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For more than five years, Chinese vessels operating in the South China Sea have repeatedly collided with Philippine ships, sometimes dousing them with water cannons and injuring personnel. In response, the United States deployed a Typhon intermediate-range missile system to the island country last year. It was the first time since the end of the Cold War that the United States had supplied an ally with a weapon of such magnitude—and it kicked off a diplomatic storm. China’s foreign ministry argued that the installation “disrupts regional peace and stability, undermines other countries’ legitimate security interest, and contravenes people’s aspiration for peace and development.” China, the ministry continued, would “not sit idly by” if the Philippines refused to remove it.
Beijing’s actions and threats against the Philippines are part of a broader attempt to counter the United States’ policy of “extended deterrence,” a strategy that commits Washington to defending its allies against aggression, including, in certain cases, with U.S. nuclear weapons. Beijing has long been critical of U.S. extended deterrence, on the grounds that it is a way for the United States to advance its interests against China. Chinese officials are now ramping up their efforts to undermine it. They have portrayed the United States as a destabilizing force in the region, made attempts to peel off U.S. allies using economic enticements and penalties, and engaged in ever more confrontational military operations. Such acts are intended to sap the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, which is predicated on trust in Washington and faith in the United States’ capabilities.
For the Trump administration, maintaining extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific should be a priority. It should challenge Beijing’s rhetoric in diplomatic forums and counter Chinese gray-zone tactics, as well as strengthen military cooperation with regional allies. Otherwise, Washington’s power and influence in the region will soon be eclipsed.
THE VIEW FROM BEIJING
For Chinese leaders, U.S. extended deterrence is not a defensive strategy but part of a broader effort by the United States to contain and even roll back China’s rise. Beijing also dismisses the idea that extended deterrence exists because U.S. allies want it. Rather, Chinese officials see Washington’s strategy as an imposition on Australia, Japan, South Korea, and others that, in Beijing’s view, belong in China’s rightful sphere of influence.
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American officials have long argued that U.S. extended deterrence keeps nuclear proliferation in check, because U.S. allies under the protection of the United States’ nuclear umbrella see no need to develop their stockpiles. That logic does not hold sway in Beijing. In the words of Guo Xiaobing, a scholar at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, “The concept of ‘extended deterrence’ itself is a major contributor to nuclear proliferation” since it spreads “nuclear weapons geographically.” China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs echoes this perspective, accusing the United States of having “double standards” on nonproliferation because it “exerts maximum pressure on so-called geopolitical adversaries” but also “strengthens nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangements” with its allies.
In diplomatic forums, Beijing has long sought to undermine U.S. extended deterrence by castigating the United States as a destabilizing force in the region. In a speech in 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping signaled his displeasure with the United States playing the role of security guarantor. “It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the security of Asia,” Xi said. “The people of Asia have the capability and wisdom to achieve peace and stability in the region through enhanced cooperation.”
China has also attacked U.S. extended deterrence directly. Last year, Beijing called on all parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to adopt a no-first-use policy and used the proposal to attack extended deterrence, arguing that it is a threat to peace, contributes to nuclear proliferation, and prevents the establishment of nuclear-free zones. According to this view, there is no place for U.S. alliances in the region. As Beijing sees it, if the United States did not maintain such a large military presence in the Indo-Pacific, there would be fewer crises to manage. Hence, the way to prevent and mitigate crises in the area is for the United States to withdraw its forces—or to constrain their use considerably.
Beyond challenging U.S. alliances and extended deterrence in diplomatic forums, Beijing takes economic actions to weaken Washington’s regional role. It does so using both carrots and sticks. Before it began menacing Philippine ships at sea, Beijing had tried, in vain, to forestall deeper military cooperation between the Philippines and the United States by offering substantial infrastructure projects and economic incentives through its Belt and Road Initiative.
Maintaining extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific should be a priority.
In 2016, after the United States stationed a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system in South Korea, Beijing banned Chinese group tours to South Korea, blacklisted South Korean celebrities so they could not appear on Chinese television programs, imposed restrictions on South Korean businesses in China, and excluded South Korea from a number of Chinese-led diplomatic and cultural initiatives. Similarly, after Australia began strengthening defense ties with the United States in the late 2010s, Beijing imposed restrictions on Australian exports.
Beijing’s military responses to U.S. extended deterrence have also become more assertive. In recent years, China has scaled up its use of gray-zone tactics against U.S. allies in many areas, but especially in the maritime and cyber domains, where there is no clear redline that would trigger a response from the United States. Beijing has gradually militarized the South China Sea, deploying the Chinese coast guard and maritime militia to harass U.S. allies’ vessels. Beijing has also orchestrated influence operations and cyber-campaigns against Taiwan and other American allies. Chinese hackers have also targeted U.S. critical infrastructure to demonstrate Beijing’s ability to disrupt essential services and deter American involvement in regional conflicts.
For years, China has patrolled and conducted military drills in contested waters, and it has increased the scale and scope of those drills significantly. Admiral Samuel Paparo, head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, has called such exercises “rehearsals” because they simulate attacks on U.S. allies, such as an invasion of Taiwan. In 2024 and 2025, for example, China conducted large-scale exercises (Joint Sword-2024A and Joint Sword-2024B) that involved coordinated operations by the Chinese navy, air force, rocket force, and coast guard around Taiwan. Earlier this year, Beijing also ramped up military incursions into Taiwan’s airspace and waters.
Finally, Beijing is building up its military forces to allow for quick action, such as the seizure and control of territory close to China, and to make it prohibitively costly for the United States to intervene. At the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2017, Xi announced that China is committed to building “world-class military forces” by 2049. Since then, Beijing has made significant investments in conventional and nuclear weapons. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, China has the world’s most active and diverse ballistic missile development program and is currently pursuing a nuclear buildup. Beijing is also enhancing its capabilities in cyberspace, outer space, and electronic warfare.
Taken together, these steps are meant to make the United States hesitate to act in the event of a contingency—and to cast doubts in the minds of U.S. allies that Washington will abide by its defense commitments.
US AND THEM
China is hardly alone in pushing back against U.S. extended deterrence. Russia has long been critical of this strategy, and as of late, the two countries have joined forces to counter it. At a summit in Beijing in early 2022, just two weeks before Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin declared a “friendship without limits.” In that spirit, Beijing and Moscow have promoted “global strategic stability,” calling for a more multipolar world and chastising the United States for its pursuit of “absolute security.” They have criticized the security arrangement among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) as one of the latest efforts to militarize the Indo-Pacific, and they have expressed alarm at U.S. plans to deploy more intermediate-range missiles in their respective regions.
Beijing and Moscow are also strengthening their military cooperation, conducting numerous joint military exercises and joint air and maritime patrols in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic, including near the territories of U.S. allies such as Japan and the Scandinavian countries. Moreover, according to a 2024 Reuters investigation, Moscow has established a covert program in China to develop long-range attack drones. The Russians are also assisting Beijing in developing a missile early warning system.
Since the first decades of this century, successive U.S. administrations have taken important measures to adapt to China’s evolving approach. The Biden administration has done much to strengthen regional alliances and its spearheading of the AUKUS security partnership has also helped promote stability in the region. The Trump administration appears committed to continuing the same trajectory and further strengthening regional defense and deterrence. To do so effectively, it should take further action across several additional fronts.
The United States and its allies must deepen their security cooperation.
In diplomatic forums, Washington should step up its efforts to challenge Chinese rhetoric about the United States’ role in the Indo-Pacific and the aim of U.S. extended deterrence. Chinese officials have portrayed the United States as a destabilizing force in the region, if not an existential threat to China. Speaking at the 2022 Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s largest annual defense summit, Wei Fenghe, then China’s defense minister, called the United States a “bully” and accused Washington of “interference” in territorial disputes in the region. “Some people in the U.S. try to suppress China on all fronts,” he said. To regain control of the narrative, American officials should set the record straight on the goals of extended deterrence and nuclear sharing. Washington should also call greater attention to China’s increasingly aggressive measures against U.S. allies, as well as to Beijing’s nuclear buildup.
Additionally, the United States should increase its efforts to counter Chinese gray-zone tactics. In recent years, Washington and its allies have enhanced intelligence collaboration, and they have countered disinformation and cyberattacks. They should further strengthen policy and operational coordination and enhance resilience in vulnerable regions, such as Southeast Asia and the Pacific. To counter Chinese disinformation campaigns, Washington and its allies should better integrate their economic tools, such as export controls and sanctions. In the absence of severe consequences, Beijing will continue and even intensify its coercive actions.
Crucially, the United States and its allies should develop military concepts and capabilities allowing them to respond to aggression quickly and effectively. In other words, they should make every effort to be able to deny territory grabs by China. They should be prepared to fight and win a conflict with Beijing, if necessary, despite the increasingly long nuclear shadow that China casts over the region. They should, in turn, consider how they can best leverage their collective military might, including nuclear weapons, against China.
Finally, Washington and its allies should expect Beijing and Moscow to strengthen security ties in the years ahead. The relationship between China and Russia has significant implications for both the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic. As both ratchet up their defense cooperation, the United States and its allies from these regions must likewise deepen their security cooperation. Failure to do so could prove fatal to U.S. extended deterrence, with far-reaching consequences for U.S. power and influence.
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첫댓글 확장억제 전략을 변경한다면 핵고슴도치들이 최소 3마리 늘어나서 중국에도 별로 좋은 시나리오가 아니라고 보는데 중국의 시각은 또 다르네요...
그나저나 아침에 서해문제 이야기했더니 이런 기사가 뜨네요.........https://www.thepublic.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=264043
누가 대통령이 되건 서해는 꽤나 시끄러울 것 같습니다.