역사 1982년 - 슈페르 에탕다르와 엑조세를 제거하기 위해 특수작전을 계획했던 영국군

[위종민]

영국이 포클랜드 전쟁 당시 골치거리였던 아르헨티나의 슈페르 에탕다르와 공중발사 엑조세 대함미사일 전력을 제거하기 위해 공군기지 습격작전을 계획했었다고 하네요. 작전 수행 몇시간 전에 전쟁이 끝났다고 합니다. 

포클랜드 전쟁에 원잠인 HMS 컨커러 외에 디젤전기추진 잠수함이었던 오베론급 잠수함 HMS 오닉스도 참전했었군요. HMS 컨커러는 야간비행하는 수송기를 위한 무선항법표지 역할을, 특작부대는 HMS 오닉스가 수송할 예정이었다고 합니다. 

영국의 마지막 아르헨티나 슈페르 에탕다르 공격기 파괴 계획

포클랜드 전쟁 당시 엑조세 대함미사일로 무장한 아르헨티나 전투기 전력을 파괴하려 했던 영국의 마지막 시도.

마리아노 시아로니

2026년 10월 26일 오후 5시 11분(미국 동부시간)

1982년 4월 27일 포클랜드 전쟁 당시 비행 중인 아르헨티나 해군의 슈페르 에탕다르 전투기 2대. (사진: UPI/Bettmann Archive/Getty Images)

1982년 남대서양 분쟁 당시 영국의 작전계획에 다소 슈페르 에탕다르 공격기와 치명적인 AM39 엑조세 대함미사일의 조합만큼 큰 영향을 미친 아르헨티나의 전력은 없었다. 영국은 이러한 위협에 대응해 일련의 특수부대 작전을 개시했으며, 모든 작전은 동일한 목표를 가지고 있었다. 아르헨티나 조종사들을 사살하고, 항공기와 미사일이 다시 사용되기 전에 파괴하는 것이었다. 공격기와 미사일의 조합은 포클랜드 제도를 탈환하기 위해 파견된 영국 해군 기동부대에 가장 큰 위협임이 입증된 상태였다.

1982년 포클랜드 전쟁 무렵 비행 중인 아르헨티나 해군의 슈페르 에탕다르 2대. (사진: UPI/Bettmann Archive/Getty Images)

프랑스의 금수조치가 시행되기 전까지 아르헨티나에는 슈페르 에탕다르 항공기 5대와 AM39 엑조세 미사일 5발이 인도됐다. 이 전투기들은 남아메리카 최남단에서 칠레와 아르헨티나가 공유하는 지역인 티에라델푸에고의 리오그란데 기지를 거점으로 하는 아르헨티나 해군 제2전투공격비행대대가 운용했다. 슈페르 에탕다르와 엑조세의 조합은 이미 5월 4일 영국 구축함 HMS 셰필드와 5월 25일 컨테이너선 애틀랜틱 컨베이어의 손실을 초래한 바 있었다.

항공모함 HMS 허미스의 의무실로 긴급 후송되는 HMS 셰필드의 부상자. (영국 왕실 저작권)

특수부대 작전은 플럼 더프(PLUM DUFF), 미카도(MIKADO), 케틀드럼(KETTLEDRUM), 임피(IMPI)라는 네 단계로 나뉘었다. 이 가운데 마지막 작전은 문서화된 내용이 가장 적으며, 이 기사의 중심 주제이기도 하다.

플럼 더프는 병력 침투 단계이자 정찰임무였다. 5월 16일 영국 공군 허큘리스 수송기 한 대가 정찰조를 구성할 특수부대원 8명을 영국 해군 보조함 RFA 포트 오스틴에 공중투하했다. 5월 17일에서 18일로 넘어가는 밤, 시 킹 HC4 헬리콥터 ZA290이 항공모함 HMS 인빈시블에서 이륙해 티에라델푸에고를 향한 편도비행에 나섰다. 특수부대원들은 그곳에서 리오그란데를 관찰하고 정보를 보고할 예정이었다. 그러나 정찰조는 목표지점에서 멀리 떨어진 곳에 내려졌으며, 정찰임무를 완료하지 못했다. 헬리콥터 승무원들은 칠레로 계속 비행했고, 그곳에서 증거를 숨기기 위해 의도적으로 헬리콥터를 불태운 뒤 체포를 피하려 했다.

어센션섬에서 포클랜드 제도로 향하는 항공모함 HMS 허미스와 HMS 인빈시블의 갑판에서 특공대원들이 웨스트랜드 시 킹 헬리콥터에 탑승해 다른 함정으로 이동하고 있다. 이를 통해 해병대원들은 단시간 내에 이동할 수 있는 준비태세를 갖췄다. (사진: Fox Photos/Getty Images)

미카도는 계획된 공격 단계였으며, 앞서 확보하지 못한 정보에 의존하고 있었다. 허큘리스 수송기 2대가 영국 육군 제22공수특전단(SAS) B중대 소속 최대 70명을 리오그란데에 직접 착륙시킬 예정이었다. 5월 19일 작성된 항공작전명령에는 아르헨티나 해안을 따라 더 북쪽에 위치한 리오가예고스도 대체 목표지점으로 명시돼 있었다. 특수부대원들은 지상에 있는 슈페르 에탕다르 전투기들과 엑조세 미사일을 파괴하고 조종사들을 사살한 뒤, 육로로 칠레에 철수할 계획이었다. 노스우드에 위치한 제317기동부대 사령관은 처음부터 이 임무로 인해 허큘리스 수송기 두 대를 모두 잃을 가능성이 크다는 점을 받아들였다.

1982년 5월 23일 리오그란데에서 이륙을 준비하는 슈페르 에탕다르 3-A-203에 탑승한 후안 호세 ‘티에르노’ 로드리게스 마리아니 중위. 지상전원공급장치가 여전히 연결돼 있는 모습에 주목할 수 있다. (아르헨티나 해군)

수송기 승무원들은 임무를 거부하지 않았지만, 요구되는 조건에 대해서는 직설적으로 설명했다. 방어가 매우 견고할 가능성이 있는 얼어붙은 군용 활주로에 대형 수송기 두 대가 편대 착륙해야 했다. 약 20노트의 배풍이 예상됐으며, 야간에 최소한의 조명만 있는 환경에서 수동식 야간투시경을 이용해야 했다. 게다가 어떤 형태의 착륙작전도 뒷받침하기에는 정보가 불충분했다. 영국 공군 계획팀은 은밀성을 유지하기 위해서는 공중투하가 더 나은 방법이라고 권고했다. 또한 제38비행단 사령부의 선임 항공참모장교는 항공사령관에게 SAS에서 제시하는 지나치게 야심적인 계획들을 경계하라고 경고했다.

영국 국방부는 6월 4일 미카도 작전을 공식적으로 취소했다.

케틀드럼은 이 일련의 작전 가운데 세 번째로 계획됐다. 목표는 아르헨티나 산타크루스주의 푸에르토데세아도였으며, 잠수함 HMS 오닉스에서 특수주정대(SBS, 영국 해병대의 특수부대) 병력을 침투시키는 방식이었다. 오닉스함은 이 이야기의 끝부분에서 다시 등장하게 된다.

세 작전 모두 계획대로 실행되지 않았다.

1982년 4\~6월 포클랜드 분쟁 당시 어센션섬 앞바다에서 수상항해 중인 오베론급 잠수함 HMS 오닉스. 오닉스는 이 분쟁에 참가한 유일한 영국의 디젤전기추진 잠수함이었으며, 해안 가까이에서 조용히 작전할 수 있는 능력 덕분에 중요한 역할을 수행했다. 오닉스는 잠수함을 이용한 억제력을 제공하고 포클랜드 제도 주변의 배제구역을 유지하는 임무 외에도 정찰을 수행하면서 적 시설과 특수부대 작전의 잠재적인 상륙지역을 잠망경으로 촬영했다. 1982년 5월 12일 어센션섬에서 오닉스는 SAS와 SBS 특수부대원들을 승선시켰으며, 일련의 작전에서 이들을 지원했다. (사진: Dr S J Townsend/영국 왕실 저작권, Imperial War Museums via Getty Images)

상대적으로 덜 알려진 사실은 미카도 작전의 취소가 네 번째 계획인 임피 작전(Operation IMPI)으로 이어졌다는 것이다. 임피라는 이름은 줄루족의 전투부대에서 따온 것이다.

미카도 작전의 취소가 더 광범위한 작전의 종료를 의미하지는 않았다. 같은 6월 4일 영국 국방부는 제317기동부대 사령관에게 특수부대를 이용해 슈페르 에탕다르 전투기의 전투능력을 파괴할 새로운 계획을 수립하도록 지시했다.

제317기동부대 참모진은 이후 임피 작전으로 발전한 계획의 수립에 착수했다. 작전계획 문서인 Ops 1/3에는 아르헨티나군이 포클랜드 제도에서 항복한 날인 6월 14일이라는 날짜가 적혀 있다. 개괄적으로 이 계획은 항공편과 해상을 통해 도착하는 특수부대가 목표를 공격하는 방식이었다.

이 정도의 내용은 이전부터 단편적으로 알려져 있었다.

사우스조지아섬의 리스에서 HMS 플리머스함에 승선해 아르헨티나군을 대표해 항복문서에 서명하는 아르헨티나 해군 알프레도 아스티스 대위. (영국 왕실 저작권)

그러나 작전에 필요한 자원이 이미 배정돼 있었다는 사실은 지금까지 공개되지 않았다.

6월 12일 22시 40분(UTC), 제317.1기동단 지휘관으로 지상군을 지휘하던 제러미 무어 소장은 샌디 우드워드 소장의 전투단(제317.8기동단)에 전문을 보냈으며, 노스우드의 존 필드하우스 제독(제317기동부대 사령관)과 마이클 클래프 준장의 상륙전단(제317.0기동단)을 참조 수신자로 지정했다. 전문은 제22SAS B중대가 가능한 한 신속하게 작전에 투입될 수 있도록 해달라고 요청했다. 서포클랜드(그란말비나)에서 불리한 상황이 급속히 전개될 가능성에 대비할 필요가 있었으며, 전구에 이미 배치된 특수부대 전력은 스탠리 전투와 임피 작전을 지원하는 데 완전히 투입된 상태였기 때문이다. 무어는 부수적으로 임피 작전이 당시 이미 독자적으로 수행할 수 있는 상태였다고 언급했다.

포클랜드 분쟁 당시 지상군 사령관 제러미 무어 소장. (사진: Avalon/Getty Images)

일상적인 전문 교신의 단 두 줄을 검토하는 것만으로도 여러 사실이 한꺼번에 명확해진다. 항복을 48시간 앞둔 시점에서 임피는 단순한 참모 연구가 아니라 이미 자원이 배정된 작전이었다. 이 작전은 전구의 특수부대 전력을 소모하고 새로운 SAS 중대의 전방 투입을 요청해야 할 정도였다. 또한 이 전문은 지금까지 공개된 자료 가운데 임피를 언급한 유일한 당시의 작전 수준 기록이기도 하다. 그 밖의 모든 내용은 수년 뒤 작성된 서술 자료에서 나온 것이다.

후대의 서술 자료에 따르면 임피의 기본 구상은 미카도보다 훨씬 간소했다. 허큘리스 2대와 병력 70명을 투입하는 미카도와 달리, 임피의 항공 전력은 영국 공군 허큘리스 수송기 1대에 의존했다.

1983년 11월 브리튼 노먼 아일랜더 항공기에서 내려다본 스탠리 비행장. 비행장에는 C-130 허큘리스 수송기 2대가 있었다. (미확인 내용)

수송기는 어센션섬에서 출발해 공중급유를 받은 뒤 포클랜드 제도의 동쪽과 케이프혼 남쪽으로 비행할 계획이었다. 이후 아르헨티나 레이더의 탐지범위 아래에서 저고도로 접근해 산호세와 아르코이리스라는 암호명이 부여된 비행장에 야간 착륙하고 특수부대를 투입할 예정이었다. 다른 특수부대원들은 해상으로 침투할 계획이었다. 뒤에서 살펴보겠지만, 이러한 항공작전 부분은 전체 문서에서 가장 의문스러운 대목이다.

비행경로는 주목할 만하다. 이는 어센션섬에서 남쪽으로 직접 비행한다는 직관적인 구상을 배제하기 때문이다. 대신 항공기는 북동쪽이 아니라 남아메리카 대륙의 남단을 돌아, 방어망이 가장 취약하고 적이 가장 예상하지 못할 방향에서 진입할 계획이었다.

계획된 임피 작전의 개략도. (저자 제공)

비밀 해제된 기록에서는 산호세와 아르코이리스가 정확히 어느 비행장을 가리키는지 확인되지 않았다.

가장 가능성이 높은 해석은 이들이 리오그란데와 리오가예고스를 가리킨다는 것이다. 이 두 비행장은 계획된 항법 경로의 종착점이었으며, 한 달 전 미카도 항공작전명령에 명시된 두 곳이기도 했다. 제한된 경로를 통해 유통되는 문서에서 두 목표의 이름을 암호화하는 것은 기본적인 예방조치였을 것이다. 다만 작전명령에서는 일반적으로 이들을 단순히 제1표적과 제2표적으로 지정했을 가능성이 더 크다는 점도 지적할 필요가 있다.

이 모든 사실이 작전의 다른 단계에 칠레가 참여했을 가능성을 배제하지는 않는다. 오히려 그 가능성이 더 높았음을 시사한다. 해당 서술 자료는 '극비(Top Secret)'로 분류되고 공군참모총장만 열람할 수 있도록 제한된 문서철에 남아 있으며, 문서철에 명시된 주제는 칠레와의 협력이었다. 이는 칠레 비행장에서 특수부대 침투작전을 시작하고 철수시키는 방안이 검토됐다가 정치적 이유로 명시적으로 배제됐던 초기 계획 단계와 대조된다. 남극의 활주로를 이용하는 방안 역시 뉴질랜드 고등판무관실이 남극의 겨울철에는 안전한 극지 횡단비행이 불가능하다고 조언한 뒤 배제됐다.

임피의 해상작전 부분은 당시 현장에 있었던 사람들의 기록을 통해 추적할 수 있다.

최종 단계의 항법 지원은 원자력 추진 공격잠수함 HMS 컨커러가 제공할 예정이었다. 1982년 6월 9일 컨커러는 바이아카마로네스 앞바다에서 전방 경계임무를 수행하면서 아르헨티나 영해의 12해리 경계 밖으로 나오는 기회표적들을 탐색하고 있었다. 또한 포클랜드/말비나스 제도를 향해 항해하는 것으로 판단되는 민간선박은 모두 격침할 권한을 부여받았다. 실제로 그날 아침 잠수함은 아르헨티나 해군 제79.2기동단을 찾기 위해 아르헨티나 영해에 진입했다.

항구로 귀환하는 원자력 추진 공격잠수함 HMS 컨커러. (저자 제공)

그날 컨커러는 임피 작전에 관한 사전 정보를 전달받았다. 잠수함의 임무는 잠망경 심도로 상승해 무선 표지 역할을 수행하는 것이었다. 이를 통해 허큘리스 수송기는 무선 기준점을 확보해 항법을 더욱 정확하게 수정할 수 있었다. 야간 저고도 비행에서는 항법 오차가 허용되지 않았기 때문이다. 결과적으로 매우 특이한 상황이 만들어졌다. 파타고니아 해안에서 차단작전을 수행하던 원자력 잠수함이 수송기의 항법 보조수단으로 전환된 것이다.

실제 병력 침투는 HMS 오닉스가 담당했다. 오닉스는 앞서 케틀드럼 작전에 참여했던 오베론급 디젤전기추진 잠수함이자 영국이 남대서양에 배치한 유일한 재래식 잠수함이었다. 6월 14일 08시 15분(UTC), 산카를로스 수역에 있던 오닉스는 임무 수행을 위해 제22SAS B중대와 SBS 소속 병력 10명을 승선시켰다. 이 시점은 이틀 전 무어가 보낸 전문의 내용과 거의 정확하게 일치한다.

계획에 따르면 잠수함은 야간에 해안에서 약 2해리 떨어진 곳에서 부상할 예정이었다. 병력들은 제미니 고무보트를 이용해 해변에 접근한 뒤, 대전차무기와 폭파장약을 사용해 목표물인 항공기와 미사일을 파괴할 계획이었다. 물론 해당 지역에 그러한 목표물이 존재하는 경우에 한해서였다.

이후 벌어진 일은 군사조직의 관성을 보여준다. 병력이 오닉스에 승선한 지 몇 시간 뒤인 바로 그날, 6월 14일 포클랜드 제도의 아르헨티나군이 항복했다. 그런데도 준비작업은 즉시 중단되지 않았다. 6월 15일에는 승선한 병력들이 제미니 고무보트를 이용한 상륙 연습을 실시했다. 이것이 임피가 실제로 실행됐다는 뜻은 아니다. 작전은 실행되지 않았다. 그러나 전략적 결과가 이미 결정된 상황에서도 군사조직은 여전히 임무를 연습하고 있었다는 사실을 보여준다.

특수부대와 함께 작전하는 HMS 오닉스. (저자 제공)

영국 측 기록은 행정적으로 건조한 표현으로 이 문제를 마무리한다. 포클랜드 제도의 아르헨티나군이 항복하고 아르헨티나 항공기들의 적대행위가 중단됨에 따라 작전이 취소됐다는 것이다.

그러나 임무의 항공작전 부분은 전혀 다른 문제이며, 임피에 관한 불확실성이 커지는 지점이기도 하다.

임피와 항공기를 연결하는 유일한 자료는 영국 공군의 역사 서술 문서에 포함된 단 한 문단이다. 이 문서가 보관된 문서철은 전쟁이 끝난 지 4년이 지난 1986년 4월 18일 공군참모총장만 열람할 수 있는 브리핑 자료철로 개설됐다. 또한 문서 곳곳에 연필로 수정한 흔적이 있다는 점에서 완성된 제출 문서라기보다는 작성 중이던 초안으로 보인다.

허큘리스 수송기 한 대가 이 임무에 배정됐다면 어느 부대가 제공했을지는 의심의 여지가 없다. 이 이야기 전반에 등장하는 특수부대 비행대는 비행대장 계급의 장교가 지휘하는 5개 승무원팀으로 구성됐으며, SAS와 SBS 분견대와 정기적으로 훈련했다. 문서에서는 이 부대의 비행대대 번호가 가려져 있지만, 몇 문단 뒤에는 소속 승무원팀 2개가 공중급유 프로브를 장착한 허큘리스 C1P로 훈련했다고 설명하면서 번호가 드러난다. 이 부대는 라인엄을 모기지로 하는 영국 공군 제47비행대대였으며, 이후 수십 년 동안 특수부대 항공지원 임무를 계속 수행하게 된다.

그러나 당시 어센션섬에서 이 분견대와 함께 근무했던 사람들은 자신들이 임피와 아무 관련이 없었다고 말한다. 이 비행대의 활동에 관해 직접 알고 있는 신뢰할 만한 소식통들은 당시 임피라는 암호명을 본 적이 없으며, 해당 문서가 발견되기 전까지 작전에 관해 들어본 적도 없다고 밝혔다. 또한 이후 40년 동안 계속 연락을 유지해온 5개 승무원팀으로 구성된 공동체에서 어느 시점에도 이를 알지 못한 채 특수부대용 허큘리스 수송기와 승무원들이 이와 같은 임무에 배정됐다는 것은 상상하기 어렵다고 평가했다. 6월 14일 당시 와이드어웨이크 비행장에는 공중급유 자격을 갖춘 특수부대 항공 승무원팀이 많아야 하나뿐이었다.

이러한 회의적인 시각은 같은 서술 문서가 해당 승무원들이 직접 경험한 사건들을 다루는 방식에서도 강화된다. 이들의 자체 훈련 준비과정에 대한 설명은 실제 비행기록과 일치하지 않는다.

예를 들어 서술 문서는 독일의 영국 공군 라르브루흐 기지에 대한 침투 연습이 성공했다고 설명하지만, 실제로는 탐지됐다. 허큘리스는 접근 중 목표지점에서 약 2마일 떨어진 곳에서 모의 격추 판정을 받았다. 또한 문서에는 후방 화물램프 맨 끝에 부착하는 연장판인 램프 토(ramp toes)를 20\~30노트의 속도에서 내릴 수 있다고 설명돼 있지만, 이 장치는 항공기가 움직이는 동안 내리도록 설계되지 않았다. 그렇게 하면 위험하고 기체가 손상될 수 있었다. 이 밖에도 다른 이상한 점들이 존재한다.

허큘리스 C-130의 후방 화물램프에서 바라본 서포클랜드. (미확인 내용)

영국 공군 허큘리스의 후방 화물램프에서 바라본 서포클랜드. (Donald Morrison/Getty Images)

비행대대 자체의 훈련 내용을 잘못 설명한 문서를 근거로 그 비행대대가 티에라델푸에고 상공에 투입될 예정이었다고 판단하기에는 증거가 빈약하다.

반면 특수부대 비행대가 요청을 받았을 경우 무엇을 수행할 수 있었는지는 의심할 여지가 없다.

5월 중순까지 이 부대에는 공중급유 자격을 갖춘 승무원팀 2개가 있었다. 하나는 어센션섬에 배치됐고, 다른 하나는 영국에 남아 다른 승무원들을 훈련했다. 이들은 공중급유 프로브를 장착하고 임무에 따라 동체 내부에 추가 연료탱크를 설치한 허큘리스 C1을 운용했다. 부대는 연속 착륙과 신속한 병력 하차, 레이더 탐지범위 아래에서 해안의 정확한 특정 지점으로 낙하산 병력을 침투시키는 훈련을 실시했다. 또한 바다와 육지 위 250피트 고도에서 항공용 야간투시경(ANVIS)을 착용하고 비행하는 훈련도 했다. 야간투시경 자체는 4월 중순 왕립항공기연구소(RAE) 판버러의 전문가들이 단 하루 만에 승무원들의 헬멧에 장착했다. 이러한 작전반경은 5월 16일 플럼 더프 병력을 투하한 항공기가 24시간 5분 동안 공중에 머물렀던 출격에서 입증됐다. 당시 빅터 공중급유기들은 어센션섬에서 약 1,800마일 떨어진 곳에서 공중급유를 실시했다. 이러한 활동 가운데 일상적인 것은 거의 없었다. 분쟁 기간 이 부대가 수행한 거의 모든 일은 불과 몇 주 사이에 신속하게 임시방편으로 마련한 것이었다.

1982년 5월 24일 어센션섬 와이드어웨이크 비행장에서 공중급유 임무를 수행할 준비를 갖춘 영국 공군 빅터 공중급유기. (사진: AFP via Getty Images)

그러나 미카도 작전에서도, 임피가 의도했던 어떤 작전에서도 끝내 해결책을 찾지 못한 것은 문제의 다른 절반이었다. 아르헨티나 영토 깊숙한 곳에 병력을 침투시키는 것은 해결할 수 있는 부분이었다. 그러나 아르헨티나 공군의 작전반경 안에 있는 활주로에서 직접공격을 실시한 뒤 항공기와 탑승자들을 다시 철수시키는 문제는 그렇지 않았다.

위의 모든 내용은 영국 국립문서보관소의 AIR 20/13036 문서철에 보관된 영국 공군의 서술 자료, 부대 기록, 잠수함 항해일지, 작전 전문 교신 기록, 참가자들의 증언 등 여러 간접 자료를 통해 재구성한 것이다.

부속 문서와 비행장 식별정보, 실행 순서를 포함한 완전한 계획이 담긴 구체적인 문서철은 여전히 비공개 상태다. 해당 문서의 번호는 DEFE 71/980이며, 제목은 ‘코퍼레이트 작전(포클랜드 분쟁): 임피 작전(Operation Corporate (Falklands Conflict): Operation IMPI)’이다. 이 문서는 큐에 위치한 영국 국립문서보관소에 보관돼 있으며, 공개 예정일은 발표되지 않았다. 이 문서가 공개되기 전까지 임피의 항공작전 부분에 관한 논쟁은 어느 쪽으로도 결론을 내릴 수 없다.

분쟁이 끝난 지 44년이 지난 지금도 전쟁 중 영국의 마지막 특수작전은 본질적으로 영국 정부가 공개할 준비가 되지 않은 문서로 남아 있다. 이는 사소한 문제가 아니다. 칠레와의 협력에 관련된 문서들은 일관되게 공개에 가장 소극적이었던 자료들이기 때문이다.

임피 작전의 개략계획이 담긴 문서철. (영국 국립문서보관소)

결국 남는 것은 두 부분으로 나뉜 작전이다. 한쪽은 확실하다. 이미 자원이 배정된 계획이 있었고, 6월 12일에는 독자적인 작전 수행이 가능한 상태라고 선언됐다. 원자력 잠수함은 무선 표지 역할을 수행하도록 사전 지시를 받았으며, 항복 당일 아침에는 SAS와 SBS 병력 10명이 산카를로스에서 재래식 잠수함에 승선했다. 훈련은 다음 날에도 계속됐다. 반면 다른 절반, 즉 허큘리스 수송기 한 대가 케이프혼을 돌아 암호명이 부여된 활주로에 착륙한다는 계획은 결함이 있는 참모 서술 문서의 단 한 문단에 근거하고 있으며, 이를 실제로 수행할 수 있었던 유일한 사람들은 그러한 주장을 부정하고 있다.

어느 쪽이든 집착의 대상은 동일했다.

1982년 6월 4일부터 14일 사이, 포트스탠리/푸에르토아르헨티노를 둘러싼 마지막 전투가 벌어지고 아르헨티나군의 지상작전이 붕괴하고 있던 시기에도 영국의 작전계획 일부는 여전히 프랑스제 항공기 5대와 승무원 10명, 그리고 그들이 보유한 미사일을 중심으로 수립되고 있었다. 이 계획에 항복 당일의 날짜가 적혀 있다는 사실, 다음 날에도 여전히 훈련이 진행됐다는 사실, 그리고 오늘날까지 기밀로 남아 있다는 사실은 영국이 슈페르 에탕다르와 엑조세를 파괴하기 위해 얼마나 멀리까지 나아갈 준비가 돼 있었는지를 잘 보여준다.

편집자 연락처: thomas\@thewarzone.com

마리아노 시아로니는 아르헨티나 육군사관학교에서 전략 및 지정학 석사학위와 현대군사사 대학원 수료증을 취득했다. 시아로니는 군사사와 해군사를 주제로 책 5권과 다수의 기사를 출간했다. 또한 아르헨티나 군사사연구소의 정회원으로 활동하고 있으며, 아르헨티나 육군 예비역 소위로 복무하고 있다(육군항공예비비행대대). 그의 저서에 관한 자세한 정보도 확인할 수 있다.

마리아노 시아로니

기고자

Britain’s Final Plan To Kill Argentina’s Super Étendards Attack Jets

Britain’s Final Plan To Kill Argentina’s Super Étendards Attack Jets

Britain’s Final Plan To Kill Argentina’s Super Étendards Attack Jets

Britain's last bid to destroy Argentina’s fleet threatening Exocet anti-ship missile-armed combat jets during the Falklands War.

Mariano Sciaroni

Published Oct 26, 2026 5:11 PM EDT

95

Add TWZ(opens Google in a new window or tab)More information

Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis via Getty Images, UPI/Bettmann Archive/Getty Images, Dennis Gooch/Getty Images

The TWZ Newsletter

Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.

Email addressSign Up

Terms of Service and Privacy Policy

No single Argentine capability shaped British planning during the 1982 South Atlantic conflict more than the pairing of the Dassault Super Étendard strike fighter and its deadly AM39 Exocet anti-ship missile. Against that threat, the British launched a series of special forces operations, all with the same objective: kill the Argentine pilots and destroy their aircraft and missiles before they could be used again. Together, the strike fighter and missile pairing had proven to be the biggest threat to the Royal Navy task force that had been sent to recapture the islands.

Two Super Étendards of the Argentine Navy in flight around the time of the Falklands War in 1982. Photo by UPI/Bettmann Archive/Getty Images

Five Super Étendard aircraft and five AM39 Exocet missiles had been delivered to Argentina before a French embargo took hold. The jets were flown by the Argentine Navy’s 2nd Naval Fighter and Attack Squadron out of Río Grande, on Tierra del Fuego, a region at South America’s southernmost tip, shared by Chile and Argentina. The Super Étendard/Exocet combination had already cost the British the destroyer HMS Sheffield on May 4 and the container ship Atlantic Conveyor on May 25.

A casualty from HMS Sheffield being rushed to the sick bay on board the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes. Crown Copyright

The special forces operations were broken down into four phases — named PLUM DUFF, MIKADO, KETTLEDRUM, and IMPI — the last of which is the least well-documented, and the focus of this article.

PLUM DUFF was the insertion phase and was a reconnaissance mission. On May 16, an RAF Hercules airdropped eight special forces troops onto RFA Fort Austin to form a recce party. On the night of May 17/18, a Sea King HC4, ZA290, lifted off from the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible for a one-way flight to Tierra del Fuego, where the men were to observe Río Grande and report back. The patrol was set down far from the objective and never completed the reconnaissance; the helicopter crew flew on into Chile, where the aircraft was deliberately burnt to try and hide the evidence, while they tried to evade capture.

Commandos being lifted from the decks of HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible to be transferred by Sea King helicopters to other ships while the two aircraft carriers forge ahead to the Falkland Islands from Ascension Island, leaving the marines ready to move at short notice. Photo by Fox Photos/Getty Images

MIKADO was the planned attack phase, and it depended on that missing intelligence. Two Hercules were to air-land up to 70 men of B Squadron, 22 Special Air Service (SAS), directly on Río Grande — the air operation order of May 19 also named Río Gallegos, further up the Argentine coast, as an alternative. The men would destroy the Super Étendards and their Exocets on the ground, kill the pilots, and then withdraw overland into Chile. Commander Task Force 317, at Northwood, accepted from the outset that the mission could well cost both Hercules.

Lieutenant Juan José “Tierno” Rodríguez Mariani in Super Étendard 3-A-203, preparing to take off from Río Grande on May 23, 1982; note the ground power unit still connected. Armada Argentina

The aircrew did not refuse the task, but they were blunt about what it demanded: formation landing by two heavy transports on a possibly heavily defended, icy military runway, with a probable 20-knot tailwind, at night and on passive night-vision goggles in minimum light levels, with intelligence that was inadequate to support any air-land option at all. The RAF planning team recommended an airdrop as the better way to maintain a covert posture, and the Senior Air Staff Officer at Headquarters 38 Group warned the Air Commander to watch for overambitious schemes coming out of the SAS.

The U.K. Ministry of Defense formally cancelled MIKADO on June 4.

KETTLEDRUM was planned as the third of the set. It was aimed at Puerto Deseado, Santa Cruz Province of Argentina, and would have inserted a Special Boat Service party (SBS, the Royal Marines’ special forces unit) from the submarine HMS Onyx — a boat that will reappear before the end of this story.

None of the three was executed as planned.

The Oberon class submarine HMS Onyx on the surface off Ascension Island. HMS Onyx was the only diesel-electric British submarine to serve in the conflict, and its ability to operate silently close inshore enabled it to play an important role. At Ascension Island, Onyx boarded SAS and SBS special forces personnel and supported them during a series of operations. Imperial War Museums via Getty Images

Less well-known is that the cancellation of MIKADO produced a fourth project: Operation IMPI, named after a Zulu fighting force.

Cancelling MIKADO did not mean the wider operation was over. Also on June 4, the U.K. Ministry of Defense tasked CTF 317 to produce a new plan for special forces to destroy the combat effectiveness of the Super Étendards.

CTF 317’s staff went to work on what became IMPI. The planning document, Ops 1/3, is dated June 14 — the day of the Argentine surrender in the islands. In broad terms, the objective was to be attacked by special forces arriving both by air and by sea.

That much has been known, in fragments.

Teniente de Naviro (Lieutenant Commander) Alfredo Astiz signing the Instrument of Surrender on behalf of his Argentine forces at Leith, on the island of South Georgia, on board HMS Plymouth. Crown Copyright

What has not been published until now is the fact that the operation had already been resourced.

At 2240Z on June 12, Maj. Gen. Jeremy Moore, commanding the land forces as CTG 317.1, signalled Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward’s battle group (CTG 317.8), with Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse at Northwood (CTF 317) and Commodore Michael Clapp’s amphibious group (CTG 317.0) as information addressees. The message called for B Squadron, 22 SAS, to be made available for operations as soon as possible: cover was needed against rapid developments of an unfavorable nature in West Falkland (Gran Malvina), and the theatre’s existing special forces assets were fully absorbed supporting the battle for Stanley — and IMPI. Operation IMPI, Moore noted in passing, was by then self-sufficient.

Maj. Gen. Sir Jeremy Moore Mc, Commander, Land Forces Falkland Islands Conflict. Photo by Avalon/Getty Images

Examining two lines of routine signal traffic settles several things at once. Forty-eight hours before the surrender, IMPI was not a staff study but an operation that had been resourced, and that was enough to consume the theatre’s special forces and justify calling a fresh SAS squadron forward. It is also the only contemporary, operational-level reference to IMPI released so far: everything else comes from a narrative written years afterwards.

As that later narrative describes it, the concept behind IMPI was much leaner than MIKADO. Against two Hercules and 70 men, the air element of IMPI rested on a single RAF Hercules.

Overflying Stanley Airfield in November 1983, with two RAF Hercules aircraft present. Getty Images

The aircraft was to fly from Ascension Island, refuel in flight, and then track east of the Falkland Islands and south of Cape Horn before making a low-level approach below Argentine radar cover for a night landing of special forces at the airfields codenamed San Jose and Arco Iris. Other special forces would have been inserted by sea. That air element, as will be seen, is the most questionable part of the entire file.

The routing is worth attention, because it rules out the intuitive picture of a direct run south from Ascension. Instead, the aircraft would have entered from the least-covered and least-expected direction, coming around the bottom of the continent rather than from the northeast.

A schematic map of the planned Operation IMPI. via author

The precise identities of San Jose and Arco Iris are not established in the declassified record.

The most likely reading is that they stand for Río Grande and Río Gallegos — the airfields at which the planned navigation ended, and the two named in MIKADO’s air operation order a month earlier. For a document circulating through restricted channels, encrypting the names of the two targets was an elementary precaution, although it should be noted that an operational order would more commonly have designated them simply as Target One and Target Two.

None of this rules out Chilean participation in other phases of the operation; if anything, it suggests it’s more likely. The narrative survives inside a folder classified Top Secret and restricted to the Chief of the Air Staff, whose declared subject is cooperation with Chile. That setting contrasts with the earlier stage of the planning, when mounting and recovering a special forces insertion from a Chilean airfield was considered and expressly discounted on political grounds — much as the use of an Antarctic strip was discounted after the New Zealand High Commission advised that the Antarctic winter precluded safe trans-polar flight.

The maritime half of IMPI can be traced in the records of those who were there.

Navigational support for the final phase was to come from the nuclear attack submarine HMS Conqueror. On June 9, 1982, Conqueror was off Bahía Camarones, working as an advanced picket and hunting targets of opportunity that ventured outside the 12-nautical-mile limit of Argentine territorial waters, with authority to sink any civilian vessel judged to be running to the Falklands/Malvinas; that same morning the sub had in fact entered Argentine territorial waters trying to locate the Argentine Navy’s Task Group 79.2.

Nuclear attack submarine HMS Conqueror returning to port. via author

That day, Conqueror received preparatory information on IMPI. The sub’s task was to come to periscope depth and act as a radio beacon, giving the Hercules a radio reference against which to refine a navigation that, low and at night, allowed no error. The resulting picture is an odd one: a nuclear submarine deployed on interdiction off the Patagonian coast, turned into a navigation aid for a transport aircraft.

The insertion itself fell to HMS Onyx, the Oberon class diesel-electric boat that had already taken part in Operation KETTLEDRUM and the only conventional submarine Britain deployed to the South Atlantic. On June 14, at 0815Z, lying in San Carlos Water, Onyx embarked a party of 10 men from B Squadron, 22 SAS and the SBS for the mission. The timing matches Moore’s signal of two days earlier almost exactly.

The plan called for the submarine to surface some two nautical miles offshore at night. The troops would close the beach in Gemini inflatables and destroy the objective — aircraft and missiles, if any were there — using anti-tank weapons and demolition charges.

What happened next illustrates the inertia of military machinery. The Argentine surrender in the islands came on that same June 14, hours after the party had gone aboard Onyx. Even so, preparations did not stop at once: on June 15 the embarked troops carried out practice landings from a Gemini. That does not mean IMPI was ever executed — it was not — but it does show that with the strategic outcome already settled, the machine was still rehearsing.

HMS Onyx operating with special forces. via author

The British record closes the matter with administrative dryness: the surrender of the Argentine forces in the Falkland Islands and the cessation of hostile activity by Argentine aircraft resulted in the operation being cancelled.

The air part of the mission is another matter entirely and is where IMPI becomes more uncertain.

The only link between IMPI and an aircraft is a single paragraph in an RAF historical narrative. The folder that holds it was opened on April 18, 1986 — four years after the war — as an eyes-only briefing file for the Chief of the Air Staff, and the pages appear to be a working draft rather than a finished submission, carrying pencil amendments throughout.

Had a Hercules been earmarked, there is no doubt which unit would have provided it. The Special Forces Flight that runs through the whole chapter — five crews, commanded by a squadron leader, exercising regularly with SAS and SBS Sections — appears with its squadron number blanked out, yet the number surfaces a few paragraphs later, where two of its crews are described training on the probe-fitted Hercules C1P. The unit was No. 47 Squadron, RAF, home-based at Lyneham, and it would keep the special forces air support role for decades afterward.

The men who were at Ascension with that detachment, however, say they had nothing to do with it. Reliable sources with direct knowledge of the flight’s activity state that they never saw the codeword at the time, had never heard of the operation until this file surfaced, and consider it inconceivable that a special forces Hercules and crew could have been earmarked for a mission of this kind without the flight — a community of five crews that has stayed in touch ever since — learning of it at some point in the intervening four decades. By June 14, at most one aerial-refueling-qualified special forces crew was at Wideawake.

That skepticism is reinforced by the way the same narrative handles events those crews lived through. Its account of their own work-up does not survive contact with their logbooks.

For example, a practice infiltration into RAF Laarbruch in Germany that the narrative describes as successful had in fact been detected; the Hercules was notionally shot down about two miles out on the approach. The ramp toes (attachable extension plates located at the very end of the rear cargo ramp) it describes as droppable at 20 to 30 knots were never meant to be lowered with the aircraft moving, which would have been unsafe and risked the airframe. There are other anomalies, too.

West Falklands seen from the ramp of an RAF Hercules. Donald Morrison/Getty Images

A document that misstates the squadron’s own exercises is thin evidence on which to place that squadron over Tierra del Fuego.

What is not in question is what the Special Forces Flight could have done, had it been asked.

By mid-May the flight had two crews qualified in air-to-air refueling — one deployed to Ascension, the other held in the United Kingdom to train the others — flying Hercules C1s fitted with probes and, where the task required it, additional fuel tanks in the fuselage. It had rehearsed stream landings and rapid offloads, parachute insertion below radar cover to a pinpoint coastal feature, as well as flying on ANVIS goggles at 250 feet over sea and land. The goggles themselves were fitted to the crews’ helmets by RAE Farnborough specialists in a single day in mid-April. The reach was demonstrated on May 16, when the sortie that dropped the PLUM DUFF party stayed airborne for 24 hours and five minutes, with Victor tankers refueling some 1,800 miles from Ascension. Almost none of it was routine: nearly everything the force did during the conflict was improvised, at speed, in a matter of weeks.

A picture taken on May 24, 1982, at Wideawake Airfield on Ascension Island, showing an RAF Victor tanker prepared for air-to-air refuelling tasks. Photo by AFP

What never had an answer — not for MIKADO, and not for whatever IMPI intended — was the other end of the problem. Putting men ashore deep inside Argentine territory was the solvable half. Getting an aircraft and its passengers out again after a direct action, from a strip in range of the Argentine Air Force, was not.

All of the above is reconstructed from lateral references: the RAF’s narrative in file AIR 20/13036 at the National Archives, unit records, submarine logs, operational signal traffic, and the accounts of participants.

The specific file — the one holding the complete plan with its annexes, the identification of the airfields and the execution sequence — remains closed. It is DEFE 71/980, titled Operation Corporate (Falklands Conflict): Operation IMPI, retained at the National Archives at Kew with no announced opening date. Until it is released, the air element of IMPI cannot be settled either way.

Forty-four years after the conflict, the last British special operation of the war is still, in essence, a document the British state is not prepared to show. That is not a trivial detail: the files touching on cooperation with Chile have consistently been the most reluctantly opened of all.

The folder holding the outline plan for Operation IMPI. National Archives

What remains is an operation of two halves. One of them is solid: a resourced plan, declared self-sufficient on June 12, with a nuclear submarine briefed to act as a beacon, 10 men of the SAS and the SBS embarked in a conventional submarine in San Carlos on the morning of the surrender, and rehearsals continuing the following day. The other half — a lone Hercules coming round Cape Horn to land on a codenamed strip — rests on one paragraph of a flawed staff narrative and is rejected by the only men who could have flown it.

Either way, the obsession is the same.

Between June 4 and June 14, 1982, while the final battle for Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino was being fought and the Argentine land campaign was collapsing, part of the British planning effort was still revolving around five French-built aircraft, their 10 aircrew, and their missiles. That the plan carries the date of the surrender itself, that it was still being rehearsed the following day, and that it remains classified today says a good deal about how far the British were prepared to go to destroy the Super Étendards and their Exocets.

Contact the editor: thomas@thewarzone.com

Mariano Sciaroni holds a master’s degree in Strategy and Geopolitics as well as a postgraduate diploma in Contemporary Military History, both earned at the Argentine Army’s Military Academy. Sciaroni has published five books and numerous articles on military and naval history. He is also an active member of the Argentine Institute of Military History and serves as a sub-lieutenant in the Argentine Army Reserve (Army Aviation Reserve Squadron). You can find out more about his books here.

Mariano SciaroniContributor

[백선호]

참고로 SSN이 조기경보 역할을 하기도 했죠.

https://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/51Tv/285