미국의 새로운 국가방위전략; 미국우선주의, 유럽 방어는 유럽이, 파트너 대국이 된 중국, 관심 밖이 된 대만과 호주

[위종민]

트럼프 2기에서 발표된 새로운 국가방위전략을 공개했네요. 미국의 이익을 위해서 무력 사용을 서슴치 않는 미국우선주의, 유럽이 더 많은 책임을 지는 유럽방어, 세계 무대에서 파트너가 된 중국, 그에 비해 문서에서 단 한 번도 언급되지 않은 대만과 호주의 처지 등이 실려 있습니다. AUKUS Pillar 1은 나가리날 수도 있겠네요. 

파나마 운하와 멕시코만에 대한 접근을 미해군이 보장할 거라는데, 애초 이게 위협이나 된 적이 있었던가? 

미국 국가방위전략의 5대 핵심 하이라이트
미국의 새로운 지정학적 계획은 거래적 접근에서 배제된 이들을 위한 여지를 남기지 않는다.

리처드 토머스
2026년 1월 27일
공유

미국은 급진적인 새로운 지정학적 계획에 착수했다. 출처: 셔터스톡/필립 야벗

새로운 미국 국가방위전략은 향후 수년간 미국의 지정학적 목표를 제시했다.
유럽과 나토에 많은 초점이 맞춰져 있으며, 미국은 대륙의 안보로부터 스스로를 분리하려 하고 있다.
중국, 러시아, 이란, 그린란드는 두드러지게 등장하지만, 대만이나 호주를 위한 공간은 없다.

최근 공개된 미국 국가방위전략은, 다보스에서 도널드 트럼프 대통령이 한 발언들과 결합되며, 워싱턴이 세대에 걸친 약속들에서 벗어나는 가운데 떠오르는 새로운 세계 질서에 추가적인 구조를 부여했다.

느슨하게 말해 이는 유럽에서 가능한 한 많은 재래식 미군 전력을 철수시키고, 나토 회원국들을 전략적 파트너라기보다는 미국산 제품과 정보의 고객이자 수혜자로 전환하는 것을 의미한다.

미국의 전환은 국경 내부에서 위협으로 간주하는 것들을 확보하려는 내향적 움직임이자, 자국의 근접 지역에 대한 미국의 패권을 보장하려는 것이기도 하다. 더 넓은 국제적 전환은 중국에 대한 집중을 강화하고 인도·태평양 시장에 대한 접근을 보장하는 방향으로 나아갈 것이다.

“방위 전략을 수립하는 것은 우선순위를 설정하는 것을 요구한다. 2026년 국가방위전략을 읽어보면, 행정부가 나토 동맹을 상대적으로 낮은 우선순위로 보고 있다는 점이 분명하다”고 정보회사 글로벌데이터(GlobalData)의 국방 분석가 폭스 워커는 분석적 예견의 사례로 경고했다.

다음은 국가방위전략의 5대 핵심 하이라이트와, 그에 따른 잠재적 함의다.

미국 우선주의

국토와 근접 지역을 확보하는 미국 우선주의 전략은, 특히 파나마 운하를 통해 태평양에서 아메리카만으로의 접근과 관련해, 미국 국경과 즉각적인 지역에 대한 지속적인 지배를 가능하게 하려는 것이다.

글로벌데이터 전략 정보
미국 관세가 변화하고 있다 — 대응할 것인가, 예측할 것인가?
정책 변화에 허를 찔리지 말라. 실시간 데이터와 전문가 분석으로 선제적으로 대응하라.

글로벌데이터 제공

전략 정보에 대해 더 알아보기

“우리는 미국의 국경과 해상 접근로를 확보하고, 골든 돔을 통해 미국의 하늘을 방어하며, 무인 항공 위협에 대응하는 데 다시 집중할 것이다”라고 국가방위전략은 밝혔다.

또한 국가방위전략은, 파나마 운하와 아메리카만(구 멕시코만)을 명시적으로 언급하며, 미국 군이 ‘핵심 지형’에 대한 접근을 ‘보장’할 것이라고 밝혔다.

베네수엘라 상공에서의 작전에 다양한 항공기가 투입된 미국의 ‘앱솔루트 리졸브’ 작전. 출처: @realDonaldTrump/트루스 소셜

미국이 이웃 국가들을 지배하려는 의도는 트럼프 대통령의 복귀 이후 명확해졌다. 멕시코와 캐나다와의 외교적 충돌에 관여하고, 베네수엘라에서의 앱솔루트 리졸브 작전에서 보듯 목표 달성을 위해 군사력을 사용할 의지를 보여주고 있다.

“우리는 캐나다에서 중남미의 파트너들에 이르기까지 이웃들과 선의로 관여할 것이지만, 그들이 우리의 공동 이익을 방어하는 데서 자신들의 역할을 다하도록 보장할 것이다.

“그리고 그렇지 않을 경우, 우리는 미국의 이익을 실질적으로 진전시키는 데 필요한 집중적이고 단호한 행동을 취할 준비가 돼 있을 것이다”라고 국가방위전략은 밝혔다.

유럽과 나토

“우리의 전략은 고립의 전략이 아니다”라고 국가방위전략은, 아이러니 없이, 유럽 파트너들에게 대륙의 재래식 안보를 주도하라고 요구하며 밝혔다.

이 전략은 트럼프 대통령 복귀 이후 백악관에서 나오는 메시지, 즉 유럽 국가들이 미군이 제공한 안보 우산 아래에서 무임승차해 왔다는 주장을 계속해서 강조한다.

외교적으로 세련되지 않지만, 이 인식은 전적으로 부정확하다고만 할 수는 없다. 유럽의 방위 예산은 대륙 내 미군 재래식 전력의 존재로 인해 인위적으로 억제돼 왔으며, 이러한 상황은 지난해의 격렬했던 뮌헨 안보회의 이후에야 변화하기 시작했다는 점은 공정하게 말할 수 있다.

“너무 오랫동안 동맹과 파트너들은 우리가 그들의 방위를 보조하도록 내버려 두는 데 만족해 왔다. 우리 정치권은 공을 가져갔고, 평범한 미국인들은 비용을 지불했다”고 국가방위전략은 밝혔다.

방위 책임의 보다 균형 잡힌 분담을 보장하려 하기보다는, 유럽에 대한 미국의 정책은 억제에 가깝다. 이는 유럽의 수도들이 지역 문제에 집중하도록 촉구하며, 미국의 시장 지향과 경쟁할 수 있는 영역에는 덜 관여하도록 하는 것이다.

“우리는 유럽 동맹들에게 그들의 노력과 자원이 유럽에 가장 잘 집중돼야 한다는 점을 분명히 할 것이다”라고 국가방위전략은 설명했다.

유럽 나토 회원국들을 강하게 비판한 피트 헤그세스 미국 국방장관. 출처: 미국 국방부

유럽은 또한 미국의 군사 장비를 구매하도록 장려되고 있으며, 미국은 군사적 파트너라기보다는 방산 고객으로서의 국가 시장을 유지하려 하고, ‘중요하지만 제한적인’ 안보 지원만 제공하려 한다.

“우리는 또한 이러한 목표를 지원하기 위해 나토 절차를 활용하는 동시에, 대서양 횡단 방산 산업 협력을 확대하고 방산 무역 장벽을 줄이기 위해 노력함으로써, 미국과 동맹의 방위 목표 달성에 필요한 전력을 생산할 수 있는 집단적 능력을 극대화할 것이다”라고 국가방위전략은 상세히 밝혔다.

그러나 워커에 따르면, 미국의 전략은 위험으로 가득 차 있으며, 이러한 접근은 최소 두 가지의 잠재적 부정적 결과를 초래할 수 있다.

“한편으로 ‘중요하지만 제한적인 지원’은 러시아와 다른 적대국들이 영토적 야망을 추구하는 것을 억제하기에 충분하지 않을 수 있다”고 워커는 말했다.

이어 워커는, 만약 미국의 고립주의로 인해 러시아가 우크라이나에 대해 돌파구를 마련한다면, 이는 “세계 무대에서 미국의 위상을 산산조각 내고” 트럼프 대통령의 국내 지지율을 낮출 가능성이 크다고 주장했다.

“다른 한편으로, 강하고 독립적인 유럽은 대륙에서, 나아가 세계에서 미국의 영향력을 제한할 것이다. 미국은 상대적 힘이 유럽에 비해 약화된다면 스스로를 지역 강대국의 지위로 낮출 위험을 감수하게 된다”고 워커는 덧붙였다.

이란–러시아–중국

이란, 러시아, 중국이라는 세 나라와의 관계에 있어, 미국의 접근은 조 바이든 전 행정부와 뚜렷이 다르다. 특히 중국과 관련해, 미국의 접근은 훨씬 더 사업 중심적이며, 베이징을 새로운 ‘대전략 게임’에서 필요한 파트너로 보고 있다.

주목할 점은, 이 문서에 대만이 단 한 차례도 언급되지 않았다는 것이다.

“우리는 강하되 불필요하게 대립적이지는 않을 것”이라고 국가방위전략은 밝히며, 중국과의 “안정적인 평화, 공정한 무역, 상호 존중의 관계”를 추구하고 있다고 설명한다.

흥미롭게도, 미국은 중국 인민해방군(PLA)과의 군 대 군 소통을 확대하려 하며, 전략적 안정성에 초점을 맞추고 있다. “이를 통해 우리의 목표는 중국을 지배하는 것도, 억압하거나 굴욕을 주는 것도 아니다”라고 국가방위전략은 밝혔다.

수적으로 볼 때, 인민해방군 해군(PLAN)은 현역 수상 전투함 수에서 이미 미 해군을 오래전에 넘어섰으며, 잠수함 영역에서도 빠르게 격차를 좁히고 있다. 또한 중국은 군함의 세대별 발전을 신속히 추진하며 — 기술이 빠르게 진화함에 따라 배치 1 설계에서 새로운 배치 2로 효과적으로 더 빠르게 반복하고 있으며 — 질적 격차 또한 동등성에 가까운 지점까지 압축되고 있다.

2016년 항저우에서 열린 G20 정상회의에서 중국 국기 옆에 선 시진핑 중국 국가주석. 출처: 셔터스톡

미국은 서태평양에 대한 지속적인 접근을 보장하기 위해 제1도련 지역에서 ‘강력한 방어 거부’를 달성하려는 전략을 유지하고 있다. 이는 중국이 지역 해역과 정치에서 계속 확장하고 지배하려 할 것이기 때문에 마찰 가능성이 존재하는 영역이다.

러시아는 주로 유럽 경쟁자로 분류되며, 북극 작전과 태평양 연안을 단서로 언급한다. 국가방위전략의 표현은 러시아를 “예측 가능한 미래 동안 나토 동부 회원국들에 대한 지속적이지만 관리 가능한 위협”으로 묘사하는데, 이는 유럽 안보에 대한 책임을 유럽 자체로 이전하려는 맥락에서 주목할 만한 언어 선택이다.

미 국방부(구 전쟁부)는 “미국 본토에 대한 러시아의 위협에 대비할 수 있도록 미군이 준비돼 있도록 보장하는” 임무를 부여받았으며, “유럽에서의 미군 전력 태세와 활동을 조정하더라도… 미국의 이익에 대한 러시아의 위협을 더 잘 반영하도록” 나토에서 역할을 계속 수행할 것이라고 밝혔다.

이를 해석하면, 미국은 영국의 RAF 파일링데일스 우주경보 시스템과 같은 자산에 대한 접근을 통해 미 본토를 방어하고, 유럽 공군기지—잠재적으로는 레이큰히스와 같은 영국 내 미군 기지—에 전술 핵무기를 배치하는 등, 유럽에 전략적 능력을 유지할 것임을 시사하는 것으로 보인다.

동유럽 국가들, 예를 들어 루마니아 등에서 재래식 미군 능력이 감축되고 있다는 점은 이미 알려져 있다. 미국은 또한 나토 지휘권을 유럽의 군사 강국으로 이전하려 하며, 아마도 프랑스와 독일이 이를 분담할 가능성이 크다. 프랑스는 이미 특정 고위 나토 직위가 프랑스 장교에게 배정된다는 보장을 갖고 있으며, 이러한 구조는 확대될 수 있다.

“국가방위전략은 러시아의 우크라이나 전쟁을 ‘근접 지역에서의 장기전’으로 오인하고 있는데, 실제로 이 분쟁은 세계 질서에 대한 위협을 의미한다. 문서는 ‘모스크바는 유럽 패권을 노릴 위치에 있지 않다’고 말하는 데는 옳지만, 이는 러시아 침공이 지닌 더 크고 장기적인 위험을 놓치고 있다”고 워커는 평가했다.

오히려 러시아의 성공은, 충분히 강하게 싸우기만 하면 이웃 영토에 대한 주권을 주장할 수 있다는 신호를 다른 독재자들에게 보낼 것이다.

“우크라이나의 파괴는, 전후 질서를 규정해 온 비공격 원칙에 더 이상 구속받지 않는 지도자들이 등장하는, 더욱 위험한 시대를 열게 될 것이다”라고 워커는 말했다.

이란에 대해서는 상대적으로 언급이 적으며, 주된 초점은 테헤란이 핵무기를 획득하지 못하도록 하는 데 맞춰져 있다. 이는 워싱턴의 접근 방식을 보여주는 사례로 2025년 이란 핵 시설에 대한 공습이 언급된다. 이스라엘은 모범적인 동맹으로 찬사를 받으며, 미국의 역내 노력은 오랜 중동 파트너와의 관계를 공고히 하는 데 집중하고 있다.

그러나 2025년 공습과 이스라엘의 가자 전쟁 및 레바논 공습 이후 헤즈볼라와 하마스라는 대리 세력의 ‘약화된’ 역량에도 불구하고, 이란은 여전히 위협으로 남아 있다.

미국의 새로운 거래적 정치 접근을 분명히 보여주는 사례는 걸프 지역의 ‘파트너들’을 언급하는 대목이다. 이들은 이란과 그 대리 세력에 맞서 스스로를 방어하는 데 “점점 더 의지와 능력을 갖추고 있다”고 묘사되는데, 이는 “다양한 미국 군사 체계의 획득과 실전 배치” 덕분이라는 점이 강조된다.

미국산 군사 장비를 구매함으로써, 걸프 국가들은 “개별 파트너들이 자국 방위를 위해 더 많은 역할을 하도록 우리가 지원할 수 있는 더 많은 기회”를 제공받고, 지역 파트너들 간의 “통합을 촉진”하게 된다.

“국가 주권을 무시하는 국제 체제에서 미국은 더 안전하지도, 더 강력하지도 않다”고 워커는 결론지었다.

그린란드

미국은 북극 이익을 확보한다는 명분 아래 그린란드를 주시하고 있으며, 이는 표면적으로는 안보와 관련돼 있지만, 경제적·강대국적 요소를 포함하고 있음은 의심의 여지가 없다.

국가방위전략은 “서반구 전역에서” 미국의 이익이 위협받고 있다고 주장하며, 미국의 영토적 야망을 “자국의 경제 및 국가 안보를 보호하기 위해 필요한 것”으로 위치시킨다.

또한 그린란드를 비롯한 여러 지역에서 “적대국의 영향력”이 커지고 있다며, 미국이 행동할 권리를 유보하는 듯한 태도를 보인다.

그린란드에 미군 기지를 유지하고 있는 미국. 출처: 미국 국방부

“우리는 특히 파나마 운하, 아메리카만, 그리고 그린란드를 포함한 핵심 지형에 대한 미국의 군사 및 상업적 접근을 보장할 것이다”라고 국가방위전략은 이어서 밝혔다.

그린란드 사태가 어떻게 전개될지는 아직 지켜봐야 한다. 유럽은 자치령으로 이 섬을 관리하는 덴마크를 중심으로 결집하고 있다. 최근 다보스 회의에서 트럼프 대통령은 워싱턴이 해당 영토를 획득하기 위해 무력을 사용하지는 않을 것이라고 밝혔다.

그렇다 하더라도, 미국이 그렇게 하기로 선택한다면, 그린란드나 덴마크, 혹은 유럽의 나토 국가들이 이를 막기 위해 할 수 있는 일은 거의 없다.

호주와 오커스(AUKUS)

놀랍게도, 국가방위전략에는 인도·태평양 지역에서 앵글로스피어를 대표하는 핵심 국가인 호주에 대한 언급이 단 한 차례도 없었으며, 오커스(AUKUS) 프로그램 하에서 캔버라가 운용할 핵잠수함 능력을 구축하려는 구상 역시 언급되지 않았다.

바이든 행정부 하에서 처음 체결된 오커스의 미래는, 트럼프 대통령이 다시 백악관에 입성하면서 불확실해졌다.

방위 전장에 새로운 핵 전력을 도입하는 것을 목표로 하는 오커스 3국 협력은, 비밀성이 높은 잠수함 기술의 이전과 완전한 유지·운용 생태계 구축을 수반하는, 최근 기억 속에서 가장 야심 찬 프로그램 가운데 하나다.

오커스
SSN-오커스에 대한 예술적 상상도. 출처: 크라운 저작권/영국 국방부, 위키미디어 커먼즈 경유

그러나 미국, 영국, 호주가 각자 별도의 방위 조달 구조를 가진 3국 정부 간 사업이라는 점에서, 책임성 결여 속에 위원회 방식으로 인도를 시도하는 오커스 프로그램이라는 문제가 지평선 위에 떠오르고 있다.

책임(accountability)과 역할(responsibility)의 차이는 미묘하지만, 역할은 프로그램의 특정 요소를 완수하도록 위임될 수 있는 반면, 책임은 체계 전체를 인도해야 하는 주체에게 귀속된다는 점에서 실질적 차이를 만든다.

오커스의 맥락에서 각 파트너 국가는 핵 기술, 설계, 유지, 훈련 등 각자의 기여 요소를 인도할 책임을 진다.

그러나 이들 국가는 프로그램 전체의 인도에 대해 개별적으로 책임을 지지는 않으며, 이는 대신 주기적으로 모여 상황을 점검하는 일련의 미국·영국·호주 군 및 정부 위원회에 맡겨져 있는 것으로 보인다.

취약 고리는 영국으로 보이며, 영국의 핵잠수함 산업은 산업 역량 부족과 현역 함정의 만성적인 가용성 문제로 어려움을 겪고 있다.

호주가 임차한 미 해군 버지니아급 잠수함을 운용하기 시작할 즈음, 미국이 이 거래에서 배제되는 상황이 벌어져도 놀라지 말라.

Top 5 highlights from the US National Defense Strategy - Naval Technology

Top 5 highlights from the US National Defense Strategy

Top 5 highlights from the US National Defense Strategy

The US' new geostrategic plan leaves no room for those left outside of its transactional approach.

Richard ThomasJanuary 27, 2026

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The US has embarked on a radical new geopolitical plan. Credit: Philip Yabut via Shutterstock

• The new US National Defense Strategy has set out the geopolitical aims of the United States in the years ahead
• Much focus goes to Europe and Nato, with the US seeking to decouple itself from the continent’s security
• China, Russia, Iran, and Greenland all feature prominently, but there is no space for Taiwan or Australia

The recently released US National Defense Strategy, coupled with the comments made by President Donald Trump in Davos, added further structure to an emerging New World Order as Washington detaches from generational commitments.

In loose terms, this means removing as much conventional US military capacity as is possible from Europe, turning its Nato members into customers and recipients of American products and intelligence, less so strategic partners.

The US pivot is both inward – to secure what it considers to be threats in its own borders – and also ensuring American hegemony over its near abroad. The wider international pivot will see an increasing focus on China and ensuring access to the markets in the Indo-Pacific.

“Crafting a defence strategy requires setting priorities. When reading the 2026 National Defense Strategy, it is clear that the administration views the Nato alliance as a relatively low priority,” warned Fox Walker, defence analyst at intelligence firm GlobalData, in a prescient instance of analytical foreshadowing.

Here are the Top 5 highlights from the National Defense Strategy, and some of the possible implications.

America First

Securing the homeland and the near abroad, the America First strategy is intended to enable continued US dominance of its borders and immediate region, particularly related to access from the Pacific to the Gulf of America through the Panama Canal.

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“We will secure America’s borders and maritime approaches, and we will defend our nation’s skies through Golden Dome for America and a renewed focus on countering unmanned aerial threats,” the NDS.

Further, the NDS stated that the US military would “guarantee” access to “key terrain”, mentioning by name the Panama Canal and the Gulf of America (nee Mexico).

The US’ Operation Absolute Resolve saw a range of aircraft involved in operations over Venezuela. Credit: @realDonaldTrump/Truth Social

The intention of the US to dominate its neighbours has been clear since the return of President Trump, engaging with diplomatic spats with Mexico and Canada, and demonstrating its willingness to utilise military force to achieve its aims, as seen in Operation Absolute Resolve in Venezuela.

“We will engage in good faith with our neighbours, from Canada to our partners in Central and South America, but we will ensure that they respect and do their part to defend our shared interests.

“And where they do not, we will stand ready to take focused, decisive action that concretely advances US interests,” the NDS states.

Europe and Nato

“Ours is not a strategy of isolation,” the NDS states, apparently without irony, charging European partners to take the lead for conventional security on their continent.

The strategy continues to extol the messaging emerging from the White House since the return of President Trump, namely that European countries have been freeriding under the security blanket provided by the US military.

Albeit undiplomatic, this perception is not entirely inaccurate. It is fair to say that defence budgets of Europe have been artificially supressed due to the presence of conventional US forces in the continent, a situation that is only now beginning to change, following last year’s acrimonious Munich Security Conference.

“For too long, allies and partners have been content to let us subsidise their defence. Our political establishment reaped the credit while regular Americans paid the bill,” the NDS said.

Far from wanting to ensure of more balanced sharing of defence responsibilities, the US policy to Europe is one of containment, urging European capitals to concentrate on the regional, less so areas that might compete with US market aspirations.

“We will be clear with our European allies that their efforts and resources are best focused on Europe,” the NDS explains.

US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth highly critical of European Nato members. Credit: US DoD

Europe is also encouraged to buy US military equipment, maintaining the national markets as defence customers rather than military partners, with America seeking only to provide “critical but limited” security support.

“We will also seek to leverage Nato processes in support of these goals, while also working to expand transatlantic defence industrial cooperation and reduce defence trade barriers in order to maximise our collective ability to produce forces required to achieve US and allied defence objectives,” details the NDS.

However, the US strategy is fraught with risk, according to Walker, who suggests that such an approach could present at least two potential negative outcomes.

“On one hand, ‘critical but limited support’ may not be enough to dissuade Russia and other adversaries from pursuing their territorial ambitions,” said Walker.

Continuing, Walker contended that a Russian breakthrough against Ukraine, if caused by US isolationism, would “shatter America’s standing on the world stage” and likely lower President Trump’s approval rating at home.

“On the other hand, a strong and independent Europe will limit American influence on the continent and thus in the world. America risks lowering itself to the status of a regional power if its relative power wanes compared to that of Europe,” Walker added.

Iran-Russia-China

On relations with the trip of Iran, Russia, and China, the US approach is distinctly different from the previous administration of President Joe Biden. Indeed, regarding China, the US approach is far more business-like, seeing Beijing as a necessary partner in the new Great Game.

Notably, Taiwan is not mentioned once in the document.

“We will be strong but not unnecessarily confrontational,” the NDS details, with the US seeking a “stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China”.

Interestingly, the US will look to establish greater military-to-military communications with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), with a focus on strategic stability. “Our goal in doing so is not to dominate China; nor is it to strangle or humiliate them,” the NDS states.

Quantitatively, the PLA Navy (PLAN) has long-since surpassed the US Navy in terms of active surface combatants and is rapidly gaining ground in the subsurface domain. In addition, as China’s moves quickly through generational developments of warships – effectively more quickly iterating from a Batch 1 design to a new Batch 2 as technology evolves at pace – the qualitative gap is also being compressed towards the point of parity.

Image of China’s president, Xi Jinping, stood next to the Chinese flag during a G20 summit, Hangzhou, China in 2016. Credit: Shutterstock.

The US maintains its strategy to affect a “strong defence denial” with the First Island Chain region, in a bid to ensure continued US access to the Western Pacific. This is one area where there could be potential for friction, as China will continue to break out and dominate regional waters and politics.

Russia is mainly categorised as a European competitor, with the caveats of its Arctic operations and Pacific shoreline. The NDS language paints Russia as a “persistent but manageable threat to Nato’s eastern members for the foreseeable future”, a pertinent choice of language as it shifts responsibility for European security to Europe itself.

The US Department of Defense (nee War) is tasked with ensuring “that US forces are prepared to defend against Russian threats to the US homeland”, claiming its forces will continue to play a role in Nato, “even as we calibrate US force posture and activities in Europe… to better account for the Russian threat to American interests”.

Translating, the appears to suggest the US will retain strategic capabilities in Europe to secure the continental US through access to assets like RAF Fylingdales space warning system in the UK, and stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in European airbases, potentially also in the UK at US bases like Lakenheath.

It is known that conventional US military capabilities are being drawn down, with reductions in Eastern European countries such as Romania. The US also wants to shift command of Nato to a European military power, probably shared between France and Germany. France already has a guarantee that certain high-level Nato positions are reserved for French officers, and such as structure could be extended.

“The National Defense Strategy mischaracterises Russia’s war against Ukraine as ‘a protracted war in its near abroad,’–in reality the conflict represents a threat to global order. The document is correct to say that ‘Moscow is in no position to make a bid for European hegemony,’ but this misses the greater, long-term danger of Russia’s invasion,” Walker considers.

Rather, success of Russia would send a signal to autocrats elsewhere that if they fight hard enough, they can claim sovereignty over neighbouring territory.

“The destruction of Ukraine would usher in a more dangerous era, one in which leaders no longer feel as restrained by the principle of nonaggression that defined the post-war order,” Walker said.

Less is mentioned of Iran, centred mainly on the desire to prevent Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, citing the 2025 strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities as examples of Washington’s approach. Israel is praised as a model ally, with US regional efforts at pains to secure its relationship with its long-time Middle East partner.

However, Iran remained a threat, despite the air strikes of 2025 and the “degraded” capabilities of its proxies Hezbollah and Hamas following Israel’s Gaza war and strikes into Lebanon.

A clear example of the new transactional US approach to politics is made in its reference to “partners” in the Gulf region, who are described as being “increasingly willing and able” to defend themselves against Iran and its proxies, pertinently thanks to the “acquisition and fielding a variety of US military systems”.

In purchasing US military equipment, Gulf countries are provided “even more opportunities for us to enable individual partners to do more for their defence” and “foster integration” between regional partners.

“America is less safe and less powerful in an international system that disregards national sovereignty,” Walker concludes.

Greenland

The US has its sights set on Greenland in a desire to what it says is secure its Arctic interests, putatively security related, but doubtless containing an economic and Great Power element.

Claiming that US interests are under threat “throughout the Western hemisphere”, the NDS seeks to position American territorial ambitions as necessary “in order to safeguard our nation’s own economic and national security”.

Further, with “adversaries influence” growing in Greenland, among other locations, the US appears to be reserving the right to act.

The US maintains a military base in Greenland. Credit: US DoD

“We will guarantee US military and commercial access to key terrain, especially the Panama Canal, Gulf of America, and Greenland,” the NDS continues.

How the Greenland debacle will lay out is yet to be seen, with Europe rallying around Denmark, which administers the island as an autonomous territory. At the recent Davos gathering, President Trump stated that Washington would not use force to acquire the territory.

All well and good, but should the US choose to, there is little Greenland, Denmark, or European Nato could do to stop it.

Australia and AUKUS

Remarkably, the NDS did not contain a single reference to Australia, the leading Anglosphere representative in the Indo-Pacific region, nor the putative endeavour to establish a nuclear submarine capability operated by Canberra under the AUKUS programme.

Originally signed under the Biden administration, the future of AUKUS with President Trump once again resident in the White House is uncertain.

Aimed at delivering a new nuclear power to the defence battlespace, the trilateral AUKUS endeavour is one of the most ambitious programmes in recent memory involving the transfer of secretive submarine technology and generation of an entire sustainment ecosystem.

An artist’s impression of SSN-AUKUS. Credit: Crown copyright/UK Ministry of Defence via Wikimedia Commons.

However, as a trilateral government-to-government-to-government enterprise, with each of the US, UK, and Australia having their own separate defence procurement structures, one problem looming over the horizon could be an AUKUS programme attempting to deliver by committee, amid a lack of accountability.

The difference between accountability and responsibility is subtle but effectively allows responsibility to be delegated to complete specific elements of a programme, while those accountable have to deliver the system as a whole.

In AUKUS speak, each partner nation in responsible for the delivery of specific elements of their own contributions, be in nuclear technology, design, sustainment, or training.

However, these countries are not individually accountable for the delivery of the programme as, which instead appears to rest on a series of US, UK, and Australian military and government committees that periodically gather to catch up.

The weak link appears to be the UK, with its own nuclear submarine sector struggling for industrial capacity and chronic availability issues of boats in service.

Don’t be surprised if the US gets cut out of the deal around the time that Australia begins to operate leased US Navy Virginia-class submarines.