미국과 국내 강경파/중국-러시아 사이에 놓인 베네수엘라의 지도부

[위종민]

베네수엘라 야당의 지도자 마리아 코리나 마차도는 대중적 정당성과 권위에도 불구하고 야권의 동원능력이 불확실해 정권을 인수받지 못하고 있고 델시 로드리게스 부통령이 상황을 수습중으로 보이는데, 미국의 요구를 들어줌과 동시에 내부분열과 쿠데타를 막기 위해 차비스타 연합의 지지를 유지해야 하는 과제를 안고 있다고 합니다. 

트럼프는 미국 석유기업들이 베네수엘라 석유산업을 접수할 수 있도록 차비스타 연합이 해체해 온 투명한 계약과 규제안정성을 요구할 가능성이 크다고 보네요. 또한 트럼프가 중국, 러시아, 쿠마, 이란과의 관계를 단절하도록 요구했다고... 

보면 볼수록 벌집 건드린 것 같습니다. 

델시 로드리게스의 감당할 수 없는 줄타기
Iria Puyosa 작성
2026년 1월 8일 오후 3시 32분(미 동부시간)

미국 특수부대에 체포된 베네수엘라 대통령 마두로의 후임자인 델시 로드리게스가 2025년 1월 5일 그의 아들 니콜라스 마두로 게라와 인사하고 있다. (스트링거/dpa, 로이터 커넥트를 통해)

핵심 요약
베네수엘라의 새로운 임시 대통령 델시 로드리게스는 체제 분열을 피하기 위해 워싱턴의 요구를 충족시키는 동시에 베네수엘라 엘리트층 내부에서 충분한 지지를 유지해야 한다.
로드리게스가 직면한 가장 복잡한 도전은 트럼프 행정부가 베네수엘라 정권에 러시아, 중국, 이란, 쿠바와의 관계 단절을 요구하는 가운데, 이들 국가와의 깊은 얽힘을 관리하는 것이다.
장기간 억압돼 온 베네수엘라 시민사회는 미국의 경제적 이해관계와 정권 내부의 파벌 정치가 지배하는 권력 이행 과정 속에서 자신들의 존재 의미를 유지하기 위해 노력해야 한다.

1월 3일 미국이 베네수엘라 지도자 니콜라스 마두로를 벙커에서 끌어낸 사건은 베네수엘라 소셜미디어 전반에 폭발적인 반응을 촉발했다. 인스타그램, 틱톡, 왓츠앱 상태 메시지를 통해 수백만 명의 베네수엘라인들이 구금된 전 독재자의 모습에 환호하는 반응을 공유했다. 부에노스아이레스에서 마드리드에 이르는 베네수엘라 디아스포라 공동체는 축하 영상을 게시했고, 국내 사용자들은 인터넷 제한을 우회해 안도와 희망을 표현했다.

통상 정권의 가장 강력한 무기 중 하나였던 정권의 선전·소통 장치는 작전 직후 결정적인 첫 15시간 동안 붕괴됐다. 안테나에 대한 정밀 타격으로 보안군의 무선 통신이 교란됐고, 정전으로 인해 푸에르테 티우나 육군기지 주변 지역이 영향을 받았다. 그러나 인터넷과 전화 통신은 정상적으로 작동했다. 국영 TV와 라디오 방송국은 중대한 뉴스 보도를 제공하지 않고 사전 녹화된 프로그램을 송출하고 있었다. 차비스모 진영은 텔레그램 채널과 그룹으로 숨어들었다.

정부의 공식 소통이 재개되자, 상반된 성명들이 정권 내부의 혼란을 드러냈다. 1월 3일 늦은 시각, 전 부통령 델시 로드리게스는 마두로를 “베네수엘라의 유일한 대통령”이라고 선언하며 그의 석방을 요구하는 동시에, 자신이 임시 대통령 역할을 맡는다고 밝혔다. 이에 반해 미국 대통령 도널드 트럼프는 그녀가 자신의 행정부와 협력하고 있으며, 미국의 베네수엘라 석유 산업 장악과 관련한 모든 요구를 이행할 의지가 있다고 주장했다. 이러한 불협화음은 국내 청중을 향한 강경한 수사와 워싱턴을 향한 유화적 협상 사이에서 갈라진 정권의 혼란을 부각시켰다.

정권의 이중 게임
마두로가 제거된 지 몇 시간 뒤, 도난당한 2024년 선거에서 개표 집계상 67%를 득표한 후보를 배출한 베네수엘라 민주 야권 운동의 지도자 마리아 코리나 마차도는 소셜미디어를 통해 “베네수엘라인들이여, 자유의 시간이 도래했다!”고 선언했다. 그러나 압도적인 대중적 정당성과 도덕적 권위를 지니고 있음에도 불구하고, 그녀는 감시와 탄압이라는 제약 속에서 활동하고 있다. 마두로 정권의 체계적인 탄압으로 시민사회가 짓눌려온 탓에, 야권의 동원 능력은 여전히 불확실하다.

한편 로드리게스는 베네수엘라 지도자에게 전례 없는 도전에 직면해 있다. 그녀는 워싱턴의 요구를 충족시키는 동시에 내부 분열이나 군사 쿠데타를 막기 위해 충분한 차비스타 연합의 지지를 유지해야 한다. 트럼프 행정부는 미국 석유 기업의 활동을 가능하게 할 수준의 협력을 요구하고 있으며, 이는 투명한 재산 계약과 규제 안정성을 포함할 가능성이 크다. 이는 차비스모가 체계적으로 해체해 온 제도적 환경 그 자체다. 로드리게스가 트럼프와 이러한 합의를 체결할 경우, 강경파들은 이를 배신으로 간주하며 이탈할 것이다. 따라서 로드리게스는 트럼프가 베네수엘라에서 운영하고자 하는 사업에 필요한 안정성을 보장하지 못할 수도 있다.

그녀의 공개적인 모순은 이러한 불가능한 처지를 반영한다. 임시 대통령으로서 첫 텔레비전 연설에서 그녀는 국내 청중에게 충성을 과시하기 위해 마두로의 즉각적인 석방을 요구했다. 그러나 24시간도 채 지나지 않아, 그녀는 미국과 베네수엘라 간 “균형 있고 상호 존중하는” 경제 협력으로 나아가는 것을 우선 과제로 선언했다.

이러한 이중 행보는 무기한 지속될 수 없다. 로드리게스는 트럼프의 요구에 응할 것인지, 아니면 차비스타의 결속을 유지할 것인지 선택해야 한다. 로드리게스가 “옳은 일을 하지 않으면, 마두로보다 더 큰 대가를 치르게 될 것”이라는 트럼프의 위협은 불이행에 따른 결과가 분명히 존재함을 보여준다. 강경파를 숙청하는 것이 로드리게스에게는 최선의 선택일 수 있다.

지정학적 지뢰밭을 헤쳐 나가기
로드리게스가 직면한 가장 복잡한 도전은 트럼프 행정부와 협력하는 동시에 중국, 러시아, 이란, 쿠바와 깊이 얽힌 베네수엘라의 관계를 관리하는 것이다. 이는 트럼프 행정부가 베네수엘라에 즉각적으로 이들 국가와의 관계를 단절하고 정보 협력을 중단하라고 요구한 이후 특히 그렇다. 이러한 관계들은 단순한 외교적 정렬을 넘어, 쉽게 포기할 수 없는 재정적 의무, 운영상의 의존성, 전략적 약속으로 구성돼 있다. 이를 일방적으로 포기할 경우 막대한 경제적·안보적 결과를 초래할 수밖에 없다.

중국은 가장 큰 재정적 부담을 안고 있는 상대다. 베네수엘라는 베이징에 약 200억 달러의 부채를 지고 있다. 이 부채는 원유-대출 방식으로 담보돼 있으며, 원유 인도를 통해 상환해야 한다. 현재 중국은 베네수엘라 원유 수출의 절반 이상(2025년 11월 기준 하루 약 74만 6,000배럴)을 흡수하고 있다.

석유를 넘어, 중국 국영 기업들은 베네수엘라의 핵심 인프라를 장악하고 있다. 화웨이는 베네수엘라 국가 광섬유 통신망을 구축하고 운영·통제하고 있다. 중국전자수출입공사는 VEN911 감시 시스템을 구축하고 운영하고 있다. ZTE는 주민 카드 시스템을 설계하고 사회 통제를 위해 사용되는 파트리아 시스템 데이터베이스를 운영했다. 이들 기업은 단순히 서비스를 제공하는 것이 아니라, 베네수엘라의 디지털 인프라에 운영 통제를 내장시켜 쉽게 끊을 수 없는 의존 구조를 만들고 있다. 중국 기술 기업들을 축출하려면 베네수엘라의 통신 및 감시 시스템을 전면 재구축해야 한다.

러시아는 2025년 5월 체결된 베네수엘라와의 전략적 파트너십 조약을 통해 탄화수소, 군사 기술, 전략 부문 전반에서 포괄적 협력을 약속받았다. 러시아는 베네수엘라 중질유를 처리하는 데 필수적인 나프타와 희석제의 주요 공급국이다. 이러한 러시아의 약속은 트럼프 행정부의 요구가 분명해진 상황에서 잠재적인 미국과의 협력과 즉각적인 충돌을 일으킨다. 1월 7일 트럼프 행정부가 발표한 에너지 합의는 미국산 희석제가 베네수엘라로 공급될 것임을 시사하며, 이는 러시아가 해당 시장에서 철수해야 함을 의미한다.

이란은 베네수엘라에 가장 민감한 운영 차원의 국제 협력을 제공하고 있다. 이는 이란 인력이 엘 리베르타도르 공군기지에서 운영을 구축한 드론 기술 생산이다. 2025년 12월 30일, 미국 재무부는 베네수엘라 내 드론 제조 시설에서 이란 기업들과 합작 사업을 운영하는 베네수엘라 기업 Empresa Aeronautica Nacional SA에 제재를 부과했다. 이러한 군사·기술 협력은 미국의 이익을 직접적으로 위협하며, 워싱턴에게 있어 거의 확실한 비협상적 레드라인에 해당한다.

쿠바와의 관계 단절은 정권에게 가장 깊은 이념적·운영상의 도전을 의미한다. 마두로의 개인 경호 부대가 무력화됐음에도 불구하고, 쿠바 정보 요원들은 여전히 베네수엘라 보안 기관 전반에 깊숙이 침투해 있다. 이들은 방첩 전문성, 심문 훈련, 탄압 조율을 제공해 왔으며, 이는 쿠데타 가능성에 맞서 내부 통제를 유지하려는 로드리게스에게 꼭 필요한 역량이다. 쿠바의 생존 역시 베네수엘라의 석유 공급에 의존하고 있으며, 아바나는 보조금을 받은 석유를 제공받고 있다. 쿠바 정보 협력을 단절할 경우 보안군 내부의 운영 역량에 타격을 주어 군 내부 분열을 촉발할 수 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고 워싱턴은 베네수엘라가 쿠바 정보기관과의 관계를 즉각 단절할 것을 요구했다. 더 나아가 1월 3일, 미국 국무장관 마코 루비오는 쿠바 지도부에 경고를 보냈다. “만약 내가 아바나에 살고 있고 정부의 일원이라면, 적어도 조금은 걱정할 것”이라고 그는 말했다. 그는 또한 쿠바가 더 이상 베네수엘라로부터 석유를 공급받지 못할 것이라고 강조했다.

유예된 민주주의
모호한 상태가 하루하루 지속될수록 모든 방향에서 압박은 커지고, 로드리게스의 줄타기는 점점 더 감당하기 어려워지고 있다. 가능한 시나리오는 세 가지다. 첫째, 로드리게스가 워싱턴과 차비스모 사이를 성공적으로 조율하는 경우. 둘째, 강경파가 미국과의 타협에 저항해 트럼프가 위협한 ‘2차 작전’을 촉발하는 경우. 셋째, 반란이 차비스타 지도부를 대체해 체제 전환의 문을 여는 경우다.

이처럼 불확실한 상황 속에서, 체계적인 탄압에도 불구하고 2023년 10월 예비선거와 2024년 7월 대선 과정에서 놀라운 회복력을 보여준 베네수엘라 시민사회는 또 다른 도전에 직면해 있다. 그것은 미국의 경제적 이해관계와 차비스타 내부 파벌 협상이 지배하는 권력 이행 과정 속에서 자신들의 의미를 지켜내는 일이다. 마두로 체포 이후 며칠 동안 베네수엘라 시민사회에 분명한 우선 과제가 부상했다. 현재 약 1,000명에 달하는 정권의 모든 정치범을 전면적으로 석방하는 것이다. 그때서야 비로소 베네수엘라의 민주주의로의 전환이 진정으로 시작될 것이다.

Delcy Rodríguez’s untenable balancing act - Atlantic Council

Delcy Rodríguez’s untenable balancing act

Delcy Rodríguez’s untenable balancing act

By Iria Puyosa January 8, 2026 3:32 p.m. ET

Delcy Rodriguez, successor to Venezuelan President Maduro, who was captured by US special forces, greets his son, Nicolas Maduro Guerra on January 5, 2025. (Stringer/dpa via Reuters Connect)

Bottom lines up front

• Venezuela’s new acting president, Delcy Rodríguez, must satisfy Washington’s demands while maintaining sufficient support among the Venezuelan elite to avoid a regime fracture.
• Rodríguez’s most complex challenge will be managing Venezuela’s deep entanglements with Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba as the Trump administration demands that the regime cut ties to those countries.
• Venezuela’s long-repressed civil society will need to work to remain relevant amid a power transition dominated by US economic interests and the regime’s factional politics.

The United States’ extraction of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro from his bunker on January 3 triggered an explosion of activity across Venezuelan social media. Across Instagram, TikTok, and WhatsApp status updates, millions of Venezuelans shared jubilant reactions to images of the former dictator in custody. Venezuelan diaspora communities from Buenos Aires to Madrid posted celebratory videos, while domestic users circumvented internet restrictions to express relief and hope.

The regime’s communication apparatus—typically one of its most formidable weapons—collapsed during the crucial first fifteen hours following the operation. Targeted strikes on antennas disrupted the radio communications of the security forces, while an electricity outage impacted the area around the Fuerte Tiuna Army Base. However, internet and phone communications continued to function normally. State TV and radio stations were broadcasting prerecorded programming rather than providing critical news coverage. Chavismo took refuge on Telegram channels and groups.

When government communications finally resumed, conflicting statements revealed chaos within the regime. Late on January 3, former Vice President Delcy Rodríguez proclaimed Maduro “the only president of Venezuela” and demanded his release while simultaneously assuming the role of acting president. In contrast, US President Donald Trump claimed that she was cooperating with his administration and was willing to fulfill all his requests regarding the US takeover of the Venezuelan oil industry. This dissonance highlighted the regime’s turmoil, torn between defiant rhetoric for domestic audiences and pliant negotiations with Washington.

The regime’s double game

Hours after Maduro’s removal, María Corina Machado, the leader of Venezuela’s democratic opposition movement, whose candidate won 67 percent of the vote according to tallies from the stolen 2024 election, declared on social media “Venezuelans, the HOUR OF FREEDOM has arrived!” However, despite her overwhelming popular legitimacy and moral authority, she operates under the constraints of surveillance and repression. The opposition’s mobilization capacity remains uncertain, as the Maduro regime’s systematic repression has crushed the country’s civil society.

For her part, Rodríguez confronts an unprecedented challenge for a Venezuelan leader: She must satisfy Washington’s demands while maintaining sufficient Chavista coalition support to prevent an internal fracture or a military coup. The Trump administration demands sufficient cooperation to enable US oil company operations, likely including transparent property contracts and regulatory stability—precisely the institutional environment that Chavismo systematically dismantled. Rodríguez making such an agreement with Trump would alienate the regime’s hardliners, who would view her accommodation as a betrayal. Thus, Rodríguez may be unable to guarantee the stability required for the business operations Trump wants to run in Venezuela.

Her public contradictions reflect this impossible position. In her first televised addresses as interim president, she demanded Maduro’s immediate release to demonstrate loyalty to domestic audiences. Less than twenty-four hours later, however, she declared it a priority to move toward a “balanced and respectful” economic cooperation between the United States and Venezuela.

This double game cannot persist indefinitely. Rodríguez must choose between accommodating Trump’s demands or preserving Chavista unity. Trump’s threat that if Rodríguez “doesn’t do what’s right, she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro” makes clear that there will be consequences of noncompliance. Purging the hardliners may be Rodríguez’s best option.

Navigating the geopolitical minefield

Perhaps Rodríguez’s most complex challenge is managing Venezuela’s deep entanglements with China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba while simultaneously partnering with the Trump administration. This is especially the case after the Trump administration demanded that Venezuela immediately cut ties and cease intelligence cooperation with Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba. These relationships represent more than diplomatic alignments—they constitute binding financial obligations, operational dependencies, and strategic commitments that cannot simply be abandoned without triggering massive economic and security consequences.

China presents the most significant financial exposure. Venezuela owes Beijing around twenty billion dollars in loans. These debts are secured through oil-for-loan arrangements that require repayment through crude deliveries, with China currently absorbing more than half of Venezuela’s oil exports (approximately 746,000 barrels per day in November 2025).  

Beyond petroleum, Chinese state enterprises control critical Venezuelan infrastructure. Huawei built and maintains control over Venezuela’s national fiber-optic backbone. China Electronics Import & Export Corporation built and operates the VEN911 surveillance system. ZTE Corporation designed the Homeland Card system and operationalized the Patria System database used for social control. These companies don’t simply provide services—they embed operational control within Venezuela’s digital infrastructure, creating dependencies that cannot be severed without system collapse. Expelling Chinese technology companies would require the complete reconstruction of Venezuela’s telecommunications and surveillance systems.  

Russia’s Strategic Partnership Treaty with Venezuela, signed in May 2025, commits Caracas to comprehensive cooperation with Moscow across the hydrocarbons, military technology, and strategic sectors. Russia is Venezuela’s primary supplier of naphtha and diluents—essential additives for processing Venezuela’s heavy crude. These Russian commitments create immediate conflicts with a potential US partnership, as the Trump administration’s demands make clear. The energy deal announced by the Trump administration on January 7 indicates that US diluent will be sent to Venezuela, meaning that Russia will have to withdraw from that market.

Iran provides Venezuela’s most operationally sensitive international cooperation—drone technology production at El Libertador Air Base, where Iranian personnel set up operations. On December 30, 2025, the US Treasury imposed sanctions on Empresa Aeronautica Nacional SA, the Venezuelan company operating in a joint venture with Iranian companies at drone manufacturing facilities in Venezuela. This military-technical cooperation directly threatens US interests and almost certainly constitutes a nonnegotiable red line for Washington.

Cutting ties with Cuba would resent the deepest ideological and operational challenge for the regime. Cuban intelligence advisors remain embedded throughout Venezuelan security services despite the neutralization of Maduro’s personal protection unit. These advisors provide counterintelligence expertise, interrogation training, and repression coordination—exactly the capabilities Rodríguez needs to maintain internal control against potential coup attempts. Cuba’s own survival depends on Venezuelan oil shipments, with Havana receiving subsidized petroleum. Severing Cuban intelligence cooperation would affect operational expertise within the security forces, potentially triggering a military fracture. Yet Washington has demanded the immediate severance of Venezuela’s ties to Cuban intelligence. Moreover, on January 3, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a warning to the Cuban leadership: “If I lived in Havana and was part of the government, I’d be at least a little concerned.” He also emphasized that Cuba would no longer receive oil from Venezuela.

Democracy deferred

Each day of ambiguity increases pressure from all directions, making Rodríguez’s balancing act increasingly untenable. There are three competing scenarios: First, Rodríguez could successfully navigate between Washington and Chavismo. Second, hardliners could resist accommodation with the United States, triggering Trump’s threatened “second wave” operation. Third, a rebellion could replace Chavista leadership, opening the door to a transition.

Amid this uncertain picture, Venezuelan civil society, having demonstrated extraordinary resilience through the October 2023 primary elections and the July 2024 presidential campaign despite systematic repression, now confronts a different challenge. It must fight to remain relevant amid a power transition dominated by US economic interests and Chavista factional negotiations. In the days following Maduro’s capture, a clear priority has emerged for Venezuelan civil society: the total liberation of all the regime’s political prisoners, who currently number nearly one thousand. Only then will Venezuela’s transition to democracy truly begin.