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Jing Fang의 文王卦

Wen Wang Gua (Chinese: 文王卦; pinyin: Wen Wang Gua) is a method of interpreting the results of I Ching divination that was first described in writing by Jing Fang (78–37 BC) in Han dynasty China. It is based on correlatingtrigrams to the celestial stems and Earthly Branches of the Chinese calendar, and then using the stem and branchelements to interpret the lines of the trigrams and hexagrams of the I Ching.^[1] The method is popular in South East Asia. It is known by various names: (Liu Yao) (six lines) refers to the fact that it interprets the meaning of six symbols; the Najia method, indicates its logic of elemental values derived from the Chinese calendar; Wu Xing Yi(changes of the five elements); or Wen Wang Ke (Lessons of King Wen), which can refer to an actual King Wen (the author of the I Ching) or since Wen can mean 'man' the meaning can be "lessons of sovereign man", a more metaphysical connotation.

Contents

  [hide] 

• 1 History
  • 1.1 Trigram values
  • 1.2 Jing Fang
  • 1.3 Line values
• 2 Eight houses
• 3 Mei Hua Yi
• 4 Ho Lo Li Shu
• 5 References
  • 5.1 Publications
• 6 External links

History[edit]

The name Wen Wang Gua means King Wen fortune telling hexagrams (or trigrams, since gua can mean either hexagram or trigram). King Wen of Zhou and his son are traditionally said to be the authors of the I Ching. Theelemental correspondences of the trigrams were not originally part of the tradition associated with King Wens name, but may have been based on a trigram sequence described in the Eighth Wing (one of the Ten Wings, a series of appendixes to the I Ching which are usually ascribed to Confucius). That the use of element correlation theories was relevant at the time can be seen from the extant records, such as the Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals, a compilation of earlier texts which was attributed to Dong Zhongshu. As one modern researcher remarks: "Dong Zhongshu is generally remembered as the author of a detailed system of correspondences in which everything was correlated to one of the five fundamental forces, so that everything could be shown to be interrelated in an orderly and comprehensible manner."^[2] Jing Fang and his teacher, the author of the "Forest of Changes by Jiao", were among the first to apply this form of correlative thinking to I Ching divination.^[3]

Trigram values[edit]

This is the text from section 5 of the Eighth Wing, an appendix to the I Ching, which relates the trigrams to the seasons of the year, and indirectly to the elements:

"God comes forth in Kan (to His producing work); He brings (His processes) into full and equal action in Sun; they are manifested to one another in Li; the greatest service is done for Him in Khwan; He rejoices in Tui; He struggles in Khien; He is comforted and enters into rest in Khan; and He completes (the work of the year) in Kăn."^[4]

Kan and Sun (☳ and ☴) correlate with wood, the first of the elements in the Chinese calendar, then Li (☲) with fire, Khwan (☷) with earth, Tui and Khien (☱ and ☰) with metal, and Khan (☵) with water. Thus the elements appear in their generating sequence, which correlates with the seasons of the year and the trigrams. The Kăn trigram (☶), correlating with earth, has been placed at the end of the sequence because in it is said that God has completed His work, and this must appear to us at the end, even if from the point of view His relation with creation the work was actually complete after Khwan, after the greatest service is done for Him and before He does His own rejoicing and struggling.

Section 2 of the Eighth Wing relates line positions top, middle and bottom to Heaven, Man and Earth respectively. Although traditionally attributed to Fu Xi, Shao Yung's binary or lexicographical order first appears in the eleventh century AD:^[5][6]

Element	metal	metal	fire	wood	wood	water	earth	earth
Trigrams	☰	☱	☲	☳	☴	☵	☶	☷
Trigram hanzi	乾	兌	離	震	巽	坎	艮	坤
Trigram pinyin	qian	dui	li	zhen	xun	kǎn	gen	kūn

Jing Fang[edit]

Larry James Schulz writes in his dissertation Lai Chih-Te, (1525-1604) and the phenomenology of the “Classic of Change” (Yijīng):

"Jīng Fang’s is the name associated with the earliest appearance of numerous other explanatory and integrative devices, among them the systematic application of a hexagram’s “nuclear trigrams (hutǐ 互體 or zhōngyao 中爻)” – lines two through four and three through five separately considered – to expound the hexagram’s verbal properties; the “Eight Palaces (bā gōng 八宮)” system of arranging hexagrams (...); and incorporation of the Five Phases (wǔxing 五行), the “heavenly stems (tiāngān 天干)”, and the “earthly branches (dizhī 地支)” designations to amplify the Change’s linear figures in what is called the “najiǎ 納甲” theory."^[7]

More about this system can be found in Fung Yu-lan’s A History of Chinese Philosophy, Volume II.^[8]

Line values[edit]

Jing Fang assigns stem and branch elements to the lines of the trigrams^[1] (the trigrams as a whole already had their own element correspondences). The correspondences of the trigrams for the celestial stems and Earthly Branchesbelow indicate the elements for each line of the trigrams, as opposed to the trigrams as a whole.

Celestial stem	Trigram	Element
Jia 甲	☰	wood
Yi 乙	☷
Bing 丙	☶	fire
Ding 丁	☱
Wu 戊	☵	earth
Ji 己	☲
Geng 庚	☳	metal
Xin 辛	☴
Ren 壬	☰	water
Gui 癸	☷

The Earthly Branches correspondences can best be understood in terms of hexagrams made by doubling a trigram. The trigram assigned to a branch (as shown below) is used as a starting point for a yang or yin sequence of elements, depending on the yin or yang value of the trigram. For example ☳ is a yang trigram, so the line elements of the hexagram made by doubling it (number 51) are water, wood, earth, fire, metal, and earth, corresponding to the yang sequence of branches beginning with Rat. According to the celestial stems, each line of the hexagram also corresponds to metal. The line elements of yin trigrams are determined in the same way, except that the sequence is inverted (backward). Thus, for example, the lines of hexagram number 2, made by doubling the ☷ trigram, are earth, fire, wood, earth, water, and metal. In the case of trigrams ☰ and ☷, because they appear twice in the celestial stems, they have the value of their first appearance when on the bottom, or their next appearance when on the top. Accordingly, the lines of the bottom trigram for hexagram 2 are wood and the lines of the top trigram are water.

The line elements of the other hexagrams, which are not made of doubled trigrams but a combination of them, are determined by combining the trigrams already obtained. To use the same example, the line elements of hexagram 24, made by ☳ at the bottom and ☷ at the top, are exactly the same as those of the bottom trigram of hexagram 51 for the bottom trigram, and those of the top trigram of hexagram 2 for the top one.

	Earthly Branch	Mandarin name	Chinese zodiac	Trigram	Element
1	子	zǐ	Rat	☰,☳	water
2	丑	chǒu	Ox	☴	earth
3	寅	yin	Tiger	☵	wood
4	卯	mǎo	Rabbit	☲	wood
5	辰	chen	Dragon	☶	earth
6	巳	si	Snake	☱	fire
7	午	wǔ	Horse	yang	fire
8	未	wei	Goat	☷	earth
9	申	shēn	Monkey	yang	metal
10	酉	yǒu	Rooster	yin	metal
11	戌	xū	Dog	yang	earth
12	亥	hai	Pig	yin	water

Eight houses[edit]

Eight houses is a way of assigning the elements to the hexagrams. This is used to identify the line which contains the same element as the hexagram, as a whole, and to establish an ordered relationship among the lines of the hexagram.^[1] There are various ways of arranging the houses in relation to each other.

Each house begins with a hexagram made by doubling a trigram. Then lines 1 thru 5 are changed to produce the first 6 hexagrams. Next the fourth line of hexagram 6 is changed to produce hexagram 7. Changing the first three lines of hexagram 7 produces hexagram 8. These eight hexagrams are of the same element as the original hexagram that was made by doubling a trigram.

For example, the house of the first hexagram is:

Mei Hua Yi[edit]

Associated with the name of Shao Yung, the Mei Hua Yi (Plum Flower Changes) system uses actual Chinese calendardate numbers to obtain hexagrams. The interpretation of them however relies on the Wen Wang Gua trigram values rather than the line values.

Ho Lo Li Shu[edit]

Also said to originate with Shao Yung, the Ho Lo Li Shu (Ho Map Li Writing) system is in a sense the opposite of Mei Hua, in that it is the Wen Wang Gua calendar correspondences of trigrams that are used to obtain the hexagrams. It is a complex numerical system, with its own unique way of interpreting the results.^[9]

References[edit]

1. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Wang Mo (王謨); Jing Fang Yi Chuan (京房易傳); Woolin Publishing Company Taipei, ISBN 957-35-0561-4
2. Jump up^ Russell Kirkland, "Tung Chung-shu." Copyright: Ian P. McGreal, ed., Great Thinkers of the Eastern World (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 67-70.
3. Jump up^ Loewe, Michael; A Biographical Dictionary of the Qin, Former Han & Xin Periods (221 BC – AD 24); p. 199-200
4. Jump up^ Legge, James; The I Ching; Clarendon Press, 1899; p. 425
5. Jump up^ Wang, Robin R.;Yinyang (Yin-yang); Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
6. Jump up^ Ryan, James A. (January 1996). "Leibniz' Binary System and Shao Yong's Yijing". Philosophy East and West(University of Hawaii) 46 (1): 59–90. doi:10.2307/1399337. JSTOR 1399337.
   Also the lexicographical ordering on sextuples of two elements.
7. Jump up^ Schulz, Larry James; Lai Chih-Te, (1525-1604) and the phenomenology of the “Classic of Change”(I Ching); p.16
8. Jump up^ Fung, Yu-lan; A History of Chinese Philosophy; Princeton University Press
9. Jump up^ W.A. Sherrill and W.K. Chu; The Astrology of I Ching; Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987

Publications[edit]

• W.A. Sherrill and W.K. Chu; An Anthology of I Ching; Routledge & Kegan Paul
• Shao wěi-hua 邵偉華; Zhōuyi yǔ yucexue 周易與預測學; Ming Bao Chūbǎnshe 明報出版社, Hong Kong

External links[edit]

• Wen Wang Blah Blah reviews some books.
• The Yin Yang Horoscope Online calculator.

The Jiaoshi yilin 焦氏易林 "Master Jiao's forest of changes" is a book on diviniation with the help of hexagrams compiled by theHan period 漢 (206 BCE-220 CE) master Jiao Yanshou 焦延壽,courtesy name Jiao Gan 焦贛 (it is not sure whether Yanshou was his courtesy name, or Gan). He came from Liang 梁 (modern Shangqiu 商丘, Henan) and was a teacher in the household of the Prince of Liang. Later on he was appointed clerk (li 吏) in a commandery (jun 郡) and was then promoted to district magistrate (ling 令) of Xiaohuang 小黃 (near modern Kaifeng 開封, Henan). His teachers were famous Confucian professors like Meng Xi 孟喜 and Jing Fang 京房, both of them experts in the Confucian Classic Yijing 易經 "Book of Changes". Except the 16 juan "scrolls" long Yilin, Jiao Gan has also written the book Yilin bianzhan 易林變占, with the same length, yet this book went lost after the Tang period 唐 (618-907) .
The Jiaoshi yilin explains that the 64 hexagrams are not only produced out of a single structure or basic hexagram (like qian 乾, Heaven), but are multiplied with each other to form 4,096 newly changed hexagrams. For each of these potential transformations, the author writes a short analysis consisting of a 4-syllable rhyme, an idea that has its origin in a sentence of the history Zuozhuan 左傳 (Fenghuang yu fei, he ming qiangqiang. 鳳凰于飛，和鳴鏘鏘 "The male and female phoenix fly together, singing harmoniously with gem-like sounds."). The book is specialized on the explanation of the hexagrams by the changes of single lines (guabian 卦變), the integration of cardinal directions, the Five Processes (wuxing 五行) and the Ten Celestial Stems (shi tiangan 十天干) into the interpretation of the trigrams (najia 納甲), as well as the evident or hidden character of particular hexagram lines (feifu 飛伏). These changes can be seen in the continuing increase and decrease of the agents Yin and Yang 陰陽, in natural disasters or personal luck and fortune.
The Yilin is an important early writing for a lot of divination schools in ancient China, especially for masters practicing divination by observing celestial phenomena (zhanhou 占候). Many Chinese scholars doubted that the Yilin was written by Jiao Gan. The imperial bibliography Yiwenzhi 藝文志 in the official dynastic history Hanshu 漢書, for instance, lists 13 books of experts on the Book of Changes, and 15 books on milfoil and turtle plastron divination, but a book of Jiao Gan is not included. In the imperial bibliography Jingjizhi 經籍志 in the history Suishu 隋書 the Jiaoshi yilin is included in the list of books on the Five Processes. TheQing period 清 (1644-1911) scholar Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 called theJiaoshi yilin a book of the Later Han period, while Jiao Gan lived during the late Former Han period 前漢 (206 BCE-8 CE), when theZuozhuan was not yet made a Classic. Yet the Yilin quotes a lot of sentences from the Zuozhuan, as well as sentences from theHanshu, the history of the Former Han period that was only written in the early Later Han period 後漢 (25-220 CE). There is a more recent discussion on this topic, to be found in Qian Tongshu's 錢鐘書 book Guanzhuipian 管錐篇.
The Jiaoshi yilin in included in the collectanea Han-Wei congshu 漢魏叢書, Jindai mishu 津逮秘書, Siku quanshu 四庫全書 and Xuejin taoyuan 學津討原.

Source: Li Xueqin 李學勤, Lu Wenyu 呂文鬰 (1996). Siku da cidian 四庫大辭典, vol. 2, p. 1788. Changchun: Jilin daxue chubanshe.

Chen Tuan (陳摶)^[2] (d. 989) was a legendary Taoist sage. In Chinese, he is often respectfully referred to as "Aged Ancestor Chen Tuan" (陳摶老祖 Chen Tuan Lǎozǔ) and "Ancestral Teacher Xiyi" (希夷祖師 Xīyi Zǔshī). Little is certain about his life, including when and where he was born. He was born around the end of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period and the start of the Song Dynasty, possibly in what is now Luyi in Henan Province.

According to certain Taoist schools who claim him as a founder, he lived a secluded life in the Nine Room Cave on Mount Wudang. Later at Mount Hua, one of the five sacred mountains of China, he is said to have created the kung fu system Liuhebafa ("Six Harmonies and Eight Methods"). Along with this internal art, he is also said to be associated with a method of Qi (energy) cultivation known today as Taiji ruler and a 24 season Daoyin method (er shi shi ssu shih tao yin fa) using seated and standing exercises designed to prevent diseases that occur during seasonal changes throughout the year. Known as the "Sleeping Immortal" he is also credited with using and creating sleeping qigong methods of internal alchemical cultivation.

The story goes that Chen Tuan had planned a career at the Imperial court, but flunked the state examination and became a hermit sage instead. He was also said to be conversant with the Confucian classics, history, and the theories of various schools of thought. In his legends he was said to be fond of taoist philosophy, medical principles, astronomy and geography, and famous for his poems as well. Chen Tuan liked to study the I Ching, which he was unable to put down. Chen Tuan, styled Tunan, titled himself Fuyao Zi (one soaring upward in the high sky, like a roc in Nan Hua Jing written by Zhuangzi) born in Zhenyuan of Haozhou (Hao County of Anhui Province nowadays). As a Taoist master in the late Tang Dynasty, Five Dynasties and early Northern Song Dynasty, Chen was astonishingly intelligent and erudite in his childhood. He travelled here and there and dwelled in Wudang Mountain for two decades at the beginning. Later he lived a hermit’s life in Huashan at the First Year of Xiande Period of Later Zhou Dynasty (one of the Five Dynasties).

Chen Tuan has a good command of primordial Yi learning, teaches River Chart and Luo River Book as well as Infinite and Taiji Charts. As a culminant figure of Taoist doctrines who pioneers the Confucian school of idealist philosophy of the Song and Ming Dynasties, he has a profound influence upon later generations. He is adept in practicing Taoist inner alchemy and often sleep meditation. Strange to say, it often takes several months for sleeping meditation practice; and as a result was known as the "Sleeping Immortal." Having rejected emperor’s orders and edicts, was still conferred the title of “Master Xi Yi" (Master of the Inaudible and Invisible) by the Emperor Taizong of the Song Dynasty. During the first year of Duangong Period of the Emperor Taizong, Chen appointed his disciples to cut a stone chamber in the Zhao Chao Valley (later renamed Xi Yi Valley); then Chen Tuan presented a report to the imperial court in which he wrote the following note: “I will die soon. I am about to leave, nowadays I’m transformed in the Zhang Chao Valley at the foot of Lotus Peak on the 27th day of the tenth month of the lunar calendar”. By the time he died when he cupped his check in the hand his facial features still remained without a change.

Chen Tuan once told to his disciples: “I will visit Emei Mountain next year.” Later a secret agent saw him at Emei Mountain, only to find no trace of Chen Tuan while he was looking for him. Many tales of Chen Tuan have been circulated around; for instance: "He wanders around and shows no concern for worldy benefits. However, Chen still cares about the ordinary people and is compassionate so that he is deeply respected by the people. This Taoist sage was considered the embodiment of the Supreme Lord Lao and received the nickname of “Aged Ancestor”, a symbol of Taoism in Huashan.

Contents

  [hide] 

• 1 Legends
• 2 Sources
• 3 See also
• 4 References
  • 4.1 Sources
• 5 External links

Legends[edit]

According to the "semi-historical" biography of Gen. Yue Fei, it was the immortal Chen Tuan who, disguised as a wandering Taoist, warned the Yue Family of the imminent Yellow River flood.

Shao Yong (Chinese: 邵雍; pinyin: Shao Yōng; Wade–Giles: Shao Yung) (1011–1077), courtesy name Yaofu (堯夫), named Shao Kāngjie (邵康節) after death, was a Song Dynasty Chinese philosopher, cosmologist, poet and historian who greatly influenced the development of Neo-Confucianism in China.

Shao is considered one of the most learned men of his time. Unlike most men of such stature in his society, Shao avoided governmental positions his entire life, but his influence was no less substantial. He wrote an influential treatise on cosmogony, the Huangji Jingshi (皇極經世, Book of supreme world ordering principles).

Contents

  [hide] 

• 1 Origins
• 2 Career and later life
• 3 Poetry
• 4 See also
• 5 Notes
• 6 References
• 7 External links

Origins[edit]

Shao's ancestors were from Fanyang. He was born in 1011 in an area known as Hengzhang county (衡漳, now Anyang, Henan) to Shao Gu (邵古, 986–1064) and Lady Li (李氏, d. 1032 or 1033).^[1]Shao's mother, Li, was an extremely devout practitioner of Buddhism. This link with Buddhism proved to be a major influence on Shao's thought throughout his life.

Shao Yong's first teacher was Shao Gu, his father. This was common practice in the familial environment of China at the time. Shao Gu was a scholar in philology and his influence can be discerned in Shao's literary works. Guided by his father, he studied the Six Confucian classics intensively at a young age. Shao also sought out the scholarship of private schools, many of which were run by monks and heavily influenced by Buddhism.

Around 1020, the Shao family moved to Gongcheng county (now Xinxiang, Henan). Shortly after his mother's death in 1032 or 1033. Shao met his most important teacher, Li Zhicai (李之才). Li was a former pupil of ancient prose specialist Mu Xiu (穆修, 979–1032). Under Mu Xiu, Li had studied the I Ching extensively.

Career and later life[edit]

Shao was a member of a group of thinkers who gathered in Luoyang toward the last three decades of the 11th century. This group had two primary objectives. One of these was to draw parallels between their own streams of thought and that of Confucianism as understood by Mencius.

Secondly, the men set out to undermine any links, real or otherwise, between 4th-century Confucianism and what they viewed as inferior philosophical schools of thinking, namely Buddhism and Taoism. Other loosely connected members of this so-called network of thinkers include: Cheng Yi, Zhang Zai, Cheng Hao (程顥, 1032–1085) and Zhou Dunyi. Central to each of these men was the ancient text I Ching, which each had studied closely. The way in which Shao studied this ancient text, however, differed from the other members.

During the Song Dynasty, there were two main approaches in I Ching studies. Together with the majority of scholars, the other members of the group took the yili xue (義理學, "principle study") approach, which was based on literalistic and moralistic concepts. The other approach, taken by Shao alone, was the xiangshu xue (象數學, "image-number study") approach, which was based much more on iconographic and cosmological concepts. An approach to I Ching divination known as Mei Hua Yi has been attributed to him.

Shao Yong also edited the "Tai Hsuan Jing" by Yang Hsiung (10 AD). Influenced by the Base 3 number system found in the Tai Hsuan, Shao Yong then set the Hexagrams of the I Ching into a binary order (the Fu Hsi Ordering). This in turn influenced Leibniz and his thinking on binary arithmetic, and in turn the language of modern computers.

Poetry[edit]

Shao is also famous for his poetry and for his interest in the game of Go (weiqi). He wrote a Great Ode to Watching Weiqi (觀棋大吟), one of the longest surviving classical Chinese poems, as well as a Long Ode to Watching Weiqi (觀棋長吟), which is translated below.

Long Ode to Watching Weiqi

	In a quiet courtyard in the spring, with evening's light filtering through the leaves, guests relax on the veranda and watch as two compete at weiqi. Each calls into themselves the divine and the infernal, sculpting mountains and rivers into their world. Across the board, dragons and serpents array for battle, geese scatter as collapsing fortresses are sacked; masses die, pushed into pits by Qin's soldiers, and the drama's audience is left in awe of its General Jin. To sit at the board is to raise halberd and taste combat, to endure the freezing and brave the flames in the constant changes; life and death each will come to both masters, but victory and defeat must each go to one. On this road, one strips away the other's disguises, in life, one must erect one's own facade; dreadful is a wound to the exposed belly or heart, merely painful is an injury to the face, which can be cured; Effective is a blow that strikes home in an opponent's back, successful are schemes that use repeated feints and deceit. Look at the activity on the streets of our capital, if you were to go elsewhere, wouldn't it be the same?
Shao Yong a[›]

See also[edit]

Poetry portal

• History of the Song Dynasty
• Wen Wang Gua

Notes[edit]

^ a: The shorter "Long Ode" is available at this Chinese source

1. Jump up^ Wyatt; 12,13,16

References[edit]

This article containsChinese text. Without properrendering support, you may seequestion marks, boxes, or other symbols instead of Chinese characters.

• Birdwhistell, Anne D. Transition to Neo-Confucianism: Shao Yung on Knowledge and Symbols of Reality. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-8047-1550-5.
• Liu, Weihua, "Shao Yong". Encyclopedia of China (Philosophy Edition), 1st ed.
• Wyatt, Don J. The Recluse of Loyang: Shao Yung and the Moral Evolution of Early Sung Thought. Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1996. ISBN 0-8248-1755-9.

External links[edit]

• The "Great Ode to Watching Weiqi"
• "Zu-yan Chen, Shao Yong's (1011-77) 'Great Chant on Observing Weiqi': An Archetype of Neo-Confucian Poetry CHINA & INNER ASIA SESSION 171"

Wang Bi 王弼 (226-249), courtesy name Wang Fusi 王輔嗣, was an important Confucian philosopher and a represantant of the "School of the Mystery" (xuanxue 玄學) that flourished during the Three Kingdoms三國 (220-280) and Jin 晉 (265-420) periods. He came from Shanyang 山陽 (modern Jiaozuo 焦作, Henan) and found interest in the Daoistbook Laozi 老子 (Daodejing 道德經) as a young boy. When Cao Shuang曹爽 was made regent for the young emperor, Wang Bi was appointed ministerial director (tailang 臺郎). With the assassination of Cao Shuang by Sima Yi 司馬懿, Wang Bi was charged of treason and was dismissed. He died, infected during a plague, at the age of no more than 24.
Although Wang Bi interpreted Confucian writings in the sense of Daoist philosophers, he must be seen as a Confucian scholar. He was very impressed by Laozi's proposition that all things are created out of the "nothing" (you sheng yu wu 有生於無), and that all instruction and teaching is derived from nature (ming jiao chu yu ziran 名教出於自然). Contradicting He Yan's 何晏 assumption that a sage man does not dispose of emotions (sheng ren wu qing 聖人無情), Wang Bi stressed all the more that the sage man possesses more spirit (shenming 神明) than the common man, and has, like all men, five different kinds of emotions (wu qing 五情). His wisdom allows him to understand the origin of all things in the voidness, and the five emotions connect him with the feelings of all the ten thousand beings.
Wang Bi's most important contribution to scholarship is his commentary and interpretation of the Confucian Classic Yijing 易經 "Book of Changes". Like Zheng Xuan 鄭玄, he used Fei Zhi's 費直 old text version of the Yijing and brought the old text tradition, which was again flourishing during the late Eastern Han period 東漢 (25-220 CE) , into new forms. Fei Zhi had used the Zhuan 傳 "Commentary" parts of the Yijing to explain the meaning of the Zhouyi, the core part of the book, with its hexagrams, that were interpreted in a colourful and obscure way, close to the apocryphal texts (chenwei 讖緯) that were very popular during the Han period. The eight trigrams were interpreted as Heaven, earth, thunder, wind, water, fire, mountains and swamps, as spiritual powers of nature. Other hexagrams were interpreted as symbols of the "strong horse" and the "obedient ox". Wang Bi had a much more scholarly approach and interpreted the Zhouyi in a philosophical way. He wrote direct commentaries to all parts of the book except the parts Xici 繫辭, Shuogua 說卦, Xugua 序卦 and Zugua 雜卦, and used the Zhuan commentary as the main instrument for explanation. The missing comments were later added by the Eastern Jin period 東晉 (317-420) scholar Han Kangbo 韓康伯.
A hexagram (xiang 象) is, in the eyes of Wang Bi, an expression‎ of an idea (yi 意). The designation of the hexagram is just its name. There is, he says, no better way to express an idea than a hexagram symbol and its name. All aspects on earth can be symbolized by a hexagram, except the eternal Way, the Dao 道, which is the "nothing" (wu 無), the non-dimension, the non-origin, and the non-movement, out of which everything is produced. Following this assumption of the "School of Mystery", Wang Bi interpreted the hexagram Qian 乾, representing Heaven, the origin of things, as the "name of the shape" (xing zhi ming形之名), which unifies and comprises all objects on earth. It is therefore the expression‎ of vigour (jian 健).
Because the proponents of the School of Mystery were politically opposed to the powerful family Sima 司馬, their teachings were never integrated into the state schools during the Jin period. It was only during the Liang period 梁 (502-557) that Wang Bi's commentary to theYijing was considered equally important as Zheng Xuan's commentary. From then on it even overshadowed the traditional explanation of Zheng's school.
The most important writings of Wang Bi are Zhouyi zhu 周易注, Zhouyi lueli 周易略例, Laozi zhu 老子注, Laozi zhilue 老子指略 and Lunyu shiyi 論語釋疑.

Source:
Pang Pu 龐樸 (1997). Zhongguo ruxue 中國儒學, vol. 2, p. 84. Shanghai: Dongfang chuban zhongxin.

Hu Yuan
胡瑗

(993～1059)

中国北宋学者、教育家。字翼之。泰州海陵郡如皋县人。原籍陕西安定堡，门人学者称他为安定先生。他在如皋和湖州的藏书讲学处称做安定书院。20岁起北上泰山,同孙复(992～1057)、石介(1005～1045)一起读书，专心致志, 各有成就。学者称做“三先生”, 而以胡瑗的最盛。苦读十年后，胡瑗南归，私设讲坛，传授经学。从43岁起，先后在苏州郡学和湖州州学，坚持教育工作20多年。44岁时，曾到开封参与更定雅乐。研究钟律，制成钟磬等乐器，一度充任秘书省校书郎。晚年曾任直讲和主持。他为苏学所订学规，成为当时各地郡学的榜样。在湖学任教时，远道来学的学者常有几百人。宋朝中央政府对于他在苏、湖两学的教育成就很重视，曾派人考察总结，撰为《学政条约》一卷，作为指导各地教育参考。
   胡瑗认为,圣人之道”有体用文等三方面:“君臣父子,仁义礼乐”等封建体制是体,“诗书史传子集”等经典著作是文,用是把这些道理付诸日用,福国利民。学校就是要向学生传授“明体达用”之学。国家选拔和培养的人才，如果不以体、用为本，而专讲究声律浮华的词藻为应付科举考试作准备,一定会败坏世风民俗为了培养“明体达用”人才，胡瑗很重视因材施教。他在湖学采取分斋教学制度；一是经义斋,选择“心性疏通,有器局，可任大事”的学生，对他们讲授儒家经典的经义。一是治事斋，也叫治道斋，对学习研究治道的学生，分别讲授治兵、治民、水利、天文历律等等，一人各治一事和兼治一事，或专或兼，可因学生所专进行。他主持太学时，对于专攻经学、钻研军事、爱好文学等专业的学生，以及重视节操义气的学生，要求他们分别依赖群居，进行讲习。胡瑗自己也常召集他们议论学业，辅导他们认定道理。他这样让学生“穷经以博古，治事以通经”的，使学生乐于信从，学有成效，为宋朝封建统治培养了不少“博古通经”的人才。
   关于封建礼教的实施，胡瑗强调“以身先之”。他以身作则，一丝不苟，在具体行动中贯彻礼教要求，做到以礼始教，以礼始学，要求师生友爱相处，亲如父子兄弟。
   胡瑗也很重视文娱。他告诫学生食后不可伏案久坐，以免妨碍血气流通;要求学生通过习射、投壶,开展游艺活动。每逢公私结束，总要司仪人员带领学生聚会，唱诗奏乐，夜晚才散，来自各地的学生也可自行集合，琴瑟声每每响彻户外。他还认为，学者应旅游四方，尽见人情物态，南北风俗，山川气象，扩大见闻。
   胡瑗一生著作不少，有由门人编录的《周易口义》、《洪范口义》、《论语说》和《春秋说》；有他同阮逸合著的《皇新乐图记》，还有丁宝书辑的《安定言行录》。其他著作如《尚书全书》、《春秋意义》、《中庸义》、《景乐府奏议》、《皇乐府奏议》等,都已散失。《学政条约》和《武学规矩》等两部教育专著，也都失传。

http://www.chinabaike.com/article/316/327/2007/2007022258361.html

程頤（1033年-1107年），字正叔，北宋洛陽伊川（今属河南省）人，世稱伊川先生，北宋理學家，教育家，历官汝州团练推官、西京国子监教授。与其胞兄程颢共创“洛学”，人稱「二程」，为理学奠定了基础。後追封洛国公，配祀孔廟。

目录

  [隐藏] 

• 1 生平
• 2 思想
• 3 軼聞
• 4 参考文献
• 5 研究書目
• 6 外部連結

生平[编辑]

其祖父任黄陂县令，卒于该县。父程珦年幼无力返乡，遂居于黄陂，后来还做了县尉。二程就是在其父任黄陂县尉时所生^[1]。程颐幼承家学熏陶，24岁时曾在京师（今河南开封繁塔之左）授徒讲学。宋神宗熙宁五年（1072年）偕兄于嵩阳讲学。元丰元年（1078年）知扶沟县，“设庠序，聚邑人子以教之”。元丰五年，文彦博将其鸣皋镇（今河南洛阳伊川县境）之庄园赠给程氏，乃自建伊皋书院，讲学其中几达20年。元祐元年（1086年）除秘书省校书郎，授崇政殿说书。

宋宁宗嘉定十三年（1220年），赐谥程颢为“纯公”，程颐为“正公”。理宗淳祐元年（1241年），又追封程颢为“河南伯”，程颐为“伊川伯”，并“从祀孔子庙庭”。元明宗至顺元年（1330年），诏加封程颢为“豫国公”，程颐为“洛国公”。

思想[编辑]

程颐政治思想颇受父程珦的影响，推举其父反对王安石新法乃“独公一人”，又说其兄程颢对王安石之说，“意多不合，事出必论列”，极加称许。与其兄程颢不但学术思想相同，而且教育思想基本一致。

程颐同程颢一样，主张教育目的在于培养圣人，“圣人之志，止欲老者安之，朋友信之，少者怀之”，圣人以天地为心，“一切涵容复载，但处之有道”，因此，教育必须以培养圣人为职志。在教育内容上，主张以伦理道德为其根本，“学者须先识仁。仁者蔼然与物同体，义、智、信，皆仁也。”

《宋史》称他“学本于诚，以《大学》、《论语》、《孟子》，《中庸》为指南，而达于‘六经’”。教育以德育为重，强调自我修养，其途径为格物致知。“致知则智识当自渐明”，致知乃在穷理，即尽天理。致知的办法是“格物”。“格，至也”，“格”是内感于物而识其理。“耳目能视听而不能远者，气有限耳，心则无远近也”，因此认识事物的关键乃在“心”。心“与天地合其德，与日月合其明，非在外也”，故致知重“内感”而不重外面事物。在学习方法上，强调求其意，“凡看文字，先须晓其文义，然后可求其意，未有文义不晓而见意者也”。另外，主张读书要思考，“不深思则不能造其学”。或曰：“学者亦有无思而得其乎？”其教育主张和思想对后世教育影响极大。^{[來源請求]}

大程活潑自然，但小程嚴肅剛正，神聖不可侵犯，甚至不通人情，實為後世所見的「道學臉孔」。在婦女貞操方面，程頤認為：「……凡取以配身也，若取失節者以配身，是己失節也。」有人問程頤先生曰：「寡婦貧苦無依，能不能再嫁乎哉？」，程頤則提出「絕對不能，有些人怕凍死餓死，才用饑寒作為藉口，要知道，餓死事小，失節事大。」^[2]，作為衡量賢媛淑女的標準。朱熹（1130—1200）在〈與陳師中書〉也同意這樣的說法：「昔伊川先生嘗論此事，以為餓死事小，失節事大。自世俗觀之，誠為迂闊；然自知經識理之君子觀之，當有以知其不可易也。」主張婦女「從一而終」、壓抑「人欲」。^[3]

后人曾在他讲学之地设书院以为纪念，如河南嵩阳书院、伊川书院等。另外，全国各地亦有纪念他之书院，意在追踪继轨，以示其思想绵长。其著作被后人辑录为《河南二程全书》、《程颐文集》、《易传》和《经说》。

軼聞[编辑]

• 一日講罷未退，皇帝趙煦偶折柳枝為戲，程頤即正色指諫：「方春發，不可無故摧折」，皇帝聽了很不高興。^{[來源請求]}
• 司馬光過世了，剛結束明堂祭祀大典的群臣欲往弔喪，但程頤認為不合孔子「於是日，哭則不歌」的規矩，阻止群臣去弔喪。蘇軾嘲笑程頤說：「這是枉死市上叔孫通^[4]制訂的禮。」（意指程頤是腐儒）由此事起，蘇軾、程頤兩人結怨。^[5]
• 蘇軾覺得程頤迂腐，常常開他玩笑，一次國家忌日，程頤要求群臣喫素，蘇軾不但不願意，還要求秦觀、黃庭堅等人一起喫肉，完全不給程頤面子。^[6]
• 《邵氏闻见后录》记载：“程叔微云：伊川闻诵晏叔原‘梦魂惯得无拘检，又踏杨花过谢桥’，笑曰：‘鬼语也。’意亦赏之。”

参考文献[编辑]

1. ^ 严昌洪. 二程夫子与黄陂. 黄陂区政府网站. 2010-08-10 [2008-12-1] （中文（简体）‎）.
2. ^ 卷二十二//《程氏遺書》. "问：“孀妇于理似不可取，如何？”曰“然。凡取，以配身也。若取失节者以配身，是己失节也。”又问：“或有孤孀贫穷无托者，可再嫁？”曰：“只是后世怕寒饿死，故有是说。然饿死事极小，失节事极大。”"
3. ^ [[1]]. 朱熹的“饿死事小，失节事大”的背后. 2003-6-27 11:35:00 [2011-1-11].
4. ^ 《史記·劉敬叔孫通列傳》
5. ^ 《皇宋治跡統類》. "明堂降赦，臣僚稱賀訖，兩省官欲往奠司馬光。程頤言：「子於是日，哭則不歌。豈可賀赦才了，即往弔喪？」坐客有難之曰：「孔子言哭則不歌，即不言歌則不哭。」蘇軾遂戲程曰：「此乃枉死市叔孫通所制禮也。」眾皆大笑。結怨之端，蓋自此始。"
6. ^ 《程子微言》. "他日國忌，禱於相國寺，伊川令供素饌，子瞻詰之曰：「正叔不好佛，胡為食素？」正叔曰：「禮，居喪不飲酒食肉，忌日，喪之餘也。」子瞻令具肉食，曰：「為劉氏者左袒。」於是范淳夫輩食素，秦、黃輩食肉。"

研究書目[编辑]

• A.C. Graham（葛瑞漢）著，程德祥譯：《中國的兩位哲學家：二程兄弟的新儒學》（鄭州：大象出版社，2000）。
• 溫偉耀：《成聖之道——北宋二程修養工夫論之研究》（開封：河南大學出版社，2004）。

Neo-Confucianism (simplified Chinese: 宋明理学; traditional Chinese: 宋明理學; pinyin: Song-Ming Lǐxue often shortened to 理學) is a moral,ethical, and metaphysical Chinese philosophy influenced by Confucianism, and originated with Han Yu and Li Ao (772-841) in the Tang Dynasty, and became prominent during the Song and Ming dynasties.

Neo-Confucianism was an attempt to create a more rationalist and secular form of Confucianism by rejecting superstitious and mystical elements ofDaoism and Buddhism that had influenced Confucianism during and after the Han Dynasty.^[1] Although the Neo-Confucianists were critical of Daoism and Buddhism,^[2] the two did have an influence on the philosophy, and the Neo-Confucianists borrowed terms and concepts from both. However, unlike the Buddhists and Daoists, who saw metaphysics as a catalyst for spiritual development, religious enlightenment, and immortality, the Neo-Confucianists used metaphysics as a guide for developing a rationalist ethical philosophy.^[3]

Contents

  [hide] 

• 1 Origins
• 2 Philosophy
• 3 Schools
  • 3.1 Cheng-Zhu school
  • 3.2 Lu–Wang school
• 4 Neo-Confucianism in Korea
• 5 Bureaucratic examinations
• 6 Confucian canon
• 7 New Confucianism
• 8 Prominent neo-Confucian scholars
  • 8.1 China
  • 8.2 Korea
  • 8.3 Japan
  • 8.4 Vietnam
• 9 Notes
• 10 References
• 11 External links

Origins[edit]

Bronze statue of Zhou Dunyi(周敦颐) in White Deer Grotto Academy(白鹿洞書院)

Neo-Confucianism has its origins in the Tang Dynasty; the Confucianist scholars Han Yu and Li Ao are seen as forbears of the Neo-Confucianists of the Song Dynasty.^[2]The Song Dynasty philosopher Zhou Dunyi is seen as the first true "pioneer" of Neo-Confucianism, using Daoist metaphysics as a framework for his ethical philosophy.^[3]Neo-Confucianism developed both as a renaissance of traditional Confucian ideas, and as a reaction to the ideas of Buddhism and religious Daoism. Although the Neo-Confucianists denounced Buddhist metaphysics, Neo-Confucianism did borrow Daoist and Buddhist terminology and concepts.^[2]

One of the most important exponents of Neo-Confucianism was Zhu Xi (1130–1200). He was a rather prolific writer, maintaining and defending his Confucian beliefs of social harmony and proper personal conduct. One of his most remembered was the book Family Rituals, where he provided detailed advice on how to conduct weddings, funerals, family ceremonies, and the veneration of ancestors. Buddhist thought soon attracted him, and he began to argue in Confucian style for the Buddhist observance of high moral standards. He also believed that it was important to practical affairs that one should engage in both academic and philosophical pursuits, although his writings are concentrated more on issues of theoretical (as opposed to practical) significance. It is reputed that he wrote many essays attempting to explain how his ideas were not Buddhist or Taoist, and included some heated denunciations of Buddhism and Taoism.

After Zhu Xi, Wang Yangming (1472–1529) is commonly regarded as the most important Neo-Confucian thinker. Wang's interpretation of Confucianism denied the rationalist dualism of Zhu's orthodox philosophy.

There were many competing views within the Neo-Confucian community, but overall, a system emerged that resembled both Buddhist and Taoist (Daoist) thought of the time and some of the ideas expressed in the I Ching (Book of Changes) as well as other yin yang theories associated with the Taiji symbol (Taijitu). A well known Neo-Confucian motif is paintings of Confucius, Buddha, and Lao Tzu all drinking out of the same vinegar jar, paintings associated with the slogan "The three teachings are one!"

While Neo-Confucianism incorporated Buddhist and Taoist ideas, many Neo-Confucianists strongly oppose Buddhism and Taoism. Indeed, they rejected the Buddhist and Taoist religions. One of Han Yu's most famous essays decries the worship of Buddhist relics. Nonetheless, Neo-Confucian writings adapted Buddhist thoughts and beliefs to the Confucian interest. In China Neo-Confucianism was an officially-recognized creed from its development during the Song dynasty until the early twentieth century, and lands in the sphere of Song China (Vietnam and Japan) were all deeply influenced by Neo-Confucianism for more than half a millennium.

Philosophy[edit]

Neo-Confucianism is a social and ethical philosophy using metaphysical ideas, some borrowed from Taoism, as its framework. The philosophy can be characterized as humanistic and rationalistic, with the belief that the universe could be understood through human reason, and that it was up to humanity to create a harmonious relationship between the universe and the individual.^[4]

The rationalism of Neo-Confucianism is in contrast to the mysticism of the previously dominant Chan Buddhism. Unlike the Buddhists, the Neo-Confucians believed that reality existed, and could be understood by humankind, even if the interpretations of reality were slightly different depending on the school of Neo-Confucianism.^[4]

But the spirit of Neo-Confucian rationalism is diametrically opposed to that of Buddhist mysticism. Whereas Buddhism insisted on the unreality of things, Neo-Confucianism stressed their reality. Buddhism and Taoism asserted that existence came out of, and returned to, non-existence; Neo-Confucianism regarded reality as a gradual realization of the Great Ultimate... Buddhists, and to some degree, Taoists as well, relied on meditation and insight to achieve supreme reason; the Neo-Confucianists chose to follow Reason.^[5]

The importance of li in Neo-Confucianism gave the movement its Chinese name, literally "The study of Li."

Schools[edit]

Neo-Confucianism is classically categorized into two different schools of thought. The most dominant of these schools was the Cheng-Zhu school, based on the ideas of Cheng Yi, Cheng Hao, and Zhu Xi. The less dominant, opposing school was the Lu–Wang school, based on the thoughts Wang Yangming and Lu Jiuyuan.

In contrast to this two-branch model, the New Confucian Mou Zongsan argues that there existed a third branch of learning, the Hu-Liu school, based on the teachings of Hu Hong (Hu Wufeng, 1106–61) and Liu Zongzhou (Liu Jishan, 1578–1645). The significance of this third branch, according to Mou, was that they represented the direct lineage of the pioneers of Neo-Confucianism, Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai and Cheng Hao. Moreover, this third Hu-Liu school and the second Lu–Wang school, combined, form the true mainstream of Neo-Confucianism instead of theCheng-Zhu school. The mainstream represented a return to the teachings of Confucius, Mengzi, the Doctrine of the Mean and the Commentaries of the Book of Changes. The Cheng-Zhu school was therefore only a minority branch based on the Great Learning and mistakenly emphasized intellectual studies over the study of sagehood.^[6]

Cheng-Zhu school[edit]

Main article: Cheng-Zhu school

Zhu Xi's formulation of the Neo-Confucian world view is as follows. He believed that the Tao (Chinese: 道; pinyin:dao; literally: "way") of Tian (Chinese: 天; pinyin: tiān; literally: "heaven") is expressed in principle or li (Chinese: 理;pinyin: lǐ), but that it is sheathed in matter or qi (Chinese: 氣; pinyin: qi). In this, his system is based on Buddhist systems of the time that divided things into principle (again, li), and function (Chinese: 事; pinyin: shi). In the Neo-Confucian formulation, li in itself is pure and almost-perfect, but with the addition of qi, base emotions and conflicts arise. Human nature is originally good, the Neo-Confucians argued (following Mencius), but not pure unless action is taken to purify it. The imperative is then to purify one's li. However, in contrast to Buddhists and Taoists, neo-Confucians did not believe in an external world unconnected with the world of matter. In addition, Neo-Confucians in general rejected the idea of reincarnation and the associated idea of karma.

Different Neo-Confucians had differing ideas for how to do so. Zhu Xi believed in gewu (Chinese: 格物; pinyin: gewu), the Investigation of Things, essentially an academic form of observational science, based on the idea that li lies within the world.

Lu–Wang school[edit]

Main article: Lu–Wang school

Wang Yangming (Wang Shouren), probably the second most influential Neo-Confucian, came to another conclusion: namely, that if li is in all things, and li is in one's heart-mind, there is no better place to seek than within oneself. His preferred method of doing so was jingzuo (Chinese: 靜坐; pinyin: jingzuo; literally: "quiet sitting"), a practice that strongly resembles zazen or Chan (Zen) meditation. Wang Yangming developed the idea of innate knowing, arguing that every person knows from birth the difference between good and evil. Such knowledge is intuitive and not rational. These revolutionizing ideas of Wang Yangming would later inspire prominent Japanese thinkers like Motoori Norinaga, who argued that because of the Shinto deities, Japanese people alone had the intuitive ability to distinguish good and evil without complex rationalization. Wang Yangming's school of thought (Ōyōmei-gaku in Japanese) also provided, in part, an ideological basis for some samurai who sought to pursue action based on intuition rather than scholasticism. As such, it also provided an intellectual foundation for the radical political actions of low ranking samurai in the decades prior to the Meiji Ishin (1868), in which the Tokugawa authority (1600–1868) was overthrown.

Neo-Confucianism in Korea[edit]

Further information: Korean Confucianism

Further information: Political factions in Joseon Dynasty

In Joseon Korea, neo-Confucianism was established as the state ideology. Neo-Confucianism was introduced to Korea by An Hyang during Goryeo dynasty (Buddhism was the dominant religion and affected most ideologies of that era). At the time that An Hyang introduced neo-Confucianism, the Goryeo dynasty was in the last century of its existence and influenced by the Mongol Yuan dynasty.

Many Korean scholars visited China during the Yuan dynasty and An Hyang was among them. In 1286, he happened to read a book of Zhu Xi in Yanjing. He was so moved by this book that he transcribed this book in its entirety and came back to Korea with his transcribed copy. It greatly inspired Korean intellectuals at the time and many, predominantly from the middle class and disillusioned with the excesses of organized religion (in the form of Buddhism) and the old nobility, embraced neo-Confucianism. The newly rising neo-Confucian intellectuals were leading groups aimed at the overthrow of the old (and increasingly foreign-influenced) Goryeo dynasty.

Portrait of Jo Gwang-jo

After the fall of the Goryeo dynasty and the establishment of the Joseon Dynasty by Yi Song-gye in 1392 AD, neo-Confucianism was installed as the new dynasty's state ideology. Buddhism, and organized religion in general was considered poisonous to the neo-Confucian order. Buddhism was accordingly restricted and occasionally persecuted by the new dynasty. As neo-Confucianism encouraged education, there were a number of neo-Confucian schools (서원 seowon and 향교 hyanggyo) founded throughout the country. Such schools produced many neo-Confucian scholars, including individuals such as Jo Gwang-jo (조광조, 趙光祖; 1482–1520), Yi Hwang (이황, 李滉; pen name Toegye 퇴계, 退溪; 1501–1570) and Yi I (이이, 李珥; 1536–1584).

In the early 16th century, Jo Gwang-jo attempted to transform Joseon into the ideal neo-Confucian society with a series of radical reforms until he was executed in 1520. Despite the failure of his attempted reforms, neo-Confucianism soon assumed an even greater role in the Joseon Dynasty. Soon Korean neo-Confucian scholars, no longer content to only to read and remember the Chinese original precepts, began to develop new neo-Confucian theories. Yi Hwang and Yi Iwere the most prominent of these new theorists. Yi Hwang's most prominent disciples were Kim Hak-pong （鹤峰 1538–1593), Yu Seong-ryong (柳成龍 1542–1607）and Jeong Gu (한강 정구, 寒岡 鄭逑, 1543—1620), known as the "three heroes". These were followed by a second generation of scholars which included Jang Hyungwang (轩张显光, 1554—1637) and Jang Heung-Hyo (敬堂张兴孝, 1564—1633), and by a third generation (including Heo Mok, Yun Hyu,Yun Seon-do, Song Si-yeol) which brought the school into the 18th century ^[7]

But neo-Confucianism in the Joseon Dynasty became so dogmatic in a relatively rapid time that it prevented much needed socio-economic development and change, and led to internal divisions and criticism of many new theories, regardless of their popular appeal. For instance, Wang Yangming's theories, which were popular in the Chinese Ming Dynasty, were regarded as heresy and severely condemned by Korean neo-Confucianists. Furthermore, any annotations on Confucian canon which are different from Zhu Xi were excluded. During the Joseon Dynasty, the newly emerging ruling class, called Sarim(사림, 士林), also became divided into political factions according to their diversity of neo-Confucian views on politics. There were two large factions and many subfactions.

During the Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598), many Korean neo-Confucian books and scholars were taken to Japan. They influenced Japanese scholars such as Fujiwara Seika and affected the development of Japanese neo-Confucianism.

Bureaucratic examinations[edit]

Neo-Confucianism became the interpretation of Confucianism whose mastery was necessary to pass the bureaucratic examinations by the Ming, and continued in this way through the Qing dynasty until the end of the Imperial examination system in 1905. However, many scholars such as Benjamin Elman have questioned the degree to which their role as the orthodox interpretation in state examinations reflects the degree to which both the bureaucrats andChinese gentry actually believed those interpretations, and point out that there were very active schools such as Han learning which offered competing interpretations of Confucianism.

The competing school of Confucianism was called the Evidential School or Han Learning and argued that Neo-Confucianism had caused the teachings of Confucianism to be hopelessly contaminated with Buddhist thinking. This school also criticized Neo-Confucianism for being overly concerned with empty philosophical speculation that was unconnected with reality.

Confucian canon[edit]

The Confucian canon as it exists today was essentially compiled by Zhu Xi. Zhu codified the canon of Four Books(the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, the Analects of Confucius, and the Mencius) which in the subsequent Ming and Qing Dynasties were made the core of the official curriculum for the civil service examinations.

New Confucianism[edit]

In the 1920s, New Confucianism, also known as Modern Neo-Confucianism, started developing and absorbed the Western learning to seek a way to modernize Chinese culture based on the traditional Confucianism. It centers on four topics: The modern transformation of Chinese culture; Humanistic spirit of Chinese culture; Religious connotation in Chinese culture; Intuitive way of thinking, to go beyond the logic and to wipe out the concept of exclusion analysis. Adhering to the traditional Confucianism and the Neo-Confucianism, the Modern Neo-Confucianism contributes the nation to walk out the predicament faced by the ancient Chinese traditional culture in the process of modernization; Furthermore, it also promotes the world culture of industrial civilization rather than the traditional personal senses.^[8]

Prominent neo-Confucian scholars[edit]

China[edit]

• Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao
• Lu Xiangshan aka Lu Jiuyuan (1139–1193)
• Ouyang Xiu (1007–1072)
• Shao Yong (1011–1077)
• Su Shi, aka Su Dongpo (1037–1101)
• Wang Yangming aka Wang Shouren
• Ye Shi (1150–1223)
• Zhang Sanfeng^{[citation needed]}
• Zhang Shi (1133–1180)
• Zhang Zai
• Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073)
• Zhu Xi (1130–1200)

Korea[edit]

See also: Korean Confucianism

• An Hyang (1243–1306)
• Yi Saek (1328–1396)
• Jeong Mong-ju (1337–1392)
• Jeong Dojeon (1342–1398)
• Gil Jae (1353–1419)
• Ha Ryun
• Gwon Geun
• Jeong Inji (1396–1478)
• Kim Suk-ja
• Kim Jong-jik (1431–1492)
• Nam Hyo-on
• Kim Goil-pil
• Jo Gwang-jo (1482–1519)
• Seo Gyeongdeok
• Yi Eon-jeok
• Yi Hwang (Pen name Toegye) (1501–1570)
• Jo Sik (1501–1572)
• Ryu Seongryong
• Yi Hang
• Kim Inhu
• Ki Daeseung (1527-1572)
• Song Ik-pil (1534-1599)
• Seong Hon (1535–1598)
• Yi I (Pen name Yulgok) (1536–1584)
• Kim Jangsaeng (1548-1631)
• Song Si-yeol (1607–1689)
• Yi Gan (1677-1727)
• Yi Ik (1681-1763)
• Han Wonjin (1682-1751)
• Hong Daeyong (1731-1783)
• Park Jiwon (1737-1805)
• Park Jega (1750-1815)
• Jeong Yak-yong (1762-1836)

Japan[edit]

See also: Neo-Confucianism in Japan

• Fujiwara Seika (1561–1619)
• Hayashi Razan (1583–1657)
• Nakae Tōju (1608–1648)
• Yamazaki Ansai (1619–1682)
• Kumazawa Banzan (1619–1691)
• Yamaga Sokō (1622–1685)
• Itō Jinsai (1627–1705)
• Kaibara Ekken (aka Ekiken) (1630–1714)
• Arai Hakuseki (1657–1725)
• Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728)
• Nakai Chikuzan (1730–1804)
• Ōshio Heihachirō (1793–1837)

Vietnam[edit]

• Chu Văn An
• Le Quy đon
• Nguyễn Khuyến
• Phan đinh Phung
• Tự đức

Notes[edit]

This article includes a list of references, but its sources remain unclear because it has insufficient inline citations. Please help to improve this article by introducing more precise citations. (August 2012)

1. Jump up^ Blocker, H. Gene; Starling, Christopher L. (2001). Japanese Philosophy. SUNY Press. p. 64.
2. ^ Jump up to:^a b c Huang 1999, p. 5.
3. ^ Jump up to:^a b Chan 2002, p. 460.
4. ^ Jump up to:^a b Craig 1998, p. 552.
5. Jump up^ Chan 1946, p. 268
6. Jump up^ Yao, Xinzhong (2000). An Introduction to Confucianism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 259. ISBN 978-0-521-64430-3.
7. Jump up^ 【李甦平】 Lisu Ping, 论韩国儒学的特点和精神 "On the characteristics and spirit of Korean Confucianism", 《孔子研究》2008年1期 (Confucius Studies 2008.1). See also List of Korean philosophers.
8. Jump up^ http://baike.baidu.com/view/2053255.htm

References[edit]

• Chan, Wing-tsit, A Sourcebook of Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963)
• Chan, Wing-tsit, trans. Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming.New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.
• Chan, Wing-tsit (1946), China. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
• Craig, Edward (1998), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume 7, Taylor & Francis, ISBN 978-0-415-07310-3
• Daehwan, Noh. "The Eclectic Development of Neo-Confucianism and Statecraft from the 18th to the 19th Century," Korea Journal (Winter 2003).
• Huang, Siu-chi. Essentials of Neo-Confucianism: Eight Major Philosophers of the Song and Ming Periods Westport:Greenwood Press, 1999.
• Tu Weiming. Neo-Confucian Thought in Action: Wang Yang-ming’s Youth (1472–1509). Berkeley and Los Angeles:University of California Press, 1976.
• Tu Weiming. Confucian Thought: Selfhood As Creative Transformation. New York: State University of New York Press, 1985.

External links[edit]

• Neo-Confucian Philosophy entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• (English) (Chinese)Writings of the Orthodox School from the Song Dynasty

Zhu Xi or Chu Hsi (Chinese: 朱熹, October 18, 1130 – April 23, 1200) was a Song Dynasty Confucian scholar who became the leading figure of the School of Principle and the most influential rationalist Neo-Confucian inChina. His contributions to Chinese philosophy including his assigning special significance to the Analects of Confucius, the Mencius, the Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the Mean (the Four Books), his emphasis on the investigation of things (gewu), and the synthesis of all fundamental Confucian concepts, formed the basis of Chinese bureaucracy and government for over 700 years.

Contents

  [hide] 

• 1 Life
• 2 Teachings
  • 2.1 The Four Books
  • 2.2 Vital force (qi 氣), principle (li 理), and the Supreme Ultimate (taiji 太極)
  • 2.3 Human nature
  • 2.4 Heart/mind
  • 2.5 Knowledge and action
  • 2.6 The investigation of things and the extension of knowledge
  • 2.7 Religion
  • 2.8 Meditation
  • 2.9 On teaching, learning, and the creation of an academy
• 3 Taoist and Buddhist influence on Zhu Xi
• 4 Zhu Xi's legacy
• 5 Achievements of Zhu Xi in the art of calligraphy
  • 5.1 Calligraphy Style
• 6 See also
• 7 Footnotes and references
• 8 Further reading
  • 8.1 Translations
• 9 External links

Life[edit]

Zhu Xi, whose family originated in Wuyuan County, Huizhou (in modernJiangxi province), was born in Fujian, where his father worked as the subprefectural sheriff. After his father was forced from office due to his opposition to the government appeasement policy towards the Jurchen in 1140, Zhu Xi received instruction from his father at home. Upon his father's death in 1143, he studied with his father's friends Hu Xian, Liu Zihui, and Liu Mianzhi. In 1148, at the age of 19, Zhu Xi passed the Imperial Examination and became a presented scholar. Zhu Xi's first official dispatch position was as Subprefectural Registrar of Tong'an (同安縣主簿), which he served from 1153 - 1156. From 1153 he began to study under Li Tong, who followed the Neo-Confucian tradition of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, and formally became his student in 1160. In 1179, after not serving in an official capacity since 1156, Zhu Xi was appointed Prefect of Nankang Military District (南康軍), where he revived White Deer Grotto Academy (白鹿洞書院).^[1] and got demoted 3 years later for attacking the incompetency and corruption of some influential officials. There were several instances of receiving an appointment and subsequently being demoted. Upon dismissal from his last appointment, he was accused of numerous crimes and a petition was made for his execution. Even though his teachings had been severely attacked by establishment figures, almost a thousand brave people attended his funeral.^[2] In 1208, eight years after his death,Emperor Ningzong of Song rehabilitated Zhu Xi and honored him with the posthumous name of Wen Gong (文公), meaning “Venerable gentleman of culture”.^[3] Around 1228, Emperor Lizong of Songhonored him with the posthumous noble title Duke of (State) Hui (徽國公).^[4] In 1241, a memorial tablet to Zhu Xi was placed in theConfucian Temple at Qufu,^[5] thereby elevating him to Confucian sainthood. Today, Zhu Xi is venerated as one of the "Twelve Philosophers" (十二哲) of Confucianism.^[6] Modern Sinologists and Chinese often refer to him as Zhu Wen Kung (朱文公) in lieu of his name.

Teachings[edit]

The Four Books[edit]

During the Song Dynasty, Zhu Xi's teachings were considered to be unorthodox. Rather than focusing on the I Chinglike other Neo-Confucians, he chose to emphasize the Four Books: the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, theAnalects of Confucius, and the Mencius as the core curriculum for aspiring scholar officials. For all these classics he wrote extensive commentaries that were not widely recognized in his time; however, they later became accepted as the standard commentaries. The Four Books served as the basis of civil service examinations up until 1905,^[7] and education in the classics often began with Zhu Xi's commentaries as the cornerstone for understanding them.^[8]

Vital force (qi 氣), principle (li 理), and the Supreme Ultimate (taiji 太極)[edit]

Zhu Xi maintained that all things are brought into being by the union of two universal aspects of reality: qi, sometimes translated as vital (or physical, material) force; and li, sometimes translated as rational principle (or law). The source and sum of li is the Taiji (Wade-Giles: T‘ai Chi), meaning the Supreme Ultimate. The source of qi (Wade-Giles: ch‘i) is not so clearly stated by Zhu Xi, leading some authorities to maintain that he was a metaphysical monist and others to maintain that he was a metaphysical dualist.

According to Zhu Xi's theory, every physical object and every person has its li and therefore has contact in its metaphysical core with the Taiji. What is referred to as the human soul, mind, or spirit is understood as the Taiji, or the supreme creative principle, as it works its way out in a person.

Qi and li operate together in mutual dependence. They are mutually aspective in all creatures in the universe. These two aspects are manifested in the creation of substantial entities. When their activity is waxing (rapid or expansive), that is the yang energy mode. When their activity is waning (slow or contractive), that is the yin energy mode. The yang and yin phases constantly interact, each gaining and losing dominance over the other. In the process of the waxing and waning, the alternation of these fundamental vibrations, the so-called five elements (fire, water, wood, metal, and earth) evolve. Zhu Xi argues that li existed even before Heaven and Earth ^[9]

In terms of li and qi, Zhu Xi's system strongly resembles Buddhist ideas of li (again, principle) and shi (affairs, matters), though Zhu Xi and his followers strongly argued that they were not copying Buddhist ideas. Instead, they held, they were using concepts already present long before in the I Ching.

Zhu Xi discussed how he saw the Supreme Ultimate concept to be compatible with principle of Taoism, but his concept of Taiji was different from the understanding of Tao in Daoism. Where Taiji is a differentiating principle that results in the emergence of something new, Dao is still and silent, operating to reduce all things to equality and indistinguishability. He argued that there is a central harmony that is not static or empty but was dynamic, and that the Supreme Ultimate is itself in constant creative activity.

Human nature[edit]

Zhu Xi considered the earlier Confucian Xun Zi to be a heretic for departing from Mencius' idea of innate human goodness. Even if people displayed immoral behaviour, the supreme regulative principle was good. The cause of immoral actions is qi. Zhu Xi's metaphysics is that everything contains li and qi. Li is the principle that is in everything and governs the universe. Each person has a perfect li. As such, individuals should act in perfect accordance with morality. However, while li is the underlying structure, qi is also part of everything. Qi obscures our perfect moral nature. The task of moral cultivation is to clear our qi. If our qi is clear and balanced, then we will act in a perfectly moral way.

Heart/mind[edit]

Clarity of mind and purity of heart are ideal in Confucian philosophy. In the following poem, "Reflections While Reading - 1" Zhu Xi illustrates this concept by comparing the mind to a mirror, left covered until needed that simply reflects the world around it, staying clear by the flowing waters symbolizing the Tao. In Chinese, the mind was sometimes called "the square inch," which is the literal translation of the term alluded to in the beginning of the poem.^[8]

A small square pond an uncovered mirror
where sunlight and clouds linger and leave
I asked how it stays so clear
it said spring water keeps flowing in
(translation by Red Pine)

Knowledge and action[edit]

According to Zhu Xi's epistemology, knowledge and action were indivisible components of truly intelligent activity. Although he did distinguish between the priority of knowing, since intelligent action requires forethought, and the importance of action, as it produces a discernible effect, Zhu Xi said "Knowledge and action always require each other. It is like a person who cannot walk without legs although he has eyes, and who cannot see without eyes although he has legs. With respect to order, knowledge comes first, and with respect to importance, action is more important." ^[10]

The investigation of things and the extension of knowledge[edit]

Zhu Xi advocated gewu, the investigation of things. How to investigate and what these things are is the source of much debate. To Zhu Xi, the things are moral principles and the investigation involves paying attention to everything in both books and affairs^[11] because "moral principles are quite inexhaustible".^[12]

Religion[edit]

Zhu Xi did not hold to traditional ideas of God or Heaven (Tian), though he discussed how his own ideas mirrored the traditional concepts. He encouraged an agnostic tendency within Confucianism, because he believed that the Supreme Ultimate was a rational principle, and he discussed it as an intelligent and ordering will behind the universe (while stating that "Heaven and Earth have no mind of their own" and promoting their only function was to produce things. Whether this can be considered a conscious or intelligent will is clearly up to debate).<See W.T.Chan Source-BookZhu Xi, Ch.11, #127, pg.643> He did not promote the worship of spirits and offerings to images. Although he practiced some forms of ancestor worship, he disagreed that the souls of ancestors existed, believing instead that ancestor worship is a form of remembrance and gratitude.^{[citation needed]}

Meditation[edit]

Zhu Xi practiced a form of daily meditation called jingzuo similar to, but not the same as, Buddhist dhyana or chan ding(Wade-Giles: ch'an-ting). His meditation did not require the cessation of all thinking as in some forms of Buddhism; rather, it was characterised by quiet introspection that helped to balance various aspects of one's personality and allowed for focused thought and concentration.^{[citation needed]}

His form of meditation was by nature Confucian in the sense that it was concerned with morality. His meditation attempted to reason and feel in harmony with the universe. He believed that this type of meditation brought humanity closer together and more into harmony.^{[citation needed]}

On teaching, learning, and the creation of an academy[edit]

Zhu Xi's letter (1194) instructing a subordinate official on local government matters after he stepped down as Administrator of Tanzhou for reappointment to teach at the imperial court

Zhu Xi heavily focused his energy on teaching, claiming that learning is the only way to sagehood. He wished to make the pursuit of sagehood attainable to all men.^{[citation needed]}

He lamented more modern printing techniques and the proliferation of books that ensued. This, he believed, made students less appreciative and focused on books, simply because there were more books to read than before. Therefore, he attempted to redefine how students should learn and read. In fact, disappointed by local schools in China, he established his own academy, White Deer Grotto Academy, to instruct students properly and in the proper fashion.

Taoist and Buddhist influence on Zhu Xi[edit]

Zhu Xi wrote what was to became the orthodox Confucian interpretation of a number of concepts in Taoism and Buddhism. While he appeared to have adopted some ideas from these competing systems of thought, unlike previous Neo-Confucians he strictly abided by the Confucian doctrine of active moral cultivation. He found Buddhist principles to be darkening and deluding the original mind^[13] as well as destroying human relations.^[14]

Zhu Xi's legacy[edit]

From 1313 to 1905, Zhu Xi's commentaries on the Four Books formed the basis of civil service examinations in China.^[7] His teachings were to dominate Neo-Confucians such as Wang Fuzhi, though dissenters would later emerge such as Wang Yangming and the School of Mind two and a half centuries later.

His philosophy survived the Intellectual Revolution of 1917, and later Feng Youlan would interpret his conception of li,qi, and taiji into a new metaphysical theory.

He was also influential in Japan known as Shushigaku (朱子学, School of Zhu Xi), and in Korea known as Jujahak (주자학), where it became an orthodoxy.

Life magazine ranked Zhu Xi as the forty-fifth most important person in the last millennium.

Achievements of Zhu Xi in the art of calligraphy[edit]

This renowned neo-Confucianist, educator and thinker from Southern Sung dynasty had, from an early age, followed his father and a number of great calligraphers at the time in practicing this art. At first he learned the style of Cao Cao, but later specialized in the regular script of Zhong Yao and the running cursive script of Yan Zhenqing. As he never ceased practicing, he reached a superb level in the art characterized by overpowering strength. Since then, though his manuscripts left to the world are piecemeal and incomplete, they have been regarded as invaluable for collection. While he bequeathed to posterity quite a bit of calligraphy which has been highly acclaimed in history, it is regrettable that most of it has been lost. Moreover, since the Yuan dynasty, his school of philosophy has been adopted as the official ideology of China. His philosophy not only profoundly affected traditional Chinese thinking and culture, but also spread outside China with tremendous influence. He has been hailed as one of the ten key philosophers of the Confucian School. His fame in the realm of philosophy was so great that even his brilliance in calligraphy was overshadowed. He was skillful in both running and cursive scripts, and more especially in large characters. His extant artworks consist mainly of short written notes in running script and rarely of large characters. His authentic manuscripts are collected by Nanjing Museum, Beijing Palace Museum, Liao Ning Province Museum, China; Taipei Palace Museum and the National Museum of Tokyo, Japan. Some pieces are in private collections in China and overseas. TheThatched Hut Hand Scroll, one of Zhu Xi's masterpieces in running-cursive script, is in an overseas private collection.

Thatched Hut Hand Scroll

Thatched Hut Hand Scroll contains three separate parts:

1. Title
2. 102 characters by Zhu Xi in running cursive scripts
3. The postscripts by Wen Tianxiang (1236～1283) ofSung dynasty, Fang Xiaoru(1375～1402), Zhu Yunming(1460–1526), Tang Yin (1470～1523) and Hai Rui (1514～1587) of the Ming dynasty.

Calligraphy Style[edit]

The calligraphy of Zhu Xi had been acclaimed as acquiring the style of the Han and Wei dynasties. He was skillful in the central tip, and his brush strokes are smooth and round, steady yet flowing in the movements without any trace of frivolity and abruptness. Indeed, his calligraphy possesses stability and elegance in construction with a continuous flow of energy. Without trying to be pretentious or intentional, his written characters are well-balanced, natural and unconventional. As he was a patriarch of Confucianism philosophy, it is understandable that his learning permeated in all his writings with due respect for traditional standards. He maintained that while rules had to be observed for each word, there should be room for tolerance, multiplicity and naturalness. In other words, calligraphy had to observe rules and at the same time not be bound by them so as to express the quality of naturalness. It's small wonder that his calligraphy had been highly esteemed throughout the centuries, by great personages as follows:

Tao Chung Yi (around 1329～1412) of Ming dynasty:

Whilst Master Zhu inherited the orthodox teaching and propagated it to the realm of sages and yet he was also proficient in running and cursive scripts, especially in large characters. His execution of brush was well-poised and elegant. However piecemeal or isolated his manuscripts, they were eagerly sought after and treasured.

Wang Sai Ching (1526–1590) of Ming dynasty:

The brush strokes in his calligraphy were swift without attempting at formality, yet none of his strokes and dots were not in conformity with the rules of calligraphy.

Wen Tianxiang of Sung dynasty in his postscript for the Thatched Hut Hand Scroll by Zhu Xi:

People in the olden days said that there was embedded the bones of loyal subject in the calligraphy of Yan Zhenqing. Observing the execution of brush strokes by Zhu Xi, I am indeed convinced of the truth of this opinion.

Zhu Yunming of the Ming dynasty in his postscript for the Thatched Hut Hand Scroll by Zhu Xi:

Master Zhu was loyal, learned and a great scholar throughout ages . He was superb in calligraphy although he did not write much in his lifetime and hence they were rarely seen in later ages. This roll had been collected by Wong Sze Ma for a long time and of late, it appeared in the world. I chanced to see it once and whilst I regretted that I did not try to study it extensively until now, in the study room of my friend, I was so lucky to see it again. This showed that I am destined to see the manuscripts of master Zhu. I therefore wrote this preface for my intention.

Hai Rui of the Ming dynasty in his postscript for the Thatched Hut Hand Scroll by Zhu Xi:

The writings are enticing, delicate, elegant and outstanding. Truly such calligraphy piece is the wonder of nature.

See also[edit]

Zhu Xi's ink brush portrait

• Confucianism
• Neo-Confucianism
• Zhou Dunyi
• Lu Jiuyuan
• Wang Yangming
• Wang Fuzhi
• Feng Youlan
• Yuelu Academy
• White Deer Grotto Academy
• Classical Chinese writers
• Yi Hwang or Toegye, A Korean Confucian scholar of the Joseon Dynasty
• Yi I or Yulgok, A Korean Confucian scholar of the Joseon Dynasty
• Fujiwara Seika, Japanese follower of the philosophy of Zhu Xi
• Hayashi Razan, Seika's student &Tokugawa political theorist
• Hayashi Gahō, Tokugawa shogunateacademician/scholar/bureaucrat
• Kaibara Ekken, Edo periodwriter/botanist/philosopher

Footnotes and references[edit]

1. Jump up^ Gardner, pp. 3 - 6
2. Jump up^ Chan 1963: 588.
3. Jump up^ Chan 1989: 34.
4. Jump up^ Chan 1989: 34. Hui refers to Hui-chou his ancestral place in Anhui, now Jiangxi.
5. Jump up^ Gardner 1989: 9.
6. Jump up^ "World Architecture Images- Beijing- Confucius Temple". Chinese-architecture.info. Retrieved 2013-04-22.
7. ^ Jump up to:^a b Chan 1963: 589.
8. ^ Jump up to:^a b Red Pine, Poems of the Masters, Copper Canyon Press, 2003, p. 164.
9. Jump up^ Zhu Xi 1986, Zhuzi yulei, Beijing; Zhonghua Shuju, p.1
10. Jump up^ The Complete Works of Chu Hsi, section 20 in Chan 1963: 609.
11. Jump up^ The Complete Works of Chu Hsi, section 26 in Chan 1963: 609.
12. Jump up^ The Complete Works of Chu Hsi, section 27 in Chan 1963: 610.
13. Jump up^ The Complete Works of Chu Hsi, section 147 in Chan 1963: 653.
14. Jump up^ The Complete Works of Chu Hsi, section 138 in Chan 1963: 647.

Further reading[edit]

• J. Percy Bruce. Chu Hsi and His Masters, Probsthain & Co., London, 1922.
• Daniel K. Gardner. Learning To Be a Sage, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1990. ISBN 0-520-06525-5.
• Bruce E. Carpenter. 'Chu Hsi and the Art of Reading' in Tezukayama University Review (Tezukayama daigaku ronshū), Nara, Japan, no. 15, 1977, pp. 13–18. ISSN 0385-7743
• Wing-tsit Chan, Chu Hsi: Life and Thought (1987). ISBN 0-312-13470-3.
• Wing-tsit Chan, Chu Hsi: New Studies. University of Hawaii Press: 1989. ISBN 978-0-8248-1201-0
• Gedalecia, D (1974). "Excursion Into Substance and Function." Philosophy East and West. vol. 4, 443-451.
• Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, Utilitarian Confucianism: Ch‘en Liang's Challenge to Chu Hsi (1982)
• Wm. Theodore de Bary, Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy and the Learning of the Mind-and-Heart (1981), on the development of Zhu Xi's thought after his death
• Wing-tsit Chan (ed.), Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism (1986), a set of conference papers
• Donald J. Munro, Images of Human Nature: A Sung Portrait (1988), an analysis of the concept of human nature in Zhu Xi's thought

Translations[edit]

All translations are of excerpts except where otherwise noted.

• McClatchie, Thomas (1874). Confucian Cosmogony: A Translation of Section Forty-nine of the Complete Works of the Philosopher Choo-Foo-Tze. Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission.
• Bruce, J. Percy (1922). The philosophy of human nature. London: Probsthain.
• Wing-tsit Chan (1963), A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Gardner, Daniel (1986). Chu Hsi and Ta-hsueh: Neo-Confucian Reflection on the Confucian Canon. Cambridge: Harvard UP.
• Chan, Wing-tsit (1967). Reflections On Things at Hand. New York: Columbia University Press.
  • A full translation of 近思錄.
• Gardner, Daniel K. (1990). Learning to be a sage: selections from the Conversations of Master Chu, arranged topically. Berkeley: U. California Press. ISBN 0520909046.
• Wittenborn, Allen (1991). Further reflections on things at hand. Lanham: University Press of America.ISBN 0819183725.
  • A full translation of 續近思錄.
• Ebrey, Patricia (1991). Chu Hsi's family rituals. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0691031495.
  • A full translation of 家禮.
• Adler, Joseph A. (2002). Introduction to the study of the classic of change (I-hsueh ch'i-meng). Provo, Utah: Global Scholarly Publications. ISBN 1592673341.
  • A full translation of 易學啟蒙.

External links[edit]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Zhu Xi.

• Zhu Xi entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Zhu Xi and his Calligraphy Gallery at China Online Museum
• Chu Hsi and Divination - Joseph A. Adler
• Stillness & Activity - Joseph A. Adler
• Works by Zhu Xi at Project Gutenberg
• First part of the Classified Conversations of Master Zhu

Zhu Xi (Chu Hsi, 1130—1200)

A preeminent scholar, classicist and a first-rate analytic and synthetic thinker, Zhu Xi (Chu Hsi) created the supreme synthesis of Song-Ming dynasty (960-1628 CE) Neo-Confucianism. Moreover, by selecting the essential classical Confucian texts–the Analects (Lunyu) of Confucius, the Book of Mencius (Mengzi, the Great Learning (Daxue) and the Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong)—then editing and compiling them, with commentary, as the Four Books (Sishu). In doing so, Zhu redefined the Confucian tradition and outlook. He restored its original focus on moral cultivation and realization from the more bureaucratic stance of Confucians of the preceding Han and Tang dynasty (206 BCE-905 CE) who concentrated on the Five Classics (Wujing) of classical antiquity. The Four Books became required reading for the imperial examination system from the Yuan dynasty (1280-1341) until the system was abolished near the end of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) in 1908. In his philosophical work, Zhu fused the concepts of the principal Northern Song (960-1126 CE) thinkers, Shao Yong (1011-77), Zhou Dunyi (1017-73), Zhang Zai(Chang Tsai, 1020-77) and the brothers Cheng Yi (1033-1107) and Cheng Hao (1032-85) into a rich, grand synthesis. Zhu Xi’s thought has been the starting point for intellectual discourse and the focus of disputation for the last 800 years. His influence spread to Korea and Japan, which adopted Confucianism and the imperial examination system and were enamored of Zhu’s intellectual achievements. To study traditional Chinese philosophy, especially Confucian thought, one must engage the ideas and works of Zhu Xi.

Table of Contents

1. Life and Work
2. Philosophy of Human Nature and Approach to Self-Cultivation
3. Moral Cosmic Synthesis
4. Metaphysical Synthesis
5. Key Interpreters of Zhu Xi
6. References and Further Reading

1. Life and Work

Zhu Xi was born in Youqi in Fujian province, China in 1130. A precocious child, he asked what lay beyond Heaven at age five and grasped the import of the Classic of Filiality (Xiaojing) at age eight. After losing his father, Zhu Song (1097-1143), in his youth, he was raised in the company of several eclectic scholars, including Buddhists. A prodigy, he passed the top-level jinshi exam (the “presented scholar” exam) at the young age of nineteen, drawing on Chan Buddhist notions in his answers. He continued to nurture an eclectic interest in Daoism and Buddhism until he became the student of the Neo-Confucian master Li Tong (1093-1163) in 1160. Zhu’s father had recommended that he study under Li, but Zhu delayed seeing him until age 30, when he had spiritual doubts. A master in the tradition of the Cheng brothers, Li convinced Zhu of the superiority of the Confucian Way and cultivation, to which Zhu devoted himself for the next forty years. Having passed the jinshi examination, Zhu was qualified to hold office and was assigned to several prefectural administrative posts. But Zhu was critical of central court policy on several key issues and preferred temple guardianships, which gave him leisure to read, write and teach. (This also shielded him from the cutthroat politics at court where his frankness would have been literally fatal to him.) He thus became a productive scholar who made lasting contributions to classicism, historiography, literary criticism and philosophy. He was also a master of elegant prose and poetry.

As a renowned teacher, Zhu taught the classics and Neo-Confucianism to hundreds, if not thousands, of students. His oral teachings are preserved in the Classified Dialogues of Master Zhu (Zhuzi yulei). He also published critical, annotated editions of several classics, including the Book of Change (Yijing) and the Book of Odes (Shijing), of specific Neo-Confucianism works, including the works of Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai and the Cheng brothers, and a more encompassing Neo-Confucian anthology, Reflections on Things at Hand (Jinsi lu). Devoted to his work, he kept busy virtually to his last breath when he was rethinking and discussing the Great Learning. Throughout life, he sought to reestablish the fundamental principles and ideals of Confucianism in order to restore the vitality of China’s cultural and political integrity as a Confucian society, since those seeking spiritual guidance and solace were inclined to favor Daoism and Buddhism over the spiritually impoverished alternative of bureaucratic Confucianism. Moreover, he thought the empire needed the spiritual elan of authentic Confucian values to meet the challenge of barbarian encroachers. His patriotism, commitment to the tradition and devotion to scholarship and education remain an inspiration to this day in East Asia and throughout the world.

2. Philosophy of Human Nature and Approach to Self-Cultivation

Zhu’s complex theory of human nature registered the possibility of evil as well as that of sagehood. On his theory, while (following Mencius, 372-289 BCE) people are fundamentally good (that is, originally sensitive and well-disposed), how one manifests this original nature will be conditioned by one’s specificqiendowment (one’s native talents and gifts), and one’s family and social environment. These together yield one’s empirical personality, intelligence and potential for cultivation and success. Zhu thought difference in individual disposition, character and aptitude for moral self-realization are due to variations inqiendowments and environments.

Preceding generations of Neo-Confucian scholars had tended not to register the complexity of human nature and the wide range of individual differences and advocated relatively straightforward approaches to self-cultivation as purifying the mind to elicit the natural responses of one’s original goodness. They tended to understand this process in itself to constitute self-realization. For example, Zhu’s teacher Li Tong had strongly advocated a form of meditation called “quiet sitting,” the efficacy of which the active young Zhu had doubted from the outset, at least for himself. Several years later, Zhu held discussions with Zhang Shi (1133-80), a follower of Hu Hong (1106-61), who had advocated “introspection in action.” Zhu initially embraced this approach, but soon found that it was not viable for himself. He found that such introspection in the heat of action could not inform or guide action. It tended to impede the flow of effective deliberate action by making one too self-conscious.

Zhu Xi’s ingenious solution was a two-pronged approach to cultivation that involved nurturing one’s feeling of reverence (jing) while investigating things to discern their defining patterns (li). Reverence, a virtue taught by Confucius (551-479 BCE) and the classics, serves to purify the mind, attune one to the promptings of the original good nature and impel one to act with appropriateness (yi). At the same time, by grasping the defining, interactive patterns that constitute the world, society, people and upright conduct, one gains the key to acting appropriately. The mind that is imbued with a feeling of reverence and comprehends these patterns will develop into a good will (zhuzai) dedicated to rectitude and appropriate conduct.

Interestingly, in later life, Zhu regarded this conception of cultivation and realization as too complicated, gradual and difficult to complete. Like Confucius, he came to accept that one must, on embarking on moral self-cultivation, establish the resolve (lizhi) to realize the Confucian virtues and become an exemplary person (junzi), a master of appropriateness in human conduct and interpersonal affairs.

3. Moral Cosmic Synthesis

In “A Treatise on Humanity” (Renshuo), Zhu Xi articulates and systematizes the classical Confucian ideal of humanity (ren) in simultaneously cosmic and human perspective. At the same time, he effectively criticizes competing accounts of “humanity” on logical, semantic and ethical grounds. Following early tradition, Zhu associates humanity with cosmic creativity. At its root, humanity is the impulse of “heaven and earth” (the cosmos) to produce things. It is manifested vividly in the cycle of seasons and the fecundity of nature. (The settled Chinese terrain and climate were moderate and productive, supporting the view that nature generally was fecund and afforded suitable conditions for human flourishing.) This impulse to produce is instilled in all of the myriad creatures, but in man it is sublimated into the virtue of “humanity” (“authoritative personhood”), which, when fully realized, involves being caring and responsible to others in due degree. Zhu Xi similarly correlates the four stages of creativity and production in the cosmos and nature — origination, growth, flourishing and firmness — that were first indicated in the Book of Change, with the four cardinal virtues enunciated by Confucius — humanity, appropriateness, ritual conduct and wisdom. He thus portrays the realized person as both a vital participant in cosmic creativity and a catalyst for the flourishing and self-realization of others. On this basis, Zhu goes on to formulate the definitive definition of ren (humanity, authoritative personhood) for the subsequent tradition: “the essential character of mind” and “the essential pattern of love.” The virtue of ren grounds the disposition of mind as commiserative and describes the core of moral self-realization as love for others (other-directed concern), appropriately manifested.

4. Metaphysical Synthesis

Zhu Xi erected a metaphysical synthesis that has been compared broadly to the systems of Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Whitehead. These “Great Chain” systems are hierarchical and rooted in the distinction between form and matter. Zhu advanced Zhou Dunyi’s dynamic conception of reality as shown in the “Diagram of the Supreme Polarity” (Taiji tu), in order to conceive the Cheng brother’s concept of li (pattern, principle) and Zhang Zai’s notion of qi (cosmic vapor) as organically integrated in a holistic system. In Zhou’s treatise, Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity(Taiji tu shuo), Zhu discerned a viable account of the formation of the world in stages from the original unformed qi, to yin and yang, the five phases — earth, wood, fire, water and metal — and on to heaven, earth and the ten thousand things. Zhu blended this conception with ideas from the Book of Change and its commentaries in setting forth a comprehensive philosophy of cosmic and human creativity, providing philosophical grounds for the received Confucian concepts of human nature and self-cultivation. Zhu’s penchant for thinking in polarities—li and qi, in particular—has continued to stir critics to regard him as a dualist who used two concepts to explain reality. For his part, any viable account of the complexity of phenomena must involve two or more facets in order to register their complexity and changes.

5. Key Interpreters of Zhu Xi

Zhu Xi was an active scholar-intellectual who held discussions and disputes with other scholars, both in correspondence and in person. He can be known by contrast with others as well as through his positive views. For example, his series of letters with Zhang Shi on the topic of self-cultivation, preserved in theCollected Writings of Master Zhu (Zhuzi wenji), provides an enlightening record of these dedicated Confucians’ quest for a well-grounded, effective approach to self-cultivation. He debated with Lu Zuqian (1134-1181) on the nature of education. Zhu focused on the Confucian Way and moral practice, while Lu argued for a broader-based humanities approach. He held a series of debates with Lu Jiuyuan (Xiangshan, 1139-93) on the nature of realization and moral conduct. Whereas Zhu advocated regimens of study, reflection, observation and practice, Lu spoke simply of reflecting on the self and clarifying the mind, considering that once the mind was clear one would know spontaneously what to do in any situation. Zhu also corresponded with the “utilitarian” Confucian scholar Chen Liang (1143-94), who disputed Zhu’s focus on individual moral realization and the received “Way” with a broader institutional approach that was more sensitive to empirical facts and conditions. Zhu generally eclipsed all of the other scholars of his day, partly because he outlived them and had so many students, but mainly because his system was so compelling. It was comprehensive yet nuanced, tightly reasoned yet accommodating of individual differences. It preserved the essential Confucian Way yet ramified it to meet the challenges of Buddhism and Daoism as spiritual teachings. Zhu’s influence rose at the end of the Southern Song dynasty and became decisive during the Yuan dynasty, which adopted his edition of the Four Books as the basis of the imperial examination system arranged by scholars trained in his approach.

While raising his standing in pedagogy, this focus on the Four Books at the expense of Zhu’s deeper, more nuanced texts and dialogues opened the door to philosophic criticism. A schematic presentation of Zhu’s cosmic theory of pattern (li) and qi lay in the background of his commentary to the Four Books, which easily opened him to charges of dualism and of reading abstract categories into the essentially practical ancient texts. Because his commentary was focused on reading and understanding the meaning, intent and cultivation message of the Four Books, critics generalized that Zhu and his method were essentially scholastic and would be myopic and stilted in facing real situations. Anyone who peruses the corpus of Zhu’s writings and dialogues, however, will find that his ontology is not a crude dualism but a holism built of mutually implicative elements that never exist in separation. Also, his reflections are always informed by knowledge of history, current events and practical observation, as his method of observation applies generally to objects (and self) and phenomena while respecting but not privileging texts. Even his comments on Confucius and Mencius often refer back to the person and the speech context, and, thus, are not entirely scholastic. His method of observation opened the door to breakthroughs beyond the “verities” of the classics, though he was careful not to play up this fact because most of his colleagues sought the truth in the texts, thinking empirical facts were distractions from the essential Heavenly-patterning (tianli) reflected more adequately in the canonical texts.

Whereas early generations of Zhu’s followers were acquainted with his broader learning, style and spirit, Confucians of the Ming and Qing dynasties knew him mostly through his edition of the Four Books, through which they targeted their criticisms of his thought. Zhu’s most eminent critic was the Ming scholar-official Wang Yangming (Wang Yang-ming, 1472-1529). In youth, Wang had admired Zhu’s learning and once even attempted to try out his approach to observation, “investigate things to discern their defining patterns.” But, after diligently “observing” bamboo for several days, Wang became ill and got no special insight into the pattern or meaning of bamboo or anything else. He therefore rejected Zhu’s approach to observation as too objective, as outward rather than inward. In the twentieth century, Qian Mu observed that Zhu would only make such observations with guiding questions in mind, around which to focus his observations; he never would have countenanced just looking, which would turn up nothing that wasn’t obvious. For example, having heard a monk claim that bean sprouts grow faster by night than by day, Zhu measured the growth of some bean plants after twelve hours of daylight and of nocturnal darkness, respectively, and found that the plants exhibited the same rate of growth day and night. (The monk’s claim had been based on Mencius’ idea that the qi was more vital at night.) For his part, Wang transformed Zhu’s theory of observation into a pragmatic theory, thereby gearing observation directly to discernment and response—knowing how to act. Thus, Wang formulated a famous slogan that “knowledge and action form a unity.” Later, he argued that knowledge is not essentially objective and factual, but rooted in an inborn moral sensitivity (liangzhi), which is elicited by clarifying the mind so that one becomes actively responsive to one’s moral impulses (liangneng). It could be said that, in his criticisms, Wang was reacting more to the scholastic attitudes fostered by the examination system than to Zhu Xi himself. Wang ultimately respected Zhu and went on to compile a text attempting to show that in later life Zhu had changed his approach in a subjective, practical way that anticipated Wang’s approach.

Scholars of the late Ming through early Qing period (mid-seventeenth to early eighteenth century), notably, Wang Fuzhi (1619-92) and Dai Zhen (Tai Chen, 1723-77), disputed Zhu on philosophical and textual grounds. Whereas Zhu had insisted on the priority of “pattern” over qi, (roughly, form over matter), Wang and Dai followed the Northern Song thinker Zhang Zai in affirming the priority of qi, viewing patterns as a posteriori evolutionary realizations of qi interactions. They thought this account dissolved the threat of any hint of dualism in cosmology, ontology and human nature. For his part, Zhu Xi would have responded that, fundamentally, “pattern” is implicated in the very make-up and possible configurations of qi; which is why the regular a posteriori patterns can emerge. “Pattern” provides for the standing orders and processes, based on the steady interactions of yin-yang, five phases, etc., that give rise to the heaven-earth world order, with its full complement of ten thousand things. The fundamental a priori patterns are thus necessary to the world order and provide the fecund context in which the a posteriori forms emerge continuously. Wang and Dai’s qi-based view could not account for existence and the world order in this sense. At the same time, Zhu did not think that “patterns” were absolutely determinative. They just set certain “possibilities of order” that are realized when the necessary qiconditions obtain. For the most part, he registered the range of randomness and free flow in qi activity that is best exemplified in the randomness of weather systems and seismic events.

As to textual grounds, Wang and Dai argued that Zhu was so enamored of his metaphysics of pattern andqi that he constantly read them into the classical texts. For example, Dai said Zhu blandly associated Confucius’ term tian (heaven) with his own notion of li (pattern; principle), quoting Analects 11:9 where Confucius, in sorrow over the death of his disciple Yan Hui, cried that “Heaven had forsaken” him. Could Zhu reasonably claim that Confucius was crying that li had forsaken him? Critics tend to find Dai’s counter-intuitive example against Zhu’s approach compelling. However, consulting Zhu’s original commentary, we find that he noted that this phrase expressed Confucius’ utmost sorrow, that he felt Yan Hui’s death as if it was his own, without mentioning “pattern.” This example does not prove Wang and Dai’s claim. It illustrates that Zhu’s commentary was nuanced and sensitive to pragmatic, situational usages despite his penchant to see his own notion of “pattern” in some of Confucius’ usages of “heaven.” Moreover, the classicist Daniel Gardner shows that Zhu’s commentary was not intended as simply a glossary with comments. It was intended as a guide to self-cultivation. Hence, Zhu sometimes recast passages in the Analects more generally to show their broader implications for self-cultivation and realization, often with the isolated countryside student in mind. Gardner shows that Zhu thus had enriched the text as a vital tool for self-cultivation, whereas the earlier commentaries of the Han and Tang dynasties had just given glosses necessary for answering examination questions.

Known in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the West due to the work of Jesuits in China, Zhu Xi’s thought and texts were made more widely available to western scholarship in the late nineteenth century. Early in the twentieth century, a Chinese student of John Dewey (1859-1951) at Cornell, Hu Shi (1891-1962), initially followed the empirical, textual Qing scholars in viewing Zhu as a scholastic metaphysician. But, after reading Zhu’s Dialogues in old age, Hu contended that Zhu’s method of observation was not scholastic but essentially scientific in nature. J.C. Bruce, who translated a book of Zhu’s collected writings in the 1920s, viewed Zhu’s notion of li (pattern; principle) in light of Stoic natural law. From the 1930s, the eminent historian of Chinese philosophy, Feng Youlan, interpreted li along the lines of platonic Forms making Zhu Xi appear to be an idealist and abstract thinker. In the 1950s, Carsun Chang naturalized the notion of li by aligning it with the Aristotelian “nature” or “essence,” thereby locking Zhu’s thought into a sort of descriptive metaphysics.

From the 1960s, Mou Zongsan interpreted and criticized Zhu’s ontology and ethics on Kantian grounds, saying he erected an a priori framework but then illicitly sought to derive further a priori knowledge (of patterns) by a posteriori means (observation). In the 1970s, the intellectual historian, Qian Mu examined and explained Zhu Xi’s thought directly on its own terms, without reading western concepts and logical patterns into his system. Scholars wanting to read Zhu Xi on his own terms, unmediated by western thought, turn to the five volume Zhu Xi anthology edited by Qian Mu as a rich starting point.

In 1956, Joseph Needham, a scientist, made a highly significant breakthrough by interpreting Zhu’s system in terms of a process philosophy, Whitehead’s organic naturalism. Needham successfully recast much of Zhu’s language in naturalistic rather than metaphysical terms. The cultural, moral dimension of Needham’s account has been developed by Cheng-ying Cheng and John Berthrong, while the scientific dimension has been examined by Yung Sik Kim. In the 1980s, A.C. Graham offered the most insightful and apt account of Zhu’s terminology and pattern of thought in, “What Was New in the Ch’eng-Chu Theory of Human Nature?” and other writings. Graham showed decisively that the term li refers to an embedded contextual “pattern,” rather than to any sort of abstract form or principle. He reminded us that the term li never figures in propositions or logical sequences, as would be natural for “principle.” Rather,li are always conceived as structuring, balancing, modulating, guiding phenomena, processes, reflection and human discernment and response. For example, one never finds moral syllogisms in Zhu Xi’s writings. Everything he says is about moral emotional intelligence: attunement, sensitivity, discernment, and response. Kirill Thompson has explored and extended Graham’s interpretation in a series of studies. Joseph Adler examines the roles played by the Book of Change and Zhou Dunyi in Zhu’s thought, while Thomas Wilson and Hoyt Tillman have shown the extent to which Zhu Xi re-visioned, revised and recast the Confucian Way. Wilson is interested in Zhu’s account of the Way as a sort of educational-ideological revision, and Tillman is interested in how Zhu’s account of the Way eventually snuffed out other competing versions that might have offered more practical and liberal openings in late imperial China.

In summary, the depth and range of Zhu Xi’s thought were unparalleled in the tradition. Zhu Xi studies continue to be vital, wide-ranging and contentious, drawing growing global, cross-cultural interest.

6. References and Further Reading

• Adler, Joseph (1998). “Response and Responsibility: Chou Tun-I and Confucian Resources for Environmental Ethics” in Mary Tucker and John Berthrong ed. Confucianism and Ecology: The Interpretation of Heaven, Earth, and Humans, Cambridge: Harvard UP.
  • Expansion and application of Zhou Tunyi and Zhu Xi’s ideas to frame a cogent environmental ethic. Clear and thoughtful.
• (1999). “Chu Hsi’s Use of the I ching” in Kidder Smith, ed., Sung Dynasty Uses of the I ching, Princeton: Princeton UP.
  • Readable and informative survey. Complements the following text.
• (2002). “Introduction to the Classic of Change” by Chu Hsi: Translation with introduction and notes,Provo: Global Scholarly Publications.
  • Zhu Xi’s guide to understanding and using the Book of Change. Fascinating. Clear translation and commentary. A major contribution to Zhu Xi and Book of Change studies.
• Berthrong, John H. (1994). Concerning Creativity: A Comparison of Chu Hsi, Whitehead, and Neville,Albany: SUNY Press.
  • Well-developed “process philosophy” interpretation of Zhu’s speculative thought; see Needham 1956a and 1956b.
• Bruce, J. Percy (1923). Chu Hsi and His Masters: An Introduction to the Sung School of Chinese Philosophy, London: Probsthain.
  • Pioneering historical study.
• Chan, Wing-tsit (1963). “The Great Synthesis in Chu Hsi,” in A Source Book In Chinese Philosophy,Princeton: Princeton UP, 605-63.
  • Translations of Zhu’s principal essays and statements on key terms, drawn primarily from Zhuzi quanshu;clear and thoroughly annotated.
• (1966). Reflections on Things at Hand: The Neo-Confucian Anthology Compiled by Chu Hsi and Lu Tsu-ch’ien, New York: Columbia UP.
  • Zhu’s compendium of important early Neo-Confucian pronouncements; clear and well annotated.
• (ed.) (1986). Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism. Honolulu: Hawaii UP.
  • Detailed studies of key issues in Zhu Xi scholarship; for the specialist.
• (1987). Chu Hsi: Life and Thought. Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP.
  • (General essays; clear and accessible.)
• (1989). Chu Hsi: New Studies. Honolulu: Hawaii UP.
  • Detailed studies of key issues in Zhu Xi scholarship; for the specialist.
• Chang, Carsun (1957). “Chu Hsi, The Great Synthesizer,” in The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought, vol. 1, New York: Bookman, 243-332.
  • Aristotelian account of Zhu’s philosophy, viewed in contrast to Zhu’s rivals’ opinions. Attempted corrective of Feng’s platonic reading of Zhu Xi; see next entry.
• Feng, Youlan (1953). “Chu Hsi,” trans. D. Bodde in A History of Chinese Philosophy, 2 vols., Princeton: Princeton UP, vol. 2, 533-71.
  • Highly influential pioneering platonic account of Zhu’s thought in English; technical but clearly presented.
• Gardner, Daniel (1986). Chu Hsi and Ta-hsueh: Neo-Confucian Reflection on the Confucian Canon,Cambridge: Harvard UP.
  • Translation of Zhu’s commentary on the “Great Learning,” a major classical cultivation text; with excellent commentary and supporting essays.)
• (1990). Learning to Be a Sage: Selections from the Conversations of Master Chu, Arranged Topically,Berkeley: California UP.
  • (Zhu’s teachings on learning and study as a method of self-cultivation; very clear and accessible.
• (2003). Zhu Xi’s Reading of the Analects: Canon, Commentary and the Classical Tradition, New York: Columbia UP.
  • Insightful, corrective study of Zhu’s mission and accomplishment in writing this commentary.
• Graham, A.C. (1986) “What was New in the Ch’eng-Chu Theory of Human Nature?” in Wing-tsit Chan (ed) Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism, Honolulu: Hawaii UP, 138-157.
  • Ground-breaking study; corrective reinterpretation of Zhu’s main concepts and ethical thought.
• Kim, Yung Sik (2000). The Natural Philosophy of Chu Hsi 1130-1200, Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society.
  • Clear and multifaceted study of Zhu’s proto-scientific efforts and achievements; see Thompson 2002b for critical analysis.
• Lovejoy, Arthur O. (1936 & 1964) The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea,Cambridge: Harvard UP.
  • An account of hierarchical systems in the West, to which Zhu’s system is a distant cousin; see Thompson 1994 for discussion.
• Needham, Joseph (1956a). “The Neo-Confucians,” in Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 2,History of Scientific Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 455-95.
  • Highly influential organismic account of Zhu’s thought; lucid and fascinating.
• Needham, Joseph (1956b). “Chu Hsi, Leibniz, and the Philosophy of Organism,” in the preceding book, 496-505.
  • Highly influential organismic account of Zhu’s thought; lucid and fascinating.
• Schirokauer, Conrad (1962). “Chu Hsi’s Political Career: A Study in Ambivalence,” in A. Wright and D. Twichert (eds) Confucian Personalities, Stanford: Stanford UP, 162-88.
  • Detailed but engaging account.
• Thompson, Kirill O. (1988) “Li and Yi as Immanent: Chu Hsi’s Thought in Practical Perspective,”Philosophy East and West 38 (1): 30-46.
  • Corrective account of Zhu’s ontology and ethical theory; lucid and informative.
• Thompson, Kirill O. (1991). “How to Rejuvenate Ethics: Suggestions from Chu Hsi,” Philosophy East and West (41): 493-513.
  • Examination of how Zhu Xi’s thought could rejuvenate contemporary western ethics.
• Thompson, Kirill O. (1994). “Hierarchy of Immanence: Chu Hsi’s Pattern of Thought,” Humanitas Taiwanica (Wen-shih-che hsueh-pao, National Taiwan University (42): 1-30.
  • Examines parallels and differences between Zhu’s philosophy and Great Chain philosophies of the western tradition, in order to reveal strengths and special features of Zhu’s system.
• Thompson, Kirill O. (2002a). “Ethical Insights from Chu Hsi,” in M. Barnhart, ed., Varieties of Ethical Reflection, New York and London: Lexington Books.
  • Presentation of Zhu’s method of ethical thinking, with applications to some difficult issues in Western ethics.
• Thompson, Kirill O. (2002b). “Review article of “Yung Sik Kim, The Natural Philosophy of Chu Hsi 1130-1200,” China Review International (9): 165-80.
  • Critical examination of Kim’s study of Zhu’s proto-scientific thought.
• Thompson, Kirill O. (2007). “The Archery of Wisdom in the Stream of Life: Zhu Xi’s Reflections on the Four Books,”Philosophy East and West, vol. 56, no. 3 (July).
  • Study of Confucius and Mencius’ fascinating notion of wisdom in the light of Zhu Xi’s salient reflections.
• Tillman, Hoyt (1992). Confucian Discourse and Chu Hsi’s Ascendancy, Honolulu: Hawaii UP.
  • Detailed historical study that situates Zhu in the context of the intellectual issues and debates of the day.
• Wilson, Thomas A. (1995) Genealogy of the Way: the construction and uses of the Confucian tradition in late imperial China, Stanford: Stanford University Publications.
  • New approach that sees politics and ideology in the competing accounts of the Confucian Way.
• Wittenborn, Allen (1991). Further Reflections at Hand: A Reader, New York: University Press of America.
  • Useful compendium of Zhu’s philosophic pronouncements; clear translation with detailed commentary.
• Zhu Xi (1130-1200). Zhuzi yulei (Classified Dialogues of Master Zhu), trans. J.P. Bruce, The Philosophy of Human Nature, London: Probstain, 1922.
  • Compendium of Zhu’s moral psychology drawn from Zhuzi quanshu (“Complete” Works of Master Zhu), abstruse. Other translated selections can be found in Chan 1963, 1966; Gardner 1986, 1990, 2003; Wittenborn 1991.

Author Information

Kirill O. Thompson
Email: ktviking@ntu.edu.tw
National Taiwan University
Taiwan

http://www.iep.utm.edu/zhu-xi/

Wang Yangming (1472—1529)

Wang Yangming, also known as Wang Shouren (Wang Shou-jen), is one of the most influential philosophers in the Confuciantradition. He is best known for his theory of the unity of knowledge and action. A capable and principled administrator and military official, he was exiled from 1507 to 1510 for his protest against political corruption. Although he studied the thought of Zhu Xi [Chu His] (1130-1200 CE) seriously in his teenage years, it was during this period of exile that he developed his contribution to what has become known as Neo-Confucianism(Daoxue, [Tao-hsueh or “Learning of the Way”). With Neo-Confucianism in general, Wang Yangming’s thought can be best understood as an attempt to propose personal morality as the main way to social well-being. Wang’s legacy in Neo-Confucian tradition and Confucian philosophy as a whole is his claim that the fundamental root of social problems lies in the fact that one fails to gain a genuine understanding of one’s self and its relation to the world, and thus fails to live up to what one could be.

Table of Contents

1. Intellectual Context
2. Philosophical Anthropology
3. Redefinition of the World
4. The Unity of Knowledge and Action
5. Recent Scholarship on Wang Yangming
6. References and Further Reading

1. Intellectual Context

Neo-Confucians, above all, urged people to engage in what they thought was “true learning,” which led to the genuine realization of the self. However, the cultural landscape of early and mid-Ming dynasty China (1368-1644 CE) did not unfold as Neo-Confucians wished. To understand the shared theoretical challenge that Wang Yangming confronted, one should first note that quite a number of Neo-Confucians at that time had contempt for what they thought was a certain vulgarized form of Confucian learning. This “vulgar learning” (suxue) included such activities as memorization and recitation (jisong), literary composition (cizhang), textual studies (xungu), and broad learning (boxue). To the eyes of Neo-Confucians, all these forms of learning represent learning that is aimed at accumulating external knowledge for its own sake. As a consequence, these forms of learning disregarded what Neo-Confucians considered to be the true purpose of the learning: construction of the moral self.

Ironically, the rampant increase in charges that certain work is “vulgar” was linked to the very triumph of Neo-Confucianism in general, and to Zhu Xi’s learning in particular, through its official recognition by the Ming state. While is true that, by the early Ming, “Cheng-Zhu” learning (named after the brothers Cheng Yi [Ch’eng I] and Cheng Hao [Ch’eng Hao] as well as the aforementioned Zhu Xi) had already enjoyed official recognition for over one hundred years, it was at this time that the institutionalization of the Cheng-Zhu teaching in early Ming was relatively complete. As is well known, by the time of the Yongle reign (1403-24), Cheng-Zhu learning had become fully established as the basis for the civil service examination that was the exclusive pathway to government service in imperial China. The Emperor Cheng Zu embraced Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism and ordered Hu Kuang (1370-1418) and others to compile an official version of Zhu Xi’s commentaries on the Four Books (the Confucian Lunyu orAnalects, the Mengzi or Mencius, the Daxue or Great Learning, and the Zhongyong or Doctrine of the Mean) and Five Classics (the Shujing or Classic of History, the Shijing or Classic of Poetry, the Yijing orClassic of Changes, Liji or Record of Rituals, and the Xiaojing or Classic of Filial Piety). Their effort resulted in the comprehensive anthology of the Great Compendia on the Five Classics and the Four Books.

The establishment of Neo-Confucianism as the examination curriculum contributed to what some thinkers considered to be the “vulgarization” of Neo-Confucian moral teaching. As Cheng-Zhu learning served as the basis of the civil examinations, those who wanted to get involved in the political arena had to master it regardless of whether or not they agreed with the essence of its teaching. In other words, they studied it for the sake of their worldly interests rather than out of concern for moral self-fulfillment. Wang Yangming was one of the most prominent among those thinkers who found it difficult to accept both “vulgar learning” and the form of Neo-Confucian learning that was vulnerable to degeneration into “vulgar learning.” One can find Wang’s lengthy critique of “vulgar learning” in the section of “Pulling up the root and stopping up the source” in Chuan xi lu (“Instructions for Practical Living” in Wing-tsit Chan’s translation).

While Cheng-Zhu learning was different from “vulgar learning” in its fundamental orientation, Wang Yangming thought that Cheng-Zhu style of “investigation of things” (gewu) was particularly susceptible to degeneration into “vulgar learning. So, what was at stake in Wang Yangming’s reformulation of Neo-Confucianism was the issue of how to reinvent Confucian learning in a way different from the way of Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism, which turned out to be susceptible to “vulgarization.”

2. Philosophical Anthropology

In Wang’s mind, given the fact that the practitioners of “vulgar learning” devote their attention only to the accumulation of external knowledge, what is potentially problematic in Cheng-Zhu style of “investigation of things” is its search for moral principle (li) in the external world (as well as in the mind,xin [hsin]). Wang believed that the internalization of li resolved many problems that “vulgar learning” created. Wang’s idea that “the mind is principle” (xin ji li) expresses his belief succinctly. The most apparent and significant implication of xin ji li is the change of the locus of li from the external world (and the mind) to solely the mind. However, the proposition of xin ji li indicates more than the locus of li.

First, li does not simply reside in the mind but is coextensive with the mind. Accordingly, li does not exist as a distinguishable, searchable entity in the mind. Rather we call li the state in which the mind is so well preserved that it responds to the situation properly. In this sense, xin ji li meant a kind of eval‎uation that the mind could embody, a desirable quality represented by the concept of li, rather than a formula expressing the relationship between two distinct entities. Since li was not conceived as a static principle that one could discern and hold fast to, being attuned to li involved nothing other than having no selfish desires. In other words, we should not “seek the Principle of Nature” because principle is not something we can “seek.”

Second, the identification of xin and li brought about significant changes in the understanding of the mind as well. These changes in the understanding of the mind entailed a new philosophical anthropology. The mind — the unstable entity that was formerly understood in terms of qi (ch’i, vital force) and believed to be vulnerable to evil — is now conceived as li, the perfect moral entity.

Many of Wang’s statements, such as “The nature of all humans is good” and “[T]he original substance of the mind is characterized by the highest good; is there anything in the original substance of the mind that is not good?” show that he upheld the typical Neo-Confucian premise of the goodness of human nature. However, Wang’s philosophical anthropology was different from that of Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism in that it pushed the premise of the goodness of human nature to its extreme.

In Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism, xin means the operation of the subjective consciousness, or the location where the operation of the subjective consciousness takes place. If xin represents the immediate self as a current flow of consciousness while li is a normative state that should be embodied, xin ji limeans, above all, that the mind ceases to be one of the loci where the moral principle resides; it achieves the very status of moral principle itself. This identification of xin and xing (hsing, nature) means creating a notion of the self-sufficient moral agent by negating the distinction between the potential goodness of the self and the actual state of the self.

While this notion of a self-sufficient moral agent is encouraging, it was not without problems for a group of intellectuals. For example, Luo Qinshun thought that the identification of the subjective function of the mind with the objective reality of principle constituted “a case of an infinitesimal mistake in the beginning leading to an infinite error at the end.” How so?

In the view of people like Luo, the notion of a self-sufficient moral agent contained in the formula of xin ji li appears virtually bereft of any viable tension between the ideal and the actual: the immediate, actual self is the ideal. This absence of a normative tension poses a certain threat to the rigor of morality. This is why they criticized the notion of a self-sufficient moral agent as being a source of arbitrariness and subjectivism in moral behavior. However, normative tension is not completely out of sight for those who advocate the formula of xin ji li. For one thing, Wang’s distinction between the mind in itself (xin zhi benti) and the so-called human mind (renxin) provides one with a standard with which to distinguish between the normative state and the actual state of the self. For Wang, the “mind in itself” represents the original state of the mind, which possesses the perfect faculty of moral judgment. The “human mind” represents the state of the mind that is “obscured” by selfish human desires, and thus does not realize the perfect faculty of moral judgment. Since the immediate state of the mind often remains at the level of the human mind, one is expected to endeavor to recover the mind in itself.

As long as Wang maintains a distinction between the mind in itself and the human mind, what is really at issue is not whether to posit a normative ideal, but how to conceptualize a normative ideal. Most important to his conceptualization, Wang does not conceive the normative ideal independently of the functioning of the mind. That is, there is no ontological difference between the normative ideal and the actual, for both the mind in itself and the human mind represent certain states of our consciousness. The only difference between the mind in itself and the human mind is whether or not the mind is clouded by selfish desire.

Thus, the main consequence of this way of conceiving a normative ideal is that our current state of mind is able to return to its original state simply by getting rid of selfish desires, without a separate effort to apprehend normative principle.

Distinguishing the goodness that reflects the original state of the mind from the badness that stems from selfish desires is absolutely critical in the process of returning to the original state of the mind. Such knowledge is just another aspect of the self-sufficient nature of the self. Following the Mencian tradition, Wang called this knowledge liangzhi (innate knowing). According to Wang, liangzhi possesses several intriguing features:

1. Everyone without exception possesses liangzhi.
2. Liangzhi is innate, not something acquired by learning. Thus, effort is necessary not for forming liangzhi but for setting it in motion.
3. Liangzhi is not subject to variation or change due to time and place. One’s inner source of moral guidance can be simply applied to human conduct or society irrespective of the circumstances. Also, one can understand and make perfect judgments about things without much information.
4. We can never lose liangzhi. At worst, we simply lose sight of it. Since liangzhi is always present in the mind, one can always activate it anytime if one desires it. “Once determined to reform, he recovers at once his own mind.”
5. The character of liangzhi is intuitive. For Wang, the power of liangzhi lies in its ability properly to respond to any situation, rather than in factual knowledge that involves concrete information. In this way, Wang emphasized the intuitive power of the mind. Wang’s invoking of the image of the mirror and balance well expresses his emphasis on the intuitive moral sensitivity that liangzhi possesses. Both the mirror and balance give us knowledge of a given object by making it possible to reflect and weigh it without previous understanding. This aspect of Wang’s learning can be characterized as anti-“over-intellectualizing.”
6. Despite its intuitional character, liangzhi is perfect. People often tend to lose sight ofliangzhi because of selfish human desire. But once one gets rid of selfish human desire, the perfect power of liangzhi is completely restored. Simply put, “it [innate knowledge] knows everything” In short, when liangzhi is rendered as innate knowledge, knowledge means the capacity for moral judgment rather than factual knowledge. Thus, if we were but in full contact with liangzhi, liangzhi would make people perfectly moral rather than erudite. For Wang, however, such moral judgment presupposes a total understanding of a given situation.
7. For Wang, who believed in the perfect, intuitive power of liangzhi, resolution based on confidence was important: “There is the sage in everyone. Only one who has not enough self-confidence buries his own chance.”
8. Trusting in innate moral knowing, Wang seemed to simplify the cumbersome process of learning, considering it to be a matter of eliminating selfish desires: “In learning to become a sage, the student needs only to get rid of selfish human desires and preserve the Principle of Nature, which is like refining gold and achieving perfection in quality.” People are no longer under the burden of any other business except for getting rid of selfish desire.

All of the above points together explain the populist ethos in Wang’s learning, as we see in Wang’s famous statement: “All the people filling the street are sages.” For Wang, becoming a fully moral agent is simple and easy. “Just don’t try to deceive it [liangzhi] but sincerely and truly follow in whatever you do. Then the good will be perceived and evil will be removed. What security and joy there is in this!” It cannot but be easy because we are already fully moral agents. As self-sufficient moral subjects we do not need to engage in the exploration of the external world.

3. Redefinition of the World

Wang wanted to show that moral awareness depended on the self. While the importance of the moral agent is quite understandable in the moral sphere, it begs the question of what kind of relation moral principle has to the world out there if the ontological status of moral principle hinges solely on the moral agent. In other words, how could it be that one’s moral principle is completely in the mind and, at the same time, vitally connected to the world out there? Answering this question is absolutely critical if Wang’s reassertion of personal morality is to be socially responsible. Wang’s sense of social responsibility is clear when he wants to distinguish his own convictions from those of Buddhists, whom Confucians have regarded as forsaking the external world. “In nourishing the mind, we Confucians have never departed from things and events.”

On what ground, then, could Wang maintain that his learning was focused on the mind and, at the same time, did not depart from the external world? How did Wang resolve this contradiction? As is expected in his rhetorical question, “Is there any affair in the world outside of the mind?” the answer lay in his redefinition of the world in such a way that there was no affair outside of the mind.

According to Wang, the external world is not something out there, as distinct from the mind, but “that to which the operation of the mind is directed.” This redefinition of the external world is based on the insight that everything we can know about the world is mediated by experience. This experience is made possible by our sense organs. The activity of these sense organs is associated with the mind. Thus, all things that we encounter in our lives are necessarily associated with the mind. The world so conceived is no longer an independent entity external to the mind, but an inseparable part of the mind. According to this picture, the external world exists always in reference to the self.

This position makes one wonder if the external world does not exist without the operation of one’s mind. However, what Wang Yangming cares about is not (scientific) investigation of the existence of the world itself — which is a question of modern epistemology — but the perspective from which we can properly understand our relationship to the world. When Wang asks rhetorically, “Is there any affair in the world outside of the mind?” the message he is trying to convey is that all the things and affairs in our lives exist in an activated state, so that is what we should have in mind when we think about the world.

How, then, is the world in an activated state? The practitioners of “vulgar learning” often take the world as something statically “out there.” When they produce factual knowledge, they assume a static world-picture to the extent that they can produce fixed knowledge. However, if we accept Wang’s definition of things as “that to which the operation of the mind is directed,” the real world in our lives turns out to be the experienced world. In other words, the world is not silent, inert, and vacant, but activated and awakened. Indeed, life manifests itself in movements like eating, going to bed, and speaking rather than seeing while stationary. To be exact, we are, in a sense, moving when we are stationary, for we are experiencing something incessantly. Common metaphors of life — such as passage, travel, voyage, and journey — are related to this kind of mobility in our life-experience. What are the implications of Wang’s redefinition of the external world?

First, the most significant implication of this change in the meaning of the external world is that Wang has in principle dismissed the necessity of exploring the external world independent of the self. Under this framework, to take the mind seriously is none other than to do justice to the external world. Thus, Wang said, “The mind is the master of Heaven-and-Earth and myriad things. The mind is none other than Heaven. If we mention the mind, Heaven-and-Earth and the myriad things all are also mentioned automatically.”

Second, what we notice in Wang’s redefinition of the world is a reformulation of the relation between the mind as subject and the world as object. Wang suspected that the distinction between the mind as perceiving subject and the world as perceived object could, by creating a gap between self and world, make genuine Confucian learning liable to degenerate into “vulgar learning,” which justified the pursuit of external knowledge that was irrelevant to the self. Thus, Wang saw our experienced and lived reality as constituted in and through an inseparable relation between the mind and the world. In his reconceptualization of this relationship, inner and outer were unified because the mind was the world. This seamless conception of the mind and the world overcame the gulf between the subject and the object that “vulgar learning” engenderd.

Third, this rearrangement of the mind’s relation to the world makes the mind and the world coextensive. For Wang, the mind and the external world are not fully distinguishable, for the world is no more than that to which the operation of the mind is directed. This new arrangement of the mind’s relation to the world gives us total contact with both the self and the larger world from the beginning. We can say that the distance between the world and us is shortened in the sense that our access to the world is unmediated, and there is no world that exists beyond the scope of the self.

4. The Unity of Knowledge and Action

Wang’s theory of the unity of knowledge and action (zhixing heyi) is probably the most well-known aspect of Wang’s philosophy. Some of the most puzzling aspects of Wang’s theory of the unity of knowledge and action can be best understood by way of Wang’s conception of self and world.

The issue of the relationship between knowledge and action concerns the relationship between knowledge about (moral) matters and doing what the knowledge calls for. Traditionally, Chinese thought in general, and Zhu Xi in particular, maintained that once one acquired knowledge, one should do one’s best to put such knowledge into practice. In discussing Wang’s theory of the unity of knowledge and action, however, we first need to make clear that by his theory of the unity of knowledge and action, Wang was not asserting a traditional idea. Indeed, this was precisely the position that Wang wished to repudiate.

Despite the emphasis on the need for knowledge to be put into practice, the traditional position presupposed two possibilities: first, that one can have knowledge without/prior to corresponding action; and second, that one can know what is the proper action, but still fail to act. Because of these two possibilities, the traditional position left open the possibility of separating knowledge and action, but called for the overcoming of this separation.

However, Wang denied both possibilities. These two denials constitute the essence of Wang’s theory of the unity of knowledge and action. First, according to Wang, it is only through simultaneous action that one can obtain knowledge: “If you want to know bitterness, you have to eat a bitter melon yourself.” Wang denied any other possible routes to obtain knowledge.

According to Wang, it is not possible for one to put something into practice after acquiring knowledge. This is because knowledge and action are unified already, from beginning to end. We cannot unify knowledge and action because they are already unified. Of course, Wang was aware of the claims that “there are people who know that parents should be served with filial piety and elder brothers with respect but cannot put these things into practice. This shows that knowledge and action are clearly two different things.” Wang’s answer was: “The knowledge and action you refer to are already separated by selfish desires and are no longer knowledge and action in their original state.” In other words, knowledge necessarily/automatically leads to action in its original state. We cannot have knowledge while preventing it from leading to action.

Understanding these two apparently non-commonsensical ideas is crucial for understanding of Wang’s theory of the unity of knowledge and action, for they are the points that differentiated Wang’s position from preceding positions. In order to understand them, we need to examine what Wang meant by “knowledge” and “action.” Furthermore, considering Wang’s view of self and world is indispensable to any examination of Wang’s notions of “knowledge” and “action.”

First, knowledge in Wang’s theory of the unity of knowledge and action may not necessarily be the knowledge we conventionally imagine. What Wang meant by knowledge in his discussion of knowledge and action is not grasping information that was “out there” — which is preval‎ent in what Wang characterized as “vulgar learning.” What Wang meant was knowledge of how to act in a given situation, as we will confirm‎ in Wang’s statements concerning the unity of knowledge and action. Where, then, does knowledge of how to act come from? This question brings us to Wang’s theory of philosophical anthropology and his notion of liangzhi. Liangzhi is supposed to provide that kind of certainty for action. The English translation of liangzhi is innate knowledge or innate knowing, which suggests that we already possess all the knowledge we need to have. We do not have to spend any time to acquire knowledge. Precisely speaking, we cannot acquire knowledge, for we, as self-sufficient moral agents, already possess it from the very beginning. Thus, it would be nonsense to say that we need to know before in order to act. In this sense, what we mean by “knowing” is not to attain from outside what is previously absent but to experience the operation of our innate knowledge/knowing in the concrete situations of our own lives. “To ‘obtain’ means to get in the mind; it is not infused from without.” From this we can understand Wang’s strange idea that it is only through simultaneous action that one can obtain knowledge. For action is the process of activating our innate knowledge. Thus, Wang said, “Can anyone learn without action?” What we conventionally think of as attaining knowledge is nothing other than experiencing knowledge that we already have.

But what, precisely, is action? Wang did not think of moral action in terms of willing and then performing an action. For him, the true perception of a situation automatically and immediately sets action into motion. In emphasizing the setting-in-motion of action followed by the perception of a situation, the action in Wang’s theory does not exactly correspond to the kinds of acts we have conventionally in mind. For Wang, action means all responses to a given situation. This includes studying, which was not conventionally regarded as belonging to the realm of action.

At the same time, Wang tended to consider action as responses to given situations rather than action in a vacuum. This point is evident in his examples of responses to such things as color, smell, and taste. When action is conceived largely as a response to a given situation, we cannot avoid acting. We never depart from the “situation” in which we find ourselves.

To understand further why Wang conceived of action as a response to a given situation, we need to remember his redefinition of the world. To describe the actual fabric of life that Wang had in mind, we have invoked the sense of movement, which posited an alternative to the more static conception of experience — one that deceived one into thinking that one stood outside the actual world. For Wang, our lives consist of living in the moment.

With this understanding of Wang’s notion of knowledge and action in mind, let us imagine the situation in which one acts with one’s knowledge. First of all, one does not spend any time to attain knowledge. All one needs is to respond to a given situation. Knowledge is not fixed knowledge, but consists of ever-changing responses to shifting situations: “Innate knowledge is to minute details and varying circumstances as compasses and measures are to areas and lengths. Details and circumstances cannot be predetermined, just as areas and lengths are infinite in number and cannot be entirely covered.” Wang is invoking “the radically context sensitive and particularist nature of moral judgement.” Accordingly, the knowledge is intuitive. As action is the natural inner workings of liangzhi in the form of reaction, there is no gap between knowledge and action.

Keeping the above understanding of knowledge and action in mind, we can understand the aforementioned two idiosyncratic points in Wang’s theory of the unity of knowledge and action. First, it is only through simultaneous action that one can obtain knowledge. This is because one already possesses knowledge. What seems to be a process of obtaining knowledge is in reality the process of activating innate knowledge. Knowledge is activated through the contact with the situation, and this is called “action.” Second, knowledge necessarily/automatically leads to action. For Wang, knowledge means knowing how to respond to a given situation and action is responding to a given situation. Furthermore, one cannot help responding to the world because one is “moving” in every moment. Action is no longer an operation subsequent to the formulation of knowledge of the world, but a fundamental mode of human life. Given that one innately has knowledge of how to act in all situations, and that one cannot help acting, knowledge necessarily leads to action. When knowledge and action appear to be separate, it is because one has not activated one’s true knowledge — a result of delusion due to selfish desire or false learning: “There have never been people who know but do not act. Those who are supposed to know but do not act simply do not yet know.”

According to Wang, the normative picture of the universe is that moral agents are living their lives actualizing their liangzhi in the form of the unity of knowledge and action. In this picture, the betterment of society depends on the expansion of the self’s ability to respond morally to the world. Thus, Wang repeatedly reasserts the validity of the Neo-Confucian promise — the salvation of the world through personal morality — which is based on the assumption that “Governance depends on human beings (wei zheng zai ren).”

In his own time, Wang’s teaching was enthusiastically received. Although Wang’s new mode of thinking was rapidly gaining currency among intellectuals, for those who did not subscribe to his ideas Wang’s formulation was nothing more than a mistaken answer to the problem. Thus, Wang came to serve as a catalyst for complex and wide-ranging debates and controversies. No matter how later generation of thinkers would eval‎uate the legacy of Wang’s learning, it could hardly be denied that with Wang Yangming the tradition of Chinese philosophy became richer and more complex.

5. Recent Scholarship on Wang Yangming

Leaving aside Wang Yangming’s importance in his own time, he deserves attention because of his tremendous, long-lived influence on Chinese intellectual history. Not surprisingly, therefore, important studies of Wang Yangming have been produced all the way up to the present.

In Anglophone scholarship, the work of Frederick Goodrich Henke (1916) and Wing-tsit Chan (1963) has made available translations of Wang’s major works. Wing-tsit Chan (1970) provides a bird’s-eye view on the flow of thought from the early Ming through Wang’s era by scrutinizing the evolution of “the learning of mind” in early Ming thinkers. Wang’s thought also has been explored by Tu Weiming (1976) in terms of the interaction between his life history and the formation of his major doctrines. Wm. Theodore de Bary (1970) has discussed the progression of thought in the late Ming in terms of the unfolding of “Wang Learning.” The work of Julia Ching (1976) also merits consideration. More recently, P. J. Ivanhoe (2002) has discussed Mencius’ and Wang’s philosophies from a comparative perspective.

In Japanese scholarship, the compilation of Yōmeigaku Taikei (Compendium of Yangming Learning) is most prominent among many works. In his classic study, Shushigaku to Yōmeigaku (Zhu Xi Learning and Yangming Learning) (1967), Shimada Kenzi attempts to compare the thought of Wang with that of Zhu Xi. However, his analysis does not pay attention to the specific historical contents of their philosophical movements, while Togawa Yoshio’s Jukyōshi (A History of Confucianism) (1987) pays relatively more attention to this issue.

In mainland China, Wang’s thought has been interpreted as subjective idealism and criticized by Marxist scholars despite the fact that the influence of Marxist ideology has become relatively weak since the end of Cultural Revolution (c. 1966-1976). Yang Guorong (1990) diachronically narrates the development of the structure of Wang’s philosophy. The work of Chen Lai (1991) also is worthy of attention.

6. References and Further Reading

• Araki Kengo, et al, comp. Yōmeigaku Taikei. 12 vols. Tokyo: Meitoku shuppansha, 1971-73.
• Chan, Wing-tsit, trans. Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.
• Chan, Wing-tsit. “The Ch’eng-Chu School of Early Ming.” In Self and Society in Ming Thought, ed. W. T. de Bary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970): 29-51.
• Chen Lai. Youwuzhijing: Wang Yangming zhuxue de jingshen (The Realm of Being and Non-being: The Spirit of Wang Yangming’s Philosophy). Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1991.
• Ching, Julia, ed. To Acquire Wisdom: The Way of Wang Yang-ming. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976.
• de Bary, W. T. “Individualism and Humanitarianism in Late Ming Thought.” In Self and Society in Ming Thought, ed. W. T. de Bary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970): 145-247.
• Henke, Frederick Goodrich. The Philosophy of Wang Yang-Ming. Chicago: Open Court, 1916.
• Ivanhoe, P.J. Ethics in the Confucian Tradition. 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002.
• Shimada Kenji. Shushigaku to Yōmeigaku (Zhu Xi Learning and Yangming Learning). Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1967.
• Togawa Yoshio, et al. Jukyōshi (A History of Confucianism). Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1987.
• Tu Weiming. Neo-Confucian Thought in Action: Wang Yang-ming’s Youth (1472-1509). Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976.
• Yang Guorong. Wangxue tonglun (A Comprehensive Study of Wang Learning). Shanghai: Shanghai sanlianshudian, 1990.

Author Information

Youngmin Kim
Email: kimyoungmin@snu.ac.kr
Seoul National University, South Korea

http://www.iep.utm.edu/wangyang/