1961년 - E-5에서 랜야드(KH-6) 정찰위성으로 (1)

[위종민]

THE SPACE REVIEW에서 촬영각이 너무 좁아 실패로 돌아갔던 E-5 정찰위성 카메라가 KH-6로 부활하는 과정을 다룬 기사를 올렸네요. 

폴라로이드 사장이었던 에드윈 '딘' 랜드가 위성카메라 제작에 영향력을 갖고 있었다는 이야기도 있고.. 미국의 제조업이 정상이었던 시절의 단면 같습니다. 

랜야드

최초의 사모스 E-5 정찰위성은 1961년 11월 캘리포니아주 밴덴버그 공군기지에서 발사됐다. 사모스 E-5는 노출된 필름과 카메라를 모두 지구로 회수하도록 설계됐다. 첫 발사는 시험용 탑재체였으며 실패했다. 이후 E-5 카메라는 KH-6 랜야드 정찰카메라로 개조됐다. (사진: 피터 헌터 컬렉션)

레몬에서 씁쓸한 레모네이드로: 사모스 E-5에서 랜야드 정찰위성까지(1부)

드웨인 A. 데이

2026년 8월 3일 월요일

1961년 크리스마스 무렵의 어느 추운 겨울 저녁, 매사추세츠주 보스턴에서 아이텍의 기술자 월터 레비슨과 잭 허서는 존 F. 케네디 대통령의 최고 정보 자문역 가운데 한 명인 에드윈 “딘” 랜드의 집으로 차를 몰고 갔다. 랜드는 즉석카메라 제조업체인 폴라로이드사의 사장이었으며, 그를 아는 모든 사람에 따르면 천재적인 발명가였다. 그는 또한 1956년부터 드와이트 D. 아이젠하워 대통령에게 정보 문제, 특히 정찰카메라 같은 첨단기술에 관해 최고 수준의 자문을 제공해 왔다. 존 F. 케네디가 1961년 1월 취임한 뒤에도 랜드는 이 자문 역할을 계속했고, 케네디 대통령 외국정보자문위원회(PFIAB)의 위원으로 활동했다.[1]

레비슨과 허서는 임무를 띠고 있었다. 당시 그들의 회사인 아이텍은 4년이 조금 넘는 기간 동안 정찰위성용 카메라의 주요 설계·제조업체로 활동해 왔다. 회사의 주력 제품은 CIA용으로 제작돼 공군 로켓에 실려 발사된 코로나 카메라였다.

그들은 카메라를 재설계해 영상 흐림의 원인을 제거하고, 카메라 자체는 지상으로 회수하지 않고 폐기하며, 코로나에서 이미 검증된 동일한 회수체를 사용한다면 E-5를 작동하게 만들 수 있다고 주장했다. 그들에게 필요한 것은 단지 한 번의 기회였다.

1950년대에 미 공군은 우주정찰을 제공하기 위해 원래 센트리라는 이름이었던 사모스 프로그램을 시작했다. 이 프로그램은 소련이 스푸트니크를 발사하기 전까지 심각한 자금 부족에 시달렸지만, 그 이후 사모스는 확대되며 수많은 정찰카메라 체계를 파생시켰다. 그 가운데 하나가 공군과 CIA의 공동사업인 코로나였으며, 이 프로그램은 회수 가능한 캡슐로 필름을 귀환시키도록 설계됐다. 공군이 주도한 사모스 사업인 E-1, E-2, E-4, E-5, E-6은 수많은 문제를 겪었다. 코로나 역시 심각한 문제에 시달렸지만 1960년 8월에는 초기 성공을 거두었다. 레비슨과 허서가 1961년 말 딘 랜드를 찾아갔을 때, 코로나는 이미 각 임무 후 회수된 필름을 통해 방대한 정보자료를 제공하고 있었다.

1961년 가을까지 국방부는 위성정찰체계의 개발과 운용을 감독하기 위해 국가정찰국(NRO)을 창설했다. NRO는 그 명칭조차 비밀일 정도로 고도로 기밀화된 조직이었다. NRO의 초대 국장은 조지프 체릭 박사였으며, 그는 대외적으로는 공군 차관이라는 비기밀 직함도 갖고 있었다. 체릭은 높은 존경을 받았고 CIA와도 좋은 관계를 유지했다. 그는 또한 E-5 같은 공군의 잔존 사모스 사업에 회의적이었으며, 그것들이 유용한 정보자료를 생산할 수 있을지 의심했다.

1959년 초부터 아이텍은 코로나 카메라와 더불어 미 공군용 사모스 E-5 카메라도 개발했다. 코로나와 달리 E-5 위성은 실패작이었다. 1961년 가을에 진단용 카메라 두 대가 발사됐지만 궤도에 오른 것은 한 대뿐이었다. 체릭은 이 사업에 신뢰를 잃고 취소했으며, 단 한 대의 작전용 카메라만 발사하기로 결정했다. 그 발사는 당시 1962년 봄으로 예정돼 있었다.[2]

레비슨과 허서는 모두 E-5 카메라 설계에 참여했다. 그들은 이 카메라가 몇 가지 심각한 한계를 갖고 있음을 알고 있었다. 그 한계는 주로 코로나처럼 임무 종료 시 대기권에서 소각시키는 대신, 대형 회수캡슐 안에 카메라 전체를 넣어 지구로 귀환시켜야 한다는 요구 때문에 생겼다. 그러나 E-5는 당시 운용 중이던 다른 카메라보다 강력했다. 우주에서 촬영한 고해상도 사진은 지상 표적에 관한 과학·기술 정보를 제공하는 데 중요했다. 단순히 항공기나 탄도미사일, 기타 무기체계의 숫자를 세는 데 그치지 않고, 그 성능을 판단하는 데 활용할 수 있었다. 레비슨과 허서는 늦은 겨울 저녁 랜드의 집을 찾아가 아이텍이 자사의 설계를 만회할 기회를 달라고 요청했다. 그들은 카메라를 재설계해 영상 흐림의 원인을 제거하고, 카메라는 지상으로 회수하지 않고 폐기하며, 코로나에서 검증된 동일한 회수체를 사용하면 E-5를 작동시킬 수 있다고 주장했다. 필요한 것은 단지 한 번의 기회였다.[3]

“해보시오.”

랜드가 말했고, 두 사람은 자리를 떠났다.

“월트와 나는 어느 날 밤 한 사람에게 브리핑했고, 그걸로 사업이 시작됐습니다.”

허서는 수년 뒤 인터뷰에서 이렇게 말했다.[4]

물론 실제로는 그렇게 간단하지 않았다. 수백만 달러의 지출과 여러 정부기관의 동원을 필요로 하는 위성사업이 단 한 사람의 말만으로 진행될 수는 없었다. 그 사람이 미국 대통령이라면 모를까. 딘 랜드는 성공한 발명가이자 부유한 사업가였지만 정부 관료는 아니었다. 그러나 소규모 위성정찰 공동체 안에서 그는 큰 존경을 받고 있었다. 그가 어떤 사업에 가치가 있다고 판단하면 최소한 조지프 체릭 같은 다른 관계자들로부터 검토받을 수 있었다. 랜드는 공군과 CIA의 인맥에 연락해 아이텍의 제안을 진지하게 조사해야 한다고 말할 수 있었다. 허서와 레비슨이 랜드를 만난 뒤 며칠 동안 분명 그런 일이 있었을 것이다. 몇 달 안에 아이텍은 사모스 E-5를 개조해 유용한 것으로 바꾸는 계약을 따냈기 때문이다. 한 비판자는 훗날 그들이 돼지 귀로 비단 지갑을 만들려 했다고 평했다.

1962년 1월까지 그 비단 지갑에는 랜야드라는 이름이 붙었으며, 죽은 사모스 E-5에서 되살아날 예정이었다. 곧이어 스파르탄이라는 또 다른 사업도 폐기된 다른 사모스 사업에서 되살아나기 시작했다. 레몬을 레모네이드로 바꾸려는 시도였다.[5]

랜야드

에드윈 “딘” 랜드는 폴라로이드사의 대표이자 정부의 고위 정보 자문역이었다. 그는 천재적인 발명가로 널리 평가받았다. 1961년 12월 그는 사모스 E-5 정찰카메라를 기존 코로나 정찰장비와 결합해 성공 가능성을 높이자는 제안에 동의했다. (사진: CIA)

E-5의 빠른 죽음

사모스 E-5는 기존 코로나나 필름 판독식 사모스 E-1·E-2보다 높은 해상도를 지닌 정찰위성을 개발하려는 미국의 첫 시도였다. 1959년 초 시작됐지만 실질적인 개발은 1959년 9월에야 본격화됐다. E-5는 지상에서 5피트, 약 1.5미터 크기의 물체까지 촬영한 영상을 회수하도록 설계된 위성이었다. 해상도 면에서 그 절반 수준에조차 이르는 다른 위성은 없었다. 당초 진단용 2대와 작전용 5대를 포함해 모두 7대의 우주선이 계획됐지만, 사모스 E-5가 취소되기 전까지 완성된 것은 진단용 기체들과 작전용 탑재체 한 대뿐이었다.

그러나 사모스 E-5가 1961년 말 비행 준비를 마쳤을 때는 이미 미국의 정보 요구를 충족하기에는 너무 제한적이었다.

E-5는 파노라마 카메라였다. 이는 표적을 수직 아래로 고정해 바라보는 대신, 지상궤적을 따라 앞뒤로 훑으며 촬영한다는 뜻이었다. 이 방식은 폭은 좁지만 길이가 긴 영상을 만들어냈고, 훨씬 넓은 지역을 포괄하면서 전체 길이에 걸쳐 뛰어난 해상도를 제공했다. E-5의 초점거리는 66인치, 약 168센티미터였으며 코로나는 24인치, 약 61센티미터였다. 초점거리는 빛이 렌즈로 들어오는 지점인 조리개에서 필름상의 초점에 맺히는 지점까지의 거리다. 초점거리가 길수록 카메라는 더 강력하다. 그러나 일반적으로 긴 초점거리의 단점이 있었고, 특히 E-5 설계에서는 카메라의 시야각이 더 좁았다. 이 때문에 더 높은 해상도를 제공하는 대신 렌즈가 한 번 훑을 때 촬영하는 지역은 코로나보다 훨씬 작았다.

코로나가 70도였던 데 비해 불과 22도에 불과한 이 좁은 촬영범위를 어느 정도 보완하기 위해, E-5는 약간 회전할 수도 있었다. 우주선 전체가 좌우로 최대 15도까지 기울어져 바로 아래에 있지 않은 표적을 촬영할 수 있었다.

그러나 사모스 E-5가 1961년 말 비행 준비를 마쳤을 때는 이미 미국의 정보 요구를 충족하기에는 너무 제한적이었다. 지상에서 충분히 넓은 지역을 관측하지 못했고, 목표한 해상도를 달성하지 못할 것이라는 징후도 있었다. 게다가 공군 외부에서는 E-5 카메라를 담은 대형 회수캡슐에 큰 열의를 보이는 사람이 거의 없었다. 그 설계가 정찰위성 개발보다는 유인 군사우주선을 개발하려는 공군 관계자들의 은밀한 욕망과 더 큰 관련이 있었기 때문이다.[6]

랜야드

사모스 E-5는 원래 우주비행사를 우주로 보내기 위해 설계된 대형 우주선이었다. 공군은 이를 정찰 탑재체를 실을 수 있도록 개조하라고 지시했지만, 그 결과 카메라 설계는 심각한 타협을 강요받았다. (사진: 미 공군)

잿더미에서 되살아나다

조지프 체릭은 1961년 12월 4일 월요일 E-5 프로그램을 취소했다. 취소 이틀 뒤 아이텍 관계자 잭 카터는 체릭에게 아이텍과 퍼킨엘머 렌즈를 시험해, 마지막으로 남은 사모스 E-5 비행에 기존 렌즈 대신 개선된 렌즈를 탑재할 수 있는지 확인하자고 제안했다. 카터는 곧 사모스 위성 개발을 감독하던 로스앤젤레스의 공군 조직을 지휘한 로버트 그리어 소장에게도 E-5 카메라를 코로나 장비에 적용할 수 있다고 제안했다. 카터는 12월 19일 이 제안을 공식 제출했다.[7] 12월 29일, 아마도 레비슨과 허서가 보스턴에서 딘 랜드와 이야기한 직후였을 시점에 체릭은 그리어에게 이 아이디어에 관심이 있지만 실현 가능성에 관한 추가 정보가 필요하다는 뜻을 밝혔다.[8]

체릭이 사모스 E-5를 취소했을 때 아이텍에는 상당량의 카메라 장비가 남아 있었다. 1961년 가을, 체릭이 신설된 NRO 국장 직함까지 맡은 뒤 그는 남은 장비를 보안시설에 보관하라고 명령했다. 완성되지 않은 E-5 카메라 체계 5개가 저장시설에 들어갔다.[9]

잭 허서는 남은 장비가 완성된 카메라 체계가 아니라 주요 구성품들이었다고 회상했다.

“렌즈가 있었습니다.”

허서는 설명했다.

“렌즈 원재료와 일부 가공이 끝난 렌즈도 있었죠.”

렌즈는 크고 무거우며 비쌌다. 유리는 서독 마인츠의 쇼트사에 특별 주문했는데, 이 회사는 선결제를 요구했다. 아이텍은 정해진 수량의 유리 부품 비용을 이미 지급한 상태였다.

“처음 계약을 따냈을 때부터 장기 조달품목이었습니다.”

허서는 이렇게 설명했다. 이는 렌즈를 절삭하고 연마하는 데 긴 시간이 필요했기 때문에 나머지 장비보다 훨씬 먼저 주문해야 했다는 뜻이었다.[10]

중앙정보국장 존 매콘은 또 다른 이유로 랜야드에 동의했다. 그는 훗날 이렇게 썼다.

“나는 개인적으로 갬빗이 실패할지 모른다는 우려 때문에 랜야드 추진을 고집했다.”

로스앤젤레스에 있던 공군장관 특별사업국은 대개 SAFSP 또는 단순히 “특별사업국”으로 불렸으며, 디스커버러 위성을 비롯한 여러 우주정찰사업을 관리하는 NRO 조직이었다. 디스커버러는 실제로는 코로나 정찰사업의 위장 명칭이었다. 그리어 소장이 특별사업국을 지휘했다. 1962년 1월, 아마 체릭의 지시에 따라 리 배틀 대령은 더 비싼 아틀라스 대신 토르 발사체에 단순화된 사모스 E-5 위성을 실어 발사하는 방안의 실현 가능성을 연구했다. 이 제안에는 랜야드라는 이름이 붙었으며, 대형 가압식 사모스 E-5 우주선 대신 기존 디스커버러·코로나 재진입체를 이용해 필름을 회수하는 방식이었다. 배틀은 디스커버러 사업실의 책임자였고, 그의 팀은 이것이 실현 가능하며 위성을 평균고도 약 140해리, 약 259킬로미터, 적도 기준 경사각 69도의 궤도에 올릴 수 있다고 판단했다.[11]

새 탑재체의 초기 추정 중량은 775파운드, 약 350킬로그램이었고, 극궤도 임무기간은 이틀이었다.[12] 디스커버러 사업실 관계자들은 위성이 약 40파운드, 약 18킬로그램의 필름을 탑재할 수 있다고 판단했다. 이는 사모스 E-5가 실었던 250파운드, 약 113킬로그램보다 훨씬 적었다. 카메라는 지상에서 약 4피트, 약 1.2미터의 해상도를 달성할 수 있었다. 이들은 CIA가 아이텍에서 카메라 탑재체를 조달하고, 제너럴일렉트릭에서 표준 코로나 재진입체를 조달할 것으로 가정했다. 록히드 미사일·우주회사는 탑재체 구조물을 제작하고 전체 기체 통합을 수행할 예정이었다. 공군 우주시스템사단은 토르 로켓과 아제나 상단을 담당하고, 에어로스페이스사는 협력계약업체로서 공학지원을 제공할 예정이었다. 즉시 착수한다는 가정 아래 연구진은 첫 탑재체가 1962년 8월 22일까지 인도될 수 있고, 첫 발사는 1962년 12월에 가능하다고 판단했다. 그러나 이 예상은 지나치게 낙관적인 것으로 드러났다.[13]

기존 장비는 위성 5대분이 있었다. 유일한 실질적 문제는 토르를 추진할 로켓다인 로켓엔진을 확보하는 일이었다. 공군은 1962년 말까지 첫 랜야드를 발사할 수 있는 예비 토르 1기와 예비 아제나 B 2기를 확보할 것으로 예상했다. 배틀 대령은 또한 연료탱크를 늘린 개량형 토르인 토라드의 조달을 제안했다. 이 더 강력한 부스터를 사용하면 랜야드를 최대 6일간 궤도에 머물게 할 수 있었다.[14] 1962년 2월 초에는 랜야드가 최대 15일까지 궤도에서 운용될 수 있을 것으로 보였다.[15] 사업 관계자들은 또한 기체 하부에 소형 고체로켓모터를 장착한 새로운 계획형 토르인 추력증강형 토르(TAT)를 사용하기로 결정했다. 곧 아제나 B를 대체할 예정이었던 더 성능이 뛰어난 아제나 D형 상단·우주선도 선택했다.

랜야드

사모스 E-5 탑재체의 두 번째 발사는 1961년 12월 이루어졌다. 당시 이 사업은 이미 취소가 예정돼 있었다. 카메라 설계자들은 오래전부터 전체 체계에 우려를 갖고 있었으며, 카메라의 성공 가능성을 높이기 위한 개조방안을 고민하기 시작했다. (사진: 피터 헌터 컬렉션)

디스커버러 사업실은 계획이 기술적으로 실현 가능하다고 판단했지만, 그렇다고 새 위성이 반드시 필요하다는 의미는 아니었다. 1962년 1월 말까지 이 문제는 국가정찰국 연구팀의 검토 대상이 됐다. 연구팀은 랜야드가 국가정찰계획(NRP)에 어떤 추가적 가치를 제공할 수 있는지를 평가하도록 요청받았다. NRP는 전체 정찰활동을 의미했다. 몇 대의 위성을 어떤 종류로 조달할지, 국가의 정보수집 요구를 충족하기 위해 발사일정을 어떻게 잡을지가 포함됐다. 이 용어는 당시 CIA와 공군이 따로 추진하던 여러 정보위성사업을 중앙에서 통합하고 조정하려는 노력의 일환으로 NRO 관계자들이 만든 것이었다.

국가정찰국은 형식상 국방부 기관이었으며, 공군과 중앙정보국, 해군이 제공한 여러 소규모 조직으로 구성돼 있었다. 로스앤젤레스의 공군 구성조직에는 CIA의 코로나 프로그램을 위장한 디스커버러 사업실도 포함돼 있었다. 그러나 NRO 초창기에는 이 모든 조직의 공식적인 관계가 여전히 불분명했다. 체릭 국장의 참모진은 주로 공군 임무를 수행한다는 위장 아래 활동하는 공군 장교들로 구성돼 있었다. 이는 다른 조직들, 특히 CIA가 NRO를 경계하게 만들었다. 그들은 NRO가 전체 위성정찰사업을 장악할 수 있는 공군의 트로이 목마라고 여겼다.

NRO 연구팀은 1961년 11월 실시한 유사 연구의 결과를 토대로 랜야드를 검토했다. 그 연구는 사모스 E-5 체계의 취소를 권고한 바 있었다. 연구팀은 소련 내 약 10개 표적에 대해 5피트, 약 1.5미터 해상도의 촬영이 필요하다고 판단했다. 또한 랜야드 임무의 성공확률을 40퍼센트로 계산했다. 이는 랜야드 5회를 발사하면 2회의 성공을 기대할 수 있다는 의미였다.[16]

연구 당시 공군 사모스 사업실은 E-5 작업을 정리하는 동시에 여러 신호정보위성 개발을 계속하고 있었으며, 주요 신형 고해상도 위성인 KH-7 갬빗도 개발하고 있었다.[17] 갬빗은 1960년 5월 러시아 상공에서 게리 파워스의 U-2 정찰기가 격추된 뒤 시작된 사업이었다. 이 위성은 초점거리 77인치, 약 196센티미터의 강력한 카메라를 탑재했으며, E-5·랜야드의 66인치 카메라보다 더 길었다. 갬빗은 한 변이 4피트, 약 1.2미터에 불과한 지상 표적을 촬영할 수 있을 예정이었고, 이 성능은 시간이 지나며 더 개선될 수 있었다. 갬빗이 1963년 여름부터 운용되면 기술적 특성을 판별하기 위해 고해상도가 필요한 러시아 내 최우선 표적들을 촬영할 예정이었다. 목록의 최상단에는 소련의 대륙간탄도미사일 기지가 있었다. 정보공동체는 발사시설에 배치된 소련 미사일을 절실히 촬영하고 싶어 했다.[18]

NRO 연구팀은 갬빗이 작전배치될 예정이던 1963년 6월 이전에 반드시 촬영해야 하는 표적들이 있으며, 랜야드가 이 임무를 수행할 수 있다고 판단했다.[19] 연구팀은 랜야드 위성 5대를 조달하고 가능한 가장 이른 시점에 발사할 것을 권고했다. 랜야드는 갬빗이 비행을 시작할 때까지 고해상도 영상 수요를 충족하는 임시방편이었으며, 정보 요구에 대한 영구적 해결책은 아니었다.

중앙정보국장 존 매콘은 또 다른 이유로 랜야드에 동의했다. 그는 훗날 이렇게 썼다.

“나는 개인적으로 갬빗이 실패할지 모른다는 우려 때문에 랜야드 추진을 고집했다.”[20]

갬빗은 우주비행 경험이 전혀 없는 대형 반사거울 설계를 사용했고, 높은 수준의 지향정확도와 안정성을 요구했다. 또한 유도와 통제를 위해 검증되지 않은 우주선을 사용했다. 랜야드는 주로 검증된 체계를 이용했다. 해상도는 갬빗보다 낮겠지만 보험 역할을 할 수 있었다.

랜야드

1960년 12월 촬영된 소련 바이코누르 발사단지의 코로나 정찰사진. 코로나 영상은 상대적으로 해상도가 낮았지만, 다른 정찰사업들이 고전하던 1961년 내내 성능과 신뢰성이 꾸준히 개선되고 있었다. 코로나의 성공은 더 강력한 사모스 E-5 카메라를 개조해 개량된 코로나 장비와 함께 발사하자는 제안으로 이어졌다. (사진: 해리 스트레인저)

본격적인 추진

1962년 3월 세 번째 사모스 E-5 위성이 발사돼 성공적으로 궤도에 올랐다. 그러나 기체가 고장 나 회수되지 못했다. 이 실패는 E-5를 계속하는 대신 랜야드를 추진하기로 한 결정을 재확인해 주었을 뿐이었다.

1962년 4월 3일 CIA는 록히드 미사일·우주사단에 “작업명세서”를 발행했다. 불과 10여 쪽 분량의 이 문서는 록히드가 랜야드를 위해 어떤 장비를 만들고 언제까지 생산해야 하는지를 규정했다.[21] 이때까지 랜야드는 탑재체 8대로 확대됐으며, 록히드는 1963년 9월 마지막 완성형 “탑재체 체계”를 공급할 예정이었다.

이틀 뒤 CIA 연구담당 부국장 허버트 스코빌 주니어는 체릭에게 두 사람이 협의한 관리절차에 동의한다는 각서를 보냈다. CIA는 랜야드의 보안과 일부 운용을 담당할 예정이었다.[22]

이 무렵 코로나에서 매우 잘 작동했던 CIA와 공군의 관계는 악화되기 시작했다. 이러한 불신의 증가는 랜야드 사업 자체에도 반영됐다.

코로나 구성요소, 특히 재진입체가 랜야드 설계에 포함되면서 CIA도 사업관리방식 논의에 참여하게 됐다. 사모스 E-5는 공군 사업이었다. 그러나 이제 랜야드가 비밀사업이 되고 CIA가 관여하면서 누가 인원들의 사업 접근을 승인할 권한을 갖는지를 둘러싼 문제가 제기됐다. CIA가 통제권을 가져가려는 듯한 모습을 보이면서 불편한 논의가 일부 있었지만, 관리방식은 큰 어려움 없이 해결됐다. 1962년 2월 존 F. 케네디 대통령은 랜야드에 누가 참여할지를 승인할 권한을 CIA에 부여했으며, 이 지시는 부수적으로 랜야드 사업 자체를 승인하는 효과도 냈다.[23]

그러나 이때까지 코로나에서 매우 잘 작동했던 CIA와 공군의 관계는 악화되기 시작했다. 체릭과 긴밀히 협력했던 전설적인 CIA 인사 리처드 비셀이 떠난 것과 성격 충돌 등 여러 이유가 있었다. 게다가 위성정찰은 이제 미국 정부에 가장 중요한 단일 정보원으로 자리 잡았고, 여러 인물과 조직이 이를 통제하고 싶어 했다. 공군의 정찰위성 설계는 하나도 성공하지 못했지만, 코로나는 광대한 소련 영토를 촬영한 저해상도와 중해상도 사진을 정기적으로 회수하며 엄청난 양의 정보를 생산하고 있었다. 일부 CIA 관계자들은 코로나가 처음부터 CIA 단독사업이었던 것처럼 행동하며 공군의 기여를 깎아내리기 시작했고, 이는 관계를 더욱 악화시켰다.

이러한 불신의 증가는 랜야드 사업 자체에도 반영됐다. 4월 초 CIA의 정찰사업을 총괄하던 스코빌은 랜야드의 관리관계를 명확히 하려는 서한을 체릭에게 보냈다. 스코빌은 랜야드와 관련된 모든 기술적 결정은 NRO 로스앤젤레스 조직 책임자인 로버트 그리어 소장이 내리기로 동의했다.[24] 얼마 뒤 그리어는 공군과 CIA 인력이 참석한 회의를 주재해 관리체계를 논의했다.

그리어는 CIA의 조달담당자, 즉 CIA에 파견된 공군 장교가 워싱턴 D.C.가 아니라 로스앤젤레스에서 근무하며 자신에게 직접 보고하기를 원한다고 밝혔다. 그는 또한 공군이 취소한 사모스 E-4 지도제작위성의 전자제어장치를 랜야드에 사용하는 방안을 평가하고 싶어 했다. 이 장치는 E-5 위성에 사용된 페어차일드사의 장치보다 무거웠지만, 발사 전에 지상에서만 프로그래밍할 수 있었던 기존 장비와 달리 궤도에서 프로그래밍할 수 있어 훨씬 더 유연할 것이라고 그리어는 판단했다. 그러나 이 경우 모든 위성 프로그래밍과 통제는 워싱턴이 아니라 로스앤젤레스에서 이루어져야 했다. CIA에는 서부 해안에서 이러한 작전을 수행할 시설이 없었기 때문이다.[25]

CIA 정찰사업을 담당하는 특별사업실 책임자는 그리어의 발언을 경고신호로 받아들였다.

“그리어 장군이 랜야드 사업에서 중앙정보국은 공동역할이 아니라 지원역할만 맡는다고 생각하고 있다는 증거가 있다.”

그는 이렇게 썼다.

그는 그리어의 제안을 랜야드의 통제권을 확보하려는 시도로 보았다.

“그러한 통제가 소급 적용돼 코로나까지 포함하게 될지는 두고 봐야 한다.”

그는 이렇게 썼다.

랜야드가 주된 갈등 원인은 아니었지만, 두 집단 사이의 긴장이 커지고 있음은 분명했다.[26]

다음 편: 랜야드 건조

주석

빅터 K. 매켈헤니, 『불가능을 고집하다: 에드윈 랜드의 생애』(뉴욕: 페르세우스 북스, 1998).

조너선 루이스, 『스파이 자본주의: 아이텍과 CIA』(매사추세츠주 보스턴: 예일대학교 출판부, 2002); 드웨인 A. 데이, 「늑대의 탈을 쓴 양: 사모스 E-5 정찰위성 1부」, 『스페이스플라이트』, 2002년 10월, 424~431쪽; 드웨인 A. 데이, 「둥근 구멍에 들어가지 않는 네모난 말뚝: 사모스 E-5 정찰위성 2부」, 『스페이스플라이트』, 2003년 2월, 71~79쪽; 드웨인 A. 데이, 「카메라에서 원숭이와 인간으로: 사모스 E-5 정찰위성 3부」, 『스페이스플라이트』, 2003년 9월, 380~389쪽. 또한 로버트 페리, 「위성정찰의 역사 제2B권―사모스 E-5와 E-6」, 1973년 10월 참조.

존 잭 허서, 드웨인 A. 데이와의 인터뷰, 매사추세츠주 월섬, 2002년 9월 26일.

같은 자료.

이 글은 사모스 E-5에서 개발된 랜야드 정찰위성에 관한 필자의 이전 글을 확장하고 수정하기 위한 것이다. 그 이후 KH-6에 관한 상당수 문서가 기밀해제됐다. 이전 글에는 랜야드가 특별히 탈린 탄도탄요격미사일 기지를 찾아내기 위해 제작됐다는 주장 등 부정확한 내용이 포함돼 있다. 드웨인 A. 데이, 「실패한 불사조: KH-6 랜야드 정찰위성」, 『스페이스플라이트』, 1997년 5월, 170~174쪽 참조.

역사가 로버트 페리가 이 사업의 공식 역사에서 지적했듯, 원래의 E-5 캡슐은 본질적으로 록히드가 ‘맨 인 스페이스 수니스트’ 계획을 위해 제안했던 우주선과 동일했다. 로버트 페리, 365쪽.

같은 자료, 343~344쪽.

같은 자료, 346쪽.

확인 가능한 기록에 따르면 작전용 사모스 E-5 비행은 5회만 계획됐으며, 그중 1회가 1962년 초 실시됐다. 사업 종료 당시 왜 4개가 아니라 5개의 카메라 체계가 남아 있었는지는 불분명하다. 아이텍이 비행용이 아닌 카메라 1개를 별도로 제작했고, 이것이 수량에 포함됐을 가능성이 있다.

존 허서 인터뷰.

[삭제됨] 미 공군 소령, 기록용 각서, 「단순화된 66인치 체계(우주시스템사단 비밀 암호명: 랜야드)」, 1962년 1월 11일. 국가정찰국 열람실 코로나·아르곤·랜야드 컬렉션 3/A/0063. 이하 CAL. 이 기록들은 이후 열람실이 폐쇄된 뒤 NRO 웹사이트에 게시됐다. 가장 쉽게 찾는 방법은 해당 컬렉션을 검색하는 것이다.

페리, 346~347쪽.

같은 자료.

같은 자료.

같은 자료, 350쪽.

[삭제됨]에게 보내는 각서, 「랜야드 프로그램」, 1962년 2월 2일. CAL 2/6/0022.

이 우주선은 처음에는 “갬빗”으로 명명됐으며, 때로는 모두 대문자로, 때로는 그렇지 않게 표기됐다. 개량형 KH-8 갬빗-3가 비행을 시작한 뒤 KH-7 갬빗은 갬빗-1로 불렸다.

CIA 공식 역사에 따르면 에스토니아 탈린의 소련 탄도탄요격미사일 기지로 추정된 시설이 랜야드의 주요 표적이었다. 그러나 연대가 맞지 않는다. 탈린의 의심스러운 ABM 기지는 랜야드 사업이 끝난 뒤인 1964년 7월 코로나 위성에 의해 발견됐다. 도널드 E. 웰젠바흐, 「과학과 기술: 한 국의 기원」, 『인텔리전스 연구』 제30권, 1986년 여름, 24쪽, 미국 국립문서기록관리청 RG 263 참조. 탈린 기지에 관한 정보는 크리스 만토이펠, 「철의 장막 뒤의 수수께끼: 탈린 탄도탄요격미사일 체계와 위성정보」, 『더 스페이스 리뷰』, 2019년 3월 18일 참조.

[삭제됨]에게 보내는 각서, 「랜야드 프로그램」, 1962년 2월 2일. 연구팀은 그 밖에도 매달 토르 로켓 4기를 계속 생산할 것, 매달 아제나 D 우주선 5기를 생산할 것, 아르곤 지도제작위성이나 코로나 우주선의 토르 부스터와 손쉽게 호환할 수 있을 것, 코로나 마크 VA 회수캡슐을 사용할 것, 신형 코닥 SO 132 필름을 사용할 것 등을 가정했다.

존 A. 매콘 중앙정보국장이 카터 장군과 휠런 박사에게 보낸 문서, 1963년 9월 20일.

LMSC 작업명세서: 코로나 “L” 프로그램 위성정찰·회수체계 개발, 1962년 4월 3일. CAL 7/B/0069.

허버트 스코빌 주니어 연구담당 부국장이 공군 차관에게 보낸 각서, 「랜야드 관리」, 1962년 4월 5일. CAL 1/B/0064.

페리, 351~352쪽.

같은 자료.

[삭제된 이름], DPD/SPB/C/COR, 기록용 각서, 「랜야드 사업의 현황」, 1962년 4월 18일. 미국 국립문서기록관리청 CIA 기록검색도구, 이하 CREST.

[삭제된 이름], DPD 특별사업과장, DPD 국장대리에게 보내는 각서, 「랜야드 프로그램의 운용」, 1962년 4월 19일. CREST. 1962년 7월 양측은 워싱턴에서 관계자들이 비행 중인 우주선의 상태를 감시할 수 있도록 “비행추적” 센터를 설치하는 방안을 논의하기 위해 회의를 열었다. 스탠리 W. 비얼리 미 공군 대령, 특별활동담당 부국장, 연구담당 부국장에게 보내는 각서, 「위성사업의 작전통제」, 1962년 7월 16일. CREST.

드웨인 데이에게는 [zirconic1@cox.net](mailto:zirconic1@cox.net)으로 연락할 수 있다. 

The Space Review: Lemons to bitter lemonade: from the Samos E-5 to the LANYARD reconnaissance satellite (part 1)

The Space Review: Lemons to bitter lemonade: from the Samos E-5 to the LANYARD reconnaissance satellite (part 1)

The first Samos E-5 reconnaissance satellite was launched in November 1961 from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. The Samos E-5 was designed to return both its exposed film and camera to Earth. The first launch was a test payload that failed. The E-5 camera was later modified to become the KH-6 LANYARD reconnaissance camera. (credit: Peter Hunter Collection)

Lemons to bitter lemonade: from the Samos E-5 to the LANYARD reconnaissance satellite (part 1)by Dwayne A. Day
Monday, August 3, 2026

On a cold winter evening around Christmas 1961 in Boston, Massachusetts, Itek engineers Walter Levison and Jack Herther drove to the home of Edwin “Din” Land, one of President John F. Kennedy’s top intelligence advisors. Land was the president of the Polaroid Corporation, maker of the instant camera, and according to all who knew him, a genius inventor. He had also served as a top advisor to President Dwight D. Eisenhower on intelligence issues since 1956, particularly on advanced technologies such as reconnaissance cameras. When John F. Kennedy entered office in January 1961, Land had continued providing this advice, serving as a member of Kennedy’s Presidential Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, or PFIAB.[1]

Levison and Herther were on a mission. For just over four years now their company, Itek, had been a major designer and manufacturer of reconnaissance satellite cameras. The company’s main product was the CORONA camera, which it built for the CIA and was launched atop Air Force rockets.

The E-5 could be made to work, they argued, if they could redesign the camera to eliminate sources of image blurring, discard the camera rather than return it to the ground, and utilize the same proven recovery vehicle as the CORONA. All they needed was a chance.

In the 1950s, the US Air Force had started the Samos program—originally named Sentry—to provide reconnaissance from space. The program was severely underfunded until after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, at which time Samos expanded and sprouted numerous reconnaissance camera systems. One of the offshoots was a joint Air Force-CIA program named CORONA, which was designed to return its film in recoverable vehicles. The Air Force-led Samos projects—E-1, E-2, E-4, E-5, and E-6—suffered numerous problems. CORONA also had severe problems, but by August 1960 it had achieved initial success. By the time Levison and Herther went to see Din Land at the end of 1961, CORONA was already providing a wealth of intelligence data in the film that was recovered after each mission.

By fall 1961, the Department of Defense created the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to oversee development and operations of satellite reconnaissance systems. The NRO was so classified that even its name was secret. The NRO’s first director was Dr. Joseph Charyk, who also had an unclassified title as Undersecretary of the Air Force. Charyk was highly respected and had a good relationship with the CIA. Charyk was also skeptical of the remaining Air Force Samos programs, like the E-5, which he doubted would produce useful intelligence data.

Starting in early 1959, in addition to the CORONA camera, Itek also developed the Samos E-5 camera for the US Air Force. Unlike CORONA, the E-5 satellite had been a failure. Two diagnostic cameras had been launched in fall of 1961, with only one reaching orbit. Charyk lacked confidence in the project and canceled it, deciding that only one operational camera would be launched. That launch was currently scheduled for the spring of 1962.[2]

Levison and Herther had both designed the E-5 camera. They knew that it had some serious limitations, primarily forced upon them by the need to return the entire camera to Earth inside a large recoverable capsule rather than let it burn up in the atmosphere at the end of the mission, as was done with CORONA. But the E-5 was a more powerful camera than the other ones then in service. Higher resolution photos from space were important for providing scientific and technical information about targets on the ground; rather than simply counting planes, ballistic missiles, and other weapons systems, they could be used to determine their capabilities. Levison and Herther went to Land’s house late one winter evening to ask that Itek be given a chance to redeem their design. The E-5 could be made to work, they argued, if they could redesign the camera to eliminate sources of image blurring, discard the camera rather than return it to the ground, and utilize the same proven recovery vehicle as the CORONA. All they needed was a chance.[3]

“Do it,” Land said, and they left.

“Walt and I briefed one guy one night and the program was on,” Herther said in an interview many years later.[4]

Of course it was not that easy. No satellite project requiring the expenditure of millions of dollars and the mobilization of various government agencies could proceed simply on the word of a single individual unless that person was the President of the United States. Din Land was a successful inventor and a rich businessman, not a government official. But within the small satellite reconnaissance community he commanded a lot of respect. If he thought that a project had merit, then it would at least get a hearing from others, like Joseph Charyk. Land could talk to his contacts in the Air Force and CIA and tell them that they should seriously investigate the Itek proposal. That is undoubtedly what happened in the days after Herther and Levison met with Land, for within a few months Itek had a contract to modify the Samos E-5 and turn it into something useful. As one critic later commented, they were trying to make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear.

By January 1962, the silk purse was named the LANYARD, and it would rise from the dead Samos E-5. Soon afterwards, another program, named SPARTAN, would also begin to arise from another dead Samos project. Trying to turn lemons into lemonade.[5]

Edwin “Din” Land was the head of the Polaroid Corporation and a senior intelligence advisor to the government. He was widely considered to be a genius inventor. In December 1961 he agreed with a suggestion that the Samos E-5 reconnaissance camera be modified to use existing CORONA reconnaissance hardware to improve its chances for success. (credit: CIA)

The E-5 dies a quick death

The Samos E-5 was the first American effort to develop a reconnaissance satellite with higher resolution than the existing CORONA or the film-readout Samos E-1 and E-2. Started in early 1959, but not getting truly underway until September 1959, the E-5 was a recoverable satellite designed to return imagery of objects on the ground as small as five feet (1.5 meters). No other satellite was even half as good when it came to resolution. Although seven spacecraft were initially planned—including two diagnostic and five operational vehicles—only the diagnostic vehicles and one operational payload were completed before the Samos E-5 was canceled.

But by the time the Samos E-5 was ready to fly in late 1961, it was too limited to meet the intelligence requirements of the United States.

The E-5 was a panoramic camera, which meant that rather than staring straight down at its target, it swept over it, panning back and forth along its ground track. This produced an image that was thin but long, covered much more territory, and had excellent resolution along its entire length. The E-5 had a 66-inch (168-centimeter) focal length compared to the 24-inch (61-centimeter) focal length of the CORONA. Focal length is the distance from the point where the light enters the lens, called the aperture, to where it focuses at the focal point, on the film. The bigger the focal length, the more powerful the camera. But one drawback of a longer focal length in general and the specific E-5 design was that the camera had a smaller viewing angle and therefore photographed far less territory on each sweep of the lens than the CORONA, albeit at higher resolution.

To compensate somewhat for this reduced viewing area—only 22 degrees verses 70 degrees for CORONA—the E-5 could also rotate slightly. The entire spacecraft rolled up to 15 degrees to either side to take pictures of targets that were not directly below.

But by the time the Samos E-5 was ready to fly in late 1961, it was too limited to meet the intelligence requirements of the United States. It did not view enough area on the ground, and there were indications that it would not achieve its resolution goals. Furthermore, nobody outside of the Air Force was all that enthusiastic about the large recovery capsule containing the E-5 camera, because its design had more to do with a secret desire among Air Force officials to develop a manned military spacecraft than it did with developing a reconnaissance satellite.[6]

The Samos E-5 was a large spacecraft that was originally designed to carry an astronaut into space. The Air Force ordered that it be modified to carry a reconnaissance payload instead, but this led to a badly-compromised camera design. (credit: USAF)

Rising from the ashes

Joseph Charyk canceled the E-5 program on Monday, December 4, 1961. Two days after the cancellation, Itek official Jack Carter proposed to Charyk that tests could be run on Itek and Perkin-Elmer lenses to determine if an improved lens could be substituted for the original in the last remaining Samos E-5 flight. Carter also soon suggested to Major General Robert Greer, who ran the Air Force office in Los Angeles that oversaw the development of the Samos satellites, that the E-5 camera could be adapted to CORONA hardware. Carter formally submitted this proposal on December 19.[7] On December 29—possibly soon after Levison and Herther had talked to Din Land in Boston—Charyk indicated to Greer that he was interested in the idea, but wanted more information on its feasibility.[8]

When Charyk canceled the Samos E-5, Itek had a considerable amount of camera hardware left over. By fall of 1961, after Charyk had acquired the additional title of director of the fledgling NRO, he ordered that the remaining hardware be placed in secure storage. Five incomplete E-5 camera systems were placed into a storage facility.[9]

Jack Herther remembered that the leftover hardware was not complete camera systems, but major components. “We had lenses,” Herther explained. “Lens blanks. And some partially finished lenses,” The lenses were big, heavy and expensive. The glass was special ordered from the Schott company in Mainz, West Germany, which insisted upon being paid up front. Itek had paid them for a set number of glass units. “When we first got the job it was a long-lead item,” Herther explained, meaning that the lenses had to be ordered far in advance of the rest of the equipment because they took so long to cut and polish.[10]

Director of Central Intelligence John McCone agreed to LANYARD for an additional reason. He later wrote: “I personally insisted on pursuing the LANYARD because of worry that the GAMBIT might fail.”

In Los Angeles, the Secretary of the Air Force Special Projects Office—usually referred to as SAFSP or simply “Special Projects”—was the NRO office that managed several space reconnaissance programs, such as the Discoverer satellite, which was in reality the cover story for the CORONA reconnaissance program. Major General Greer ran Special Projects. In January 1962, probably at the orders of Charyk, Colonel Lee Battle conducted a study of the feasibility of launching a simplified Samos E-5 satellite atop a Thor launch vehicle instead of the more expensive Atlas. This proposal was named LANYARD and instead of the big Samos E-5 pressurized spacecraft it would utilize the existing Discoverer/CORONA reentry vehicle to return its film. Battle was head of the Discoverer office and his people determined that this was feasible and that such a satellite could be placed in an orbit with an average altitude of about 140 nautical miles (259 kilometers), inclined 69 degrees to the equator.[11]

The original estimate for the new payload was 775 pounds (350 kilograms) and a two-day polar orbit.[12] The members of the Discoverer office determined that the satellite could carry about 40 pounds (18 kilograms) of film—far less than the 250 pounds (113 kilograms) of film carried aboard the Samos E-5. The camera could achieve a ground resolution of about four feet (1.2 meters). They assumed that CIA would procure the camera payload from Itek and a standard CORONA reentry vehicle from General Electric. Lockheed Missiles and Space Company would build a payload structure and conduct overall vehicle integration. The Air Force’s Space Systems Division would be responsible for the Thor rocket and Agena upper stage. The Aerospace Corporation would provide engineering support as an associate contractor. Assuming an immediate start, the study’s authors determined that the first payload could be delivered by August 22, 1962, with the first launch occurring in December 1962—a prediction that proved overly optimistic.[13]

There was enough existing equipment for five satellites. The only real problem would be obtaining Rocketdyne rocket engines to power the Thor. The Air Force anticipated having one spare Thor and two spare Agena B rockets at the end of 1962 capable of launching the first LANYARD. Colonel Battle also suggested that the Air Force procure an upgraded version of the Thor, known as the Thorad, with stretched fuel tanks. Using this more powerful booster, the LANYARD could be placed in orbit for up to six days.[14] By early February 1962, it appeared as if LANYARD could have up to 15 days in orbit.[15] Program officials also decided to use a new planned version of the Thor equipped with small solid rocket motors at its base and known as the Thrust-Augmented Thor (TAT). They also chose the more capable Agena D version upper stage/spacecraft, which was slated to soon replace the Agena B.

The second launch of a Samos E-5 payload took place in December 1961. The program was scheduled for cancellation by this time. The camera designers long had concerns about the overall system and began thinking about how the camera could be modified for greater success. (credit: Peter Hunter Collection)

The Discoverer office had indicated that the plan was technically feasible, but that did not mean that the new satellite was necessary. By late January 1962 this question was taken up by a National Reconnaissance Office study team, which was asked to eval‎uate whether the LANYARD could add anything to the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). The NRP referred to the overall reconnaissance effort: how many satellites would be procured and of what type, and how their launches would be scheduled to meet the country’s intelligence collection requirements. The term had been coined by NRO officials as part of an effort to centralize and coordinate the disparate intelligence satellite projects then being undertaken by the CIA and the Air Force.

The National Reconnaissance Office was technically a Department of Defense agency that consisted of several smaller component offices supplied by the Air Force, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Navy. The Air Force’s component office in Los Angeles also included the Discoverer program office that was a cover for the CIA’s CORONA program. But in its early days the formal relationships of all these offices within the NRO were still unclear. NRO Director Charyk’s staff consisted primarily of Air Force officers operating under a cover story that they were performing an Air Force mission. This made other organizations, particularly the CIA, wary of the NRO. They viewed it as an Air Force Trojan Horse that could take over the entire satellite reconnaissance program.

The NRO group members based their LANYARD review on the results of a similar study they had undertaken in November 1961 that recommended the cancellation of the Samos E-5 system. They determined that there were about ten targets in the Soviet Union for which photography at five-foot (1.5 meter) resolution was necessary. They also determined that the probability of success for a LANYARD mission was 40%, meaning that five LANYARD launches should produce two successes.[16]

At the time of their study the Air Force’s Samos project office was winding down work on the E-5, continuing work on several signals intelligence satellites, and working on a major new high-resolution satellite, the KH-7 GAMBIT.[17] GAMBIT had been started in the wake of the shoot down of Gary Powers’ U-2 reconnaissance plane over Russia in May 1960. It carried a powerful camera with a 77-inch (196-centimeter) focal length compared to the 66-inch E-5/LANYARD camera. GAMBIT would be capable of photographing targets on the ground as small as four feet (1.2 meters) on a side, although this could be improved over time. Once GAMBIT was flying in summer 1963, it would photograph the highest priority targets in Russia: targets that required high resolution to determine their technical characteristics. At the top of this list were Soviet ICBM complexes. The intelligence community desperately wanted to photograph Soviet missiles at their launch facilities.[18]

The NRO study group determined that there were targets that had to be photographed before June 1963, when GAMBIT was supposed to become operational, and LANYARD was capable of accomplishing this task.[19] They recommended the procurement of five LANYARD satellites and their scheduling for earliest possible launch. LANYARD was an interim solution to the demand for higher-resolution imagery until GAMBIT started flying, not a permanent solution to the intelligence requirement.

Director of Central Intelligence John McCone agreed to LANYARD for an additional reason. He later wrote: “I personally insisted on pursuing the LANYARD because of worry that the GAMBIT might fail.”[20] GAMBIT used a large reflecting mirror design never flown in space and had high requirements for pointing accuracy and stability. It also used an untried spacecraft for guidance and control. LANYARD primarily used proven systems. Although its resolution would not be as good as GAMBIT’s, it would serve as an insurance policy.

A CORONA reconnaissance photograph of the Soviet launch complex at Baikonur taken in December 1960. Although CORONA's images were relatively low resolution, the program was steadily improving in performance and reliability throughout 1961, when other reconnaissance programs were struggling. CORONA’s success led to a proposal to modify the more powerful Samos E-5 camera and launch it using upgraded CORONA equipment. (credit: Harry Stranger)

Getting rolling

In March 1962, the third Samos E-5 satellite was launched and successfully reached orbit. But the vehicle malfunctioned and was not recovered. The loss only reaffirmed the decision to proceed with LANYARD instead of continuing E-5.

On April 3, 1962, the CIA issued a “Statement of Work” to Lockheed Missiles and Space Division. Barely a dozen pages long, it stipulated what equipment Lockheed would build for LANYARD and when it had to be produced.[21] By this time LANYARD had been expanded to eight payloads, with Lockheed scheduled to supply the last of the complete “payload systems” in September 1963.

Two days later, the CIA’s Deputy Director for Research, Herbert Scoville, Jr., sent a memo to Charyk agreeing to management procedures that they had both negotiated. CIA would handle security and some operations for LANYARD.[22]

By this time the relationship between the CIA and the Air Force that had worked so well with CORONA was starting to deteriorate. This growing distrust was also reflected in the LANYARD program itself.

The incorporation of CORONA elements into the LANYARD design, particularly the reentry vehicle, added the CIA to the discussion of how the program should be managed. Samos E-5 had been an Air Force program. But now that LANYARD was a covert program and the CIA was involved, it raised questions of who had authority to approve personnel access to the program. There were some uneasy discussions as it appeared as if CIA wanted to take control, but the arrangements were resolved without much difficulty. In February 1962, President John F. Kennedy directed that the CIA had the authority to approve who would be involved in LANYARD, and his directive had the side effect of approving the LANYARD program.[23]

But by this time the relationship between the CIA and the Air Force that had worked so well with CORONA was starting to deteriorate. There were numerous reasons for this, including the departure of legendary CIA figure Richard Bissell, who had worked closely with Charyk, as well as personality conflicts. In addition, satellite reconnaissance had now become the most important single source of intelligence information to the American government, and various people and organizations wanted to control it. None of the Air Force reconnaissance satellite designs had been successful, whereas CORONA was regularly returning low- to medium-resolution pictures of vast swaths of Soviet territory, producing a tremendous amount of intelligence information. Some CIA officials also began acting as if CORONA had been a CIA program from the start and belittling the Air Force’s contribution, further straining the relationship.

This growing distrust was also reflected in the LANYARD program itself. In early April, Scoville, who had overall responsibility for CIA reconnaissance projects, sent a letter to Charyk seeking to clarify the management relationship for LANYARD. Scoville agreed that all technical decisions regarding LANYARD would be made by Major General Robert Greer, the head of the NRO’s Los Angeles office.[24] A short time later Greer chaired a meeting of Air Force and CIA personnel to discuss the management arrangements.

Greer declared that he wanted the CIA’s procurement official—an Air Force officer on loan to the agency—to operate out of Los Angeles rather than Washington, DC, and to be directly responsive to him. He also wanted to eval‎uate using the electronic control unit for the Air Force’s canceled Samos E-4 mapping satellite aboard LANYARD. Although it was heavier than the Fairchild Company unit used for the E-5 satellite, Greer felt that it would be far more flexible because it could be programmed in orbit rather than on the ground before launch. But it would also require all satellite programming and control to be conducted from Los Angeles rather than Washington because the CIA did not have facilities for conducting these operations on the west coast. [25]

The chief of the CIA’s Office of Special Projects which was responsible for the agency’s reconnaissance programs saw Greer’s comments as a warning sign. “There is evidence that General Greer regards the LANYARD program as one in which the Central Intelligence Agency has a supporting rather than a joint role,” he wrote. He viewed Greer’s proposals as an attempt to gain control over LANYARD. “It then remains to be seen if such control becomes retroactive and includes CORONA,” he wrote. Clearly the tension between the groups was increasing, although LANYARD was not the major source of disagreement.[26]

Next: Building the LANYARD

Endnotes

1. Victor K. McElheny, Insisting on the Impossible: The Life of Edwin Land (New York: Perseus Books, 1998).
2. Jonathan Lewis, Spy Capitalism: Itek and the CIA (Boston, MA: Yale University Press, 2002); Dwayne A. Day, “A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: The Samos E-5 Reconnaissance Satellite, Part One,” Spaceflight, October 2002, pp. 424-431; Dwayne A. Day, “A Square Peg in a Round Hole, The Samos E-5 Reconnaissance Satellite, Part Two, Spaceflight, February 2003, pp. 71-79; Dwayne A. Day, “From Cameras to Monkeys to Men: The Samos E-5 Reconnaissance Satellite, Part Three,” Spaceflight, September 2003, pp. 380-389. See also: Robert Perry, “A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume IIB – SAMOS E-5 and E-6,” October 1973.
3. John (Jack) Herther, interview by Dwayne A. Day, Waltham, Massachusetts, September 26, 2002.
4. Ibid.
5. This article is intended to expand upon and correct my earlier article concerning the LANYARD reconnaissance satellite that was developed from the Samos E-5. Since that time, a considerable number of documents on the KH-6 have been declassified. That earlier article contains inaccuracies, such as the claim that LANYARD was specifically built to spot the Tallinn ABM site. See: Dwayne A. Day, “A Failed Phoenix: The KH-6 LANYARD Reconnaissance Satellite,” Spaceflight, May 1997, pp. 170-174.
6. As historian Robert Perry noted in his official history of the program, the original E-5 capsule was essentially the same spacecraft that Lockheed had proposed for the Man-In-Space-Soonest program. Robert Perry, p. 365.
7. Ibid., pp. 343-344.
8. Ibid., p. 346.
9. Available records indicate that only five operational Samos E-5 flights were planned and one flew in early 1962. It is unclear why there were five and not four camera systems left over at program termination. It is possible that Itek had built a non-flying camera that was included in this count.
10. John Herther interview.
11. [DELETED] Major, USAF, Memorandum for Record, “Simplified 66’’ System (SSD black code word: LANYARD),” January 11, 1962. National Reconnaissance Office Reading Room CORONA/ARGON/LANYARD Collection 3/A/0063. (Hereafter CAL. Note that these records were subsequently placed on the internet on the NRO’s website after the reading room was closed. The easiest way to find them is to search that collection.)
12. Perry, pp. 346-347.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 350.
16. Memorandum for [DELETED], “LANYARD Program,” February 2, 1962. CAL 2/6/0022.
17. The spacecraft was initially named “GAMBIT” (sometimes in all caps, sometimes not). After the updated KH-8 GAMBIT-3 began flying, the KH-7 GAMBIT was referred to as the GAMBIT-1.
18. According to an official CIA history, a suspected Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) site at Tallinn, Estonia was the primary target for the LANYARD. However, the timelines do not match. The suspected ABM site at Tallinn was detected by a CORONA satellite in July 1964, after the LANYARD program had ended. See: Donald E. Welzenbach, “Science and Technology: Origins of a Directorate,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 30, Summer 1986, p. 24, RG 263, National Archives and Records Administration. For information on the Tallinn site, see: Chris Manteuffel, “An enigma behind the curtain: the Tallinn anti-ballistic missile system and satellite intelligence,” The Space Review, March 18, 2019.
19. Memorandum for [DELTED], “LANYARD Program,” February 2, 1962. The group made several other assumptions, including continued Thor production of four rockets per month, Agena D production of five spacecraft per month, easy interchangeability with ARGON mapping or CORONA spacecraft Thor boosters, use of the CORONA Mark VA recovery capsule, and use of the new Kodak SO 132 film.
20. John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence, to General Carter, Dr. Wheelon, September 20, 1963.
21. LMSC Statement of Work: Development of a Satellite Reconnaissance & Recovery System CORONA “L” Program, 3 April, 1962. CAL 7/B/0069.
22. Herbert Scoville, Jr., Deputy Director (Research), Memorandum for Under Secretary of the Air Force, “Management of LANYARD,” April 5, 1962. CAL 1/B/0064.
23. Perry, pp. 351-352.
24. Ibid.
25. [DELETED NAME], DPD/SPB/C/COR, Memorandum for the Record, “Current State of Project LANYARD,” April 18, 1962. CIA Records Search Tool, National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter “CREST).
26. [DELETED NAME], Chief, Special Projects Branch, DPD, Memorandum for Acting Chief, DPD, “Operations in the LANYARD Program,” April 19, 1962. CREST. In July 1962, the groups met to discuss creating a “flight-following” center so that officials could monitor the status of a spacecraft in flight from Washington. Stanley W. Beerli, Colonel, USAF, Assistant Director (Special Activities), Memorandum for Deputy Director (Research), “Operational Control of Satellite Programs,” July 16, 1962. CREST.

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Dwayne Day can be reached at zirconic1@cox.net.

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