금 못 미쳤다.

이 숫자와 항속거리 추정치가 더 중요한 의미를 갖게 된 이유는, 1970년대 후반까지 미국과 소련이 군비통제 제한 협상을 진행하고 있었기 때문이다. 만약 백파이어가 대륙간 폭격기로 산정된다면, 소련은 훨씬 더 큰 폭격기 전력을 갖게 된다. 특히 미국이 해상 공격에 명백히 اختصاص된 폭격기들까지 포함한다면 더 그렇다. 결국 양측은 소련이 공중급유 장비를 갖추지 않는 데 동의하는 한, 백파이어를 대륙간 폭격기로 산정하지 않기로 합의했다.

딥 블랙
미국의 전략 정찰—당시 고도의 기밀이었던 정찰 위성들을 포함해—의 발전을 다룬 1987년 저서 『딥 블랙(Deep Black)』에서, 윌리엄 버로스는 은퇴한 조지 키건에 대해 썼다. 키건은 자신의 인정대로 강경파였고, 소련의 군사 능력에 대해 거듭 경고했지만 대체로 무시당해 왔다.[19]

키건은 수많은 소련 전략 동향에 대해 경보를 울렸다. 『딥 블랙』은 소련이 핵전쟁을 수행하고 생존할 수 있도록 하는 방대한 지하 지도부 벙커에 대한 그의 우려를 전했다. 1970년대 후반에는 그는 소련의 우주 기반 레이저 시스템에 대해 경고하고 있었다. 1978년 공군에서 은퇴한 뒤 키건은 BBC 파노라마 프로그램 “우주에서의 진짜 전쟁(The Real War in Space)”에 출연해 소련의 우주 무기에 대해 경고했고, 은퇴 후에도 자신이 공군 정보 수장으로 있었던 5년 동안 접한 최고기밀 정보를 바탕으로 소련 무기 개발에 대해 공개적으로 강경 발언을 이어갔다. 키건이 이전에 최고기밀 정보에 접근할 수 있었던 사실은 그에게 신뢰성을 부여하는 듯했지만, 정보 공동체 내부에서는 “위성(satellite)”이라는 단어조차 말하지 않도록 훈련받았던 많은 사람들을 불안하게 만들었다.

키건은 군이 우주 정찰 자산을 통제해야 하며, 군 장교들이 소련 무기 능력 평가를 수행해야 한다고 믿었다. 그는 CIA가 자산을 통제하거나 평가를 수행해야 한다고 믿지 않았다. 또한 키건은 군비통제 합의가 정보 생산에 교활한 영향을 미치고 있다고 믿었는데, 버로스의 표현을 빌리면 “봐야 할 것은 보이게 될 것이라는 잘못된 가정”을 만들어낸다는 것이었다.

1970년대 초 키건의 적수는 중앙정보국장 윌리엄 E. 콜비였다. 콜비는 동남아시아에서 비밀 작전 역할을 수행한 뒤 1971년에 CIA 3인자 자리에 올랐다. 랭리 본부에 도착하자 그는 새롭게 등장한 첨단 정보 수집 체계의 배열에 처음으로 노출됐다. “나는 서부 해안의 항공우주 기술 공장들을 둘러보았고, 그곳에서 우주 시스템, 레이더, 전자 센서, 적외선 사진, 그리고 어디에나 있는 컴퓨터가 만들어내는 진정한 SF 세계에 눈이 뜨였다. 이 모든 것은 하늘 높이에서 바다 깊은 곳까지 놀라운 정확도와 정밀도로 정보를 수집할 수 있었다”고 콜비는 회고록에 썼다. 콜비는 이후 CIA 활동에 대한 의회 조사에 지나치게 협조했다는 이유로 1975년 11월 포드 대통령에 의해 해임됐다. 그는 조지 부시로 교체됐고, 부시는 이후 팀 B 창설에 동의했으며 백파이어 논쟁에 휘말렸다.

백파이어
1970년대 초 CIA 수장이었던 윌리엄 콜비는 여러 정보 이슈에서 키건 소장과 충돌했다. 그는 조지 부시로 교체됐다. (출처: Wikimedia Commons)

키건의 ‘군비통제 협상이 정보 수집을 왜곡한다’는 믿음은 1960년대 후반부터 전략 정찰 공동체 내부에서 논쟁돼 온 것이었다. 미국 정찰 위성 운용자들은 자신들의 주 임무가 소련의 전략적 위협에 대한 정보 수집이며, 조약 감시는 그 활동의 하위 집합일 뿐, 정보 수집의 동인이 아니라고 믿었다. 1972년 정보 공동체 내에서 군비통제와 새로운 정보 수집 체계의 필요성에 대한 논의가 진행될 때, 한 공군 장교는 정보 수집 그 자체가 가장 어려운 도전이라고 지적했다.[20] 소련의 다탄두 독립재진입체(MIRV)나 이동식 ICBM을 탐지하는 것 같은 새로운 정보 요구는, 조약으로 금지되든 아니든 미국의 정보 수집을 견인할 것이었다. 다른 소련 무기 개발도 마찬가지였다.

콜비 자신도 그 점을 주장했다. “검증은 우리가 평소에 해오던 정보 과정의 연장일 뿐이다. 우리 사이에 조약이 있든 없든 우리는 소련 무기를 감시할 것이고, 기습으로부터 나라를 지키려면 그래야 한다.”[21]

분석가들
논쟁 이후 수십 년이 지나서도, 역사학자들과 기자들은 그 사건을 이해하려고 애썼다. 로버트 M. 클라크의 『정보 분석: 표적 중심 접근(Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach)』에 따르면, CIA와 공군 정보는 맥도널 더글러스에서 백파이어 분석을 수행할 별도의 계약 팀들을 각각 운용했다.[22] 두 팀은 서로 다른 항속거리 추정치에 도달했고, 클라크는 “각 측은 상대가 증거를 왜곡하고 있다고 비난했다”고 썼다. 그러나 CIA가 맥도널 더글러스를 고용해 백파이어 분석을 수행했다는 증거는 있지만, 공군이 그렇게 했다는 증거는 없다.

클라크는 백파이어 분석이, 소련이 새로운 대륙간 폭격기를 개발할 것이라는 이전의 예측 때문에 분석가들이 그 관점을 지지하는 증거를 “선택적으로 골라” 사용한 “조기 종결(premature closure)”의 사례라고 주장했다. 그는 “소련 체계의 설계와 요구, 그리고 그 시점에 소련이 위협으로 보았던 것이 무엇이었는지를 진지하게 고려했다면, 분석가들은 백파이어의 임무가 주변부 공격이라는 점에 더 빨리 초점을 맞췄을 가능성이 크다”고 썼다.

더 긴 항속거리 추정치로 이어진 다른 요인들도 있었을 수 있다. 클라크는 또한 이 사례가 최악의 경우(worst-case) 추정치를 제시하는 흔한 분석 문제를 보여준다고 썼다. “백파이어의 크기와 구성이라면 미국 폭격기는 대륙간 항속거리를 쉽게 가질 수 있었을 것”이라고 클라크는 썼지만, 소련 폭격기들은 연료 효율이 더 낮았다.

백파이어
1977년 『Aviation Week and Space Technology』는 서방에서 Tu-22M 폭격기의 첫 사진을 게재했다. 이 흐릿한 사진과 또 다른 사진은 항공 저술가 빌 스위트먼이 기체의 평면도를 만들고 연료 탑재량과 항속거리를 추정하는 데 사용됐다. 스위트먼의 추정치는 항공기의 실제 연료 탑재량과 8% 이내로 일치했다. (출처: Aviation Week and Space Technology)

이에 비해 항공 저술가 빌 스위트먼은 다른 설명을 제시했다. 2015년, 스위트먼은 1970년대 후반에 자신과 영국 잡지 『Flight International』의 동료 항공 저술가 더그 리처드슨이 백파이어 항속거리에 대한 자체 분석을 수행했던 과정을 회고했다. 1977년 초 그들의 경쟁지 『Aviation Week & Space Technology』가 비행 중인 백파이어의 흐릿한 사진을 게재했다.[23]

“추정 기본 치수는 공개돼 있었다. 그래서 Flight의 아티스트들이 쓰던 슈프티 스코프(Shufti Scope)[2차원 이미지로부터 3차원 물체를 그릴 수 있게 해주는 장치]로 사진을 확대하고 트레이싱한 뒤, 날개끝-날개끝 선과 장축에 평행한 격자선을 그려, 그럴듯한 평면도와 측면도를 구성할 수 있었다. 거기서 용적과 연료 용량을 추정할 수 있었다.”라고 스위트먼은 최근 통신에서 설명했다.[24]

백파이어
이 백파이어 도면은 『Aviation Week』와 경쟁 관계였던 『Flight International』의 아티스트가 제작했다. 빌 스위트먼과 동료는 사진 속 대상을 도면으로 바꾸는 장치인 “슈프티 스코프”를 사용해 이를 만들었다. (출처: Flight International via Bill Sweetman)

“우리가 독립적으로 내린 결론은 (1) 얇은 바깥쪽 날개에는 연료가 많이 들어가지 않고, (2) 연료 탱크를 후방 조종석 격벽까지 앞으로 연장할 수 없다는 것이었다. 그렇게 하면 거의 모든 연료가 무게중심 앞에 위치하게 되고, 연료가 연소되면서 무게중심이 이동하는 것을 감당할 수 없게 되기 때문이다. 특히 꼬리 지렛대 길이가 짧기 때문에 더 그렇다.”

그들은 백파이어가 연료 50메트릭톤을 탑재한다고 계산했고, 따라서 미 공군이 주장한 항속거리를 달성할 수 없다고 결론냈다. 스위트먼은 또 이렇게 덧붙였다. “내 동료 찰스 길슨(국방 편집장)이 영국 국방부에서 브리핑을 받으면서 내가 완전히 헛소리라고 들었을 때, 그는 정면에서 찍힌, 착륙 접근 중인 백파이어처럼 보이는 사진을 보여받았다. 그는 스케치를 할 수 있도록 허용됐는데, 꽤 도움이 됐다.” 『Flight International』 기사에는 상공에서 본 항공기 형상의 새로운 그림도 포함됐다.

“우리가 숫자를 발표한 지 오래 지나지 않아, 맥도널 더글러스의 한 엔지니어에게서 전화가 왔다. 그는 우리가 어떻게 자기 팀과 같은 숫자를 맞혔는지 의아해했다. 나는 내 계산기에 대해 말해줬다.”라고 스위트먼은 2015년에 썼다.

냉전이 끝난 뒤인 1992년, 스위트먼은 투폴레프 팩트시트에서 Tu-22M이 연료 54톤을 탑재한다는 사실을 알게 됐고—자신의 계산이 8% 이내로 정확했음을 확인했다. 스위트먼은 또한 맥도널 더글러스 엔지니어에게서, 그의 팀이 CIA를 위해 분석을 수행했고 비슷한 숫자를 도출했다는 사실을 들었다. 그 엔지니어에 따르면, 키건 소장은 팀이 숫자를 바꾸지 않으면 공군에 F-15 전투기를 공급하는 맥도널의 계약에 개입하겠다고 위협했다. 그러나 CEO 샌포드 “샌디” 맥도널은 키건의 압박에 굴복하지 않았다. 따라서 클라크가 말한 것처럼 더 긴 백파이어 항속거리 추정치가 “거울상 투영(mirror imaging)”과 “최악의 경우 추정”의 결과였을 수도 있지만, 군의 정치적 압박도 요인이었다.[25] 스위트먼은 다음과 같은 교훈으로 글을 맺었다. “때로 고위 장교들은 진실을 늘려서 결국 부러뜨린다. 하지만 계산기는 거짓말을 하지 않는다.”

백파이어
F-14 톰캣은 백파이어 같은 소련의 장거리 타격 항공기 공격으로부터 미 항공모함 전단을 보호하기 위해 제작됐다. AIM-54 피닉스 미사일을 장비한 목표는, 공격기가 미사일을 발사하기 전에 격추하는 것이었다. 여기서는 냉전기 F-14가 백파이어를 호위하고 있다. (출처: US Navy)

1976년 공군은 백파이어의 항속거리를 5,400해리(10,001킬로미터)로 판단했으며, 이 수치는 수년간 유지됐다. CIA와 국무부는 백파이어의 항속거리를 3,525~4,150해리(6,528~7,686킬로미터)로 계산했다. 냉전이 끝난 후 백파이어의 실제 항속거리가 알려졌는데, 3,700해리(6,800킬로미터, 또는 4,200마일)로, CIA의 낮은 추정치에 매우 가까웠다.

백파이어는 드와이트 D. 아이젠하워 대통령이 경고했던 바를 보여주는 사례 연구가 된다. 즉, 군 조직은 자신들에게 유리하게 정보 자료를 해석해 소련의 능력을 과장하고, 더 큰 예산과 새로운 무기 체계를 정당화하려 한다는 것이다.

더 많은 백파이어가 실전 배치되면서, 위성 정찰은 그들이 어디에 기지하고 누가 운용하는지를 보여줬다. 그들이 전략 폭격기로 배치되고 있지 않으며, 소련이 공중급유기 전력을 증강하고 있지 않다는 점이 더 분명해졌다. 많은 백파이어는 해상 공격에 اختصاص돼, 큰 미사일을 탑재해 자신들이 낼 수 있는 고속을 활용해 미국 항공모함을 침몰시키려 했다. 다른 미국 위성들, 예를 들어 국방지원프로그램(Defense Support Program) 미사일 경보 위성은, 미 해군에 경보를 주기 위해 백파이어와 그 미사일—소위 “느린 보행자(slow walker)” 표적—을 추적하는 데 사용됐다. 미 해군은 장거리 AIM-54 피닉스 미사일을 갖춘 F-14 톰캣 전투기를 운용해, 백파이어가 미사일을 발사하기 전에 격추하려 했다.

백파이어
우크라이나의 한 장군이 러시아 비행장의 사진과, 드론 공격에 가장 취약한 지점에 X 표시가 된 백파이어를 포함한 폭격기들의 상공 사진을 살펴보고 있다. 우크라이나는 박물관에 있는 백파이어를 연구할 수 있었다. (출처: Wikimedia Commons)

사후적 관점
백파이어는 아이젠하워 대통령이, 항공기와 위성에 의한 상공 정찰에서 CIA의 역할을 확립할 때 경고했던 바의 사례 연구가 된다. 즉, 군 조직은 자신들의 이익을 위해 정보 자료를 해석해 소련의 능력을 과장하고, 더 큰 예산과 새로운 무기 체계를 정당화하려 한다는 것이다. 이런 이유로 아이젠하워는 정보 해석뿐 아니라 수집에서도 민간 통제를 원했다.

백파이어
1990년대에 우크라이나는 러시아 공격으로부터 자국을 보호하겠다는 미국의 보장을 대가로, 약 60대에 달하던 백파이어 폭격기 대부분을 폐기하기로 동의했는데, 미국은 그 보장을 이행하지 않았다. (출처: Defense Threat Reduction Agency)

냉전 종식 시점에 우크라이나는 백파이어 폭격기 60대를 보유했고, 그 가운데 거의 전부를 파괴했으며, 소수는 박물관용으로 보존했다. 러시아의 현재 보유 수량은 알려져 있지 않지만, 노후화, 소모, 전쟁으로 인해 분명히 줄어들었다. ‘스파이더스 웹’ 작전 이전, 3년이 넘는 전쟁 기간 동안 우크라이나는 다른 백파이어 4대를 파괴하고 6대를 추가로 손상시켰다고 주장한다. 물론 러시아는 이 숫자에 이의를 제기한다. CIA가 아마도 가장 좋은 추정치를 갖고 있을 것이다.

팀 B에 대한 추가 읽을거리:
리처드 파이프스, “팀 B: 신화 뒤의 현실”. Commentary Magazine. 82 (4) (1986).

윌리엄 버, 스베틀라나 사브란스카야(편), “이전 기밀이었던 전직 소련 관료들과의 인터뷰가 수십 년에 걸친 미국 전략 정보 실패를 드러내다”. 워싱턴 DC, 2009년 9월 11일.

앤 헤싱 카(Anne Hessing Cah). “팀 B: 1조 달러짜리 실험”. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 49 (3) (1993년 4월). Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc.: 22–27.

톰 하트만, “재미, 이익—그리고 권력을 위해 공포를 부풀리기”. Commondreams.org. 2004년 12월 7일

멜빈 A. 굿맨, “CIA 바로 세우기,” The Baltimore Sun, 2004년 11월 19일.

백파이어 수량과 항속거리의 동시대 논쟁에 대한 추가 읽을거리:
태드 슐츠, “소련이 거대한 신형 폭격기를 비행시키는 것으로 알려짐,” The New York Times, 1971년 9월 5일.

버나드 그워츠먼, “상원 브리핑 후 키신저, 군비 협정 비판이 놀랍다고 말해,” The New York Times, 1974년 12월 5일.

“신형 소련 폭격기가 실전 배치된 것으로 보고됨,” The New York Times, 1975년 1월 22일.

존 W. 피니, “미국, 소련이 폭격기를 배치한다고 말해,” The New York Times, 1975년 10월 10일.

레슬리 H. 겔브, “소련과의 미사일 제한 합의가 위기에 처한 것으로 보도됨,” The New York Times, 1975년 10월 16일.

레슬리 H. 겔브, “소련, 군비 제한에 대한 입장을 재확인,” The New York Times, 1975년 11월 8일.

버나드 그워츠먼, “키신저, 군비 회담에서 소련에 대한 짜증을 표명,” The New York Times, 1975년 11월 11일.

“대통령, 군비 협상에서 지속되는 걸림돌을 발견,” The New York Times, 1975년 11월 27일.

버나드 그워츠먼, “소련, 군비 협정 해결을 위한 계획을 제안,” The New York Times, 1976년 1월 24일.

크리스토퍼 S. 렌, “소련의 지연이 군비 제안에서 보인다고 관측,” The New York Times, 1976년 3월 22일.

버나드 그워츠먼, “미·소 군비 회담은 교착 상태,” The New York Times, 1976년 4월 11일.

“미국, 러시아가 더 많은 미사일에 MIRV를 장착하고 있다고 말해,” The New York Times, 1976년 7월 30일.

데이비드 바인더, “미국 보좌관, 소련의 신형 미사일을 비난,” The New York Times, 1976년 9월 1일.

존 W. 피니, “공군, 폭격기 방어를 재건,” The New York Times, 1976년 11월 21일.

“3월 이후 군비 회담 정체,” The New York Times, 1977년 1월 25일.

버나드 그워츠먼, “새 SALT 협정: 마지막 10%가 가장 어렵다,” The New York Times, 1977년 1월 30일.

헤드릭 스미스, “밴스, 전략 군비 핵심 감축에 대해 소련을 타진할 것으로 예상,” The New York Times, 1977년 3월 17일.

“미·소 군비 감축 제안의 기술적 이슈,” The New York Times, 1977년 3월 31일.

드루 미들턴, “카터를 위한 세 가지 군비 개발 선택지,” The New York Times, 1977년 4월 1일.

“기술적 이슈가 워싱턴에서 논쟁을 일으킴,” The New York Times, 1977년 5월 3일.

버나드 와인라우브, “러시아의 백파이어 폭격기; 붉은 위협인가 붉은 청어인가?” The New York Times, 1978년 5월 7일.

참고문헌
러시아인들은 그 지역을 주콥스키라고 불렀다.
국가사진판독센터, “1969년부터 1983년 중반까지의 백파이어 생산, 소련,” 1983년 8월, 1쪽. 최초 관측의 정확한 날짜는 기밀이지만, 보고서는 5쪽에서 첫 관측이 1969년 8월이었다고 밝힌다. 이 기간에 활동 중이던 정찰 임무는 월초의 코로나다 1107 임무와, 월말의 갬빗 4323 임무였다.
국가사진판독센터, “1969년부터 1983년 중반까지의 백파이어 생산, 소련,” 1983년 8월, 1~2쪽.
국가사진판독센터, “1969년부터 1983년 중반까지의 백파이어 생산, 소련,” 1983년 8월, 4쪽.
조지 J. 키건 주니어 소장(공군 정보 담당 차장) → 윌리엄 E. 콜비 중앙정보국장, “백파이어 분석 관련,” 1973년 10월 9일. CIA-RDP80R000800140031-1
『딥 블랙: 우주첩보와 국가안보』, Random House, 1987, 8쪽.
어니스트 J. 젤머(과학기술 부문 부국장 대리), 국장에게 보내는 메모, “키건 장군 메시지(백파이어 분석)에 대한 OWI 의견,” 1976년 8월 6일, 첨부: “CIA 백파이어 분석에 대한 공군 검토 의견,” 1976년 8월 5일. CIA-RDP79M09467A0025080017-9.
루 앨런 주니어 준장 → DNRO(맥루카스 박사), “1971년 1월 1일~3월 31일 분기 프로그램 검토,” 1971년 5월 20일. C05098695
중앙정보국장 조지 부시 → 대통령 국가안보보좌관 브렌트 스코크로프트, “백파이어에 대한 CIA 분석,” 1976년 8월 11일. CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080015-1. 언론 유출은 표지 메모에 언급됨.
중앙정보국장 조지 부시 → 조지 J. 키건 주니어 소장(미 공군 정보 담당 차장), “BACKFIRE,” 1976년 8월 24일. CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080012-4.
[삭제됨], 미 해군, PAID, 정보 공동체 담당 DCI 대리에게 보내는 메모, “BACKFIRE,” 1976년 8월 17일, CIA-RDP83M00171R000700330002-3
[삭제됨], 미 해군, PAID, 정보 공동체 담당 DCI 대리에게 보내는 메모, “BACKFIRE,” 1976년 8월 17일, CIA-RDP83M00171R000700330002-3
[삭제됨], 전략 프로그램 담당 국가정보관, 국장에게 보내는 메모, “소련 백파이어 폭격기: CIA 재분석 연표,” 1976년 10월 13일, CIA-RDP79M0067A002500070008-9.
『미국 외교관계 1969–1976, 제35권』, 국무부, 2014, 789~790쪽.
『미국 외교관계 1969–1976, 제35권』, 국무부, 2014, 789~790쪽.
하워드 스토어츠 주니어(전략 프로그램 담당 국가정보관), 중앙정보국장에게 보내는 메모, “‘Face the Nation’에서 백파이어 성능 관련 질문 가능성에 대한 권고 답변,” 1977년 3월 18일, CIA-RDP80M01048A001100200023-5
CIA, 정보자문위원회에 보내는 메모, “NIE 11-4-57의 중폭격기 추정치 타당성.” CIA-RDP61-00549R000200010002-1
국가사진판독센터, “1969년부터 1983년 중반까지의 백파이어 생산, 소련,” 1983년 8월, 5쪽.
『딥 블랙』, 8쪽.
데이비드 D. 브래드번 준장, 앨런 장군에게 보내는 노트, “SALT와 NRP 체계,” 1972년 10월 16일, 첨부: 해럴드 S. 코일 주니어 소령, 브래드번 준장에게 보내는 메모, “SALT와 체계 개선,” 1972년 10월 11일, 및: 데이비드 D. 브래드번 준장, SS-5, 코일 소령에게 보내는 노트, “SALT와 체계 개선,” 1972년 10월 16일.
『딥 블랙』, 14쪽.
로버트 M. 클라크, 『정보 분석: 표적 중심 접근』 제5판, 2016, 159~161쪽.
“생산형 백파이어, 소련에서 비행,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 1977년 1월 3일, 21쪽.
빌 스위트먼 메시지(저자에게), 2025년 7월 6일.
[https://www.smithsonianmag.com/air-space-magazine/though-a-glass-darkly-bill-sweetman-technically-speaking-column-180957300/](https://www.smithsonianmag.com/air-space-magazine/though-a-glass-darkly-bill-sweetman-technically-speaking-column-180957300/)
드웨인 데이는 1970년대 백파이어 폭격기 논쟁에 관여했던 누구든지로부터 연락을 받기를 원한다. 연락처: [zirconic1@cox.net](mailto:zirconic1@cox.net)

참고: 현재 댓글은 검토 후 게시된다. 게시까지 지연이 있을 수 있으며, 제출된 모든 댓글이 게시된다는 보장은 없다.

The Space Review: The Backfire bomber controversy

The Space Review: The Backfire bomber controversy

The Backfire can carry internal and external bombs, as well as cruise missiles, including anti-ship missiles. (credit: Dmitry Terekhov Wikimedia Commons)

The Backfire bomber controversyby Dwayne A. Day
Monday, December 22, 2025

On June 1, 2025, Ukrainian drones launched as part of Operation Spider’s Web destroyed at least four Tu-22M Backfire bombers and damaged at least one more during an attack at Belaya Air Base near Irkutsk. Drone video footage released later showed the swing-wing aircraft out in the open, burning, and within a day, satellite imagery revealed the wreckage of the medium-range bombers.

A Backfire bomber in Russia about to be struck by a Ukrainian drone in June 2025. At least four Backfires were destroyed during the attack, and two others damaged. (credit: Wikimedia Commons)

Satellite images from Maxar and Planet showing destroyed Backfire bombers. The exact number of Backfires remaining in the Russian air force is not publicly known, but is only a few dozen, probably less than 60. Approximately ten have been destroyed in the war against Ukraine. (credit: Maxar and Planet)

The Backfire has been in service for many years, and more than 50 years ago, satellite photos of the bombers helped kick off a dispute within the US intelligence community. The controversy raged for years and had international implications, one of many times that CIA and military intelligence analysts clashed over the interpretation of intelligence data. The dispute was how much fuel the bomber could carry, which determined how far it could fly, and therefore whether it was a tactical or strategic bomber and subject to an international arms limitation treaty. American satellites played a major role in gathering data on the Backfire throughout the 1970s as this controversy raged. Like the earlier bomber and missile gaps of the late 1950s, as well as the 1960s disputes over the Soviet SA-5 surface-to-air missile, CIA analysts argued one set of data, whereas military officials took a far more alarmist position.

The Tu-22M Backfire was a medium-range bomber first flown in the late 1960s and entered production in the 1970s. The CIA and USAF argued over the range of the bomber. It is still in service today, although the last one was built over 30 years ago. (credit: Alexander Beltyukov Wikimedia Commons)

KAZAN-A

Although not as famous in the West as the MiG-21, MiG-25 Foxbat, or MiG-29, the Backfire is one of the better known Soviet bombers, primarily due to the late Tom Clancy. Clancy’s novel Red Storm Rising, about a theoretical World War III, featured a notorious chapter, “The Dance of the Vampires,” where the Soviet air force undertook a clever raid on the US Navy involving Backfires, among other planes, and inflicted significant damage. In the 2002 movie The Sum of All Fears, based on a Clancy novel, a flight of Backfires causes major damage to the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis, although Clancy said that the Navy only agreed to allow the ship to be filmed if the Backfires didn’t sink it in the movie.

Backfire bombers preparing for takeoff. The Soviet Union built almost 500 Backfire bombers. They were split between medium-range bombing and naval strike roles. (credit: Alexander Beltyukov Wikimedia Commons)

Unlike its larger and older brother, the Tu-95 Bear strategic bomber, which is ungainly and has propellers, the Backfire is sleek and dart-like, with swing-wings and engines that burn purple-blue flames—sometimes with a yellow plume from high-sulfur fuel—as it climbs from the runway at full power. The Backfire looks like a badass killer.

The Backfire is impressive from almost any angle. Its two engines operating in afterburner are dramatic. (credit: Andrej Shmatko Wikimedia Commons)

The Backfire is equipped with a tailgun for any adversary dumb enough to get behind the aircraft. (credit: Clemens Vasters Wikimedia Commons)

The Tu-22M was developed by the Tupolev Design Bureau starting in the mid-1960s. Although it had the same initial designation as the Tu-22 Blinder medium-range bomber, this was a political ruse. Just as the American military has sometimes built almost entirely new aircraft with only a minor designation change over their predecessor to secure political approval and funding (see, for instance, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet), the Soviet military occasionally did the same. Although it also had swing wings, the Tu-22M was an entirely new aircraft compared to the Blinder. It was designed for two missions: medium-range bombing, and attacking American aircraft carriers.

The Kazan aircraft production facility, seen in this 1972 US reconnaissance satellite photo, was responsible for many Cold War era bombers. Although it is still active today, its production rate is incredibly low. (credit: Harry Stranger)

In August 1969, an American reconnaissance satellite spotted a new swing-wing bomber at Kazan Airframe Plant Gorbunov 22. The National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) designated this bomber as KAZAN-A, and it retained this designation for a couple of years until it gained the NATO designation Backfire. (For clarity, Backfire will be used hereafter.)

The Kazan aircraft production facility where the first Backfire bomber was photographed by an American reconnaissance satellite in the late 1960s. In this 1973 satellite photo, at least one Backfire bomber is visible. (credit: Harry Stranger)

In March 1970, a KH-4B CORONA satellite, mission 1109-1, again photographed the Kazan Airframe plant. A mission report indicated that the satellite photos did not reveal any of the bombers at that location or at the Ramenskoye flight test center near Moscow.[1] In June 1970, KH-4B CORONA mission 1111 was more successful: photography from the mission identified the probable third prototype Backfire, at the Kazan Airframe Plant. The other two Backfires were seen at Ramenskoye.

Ramenskoye, known to the Russians as Zhukovsky, was the Soviet equivalent to Edwards Air Force Base, the location of flight tests of new military aircraft. Another aircraft was observed at Akhtubinsk flight test center in April 1971. These were all Backfire A models, although intelligence analysts did not know that they would soon see a new model that would result in A and B designations. In satellite photos that followed, the A models were only observed at training airfields, and none were ever observed at operational bases. Only seven were produced, according to an NPIC assessment, and by 1983 all of them were no longer flying and were on static display.[2]

The Soviet Union's equivalent of Edwards Air Force base was Ramenskoye, outside Moscow. This is where much testing of the Backfire was conducted. In a 1980 U.S. reconnaissance satellite photo (top) several Backfires are visible. But fewer were at the facility in a 1982 satellite photo (bottom), probably because the aircraft was by then in full-scale production and fewer test flights were necessary. (credit: Harry Stranger)

In November 1971, an American satellite photographed what was designated the Backfire B at Kazan. It had an increased wingspan and did not have enlarged pods like the Backfire A. These were originally thought to be landing gear pods, but were actually aerodynamic and were removed when it became clear they offered no benefits. In May 1972, a Backfire B was observed at Ramenskoye, and another at Akhtubinsk airfield in September 1972. It was not until April and May 1974 that the Backfire Bs were seen at the training bases of Ryazan/Dyagilevo Airfield and Nikolayev/Kulbakino Airfield[3]

Tu-22M Backfire bombers deployed to Nikolayev airbase in Ukraine in 1980. The deployment of the aircraft to the western USSR was an indication that they were intended for medium-range missions attacking Europe, not strategic missions attacking the United States. This airfield in Ukraine was destroyed by Russia in 2022. (credit: Harry Stranger)

A third version, designated the Backfire C, was first identified at Ramenskoye in August 1977 and then spotted at Kazan in April 1978. It had a modified nose and air intakes. The prototype was destroyed by a fire at Ramenskoye. Initial deployment to the training base at Ryazam/Dyagilevo occurred in March 1981.[4]

Although the only released American satellite photos of Backfire bombers during this period come from CORONA and later HEXAGON reconnaissance satellites, the planes were almost certainly photographed by the much more powerful GAMBIT satellites. By the mid-1970s, GAMBIT images were providing resolution better than 30 centimeters on the ground, enabling photo-interpreters to make increasingly precise measurements of the objects they photographed such as the fuselage width of bombers. Planes like the Backfire could also be compared to other objects at the airfield, such as aircraft with precisely known dimensions, like the Tu-95 Bear. Based upon these images, and knowledge of aircraft engineering principles, it was possible to calculate how much internal volume of an aircraft would be available to hold fuel, generating an estimate for the maximum amount of fuel that could be carried. Based upon this estimate and assumptions about engine efficiency and flight profiles, it was possible to derive range estimates for the aircraft. But those calculations created controversy.

This 1984 satellite photo shows engine testing of four Backfire bombers, visible where the snow has been blown away. Peak annual production of the bombers was about 30 aircraft per year, and total production was just under 500 aircraft by the time it ceased in the early 1990s. (credit: Harry Stranger)

Satellites provided two main types of information about the Backfire during the 1970s—initially providing technical information the plane, and later, indications of how it was being deployed, whether to strategic airfields or to the periphery of Europe.

Range estimates

Arguments over the range of the Backfire started in 1971 and continued over many years. The issue became more acute by 1973, when the bomber was due to be included in a high-level National Intelligence Estimate. Although there was a range of estimates for how far the Backfire could fly, if the plane was equipped for aerial refueling, it could certainly reach targets within the continental United States.[5] However, unlike the United States Air Force, the Soviet Union had a very limited refueling fleet—not many tankers capable of refueling strategic aircraft.

For the early 1970s, several US (and foreign) intelligence organizations generally agreed on the Backfire’s range. But by 1976 the issue had reached a boiling point within the US intelligence community. This was caused by a new, substantially lower, CIA estimate of the Backfire’s maximum range.

The key figure who pushed the military’s longer range estimate was Major General George Keegan, the Air Force’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Keegan was a hard-core Cold Warrior who, like the fictional General “Buck” Turgidson in Dr. Strangelove, was always smelling a big fat commie rat. As New York Times reporter William Burrows later wrote, “George Keegan worries about the Russians and deeply mistrusts them. But he despises the CIA.”[6] The CIA was about to enrage him.

Major General George Keegan was head of US Air Force Intelligence in the mid-1970s. He clashed with the CIA over many subjects, including the range of the Backfire bomber. He was wrong. (credit: Wikimedia Commons)

By 1976, the CIA had engaged a still-classified organization to perform an estimate of the Backfire’s performance based upon the latest intelligence. The CIA had also hired aerospace contractor McDonnell Douglas to perform another analysis, although the contractor may have taken inputs developed by another office and did not generate their own. The CIA estimated that the bomber’s range was 2,222 kilometers (1,200 nautical miles), less than the previous estimate. The military, particularly the Air Force, objected to this conclusion. The CIA’s new range estimate was now substantially lower than previous estimates produced by North American Rockwell, General Dynamics, the Royal Air Force, and the Air Force’s Foreign Technology Division. This greatly annoyed Keegan, who wondered why all the other estimates were consistently higher, while the CIA’s was substantially lower. Keegan then wrote a letter to the CIA.[7]

The CIA office responsible for overseeing the new analysis wrote a detailed response to Keegan’s letter. It noted that the previous estimates had all been based upon the same set of assumptions: that most of the available volume was reserved for fuel, the thrust characteristics of the engines were those of an uprated SST engine, and optimum takeoff and cruise aerodynamics applied. Those assumptions were not validated. However, new intelligence information had become available that changed those assumptions. Exactly what that new information was is unclear from the declassified report. However, the security markings on the report indicate that it contained intelligence derived from satellite imagery, as well as communications intelligence. The report also referred to the design of the Backfire’s landing gear, and because the gear would not be visible to satellites, this implies that the CIA had other photos of the aircraft, probably while it was landing or taking off. According to one source, the CIA even had access to flight test telemetry from the Backfire. A recently declassified document indicates that the SAVANT II satellite was collecting aircraft telemetry in early 1971, although it is not clear what kind of aircraft telemetry.[8]

Two SAVANT series signals intelligence satellites were flown by the United States in the late 1970s. SAVANT II reportedly intercepted telemetry signals from Soviet aircraft tests, possibly including early Backfire flights. There is some indication that the US intelligence community had intercepted telemetry from Backfire test flights. (credit: NRO)

At times, Keegan’s arguments (obviously developed by his staff) seemed rather esoteric, such as the angle of rotation of the aircraft lifting off the runway and whether it could benefit from ground effect during takeoff. The CIA analysts believed that these issues had little effect upon the plane’s maximum range. Keegan also seemed to be committing one of the cardinal sins of intelligence by conflating capability with intent. Some of his writings argued that because in some circumstances the Backfire could be used strategically, the Soviets would use it strategically, even though there was no evidence of them planning to do so (for instance, by building up their in-flight refueling fleet).

An intelligence officer summarized the problem: “The evidence is inconclusive, the range of uncertainties is large, the analytical methodologies involved are exceedingly complex, and the answers one gets are determined to a large extent by the assumptions with which one starts.”

Keegan also alleged that the newer Backfire B model had greater range due to its larger wing and elimination of the pods. But the CIA referenced an unpublished NASA study indicating that the larger wing had greater drag, which negated those benefits. He further claimed that an increase in the size of the production plant indicated an increase in Backfire production, but the CIA responded that 20% more floor space at the factory did not automatically mean more bombers—that space could instead be allocated to post-production maintenance of completed aircraft.

In August 1976, the Backfire controversy leaked to the press, generating unwanted attention for the CIA. Director of Central Intelligence George H.W. Bush wrote a letter to Brent Scowcroft, President Ford’s national security advisor, explaining the agency’s position and refuting General Keegan’s points.[9]

George Bush was head of the CIA in 1976 when the dispute over the Backfire’s range became public. He agreed to the Team B intelligence exercise, which undercut the CIA's analytical authority. (credit: Wikimedia Commons)

By mid-August, Keegan again complained to the CIA about its analysis, and recommended two aerospace executives to participate in an independent assessment of the CIA’s analysis. The CIA accepted this recommendation, but there was clearly animosity between the agency and General Keegan.[10]

In response to Keegan’s latest complaint, an intelligence officer wrote an internal memo explaining the controversy. He noted that most of the intelligence community still believed that the Backfire was suited to a peripheral attack role, but that the Air Force was insisting that the Backfire was designed to perform a variety of missions, including intercontinental attack.[11]

The aircraft’s overall appearance seemed to indicate that it was designed to perform supersonic dash and low-altitude penetration of heavily-defended areas, hence its swing wings and pointy shape compared to earlier Soviet bombers. The Air Force’s position was in part based upon the assumption that, if the plane flew at subsonic speeds at high altitude, it would have longer range. Also, all Backfire bombers seen up to that point had in-flight refueling probes, supporting the Air Force argument that the plane was intended to fly long distances. If it was staged closer to the United States and flew one-way missions, it could of course travel even further to attack the United States.

Early Backfire bombers were equipped with refueling probes. This became a source of contention between the CIA and the US Air Force. If the plane was refueled, it could reach many targets in the United States. However, there was no indication that the Soviet Union was building up its meager fleet of refueling aircraft to support the Backfire. The Soviet Union, as part of a later arms control agreement, agreed to not equip the Backfire with refueling probes. (credit: Erik Gundersen Wikimedia Commons)

It was still difficult to draw conclusions in part because the Backfire had only been in operational service since 1974, making it harder to determine Soviet intentions for the aircraft, although so far it had only been deployed for peripheral and naval strike roles. The intelligence officer, who worked for the US Navy, summarized the problem: “The evidence is inconclusive, the range of uncertainties is large, the analytical methodologies involved are exceedingly complex, and the answers one gets are determined to a large extent by the assumptions with which one starts.”[12]

By October 1976, the CIA produced an internal memo explaining the timeline of how it had come to new conclusions about the Backfire, noting that other members of the intelligence community were already aware of the new analysis a year and a half earlier, in April 1975. The Backfire dispute had become public in recent months. The CIA Director had testified in front of Congress about the aircraft’s range several times before the CIA had conducted its reanalysis, and more recently articles appeared in the press alleging that “the intelligence was slanted to support administration policy.” [13]

The range estimates produced by the CIA and other intelligence agencies in the late 1976 National Intelligence Estimate. The Backfire's actual range proved to be near the lower end of the CIA's estimate. (credit: CIA)

National Intelligence Estimate NIE 11-3/8-76, produced in December 1976, included key judgments about current developments in Soviet programs. It stated that “Soviet intercontinental striking power would be increased if Backfire bombers were employed against the U.S. The Backfire is well suited to operations against land and sea targets on the Eurasian periphery using a variety of flight profiles, and it has some capability for operations against the U.S. on high-altitude subsonic profiles.”

It continued: “The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, estimate that the Backfire has significant capabilities for operations against the U.S. without air-to-air refueling. The Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State estimate that it has marginal capabilities against the U.S. under the same conditions. With air-to-air refueling, the Backfire would have considerably increased capability for intercontinental operations, even in the case of the lowest performance estimate. In addition, the Backfire could be modified in various ways to improve its range.”[14]

Range estimates for several Soviet bombers from the DoD publication Soviet Military Power. Without refueling, the Backfire could not reach much of the United States. The problem was that the Soviet Union did not have many tankers that could refuel a fleet of Backfires. (credit: Department of Defense)

“We believe it is likely that Backfires will continue to be assigned to theater and naval missions and—with the exception of DIA, ERDA, Army, and Air Force—we believe it is correspondingly unlikely that they will be assigned to intercontinental missions. If the Soviets decided to assign any substantial number of Backfires to missions against the U.S., they almost certainly would upgrade the performance of the aircraft or deploy a force of compatible new tankers for their support. The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believe the available evidence on Backfire employment indicates only that peripheral and naval attack are its current primary missions. Since the Soviets could use the Backfire’s intercontinental capabilities at their initiative, these agencies believe that the Backfire clearly poses a threat to the U.S., even without the deployment of a compatible tanker force or the upgrading of the aircraft’s performance. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, further believes that a portion of the Backfire force will have missions against the contiguous U.S.”[15]

The Central Intelligence Agency and State Department calculated the Backfire’s range as 3,525 to 4,150 nautical miles (6,528 to 7,686 kilometers) and therefore not a strategic weapon. The Air Force had determined its range at 5,400 nautical miles (10,001 kilometers), and therefore capable of reaching the continental United States. With refueling, the planes could fly significantly farther.

In March 1977, the Director of Central Intelligence was due to appear on the television program “Face the Nation,” and there was the possibility that he might be asked about the Backfire, considering a recent newspaper column in The Washington Star that had raised the issue. The director was advised that the official United States position at the SALT negotiations was that the Backfire was comparable to the Bison heavy bomber and should be counted as a heavy bomber, and the CIA’s position on the revised range estimate had not been made public.[16]

Counting bombers and Team B

Soviet bombers had been a source of contention in the US intelligence community before. In the mid-1950s a controversy had arisen about how many strategic bombers the Soviet Union had. It took several years, and overflights of Soviet airfields by U-2 reconnaissance planes, before the CIA was able to prove that the numbers had been over-estimated.[17]

The Cold War Team B experiment was viewed with alarm by many people within the intelligence community because it established a precedent that if somebody did not like the conclusions that the intelligence analysts were providing, they could simply pick their own panel of experts.

Even before the late 1976 National Intelligence Estimate, a larger dispute about Soviet weapons capabilities had started raging inside the intelligence community. In May 1976, President Gerald Ford created what was known as the “Team B” project to appoint a group of outside experts to look at the same data that the CIA was looking at and provide an alternative interpretation. This had resulted from charges that the CIA had consistently underestimated Soviet weapons production.

The Team B report was significantly more alarming than the CIA’s conclusions, estimating much greater Soviet weapons production and capabilities. Team B did not do its own estimates of the Backfire range. They simply compared the ranges produced by CIA and USAF.

The Team B report had been intended to only be an exercise, but the report was leaked soon after Jimmy Carter became president, and it was used by various people to argue that the Soviet Union was a bigger threat and growing faster than the CIA had been assessing. This was used to justify a bigger US defense buildup.

The Cold War Team B experiment was viewed with alarm by many people within the intelligence community because it established a precedent that if somebody did not like the conclusions that the intelligence analysts were providing, they could simply pick their own panel of experts and give them the same data to produce a result more to their liking. It undercut the CIA and made intelligence analysis more vulnerable to political manipulation.

In retrospect, Team B’s report was highly inaccurate and the CIA’s estimates proved to be much closer to the reality. For example, Team B predicted that the Soviets would have 500 Backfire bombers by 1984. By 1983, NPIC determined that the Soviets produced 30.5 aircraft per year from July 15, 1982 to July 15, 1983, a production rate that was not high enough to produce hundreds of bombers in a short time.[18] Whereas Team B had predicted 500 Backfires by 1984, the actual number was 235, and just under 500 when production finally ceased in 1993.

The numbers, and the range estimates, had increased importance because the United States and Soviet Union by the late 1970s were engaged in arms control limitation talks. If the Backfire was counted as an intercontinental bomber, then the Soviet Union had a much larger bomber force, especially if the United States also included the bombers that were clearly dedicated to naval attack. Ultimately, the two sides reached an agreement that the Backfire would not be counted as an intercontinental bomber as long as the Soviet Union agreed to not equip it for aerial refueling.

Deep Black

In his 1987 book Deep Black, about the development of American strategic reconnaissance, including then highly secret reconnaissance satellites, William Burrows wrote about the then-retired George Keegan. Keegan was, by his own admission, a hard-liner who had repeatedly warned about Soviet military capabilities and been largely ignored.[19]

Keegan had raised the alarm about numerous Soviet strategic developments. Deep Black recounted his concern about vast underground leadership bunkers to enable the Soviet Union to fight and survive a nuclear war. By the late 1970s he was warning about Soviet space-based laser systems. In 1978, after retiring from the Air Force, Keegan appeared on the BBC Panorama program “The Real War in Space” where he warned about Soviet space weapons, and in retired life he was a strident hawk who publicly spoke about Soviet weapons development based upon his five years as head of Air Force intelligence. Keegan’s previous access to top secret intelligence seemingly gave him credibility, but his public appearances unnerved many people in the intelligence community who had been trained to not even speak the word “satellite.”

Keegan believed that the military should have control of space reconnaissance assets and that military officers should be performing assessments of Soviet weapons capabilities. He did not believe that the CIA should be in control of the assets or making the assessments. Furthermore, Keegan believed that arms control agreements were having an insidious effect on the production of intelligence, by creating, in Burrows’ words “the misguided assumption that what must be seen will be seen.”

Keegan’s adversary during the early 1970s had been Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby. Colby had become the CIA’s third-ranking officer in 1971 after serving in clandestine roles in Southeast Asia. Upon arriving at the CIA’s Langley headquarters, he had been exposed for the first time to the new array of high-tech intelligence collection systems. “I went on a tour of the aerospace technology factories on the West Coast and there had my eyes opened to the veritable science-fiction world of space systems, radar, electronic sensors, infrared photography, and the ubiquitous computer, all able to gather intelligence from high in the sky to deep in the ocean with astounding accuracy and precision,” Colby wrote in his memoir. Colby was later fired by President Gerald Ford in November 1975 after cooperating too closely with congressional investigations of CIA activities. He was replaced by George Bush, who later agreed to the creation of Team B, and became embroiled in the Backfire controversy.

William Colby was head of the CIA in the early 1970s and clashed with Major General Keegan over several intelligence issues. He was replaced by George Bush. (credit: Wikimedia Commons)

Keegan’s belief that arms control negotiations skewed the intelligence collection was one that had been disputed within the strategic reconnaissance community since the late 1960s. The operators of American reconnaissance satellites believed that their primary mission was collecting intelligence on the Soviet strategic threat, and treaty monitoring was simply a subset of that activity, not a driver. In 1972, during discussions within the intelligence community about arms control and the need for new intelligence collection systems, an Air Force officer had pointed out that the intelligence collection itself was the most difficult challenge.[20] New intelligence requirements such as detecting Soviet Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles, or mobile ICBMs were going to drive US intelligence collection whether or not they were banned by a treaty. The same would be true for other Soviet weapons developments.

Colby had argued that point himself: “Verification is nothing more than the continuation of our normal intelligence process. We’re going to cover Soviet weaponry whether there’s a treaty between us or not; we have to in order to protect our country against surprise.”[21]

The analysts

Decades after the dispute, historians and reporters were still trying to make sense of it. According to Robert M. Clark in Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, both the CIA and Air Force Intelligence employed separate contracting teams at McDonnell Douglas to produce analysis of the Backfire.[22] The two teams arrived at different range estimates, and Clark wrote that “Each side accused the other of slanting the evidence.” However, although there is evidence indicating that CIA employed McDonnell Douglas to produce analysis of the Backfire, there is no evidence that the Air Force did as well.

Clark claimed that the Backfire analysis was an example of “premature closure” where previous predictions that the Soviet Union would develop a new intercontinental bomber led analysts to “cherry-pick” the evidence to support this view. “A serious consideration of Soviet systems designs and requirements, and of what the Soviets foresaw as threats at the time, would likely have led analysts to zero in more quickly on the Backfire’s mission of peripheral attack.”

Other factors may have led to the longer range estimate. Clark also wrote that the case illustrated a common analysis problem of presenting the worst-case estimate. “A U.S. bomber of Backfire’s size and configuration could easily have had intercontinental range,” Clark wrote, although Soviet bombers were less fuel efficient.

In 1977, Aviation Week and Space Technology published the first photo in the West of the Tu-22M bomber. This grainy photo and another one was used by aviation writer Bill Sweetman to produce a plan view of the aircraft and to estimate its fuel capacity and range. Sweetman’s estimate was within 8% of the actual fuel capacity of the aircraft. (credit: Aviation Week and Space Technology)

In contrast, aviation writer Bill Sweetman offered an alternative explanation. In 2015, Sweetman recounted how, in the late 1970s, he and fellow aviation writer Doug Richardson at the British magazine Flight International had conducted their own analysis of the Backfire’s range. In early 1977, their rival publication Aviation Week & Space Technology had published a grainy photo of a Backfire in flight.[23]

“The estimated basic dimensions had been published. So by enlarging and tracing the pic on the Flight artists’ Shufti Scope [a device that made it possible to draw 3D objects based upon a 2D image], and drawing a grid of lines parallel with the wingtip-to-wingtip line and the long axis, it was possible to construct a decent plan and side view. From there it was possible to estimate volume and fuel capacity,” Sweetman explained in a recent communication.[24]

This drawing of the Backfire was produced by an artist at Flight International, a competing magazine with Aviation Week. Bill Sweetman and a colleague produced it using a "Shufti Scope," a device for converting a photographed object into a drawing. (credit: Flight International via Bill Sweetman)

“What we had independently concluded was that (1) the thin outer wings didn't hold much fuel and (2) you could not extend the fuel tanks forward to the aft cockpit bulkhead, because then almost all the fuel would be ahead of the center of gravity and the shift as fuel burned would be impossible, particularly with the short tail arm.”

They calculated that the Backfire carried 50 metric tons of fuel and therefore could not achieve the range claimed by the US Air Force. Sweetman also added: “When my colleague Charles Gilson (defence editor) was briefed by the UK Ministry of Defence and told that I was full of shit, he was shown a head-on pic that looked like a Backfire on approach. He was allowed to make a sketch that was quite helpful.” The article in Flight International also included new artwork of what the plane looked like from above.

“Not long after we published our numbers, I got a call from a puzzled engineer at McDonnell Douglas, who wondered how we had hit the same numbers his team had. I told him about my calculator," Sweetman wrote in 2015.

In 1992, after the end of the Cold War, Sweetman learned from a Tupolev fact sheet that the Tu-22M carried 54 tons of fuel—his calculations had been accurate within eight percent. Sweetman also found out from the McDonnell Douglas engineer that his team had been doing the analysis for the CIA and had come up with similar numbers. According to the engineer, Major General Keegan had threatened to interfere with McDonnell’s contract to supply the F-15 fighter to the Air Force unless the team changed its numbers. CEO Sanford “Sandy” McDonnell refused to buckle to Keegan’s pressure. Thus, while Clark may be correct that the longer Backfire range estimate was the result of “mirror imaging” and “worst-case estimation,” political pressure from the military was also a factor.[25] Sweetman concluded with a lesson: “Sometimes senior officers stretch the truth until it breaks. But the calculator tells no lies.”

The F-14 Tomcat was built to protect American aircraft carrier battlegroups from attack by Soviet long-range strike aircraft like the Backfire. Equipped with AIM-54 Phoenix missiles, the goal was to shoot down attacking aircraft before they could launch their missiles. Here an F-14 escorts a Backfire during the Cold War. (credit: US Navy)

In 1976, the Air Force had determined the Backfire’s range at 5,400 nautical miles (10,001 kilometers), a figure that the service had stood by for several years. The Central Intelligence Agency and State Department had calculated the Backfire’s range as 3,525 to 4,150 nautical miles (6,528 to 7,686 kilometers). After the end of the Cold War, the Backfire’s actual range became known: 3,700 nautical miles (6,800 kilometers, or 4,200 miles), or very close to the CIA’s lower-range estimate.

The Backfire serves as a case study of what President Dwight D. Eisenhower had warned about: the military services would interpret intelligence data to their advantage, exaggerating Soviet capabilities to justify larger budgets and new weapons systems.

As more Backfires entered service, satellite reconnaissance revealed where they were based and who operated them. It became clearer that they were not being deployed as strategic bombers, nor was the Soviet Union building up its fleet of aerial tankers. Many of the Backfires were devoted to maritime attack, carrying big missiles to try and sink American aircraft carriers, using the high speed that they were capable of. Other US satellites, like the Defense Support Program missile warning satellites, were used to track Backfires and their missiles—so-called “slow walker” targets—in order to warn the US Navy. The US Navy had F-14 Tomcat fighters with long range AIM-54 Phoenix missiles to try and shoot down Backfires before they could launch their missiles.

A Ukrainian general looking at photos of a Russian airfield and overhead photos of bombers, including a Backfire with an X designating the most vulnerable spot for a drone attack. Ukraine had a Backfire in a museum that it could study. (credit: Wikimedia Commons)

Hindsight

The Backfire serves as a case study of what President Dwight D. Eisenhower had warned about when establishing the CIA’s role in overhead reconnaissance from aircraft and satellites: that the military services would interpret intelligence data to their advantage, exaggerating Soviet capabilities to justify larger budgets and new weapons systems. It was for this reason that Eisenhower wanted civilian control not only of intelligence interpretation, but also collection.

In the 1990s, Ukraine agreed to scrap almost all of its approximately 60 Backfire bombers in return for U.S. guarantees that it would protect the country from Russian attack, a guarantee the United States reneged on. (credit: Defense Threat Reduction Agency)

At the end of the Cold War, Ukraine had 60 Backfire bombers and destroyed almost all of them, preserving a few for a museum. Russia’s current inventory is unknown, but has clearly dwindled due to age, attrition, and warfare. Prior to Operation Spider’s Web, during over three years of war, Ukraine claims to have destroyed four other Backfires and damaged six more. The Russians, of course, dispute these numbers. The CIA probably has the best estimates.

Additional reading on Team B:

Richard Pipes, “Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth”. Commentary Magazine. 82 (4) (1986).

William Burr and Svetlana Savranskaya, eds. “Previously Classified Interviews with Former Soviet Officials Reveal U.S. Strategic Intelligence Failure Over Decades”. Washington, DC, September 11, 2009.

Anne Hessing Cah. “Team B: The trillion-dollar experiment”. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 49 (3) (April 1993). Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc.: 22–27.

Thom Hartmann, ”Hyping Terror For Fun, Profit - And Power”. Commondreams.org. December 7, 2004

Melvin A. Goodman, “Righting the CIA,” The Baltimore Sun, November 19, 2004.

Additional reading on the contemporary debate over Backfire numbers and range:

Tad Szulc, “Soviet Said to Fly Big New Bomber,” The New York Times, September 5, 1971.

Bernard Gwertzman, “Kissinger, After Senate Briefing, Calls Criticism of Arms Accord Surprising,” The New York Times, December 5, 1974.

“New Soviet Bomber Reported in Service,” The New York Times, January 22, 1975.

John W. Finney, “U.S. Says Soviet Deploys Bomber,” The New York Times, October 10, 1975.

Leslie H. Gelb, “Pact With Soviet on Missile Curbs Reported in Peril,” The New York Times, October 16, 1975.

Leslie H. Gelb, “Soviet Reaffirms Stand on Arms Limit,” The New York Times, November 8, 1975.

Bernard Gwertzman, “Kissinger Voices Irritattion at Soviet on Arms Talks,” The New York Times, November 11, 1975.

“President Finds Continued Snags in Arms Parleys,” The New York Times, November 27, 1975.

Bernard Gwertzman, “Soviet Proposes Plan to Rexolve Arms Pact,” The New York Times, January 24, 1976.

Christopher S. Wren, “Soviet Delay Seen on Arms Proposal,” The New York Times, March 22, 1976.

Bernard Gertzman, “U.S.-Soviet Arms Talks are Deadlocked,” The New York Times, April 11, 1976.

“U.S. Says Russia is Arming More Missiles With MIRV’s.” The New York Times, July 30, 1976.

David Binder, “U.S. Aide Accuses Soviet on New Missile,” The New York Times, September 1, 1976.

John W. Finney, “Air Force Rebuilds its Bomber Defense,” The New York Times, November 21, 1976.

“Arms Talks Stalled Since March,” The New York Times, January 25, 1977.

Bernard Gwertzman, “A New SALT Pact: The Last 10 Percent is the Most Difficult,” The New York Times, January 30, 1977.

Hedrick Smith, “Vance is Expected to Sound Out Soviet on Key Cuts in Strategic Arms,” The New York Times, March 17, 1977.

“U.S.-Soviet Proposals on Arms Cuts,” The New York Times, March 31, 1977.

Drew Middleton, “Three Arms Development Options Seen for Carter,” The New York Times, April 1, 1977.

“Technical Issue in Arms Proposal Stirs Controversy in Washington,” The New York Times, May 3, 1977.

Bernard Weinraub, “Russia’s Backfire Bomber; Red Threat or a Red Herring?” The New York Times, May 7, 1978.

References

1. The Russians referred to the area as Zhukovsky.
2. National Photographic Interpretation Center, “Backfire Production From 1969 to Mid-1983, USSR,” August 1983, p. 1. Although the exact date of the first observation remains classified, the report indicates on page 5 that the first observation was in August 1969. The two reconnaissance missions active during this period were CORONA mission 1107 early in the month, and GAMBIT mission 4323, late in the month.
3. National Photographic Interpretation Center, “Backfire Production From 1969 to Mid-1983, USSR,” August 1983, pp. 1-2.
4. National Photographic Interpretation Center, “Backfire Production From 1969 to Mid-1983, USSR,” August 1983, p. 4.
5. Major General George J. Keegan, Jr., Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence), to William E. Colby, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, October 9. 1973. CIA-RDP80R000800140031-1
6. Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security, Random House, 1987, p. 8.
7. Ernest J. Zellmer, Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Memorandum for Director, “OWI Comments on General Keegan’s Message re Backfire Analysis,” August 6, 1976, with attached: “Comments on Air Force Review of CIA Backfire Analysis,” August 5, 1976. CIA-RDP79M09467A0025080017-9.
8. Brig. Gen. Lew Allen, Jr., to DNRO (Dr. McLucas), “Quarterly Program Review for January 1, 1971 through March 31, 1971,” May 20, 1971. C05098695
9. Director of Central Intelligence George Bush, to Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, “CIA Analysis of Backfire,” August 11, 1976. CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080015-1. The press leak is mentioned in a cover memo.
10. Director of Central Intelligence George Bush, to Major General George J. Keegan, Jr., Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, “BACKFIRE,” August 24, 1976. CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080012-4.
11. [Deleted], USN, PAID, Memorandum for Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, “BACKFIRE,” August 17, 1976, CIA-RDP83M00171R000700330002-3
12. [Deleted], USN, PAID, Memorandum for Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, “BACKFIRE,” August 17, 1976, CIA-RDP83M00171R000700330002-3
13. [Deleted], National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, Memorandum for the Director, “The Soviet Backfire Bomber: A Chronology of CIA’s Reanalysis,” October 13, 1976, CIA-RDP79M0067A002500070008-9.
14. Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXV, Department of State, 2014, pp. 789-790.
15. Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXV, Department of State, 2014, pp. 789-790.
16. Howard Stoertz, Jr., National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, “Suggested Response to Possible Questions about Backfire Performance on ‘Face the Nation,’” March 18, 1977, CIA-RDP80M01048A001100200023-5
17. CIA Memorandum for the Intelligence Advisory Committee, “Validity of Heavy Bomber Estimate in NIE 11-4-57.” CIA-RDP61-00549R000200010002-1
18. National Photographic Interpretation Center, “Backfire Production From 1969 to Mid-1983, USSR,” August 1983, p. 5.
19. Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security, Random House, 1987, p. 8.
20. Brigadier General David D. Bradburn, Note for General Allen, “SALT and NRP Systems,” October 16, 1972, with attached: Major Harold S. Coyle, Jr., Memorandum for General Bradburn, “SALT and System Improvements,” October 11, 1972, and: Brigadier General David D. Bradburn, Note for SS-5, Major Coyle, “SALT and System Improvements,” October 16, 1972.
21. Deep Black, p. 14.
22. Robert M. Clark, Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, Fifth Edition, 2016, pp. 159-161.
23. “Production Backfire Flies From USSR,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 3, 1977, p. 21.
24. Bill Sweetman message to author, July 6, 2025.
25. https://www.smithsonianmag.com/air-space-magazine/though-a-glass-darkly-bill-sweetman-technically-speaking-column-180957300/

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Dwayne Day is interested in hearing from anybody involved in the controversy over the Backfire bomber during the 1970s. He can be reached at zirconic1@cox.net.

[백선호]

사진들을 가져다가 3차원 모델을 만드는 것은 1962년 CIA 보고서에 나옵니다.

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78T03194A000100060001-8.pdf

[위종민]

직관적으로는 어떻게 하면 될 것 같긴 한데, 그래도 신기하긴 합니다. 계산자 쓰던 저 시절에.. ㄷㄷ

[백선호]

어떤 컴퓨터를 쓰냐에 따라서 어느 한 기종의 성능을 추정하는데 250 man-hour에서 70 man-hour의 사람과 시간이 필요했다고 하네요.

[강준구]

"능력과 의도를 혼동한 것이다."
사실, 능력은 물리적인 특성을 추정하는 것으로 일정 부분 파악할 수 있으나, 의도는 시스템이 체계화된 조직/사람에 대한 것이 아니라면 파악하기 참 힘들겠네요.

[위종민]

자동차로 비교하자면, SUV 한 대 갖다놔도 회사 이름 도색된 게 아니면 이 차가 영업용인지 자가용인지 바로 알 수는 없는 거나 마찬가지일 것 같습니다.

[백선호]

CIA는 Tu-22M이 아음속 비행에 최적화되었다고 봤네요.

https://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/515G/2970