|
|
Hybrid warfare: battlefield, electronics, and network. Credit: Shutterstock
Artificial intelligence (AI) continues to be a key battleground technology – leading suppliers such as BAE, Lockheed Martin, and Thales are integrating AI with electronic warfare (EW), applying it to autonomous air systems, mission planning, geospatial intelligence, and radar systems. This is illustrated by the upward trend in patent and defence deals over the past five years[i].
Free WhitepaperNavigating the Challenges of Military 19" Electronic Racks
In this free whitepaper, discover how 19" electronic racks are designed to meet the needs of mission-critical applications such as targeting, monitoring and controls across modern naval, air, ground and mobile applications. Download now to learn more about how...
Read more
By nVent Defence
Submit
And demand for EW is expected to increase. According to GlobaData analysis[ii], the EW market, valued at US$15.4 billion in 2024, is forecast to grow at a CAGR of 5.4% and reach US$25.9 billion by 2034 – with a cumulative value of US$221.5 billion.
However, for EW AI-integrated systems to function reliably, optimal thermal management is paramount to maintaining performance in conflict situations and preserving the longevity and reliability of mission-critical operations hardware. But while AI supports EW, it increases the thermal load through higher processing requirements.
Intelligent thermal management
Comparatively, thermal management is less challenging for more conventional EW electronics, as Matthew Tarney, Global Growth Leader, Aerospace & Defense at nVent SHROFF explains: “Traditional military electronics systems are designed around a specific function, such as communication, intelligence, targeting, etc. and rely on specific electronic inputs to create a narrow, specific output for an operator. This approach uses relatively little processing power and demands limited cooling.”
As processing speeds increase through AI, and form factors shrink – driven by demand for smaller size, weight, and power (SWaP) – heat concentration becomes a variable needing more control. Furthermore, EW is increasingly expected to operate in environments with extremes of heat and cold and failure with conventional cooling systems is more likely to occur due to the inability to adapt dynamically to changing conditions.
Whilst the military is welcoming AI, it is providing challenges for developers of cooling systems. Consequently, next-generation cooling solutions for AI-enabled EW are evolving toward dynamic and responsive architectures.
“Integrating AI into defence systems allows electronics systems engineers to combine the inputs of these many different functional systems, analyse them in an AI model, and make recommendations or whole-battlespace analyses for operators in the field,” says Tarney, “However, the processing power required to capture and make sense of these vast datasets and make operational recommendations is orders of magnitude higher than discrete functional programming.”
The response has been the development of more adaptive and dynamic cooling solutions. As AI requires higher processing power, this increases thermal loads, and defence OEMs are exploring liquid cooling and two-phase systems that use phase-change materials (PCMs) to absorb and dissipate heat more efficiently than air.
As Tarney says, “This heat requires new approaches to cooling, including non-traditional techniques such as direct air flow-through (VITA 48.5) and liquid flow-through (Vita 48.4).”
These support the compact, high-wattage electronics AI requires, without introducing mechanical noise or vibration that could increase detection.
AI and R&D
AI is also changing the approach to cooling military electronics through analysis at the design and development phase. Traditional thermal modelling is slow and restricted by the designer’s capacity to discover only a few potential configurations. But AI-driven simulations can rapidly evaluate thousands of designs, effectively identifying optimal layouts for heat dissipation and airflow.
Tarney remarks, “Given enough processing power, an AI model can run this analysis in minutes compared to the hours of repeated modelling and simulation an engineer would need to spend to optimise a flow pattern manually.”
Additionally, AI tools augment machine learning, computational fluid dynamics (CFD), and design algorithms to model how heat will behave under varying loads and environmental conditions.
Explains Tarney: “AI analysis has the potential to identify the optimal cooling type for specific applications and then to create an optimal cooling design for the specific board or chassis when given the layout and heat map of the system.”
Without building physical prototypes, designers can virtually evaluate configurations such as liquid cooling loops, micro-channel structures, or embedded phase-change materials. This level of automated design saves time and reveals configurations that may not be apparent to engineers.
This also improves overall energy efficiency, extending the battery life in portable or unmanned systems. As Tarney says, “If energy use is a priority for an application, AI tools can help recommend the most energy-efficient cooling architecture. This allows the design engineer to create an efficient cooling solution at the lowest possible energy consumption.”
Safeguarding electronics
As electronics systems become smaller, AI-driven, and more powerful, this demands greater thermal dissipation. New cooling approaches are required, including non-traditional cooling techniques such as direct air flow-through and liquid flow-through.
nVent SCHROFF is a leading developer of modular cooling solutions for advanced electronics, designed for mission-critical environments.
“Our engineers use advanced simulation and modelling tools to ensure that every cooling solution we design meets the requirements of our customers’ applications as efficiently as possible,” says nVent’s Tarney. “In addition, we test to rigorous international standards to ensure our cooling products meet the requirements of governments and industries around the globe.”
This is exemplified by nVent SCHROFF’s Calmark and Birtcher Card-Loks, Wedge-Loks, LHX air-to-liquid heat exchangers, and the liquid cooling portfolio which are deployed to cool advanced electronics in defence, aerospace, test and measurement, communications, and data centre markets worldwide.
Conclusion
EW warfare is developing at pace, and the application of AI in military electronics is testing conventional methods of cooling systems to the limit. However, developers such as nVent SCHROFF are meeting the challenge by creating customised designs and technologies to meet the requirements of military electronics as they evolve.
Download the free report to explore how nVent SCHROFF’s industry-leading enclosures can protect and cool high-tech military electronic systems on ships, tanks, ground control stations, aircraft and unmanned vehicles.
I was part of the team behind the UK Strategic Defence Review: Here is what shaped our thinking
The SDR’s vision calls for a revolution in how the UK finds, buys and uses technology to keep up with its adversaries.
Expert commentPublished 2 June 2025 4 minute READ
Associate Fellow, UK in the World Programme
‘By 2035 the UK will be a leading tech-enabled defence power, with an Integrated Force that deters, fights and wins through constant innovation at wartime pace’ – this is the core vision of the UK’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR) 2025.
It was easy enough for us to write this single sentence, but it encapsulates a radical strategic shift in how the UK must organize to find, buy and use technology. It will be hard work to execute, but success is urgent – for the UK’s ability to deter adversaries, strengthen its industrial base, and to win if required to fight.
Why that vision?
The SDR acknowledges that the international order is being reshaped. Russia’s war in Ukraine continues, but the US wants to focus on the Indo-Pacific region and at home. The UK and its European partners are rightly taking on more responsibility for their own defence as a result. Meanwhile China is vastly increasing production of advanced weapons systems, combining AI, drones, and maritime assets designed for saturation and surprise. Additionally, the UK is dealing with daily attacks against its infrastructure and economy in the grey zone of cyberspace. Taken together, it is clear that the threats faced by the UK are proximate, and in many respects already here.
—
Grace Cassy speaks at the UK Ministry of Defence.
Ukraine has vividly demonstrated that the battlefield is no longer just kinetic – it’s cognitive, autonomous, and contested in milliseconds. The war has shifted the locus of defence innovation from well-established prime contractors to agile startups, who can rapidly respond to the pace of battlefield developments. This is happening at a time when advances in AI, quantum, and biotech are progressing at dizzying speed.
UK defence is not currently set up to face the challenges of this new era. Procurement takes an average of 6.5 years for projects with a value of more than £20 million.
The result is that the UK has a narrow base of large suppliers who have the balance sheet to survive the procurement cycle. Digital capabilities have been de-prioritized to fund other long-running equipment programmes. Put simply, the UK has raided the future to pay for the past. This cannot continue, as the Defence Secretary John Healey has made clear.
The Review therefore places innovation and pace at the heart of its vision. To deter, fight and win requires an ability to endure both above and below the threshold of war. As well as ships, tanks and planes, communications and digital networks must be able to survive and decide under fire.
Threaded through all of this is the concept of tempo dominance – the simple maxim that the side that learns and adapts fastest, wins.
The creation of a Digital Targeting Web will enhance the UK armed forces’ ability to sense, operate and decide across domains – in the field as well as in headquarters. It will also force pace into the work to upgrade the UK’s digital foundations, from the Cloud to AI. The SDR calls for a significant upgrade to cyber capabilities and better protection for the UK’s Critical National Infrastructure (CNI).
NATO Allies must also be able to fight together more easily. From software to supply chain, the Review argues for interoperability by default. This means open software standards, simple architectures, and an end to over-specification. Threaded through all of this is the concept of tempo dominance – the simple maxim that the side that learns and adapts fastest, wins.
Realizing the vision
Translating this into practice requires changing how the UK finds, buys and uses capability in a constant innovation cycle. The government’s commitments to increased defence spending are welcome, but as the defence secretary has acknowledged, how we spend the money is as important as the overall number.
The UK must stimulate a deeper and broader pool of potential suppliers as part of a renewed partnership with the private sector.
The UK must stimulate a deeper and broader pool of potential suppliers as part of a renewed partnership with the private sector. Critical to that aim is the decision to ringfence 10 per cent of the equipment budget for novel technologies: for the first time, a defence review is providing formal protection for tomorrow’s needs.
This money must flow via contracts as revenue to a wider pool of companies, complementing large manufacturers with the younger and more agile technology providers who have been critical to Ukraine’s war fighting. This should be the core function of the new UK Defence Innovation organization the Review proposes.
Image — Ukrainian soldiers test a Vampire drone before deployment to the frontline in Dnipro, Ukraine in May, 2025. (Photo by Jose Colon/Anadolu via Getty Images)
Topics
Regions
Departments
Subscribe to our weekly newsletter
Our flagship email provides a round-up of content, plus the latest on events and how to connect with the institute.
Enter email
Subscribe
Article 2nd half
The Review also has clear recommendations on how to inject pace into procurement through radical reform. It recognizes that systems created to procure aircraft carriers do not work for software or fast-evolving capabilities like drones. Such purchases should have a three-month timeline. This is a challenging target and will require different risk appetite. But it is an essential reform to stay in the race against adversaries who are deploying new kit in the time the UK currently takes to draft a requirement.
Once new capability is delivered, the armed forces must be able to use it. Trusted networks, an assured data fabric, and Secret-level Cloud are all vital parts of the 21st century armoury, making other weapons more lethal. Without them, talk of deploying AI and drones will remain just talk. Defence people too must be ready to work with this new tooling. The Review recommends the creation of a Digital Warfighters group as a frontline deployable capability, and digital upskilling across UK defence as a whole.
The ingredients are now in place for a flowering of technology companies that can serve defence and security and contribute to maintaining an edge against fast-moving adversaries. Ultimately, though, companies need to show revenue to keep attracting investment capital.
The next two years will be critical to demonstrate to investors that there is a market in UK defence.
Capital follows contracts: if government buys meaningfully from a wider range of suppliers, private capital will flow to them. For pure defence technology – as opposed to dual use technology, where there is also a commercial application – government is the only buyer. No-one else can make the equation work. With the ringfenced budget for novel technology the Review outlines, and the prospect of faster, more agile contracting, defence has the answer in its hands.
The UK can become a beacon within NATO if it embraces its buying power: the next two years will be critical to demonstrate to investors that there is a market in UK defence. Technology companies will cluster where there is business to be won, creating high quality jobs and growth. If contracts don’t come, they will go elsewhere.
The SDR has set some direction to the future. Its implementation will require changes to rules, processes and culture in UK defence. To some this may feel radical and uncomfortable. To others I spoke to during the Review process, it will feel liberating – and a necessary reform for our times.
Citizens, parliament and the media must also walk this path, accepting that the new world requires different ways of thinking about risk. If a new sensor or drone cannot deliver a ten-year value for money statement, or becomes obsolete in months, that is not a failure. It is the new reality given the pace of development in technology and especially AI.
As part of the Review team, I’ve seen the distance the UK has to travel. And I’ve also seen the brilliant people inside defence committed to delivering on the SDR’s vision. Now is the time to empower them.
The Strategic Defence Review Needs to Retain its Ambitions on Technological Transformation
Matthew Savill
30 May 202511 Minute Read
Share
The long-awaited Strategic Defence Review can lead to significant change in the Armed Forces if it moves beyond previous platitudes and half-implemented ideas on innovation to rebuild the foundations of defence while also making recommendations for the big choices on technological transformation.
The SDR is Released from Purgatory
The much-discussed UK Strategic Defence Review (SDR) has recently been subject to a wearingly familiar succession of leaks and speculation, and now appears likely to be published in the week of 2 June. Through its gestation, the review has been dogged by concerns about delays caused by the changing global context, the level of its ambition, and the extent to which the government’s commitment on spending 2.5% of GDP would be enough to address the issues in Defence.
When the review was in its research phase, a trio of distinguished former UK officials set out a framework against which to judge it. Now the results of the review are imminent, how might it be read, and what should be examined as measures of success or challenge when it eventually sees the public light of day? In particular, how might its level of ambition for the ‘transformation’ of the UK’s Armed Forces be judged?
Schrodinger’s Review
The first area on which to evaluate the review is the manner of its presentation, particularly in its conclusions. The review is unusual in it is notionally independent, delivered by Lord Robertson as part of a trio of senior figures (Dr Fiona Hill and retired General Richard Barrons the other two), alongside a number of external experts and specialists, supported but not directed by a secretariat in the Ministry of Defence (MOD). They had free rein to make suggestions and propose ideas to change Defence, albeit they also have terms of reference – including a budget ceiling – within which to work.
These constrained the review, as did limited capacity (albeit bolstered by artificial intelligence summarising the thousands of submissions), but in the final analysis this should be a review less encumbered than previously by inter-service politics or the orthodoxy of the MOD. However, if media reporting is accurate, we can infer it was largely finished some time ago, but has been delayed until now by wrangling over how to implement it, what this means for the MOD’s finances, and how to present the subsequent work the MOD will need to do.
This was always the danger inherent in picking an independent team but running the review on behalf of the MOD: it could present politically difficult options. It is not feasible to only publish part of it, and cherry-picking will be obvious, leaving the alternative of watering it down. But if the report’s authors are lukewarm over the final results, or step away entirely, it will undermine its intellectual case, and lead to doubt about the government’s seriousness in approaching the issue.
The UK has instead been left with an eclectic mix of the cutting-edge sitting uneasily alongside the obsolete – for which replacements are often late, or, where weapons upgrades lag, new capabilities find their potential limited
A completely independent review would not need government ‘sign-off’ or ‘approval’ from the Treasury. Of course, the Government might not have liked the conclusions, but much like a report from a Select Committee, a government response could have then applied budgetary realism or an alternative perspective and then engaged in the resulting open and (hopefully) educational public debate about priorities. Instead, we are left with something like ‘Schrodinger’s Review’: both independent and dependent at the same time.
Strategy Requires Making Choices and Compromises
The second area for judgement is its utility as a ‘strategic’ document and whether the SDR is trying to be ‘a’ strategy or not. If so, it should be read as an attempt to achieve the cliched but necessary balancing of ‘ends, ways, and means’ for Defence: determining the purpose of the Armed Forces, how they should go about their business, and with what resources (inside a ceiling dictated to the authors).
The signs for this are not positive at the moment, given the previously-mentioned delay for discussions in the interval between the SDR’s conclusion and its publication. The terms for the review talk about prioritisation of objectives, investments and activity, which certainly sounds like important components for a strategy. But more recently, the Permanent Secretary of the MOD appeared to suggest details around investment decisions might not appear until the autumn in a separate, MOD-authored document, not least because the MOD is still trying to work out the shape of the revised Equipment Plan.
To be fair, it would be unreasonable to expect this work to both review all of Defence and perform the function of an MOD Budget Cycle in its totality. But given the challenges to the current structures and capabilities of the military, if it can’t even approach the level of detail of recent reviews in relation to capability choices (e.g. the 2010 and 2015 proposed future forces) then there is a danger it becomes too aspirational to be useful (or more cynically, too vague for the MOD to be held to account against it). We should therefore expect a ‘strategic’ review to be about prioritisation, assumptions and guidance for choices. This is also where it is possible to judge the ambition and scope of the review’s conclusions, particularly on the use of technology.
Money Alone is Not Transformational
This immediately brings up the most obvious cause for any caution about the short-term impact of the review. The spending target of 2.5% of GDP (which we now learn will also include money being spent to ‘lease’ Diego Garcia, albeit as a tiny fraction (0.2%) of the Defence Budget) is not so significant an increase as to be genuinely ‘transformational’ – at least, not given the current state of the Armed Forces. To be transformational, it will need to cut and significantly reshape the Armed Forces by taking risk in some areas to transform others.
Subscribe to the Military Sciences Newsletter
Stay up to date with the latest publications and events from the Military Sciences Research Group
Subscribe to the RUSI Newsletter
Get a weekly round-up of the latest commentary and research straight into your inbox.
The boost of several billion pounds a year should probably first be used to fill gaps: in ammunition and other weapons stockpiles; in infrastructure and housing; logistics and support functions; and in support to personnel conditions, pay and recruitment. To make radical, rather than incremental additions to military capability (for example in order to take advantage of new technologies) will therefore require some big choices on early retirement of capabilities or reductions in numbers.
Defence has been here before in terms of the promise of new capabilities being presaged by the early loss of others due to budget pressure: the cuts of November 2024 were just such a case and given the modest savings made over five years, were an indicator of just how tight in-year finances are at the MOD. Before that, the Integrated Review and related Defence Command Paper both promised investment in ‘advanced technologies’ would improve the forces – after a number of ‘legacy systems’ were cut to make room. We have had years of talk of ‘sunset and sunrise capabilities’ but rather than a planned and managed transition from older forces to new, the UK has instead been left with an eclectic mix of the cutting-edge sitting uneasily alongside the obsolete – for which replacements are often late, or, where weapons upgrades lag, new capabilities find their potential limited. This was not the planned ‘high-low mix’ as part of an ‘integrated force’ we were promised, but a classic British attempt to muddle through.
Implementation Needs to Move Beyond Experimentation
It is here the SDR could make a major mark. Never mind quibbling over the sufficiency of the 148 Challenger 3 tanks the UK will eventually have by 2030: given the experience of Ukraine does the SDR believe tanks have a future as currently envisaged? Are the Army’s expensive attack helicopters still worth it in a world where the front line is increasingly dominated by drone threats? If, as reported, the Navy wants to radically increase the number of uncrewed vessels for a variety of tasks, should it still be developing large surface combatants, and what role is envisaged for the aircraft carriers? And in air and space, might future surveillance capabilities be better provided by stealthy drones and space-based sensors rather than large, slow, vulnerable crewed aircraft such as the E-7 Wedgetail?
The SDR could help by making clear where the big bets could be made on technology – and where cold water needs to be poured on ideas that represent a triumph of optimism over reality
The UK has talked a good game on experimentation and trials, including on artificial intelligence (AI) and directed-energy weapons, but these have yet to translate into large-scale production of any new capabilities operating outside of niche organisations. New processes and structures such as a Defence Innovation Unit, and an Integrated Procurement Model are being introduced, but will take time to show their worth: the MOD already had an innovation unit alongside other innovation centres, and the IPM’s acceleration of the DragonFire laser weapon came after it had already spent seven years being developed. At least the recent announcement of the new StormShroud drone coming into service represents the first major implementation of the RAF’s Autonomous Collaborative Platforms Strategy and is a significant improvement on the RAF’s over-hyped ‘drone squadron’ which spent several years without conducting a drone trial.
Ambitious Targets for Change Are Needed
The SDR could help by making clear where the big bets could be made on technology – and where cold water needs to be poured on ideas that represent a triumph of optimism over reality. It could identify where ‘legacy’ items have outlived their usefulness and where technological solutions will enhance existing capabilities.
Moreover, it should identify where mass and depth remain vital to the creation of effective fighting power: the inexorable reduction of force sizes combined with the increasing cost of systems is unsustainable.
Some advice on where either the expansion of forces and stockpiles are required, or acceptance of limitations will be necessary alongside collaboration with allies and partners. On this last point, there should be some consideration of how to survive friction in the critical relationship with the US; a complete break is in neither’s interests, and tremendously expensive but given the unique extent of the UK’s intertwining with the US military – and thus its vulnerabilities – some additional insulation is required if the US is less reliable or (not unreasonably) expects a more prominent role for Europe in its own security.
To do all this it may be necessary to set ambitious, and crucially, measurable targets. For example, what proportion of RAF combat aircraft should be uncrewed and by what year should this target be achieved? What functions in the Royal Navy should be handed over to remote or autonomous systems, and by when? The Army has reportedly already identified a target for the proportion of its combat power to be provided by traditional crewed capabilities (20%), reusable uncrewed capabilities (40%), and disposable drones (40%). But it is not yet clear how this metric is calculated, and it is hard to believe the first category will only comprise a fifth of total budget or firepower.
Targets matter: although similar targets in the US have been missed, as has been pointed out, the fact they existed created a benchmark against which some aspects of modernisation could be measured
Other goals could be about testing the Defence Secretary’s claim that the UK will be at the leading edge of innovation on AI; for example, the widescale adoption of AI to complete all initial analysis of imagery, thus accelerating intelligence analysis, or the use of software to do initial operational estimates.
Targets matter: although similar targets in the US have been missed, as has been pointed out, the fact they existed created a benchmark against which some aspects of modernisation could be measured. The statement by the Chief of the General Staff that he intends to double the Army’s combat power within three years is exactly the sort of target that focusses minds and could potentially be useful if they appear in the SDR, and can be measured (in this case defined as a brigade being capable of defeating a Russian Combined Arms Army).
And if the MOD disagrees with these, for example, because it has a different understanding of the risks, or the speed at which technology might develop, then it should be asked to set out its own analysis, such as the probability AI smarter than people (Artificial General Intelligence) will arrive, the point at which this becomes more likely than not, and if never then why. The briefing this week that the MOD will develop a ‘Digital Targeting Web’ to be in service in 2027 is a decent start, though if it is learning lessons from what Ukraine has been doing since 2022, and uses technology already available, is this fast enough?
None of this is to suggest the SDR should purely focus on being a technologist’s manifesto. It also needs to make judgements on the state of the UK’s industrial base, and effective use of the UK’s reserves, amongst many other issues. We have not even mentioned the expense of the nuclear deterrent, its longevity and other options to improve deterrence in Europe. But many of the developments in UK Defence since the end of the Cold War have inevitably justified shrinking forces on the back of more advanced capabilities. Given we are now seeing the speed of adaptation and counter-measures in the war in Ukraine, it is reasonable to ask how this review will cut through the hype and myths and make concrete recommendations, using its independence to force change at a pace the MOD has been unable to demonstrate on its own.
© RUSI, 2025.
The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.
For terms of use, see Website Terms and Conditions of Use.
Have an idea for a Commentary you'd like to write for us? Send a short pitch to commentaries@rusi.org and we'll get back to you if it fits into our research interests. View full guidelines for contributors.
|
|