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In each case, the investigating officers independently concluded that each mishap was preventable.
In a call with reporters on Thursday, service officials emphasized the high operational tempo in the Red Sea, where sailors repeatedly came under drone and missile fire from the Yemen-based Houthis. Despite the incidents, the officials praised the overall performance of the strike group throughout its nine-month deployment.
The Navy declined to release the accountability actions for sailors involved in the four incidents when asked by USNI News. Outside of removing Harry S. Truman’s commander Capt. Dave Snowden following the Feb. 12 collision, the service did not say whether anyone else was punished or retrained.
“I assure you that accountability actions were taken across all the operators involved in this. That could be from an administrative reaction to take away someone’s watch qualification and have them requalified to administrative procedures in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice,” a senior Navy official told reporters. “I don’t feel an obligation to publish those results to the world.”
Friendly Fire
Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Gettysburg (CG-64) steams in the US Central Command area of responsibility on Dec. 16, 2024. US Navy Photo
Harry S. Truman and the strike group set out across the Atlantic in September 2024 from Naval Station Norfolk, Va., after training on the East Coast.
Capt. Justin Hodges commanded the freshly refurbished cruiser USS Gettysburg (CG-64). He was designated as the air defense commander for the strike group, reporting to Rear Adm. Sean Bailey, who led Carrier Strike Group 8. The air defense commander, or Whiskey, is responsible for coordinating the defense of the strike group, managing both ships and aircraft operating around the carrier.
In late December, the strike group entered the Red Sea and began operations against Houthi targets. Gettysburg was operating away from the strike group while guided-missile destroyer USS Stout (DDG-55) filled in as the air defense commander.
Harry S. Truman was one of a string of carriers deployed to the Red Sea after Hamas’ Oct. 7, 2023 attack on Israel. The Biden administration launched Operation Prosperity Guardian to counter subsequent Houthi strikes on merchant shipping.
Gettysburg entered the Red Sea on Dec. 18, four days after the rest of the strike group. For the first three months of the deployment, the cruiser mostly stayed in port or operated apart from the formation, serving as Whiskey for about 43 percent of the time, according to the investigation.
“It is important to note that over the immediate 45 days prior to the incident, [Gettysburg] only operated with the [strike group] 15 percent of the time (seven of 45 days),” reads the investigation conducted by former Harry S. Truman commander Rear Adm. Kavon Hakimzadeh.
On the front end of the deployment, a planned 10-day group sail where warfare commanders could train together was cut down to two due to an oiler shortage on the East Coast.
“We never really got a chance to learn from the integration,” the unnamed chief of staff for Carrier Strike Group 8 told investigators. “I would have liked to have a group sail longer than two days. We never got the chance to say ‘that does not work … let’s try something else.’ We just had to be like that’s done, that’s done, and move down the list. We then had to move on to the next thing.”
USS Stout (DDG-55) sails in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility on April 4, 2025. US Navy Photo
Investigators found that crew on the Gettysburg was sometimes disconnected with the rest of the strike group while operating at a distance and wasn’t participating in planning meetings ahead of the initial defensive strike mission on Dec. 21.
“The plan for both the strike and the associated air defense plan was not well understood on Gettysburg. Across various members of the [combat information center] watch team, they did not understand the timing of the event, the departure and return to force plan, or the potential threat response,” reads the report.
Additionally, several systems that identified friendly aircraft were either switched off or not working. Many of those failures weren’t reported to the strike group leadership on the carrier ahead of the first major series of strike missions that kicked off on Dec. 21.
On that Saturday, waves of Super Hornets from Harry S. Truman flew into Yemen to strike Houthi targets while Gettysburg, Stout, USS Jason Dunham (DDG-109),USS The Sullivans (DDG-68) and a group of defense counter air (DCA) Super Hornets operated near the carrier.
“Almost immediately after the strike package launched, there was an earlier than anticipated Houthi response, which led to extensive targeting of available DCA to airborne threats,” reads the report.
The Houthis fired waves of anti-ship and one-way attack drones for hours while the strike group fought off the threats. Aboard the carrier, the strike commander directed some of the Super Hornets returning from strike missions to join the fighters protecting the strike group.
“In total, 14 different DCA sorties occurred over the course of four hours, involving a total of 11 individual aircraft, in comparison to the original six scheduled DCA sorties,” reads the investigation.
Fighters looped into the protection mission included an F/A-18F serving as a tanker for the air wing, labeled in the investigation as Aircraft 107, assigned to the “Red Rippers” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 11; an F/A-18F designated Aircraft 112; and another Super Hornet designated as Aircraft 211.
Sailors prepare an F/A-18F Super Hornet, attached to the ‘Red Rippers’ of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 11, to take off from the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75), Sept. 25, 2024. US Navy Photo
At 1:40 a.m., Gettysburg reported that the area was clear of hostile tracks. Over the course of the next 40 minutes, the DCA was given “conflicting orders” and stayed airborne, the report reads.
Aboard Harry S. Truman, the strike warfare commander, who directed the attacks in Yemen, ordered the remaining DCA Super Hornets to return to the carrier. According to the investigation, that order was not understood by the entire strike group.
As fighters returned to the carrier, two key positions in the guided-missile cruiser’s combat information center had just changed shifts, and sailors were preparing for a helicopter landing on its flight deck, reducing the coverage of the cruiser’s AN/SPY-1 air search radar. At the same time, the E-2D Hawkeye that had overseen the strike group with its radar had a malfunction and transferred its responsibilities to one of the destroyers, according to a separate account from the pilot of Aircraft 107.
The new watchstanders didn’t know where the remaining DCA fighters were or that Gettysburg’s Identification Friend or Foe system, which automatically identifies friendly targets, was malfunctioning. For the new watchstanders, the fighters appeared on their screens as “unknown” contacts.
“The Gettysburg CIC team believed them to be enemy anti-ship cruise missiles,” reads the report.
Without checking via other means, Gettysburg’s commander, Capt. Justin Hodges, directed his crew to fire two SM-2s — one at Aircraft 107 and the other at Aircraft 112 – according to the report.
From the cockpit of the Super Hornet, the pilot saw the missile launch from Gettysburg, but was confused about the target.
“Yooooo that shit is crazy, I can’t believe they’re shooting a drone down,” reads a quote from Aircraft 107’s pilot in the separate account.
Within seconds the pilot and the weapon systems officer realized they were targets and ejected from the Super Hornet before it was destroyed by the first missile.
The second Super Hornet made an evasive maneuver and was set to eject, but the second SM-2 was deactivated before impact.
An Aviation Machinist’s Mate, assigned to Airborne Command and Control Squadron (VAW) 126, directs an E-2D Advanced Hawkeye on pre-flight checks on the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) on March 28, 2025. US Navy Photo
“It passes within 100 feet of our jet and shakes the jet,” the pilot of Aircraft 112 said in a separate account of the incident. “It explodes off our left on the surface of the water.”
The investigation concluded that the attacks on the two Super Hornets were preventable, despite the equipment failures.
“The issues inherent to Gettysburg and caused by casualty conditions could have been mitigated through effective planning and timely execution prior to the 21 December operations,” reads the report. “Neither of these occurred. Specific failures in the planning process exacerbated an already challenging integration scenario for the strike group.”
Hodges left the ship following an at-sea change of command on Jan. 30. He did not respond to a request for comment from USNI News.
Afterwards, the Navy introduced a software patch to correct the Aegis Combat System’s failure to identify friendly tracks, a senior Navy official told reporters on Thursday.
“We’ve invested over $55 million since this incident to correct those Aegis Weapon System deficiencies,” a senior naval service official told reporters. “Over the last two years, our industry partners have demonstrated their commitment and their ability to rapidly correct these software deficiencies, and it’s been very impressive.”
Collision off Port Said
Exterior damage of USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) viewed from a ship’s rigid-hull inflatable boat following a collision with merchant vessel Besiktas-M, Feb. 12, while operating in the vicinity of Port Said, Egypt on Feb. 13, 2025. US Navy Photo
Two months after Gettysburg shot down its Super Hornet, while Harry S. Truman was traveling from a port visit to Naval Support Activity Souda Bay, Greece to the Suez Canal, the carrier collided with merchant ship MV Besiktas-M.
An investigation led by Rear Adm. Todd Whalen found that “poor seamanship” and a lack of training led to the Feb. 12 collision near Port Said, Egypt.
The probe found a series of missteps occurred on the bridge that evening before the collision, including improperly recorded deck logs, inefficient communication between sailors and a lack of an Automatic Identification System transmission from Harry S. Truman.
The carrier was sailing 19 knots through the crowded waters near Port Said, preparing to transit south through the Suez Canal, when it collided with the merchant vessel at 11:45 p.m. local time, according to the investigation.
No sailors were injured or killed, though a sponson located to the rear of the carrier’s starboard aircraft elevator was damaged and the merchant tanker cut into the hull above the waterline further aft. One week after the collision, the Navy relieved Snowden, Harry S. Truman’s commanding officer at the time of the incident.
The probe compared the incident to two 2017 Navy collisions, including one between guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) and the Philippine-flagged merchant vessel ACX Crystal that killed seven U.S. sailors, and another between USS John McCain (DDG-56) and a Liberian tanker that killed 10.
“There is a natural human tendency to minimize near misses and dismiss the hypothetical,” reads the investigation into the Harry S. Truman collision. “In this case, the difference between life and death was a few feet or a few seconds. This should be a sobering reminder of what happened in the Fitzgerald and McCain collisions, and what could have happened on [Harry S. Truman].”
USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) stands by before it is loaded onto the heavy lift transport vessel MV Transshelf in 2017. US Navy Photo
Whalen’s investigation cited fatigue as a human factor in the collision and cited department heads who described a “just get it done” atmosphere aboard the carrier. Both sailors’ lack of sleep and pressure to perform tasks regardless of risk were crucial themes in the 2017 collisions.
Asked about the similarities between this investigation’s findings and the probes into the two 2017 collisions, the senior Navy official told reporters Thursday that the service is undermanned, citing the challenging combat environment in the Red Sea.
“We have 18,000 gaps at sea, which we are working mightily to reverse,” the official said. “That said, the fleet commanders do not certify ships or squadrons or units to deploy unless they’re manned, trained and equipped to go execute that mission. That doesn’t mean we’re not going to put those sailors into challenging situations, as we did with [Harry S. Truman].”
The investigation identified four “root causes” that led to the collision, including “poor seamanship” exhibited by the officer of the deck that went against the Rules of the Road and a lack of bridge resource management. The probe also found that Snowden “abdicated his responsibility for safe navigation during the approach to the Suez Canal to [the navigator
and [officer of the deck] contrary to U.S. Navy regulations,” according to the investigation. The navigator also “abdicated responsibility” while sailing to the Canal, the probe concluded.
The navigator called Snowden to the bridge at 11:43 p.m., two minutes before the collision occurred. At 11:44 p.m., the conning officer “ordered a hard left rudder” and then Snowden “ordered a hard right rudder to minimize the angle of contact” after realizing a collision was inevitable, according to the investigation.
Snowden’s “hard right rudder order reduced the closure rate between Harry S. Truman and Besiktas-M, reduced the angle of impact, and delayed the time to impact, which likely prevented more significant damage and potential loss of life,” reads the investigation.
“[Snowden’s] witness interview was a master class in ownership and accountability. I admired his candor and professionalism,” Whalen wrote.
After the collision, the carrier sailed to Souda Bay for repairs that cost the Navy $685,000.
“Repair efforts included patching holes, erecting a temporary bulkhead, replacing safety rails, adding structural supports, and removing non-structural damaged material,” reads the investigation.
Exterior damage of USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) viewed from an MH-60S Knight Hawk helicopter, attached to the ‘Dragonslayers’ of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 11 following a collision with the merchant vessel on Feb. 12, 2025. US Navy Photo
In the investigation, Whalen recommends improving training for carrier watchstanders so it more closely aligns with the surface warfare community standards.
“Unless they are SWOs, CVN watchstanders are not required to attend navigation and seamanship training prior to qualifying as a Bridge watchstander. On CVNs, Bridge watchstander training is strictly on-the-job,” reads the investigation.
“The Navy should not have two standards for Bridge watchstanders under the cognizance of different [t]ype [c]ommanders,” the investigation continues. “Adding mariner skills training requirements for CVNs would reduce risk of collision in future operations.”
Whalen wrote that the collision could have been much worse if the conditions were only slightly different.
“[A] small change in the timing of the collision or the angle of impact could have caused catastrophic results. Had the collision occurred 100 feet forward, the impact would have likely pierced a berthing compartment with 120 sleeping sailors. Had [aircraft elevator three] been lowered at the time of the collision, Harry S. Truman would have suffered a significant degradation to flight deck operations,” wrote Whelan.
“As it was, there were eight sailors in a space less than 10 feet from the impact location; a one-degree change in trajectory could have destroyed the space and caused eight fatalities,” he wrote. “My team spoke with those eight sailors, and they will never forget how close they came to losing their lives. Neither should we.”
Equipment Failures Blamed for Two Super Hornet Losses
Severed cable from USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) following a wire break on May 6, 2025. US Navy photo
Harry S. Truman’s troubles weren’t over. After its repairs at Souda Bay, the carrier lost two more Super Hornets to equipment failures.
The Navy faulted bad breaks, irreparable non-skid and inadequate communication for the loss of an F/A-18 fighter jet and a tow tractor after Harry S. Truman unexpectedly made an evasive maneuver to avoid an incoming missile at the same time the flight deck and hangar bay conducted aircraft movements.
On April 28, a towing tractor and attached Super Hornet from the “Knighthawks” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 136 both sank into the Red Sea after falling from Hangar Bay 3. The $36 million jet was the second of three that Harry S. Truman lost during its Middle East deployment.
An investigation headed by Capt. Douglas Ivanac found that Harry S. Truman had been traveling at about 15 knots when a tactical action officer announced a medium-range ballistic missile was incoming. A move team in the hangar bay removed the wheel chocks and tiedown chains from a Super Hornet parked in an elevator well to pull the aircraft into the hangar bay so the deck doors could close.
Simultaneously, the ship performed an evasive maneuver – in accordance with its standard operating procedure – increasing speed to 30 knots and making a 10-degree starboard turn before the turn was increased to 15 degrees. The increased turn rate caused the ship to heel at a faster rate before the bridge team eased the rudder back to 10 degrees and eventually down to two degrees.
The unsecured fighter and towing tractor began rolling backwards, forcing a brake rider in the cockpit of the Super Hornet and the tractor operator to jump from their positions just before the jet and tractor went over the edge. No sailors were lost in the incident, but one suffered a minor injury.
Investigators found that the fighter jet likely had a brake system failure after multiple interviewees described the aircraft’s tires as freely rolling despite the brake rider actively attempting to stop the aircraft.
While investigators said brake failure was the main cause of the accident, they also found inefficient non-skid coating in Hangar Bay 3, which had not been replaced since January 2018. According to the investigation, the hangar bay was described as “slippery” and a witness saw the tractor losing traction when towing and “sliding a bit during transit.”
Sailors transport an F/A-18E Super Hornet, attached to the ‘Knighthawks’ of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 136, aboard the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman May 22, 2025. US Navy Photo
Vice Adm. John Gumbleton, who penned the investigation’s final endorsement letter, found that insufficient communication between the bridge, flight deck and hangar bay “significantly contributed” to the incident. The report says neither Flight Deck Control nor Hangar Bay Control heard or acknowledged the bridge announcement, so they didn’t expect the ship’s first turn.
“I concur with [Naval Air Force Atlantic]’s determination that the loss of Aircraft 407 would have occurred irrespective of improved hangar bay non-skid or new spotting dolly tires. Significantly, both core issues contributing to the F/A-18F’s loss represent a failure to adhere to established procedures and processes,” Gumbleton wrote.
The Navy faulted equipment failure, as well as ineffective training and poor leadership oversight, for the loss of another Super Hornet overboard during an attempted landing just one week later.
However, unlike the preceding loss, the May 6 mishap was considered “entirely preventable,” according to an investigation endorsement signed by Rear Adm. Sean Bailey.
A two-seat Super Hornet assigned to the “Red Rippers” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 11 came in for a landing around 9 p.m. local time May 6 when the arresting wire tail-hooked by the jet failed, letting the plane plummet into the Red Sea. The air crew ejected and were safely recovered from the water, USNI News previously reported.
According to the investigation, when the aircraft hooked the wire, witnesses heard a loud boom and saw sparks and flames as the jet went overboard. Below deck in the #4 starboard sheave damper space, crew heard a loud explosion and saw the crosshead stroke out and eject from the back of the sheave damper, smashing into the #5 starboard accumulator charging panel.
The crosshead was spinning “like the Tasmanian devil” with the wire still attached, the report reads. The sheave damper operator, who had opened the safety cage moments earlier – against procedure – suffered a minor laceration to the neck, and the operator’s headset was ripped off during the incident.
The sheave damper, which is a hydraulic shock absorber, failed because the proper washer was not installed between the castle nut and the clevis pin. A washer was never recovered from the space, indicating that the material failure may have occurred days or weeks prior to the May 6 incident.
“The lack of the correct washer enabled the clevis pin to back out from the clevis and yoke, which ultimately caused the clevis pin to shear and fail. As soon as the clevis pin failed, load was transferred from the clevis to the yoke, which forced the clevis pin out of the hole that attaches the crosshead to the piston. This caused the sheave damper crosshead to leave the track, resulting in overload and failure of the P4 cable,” the investigation report reads.
The high operational tempo, inadequate manning and training and low level of knowledge caused the incident, which occurred on Harry S. Truman’s 52nd consecutive day of flight operations, the report reads. Substandard maintenance practices, substandard arresting gear leadership and overall low level of knowledge among arresting gear personnel contributed.
The crew failed to notice the material failure of the sheave damper despite maintenance completed May 5 and a pre-operational check done the day of the incident.
“Visual equipment inspections between recovery cycles presented yet another missed opportunity for the #4 STBD sheave damper operator to identify that the castle nut and cotter pin were inside the clevis,” the report reads.
It was also reported to investigators that the sheave damper ready light flickered yellow and green, indicating “ready/not ready,” prior to the aircraft making the arrested landing, but the operator responsible for calling “Foul Deck” in accordance with procedure attempted to troubleshoot the issue instead.
US Navy image
Additionally, the division’s quality assurance program was ineffective, with only one of three arresting gear quality assurance positions filled. The quality assurance supervisor, the report reads, was not monitoring or reviewing the training of personnel involved in the maintenance of aircraft launch and recovery equipment, resulting in a substandard maintenance culture in the division.
The arresting gear work center was also facing a personnel shortage, with 34 sailors – including 10 temporary additional duty sailors – as of May 18. The arresting gear assistant leading petty officer noted that, earlier in the deployment, there were 50 sailors in the arresting gear work center, according to the investigation.
“This mishap was entirely preventable had the commanding officer and air department on USS Harry S. Truman simply complied with the requirements of the aircraft launch and recovery equipment maintenance program (ALREMP). While the investigating team highlighted several factors that contributed to the eroding standard within V2 Division on Harry S. Truman, the hard reality is that multiple individuals at all levels of leadership were complicit in allowing the ALRE Maintenance Program to degrade to the level of abject failure,” reads the investigation’s first endorsement signed by Bailey.
Ultimately, the incident resulted in minor injuries among an unspecified number of crew, the loss of a $60 million Super Hornet and more than $207,000 in repairs to the arresting cable and engine.
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