The voyage of philosophy : Dr. Ahn’s youtube philosophy classroom
Unit 24 : Analysis of “Perception” Chapter in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind, Part 1.
par. 111 ~ par. 120
THE SUMMARY
The perception chapter in Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Mind” viz, “2. Perception” (hereafter simply “perception”) is enormously difficult and complicate to understand, therefore until now the correct analysis of it has not been made.
First of all “perception” is made up of two tightly related but different parts: The first part, paragraph 111 to 122, deals with the problematic of substance (=thing) and its property, which was provoked by English empiricism however the second part, paragraph 123 to 131, mainly deals with the problematic of “substance and modification” by Spinoza. These two correlatively entangled but distinctive problems about substance-notion are surveyed together in the same chapter.
The structure of the chapter “Perception” is largely divided into 4 parts: ① “Perception” as search of the universal, the substance ② “Perception” divided into the perceiver and the perceived, or “Pure Apprehension” and “Pure One” ③ “Reflexion-into- itself” as correction of “Pure Apprehension”
④ the problem of being for itself and being for other : Spinoza’s substance and modification(=modus)
In the first part of “Perception” the “appearing knowledge” intends to grasp the universal, i.e. the universal contrary to the individual or the particular. Perception seeks to grasp the universal.
However the universal which Hegel refers to is actually the problem of “matter and its properties” or “substance and its attributes“, which was critically investigated by English empiricism: John Locke e.g. thought of the substance as ”something-I-know-not-what“.
Hegel’s attitude is also not so different from the empiricism: The common notion of substance and its property is not to be accepted.
The relation of substance and attribute or object and property was very important issue of modern philosophy therefore the philosophers at that time often dealt with that problem :
By Descartes there are three kinds of beings : substance, attribute and mode. These three are in relation of dependence : Modes depend on attributes, and attributes depend on substances which subsist for itself. There is said to be plural substances by Descartes.
In addition Descartes came up with the “principal attribute” or property that makes the substance be known by us. Therefore the principal attribute is the same as the “essence” in traditional term.
The nature of mind is by Descartes to think, therefore the mind is thinking substance and to think is the mind’s principal attribute.
In contrast with plural substances by Descartes, Spinoza reduces the number of substance into one: There is only one substance, which exists in itself, i.e God. God is the only substance. His notion of mode or modification is to be taken notice of : “Modifications exist in something external to themselves”.
As will be afterwards described, this conception of modification by Spinoza played the critical role in Hegel’s concept of Being-for-Other.
영국의 경험주의는 실체에 대한 전통적인 개념을 받아들이기를 거부했습니다.
로크는 실체라는 개념을 의심하기 시작했습니다. 그는 사물의 속성 근저에 존재하는 것으로 간주되는 실체(實體) 혹은 기체(基體) 개념을 "내가 모르는 어떤 것"(something-I-know-not-what) 으로 특징지었습니다.
버클리는 다음 단계로서 실체 관념이 전혀 무의미하다 라고 했고 그렇게 해서 그는 물질적인 실체를 제거했습니다.
그 후 흄은 정신적 실체와 물질적 실체를 모두 제거했습니다. 그는 “인간이란 경험(지각)의 다발일 뿐이다” 라고 했습니다.
이처럼 실체 개념의 부정은 학문 뿐만 아니라 “인간 존재”, “나의 존재” 마저도 부정하는 결과를 가져옵니다.
이런 학문적 위기 상황에서 프랑스의 루소는 “능동적 자아” (Active-Ego) 개념을 가져와서 수동적으로 주어지는 감각적 자료를 인간의 정신이 ‘모으고, 비교하고, 판단한다’ 고 합니다.
독일의 칸트는 이를 “선험적 통각”이라고 명명하고 이를 통해서 ‘다양성의 종합적 통일’이 이루어 진다고 합니다. 이를 통해서 다시 학문과 인간성을 철학적으로 긍정할 수 있었습니다. 또한 실체 개념 역시 타당성을 얻게 됩니다.
독일의 피히테는 데카르트, 루소 그리고 칸트를 종합하여 생각하는 자아의 기능에서 흔히 범주(category)라고 하는 오성의 사유규정을 도출합니다.
헤겔은 이런 바탕위에서 다시 한번 자기 나름의 실체-속성 관계를 규명합니다. 이는 위에서 말한 1.2.3 의 과정 즉 1. 통상적인 실체 개념과 그에 대한 비판 2. “순수-파악” 개념을 통한 실체의 재정립과 그 모순 3. “자기-복귀” 개념을 통한 “순수-파악”의 교정 및 개선을 전개합니다. 이는 루소의 능동적 자아 개념을 피히테 철학적으로 재구성한 것입니다. (전문을 보시기 바랍니다)
British empiricism refused to accept traditional concepts of substance.
Locke began to doubt the concept of substance. He characterized the concept of substance as "something-I-know-not-what" that is considered to exist at the root of an object's properties.
As the next step, Buckley said the concept of substance was completely meaningless, and that's why he got rid of the material substance.
After that, Hume removed both mental and physical substances. “Mankind is just a bundle of experiences," he said.
Like this, denial of the concept of substance results not only in denial of science and philosophy but also in denial of "human spirit and existence" : I myself would have no self-identity.
In this academic crisis, French Rousseau takes the concept of "active ego" and says that the human mind "collects, compares, and judges" sensory data given passively.
Kant in Germany calls it "transcendental apperception" and says that "synthetic unification of diversity" is achieved through this. Through this, the science and humanity could be affirmed and the concept of substance gains its validity.
Also, the concept of substance also gains validity.
Fichte in Germany derives the five-star rule, commonly referred to as a category, from the function of the self-contained thinking of Cartesian, Russo, and Kant.
Hegel once again identifies his own identity-property relationship on this basis. This develops the process of 1.2.3 above: 1. Conventional concept of entity and criticism of it 2. Reestablishment of entity through "pure-identification" and the contradiction 3. Calibration and improvement of "pure-identification" through "self-reinstatement" concepts. This is a philosophical reconstruction of Russo's active self-concept. (please see the full text)