그린란드는 골든 돔에 필요하다

[위종민]

골든 돔 구축에 필요한 (이미 피투픽 기지에 배치된) 조기경보 레이다 시설 외에 요격미사일 발사 기지, 지휘통제기지 등 인프라 구축에 그린란드가 최적지라는 주장입니다. 

트럼프는 협박에 굴복하면 그린란드를 꿀꺽하고, 고분고분하지 않으면 그린란드 원주민들 따위는 쫓아내고 디에고 가르시아처럼 만들고 싶어하는 것 같습니다. 다른 기사 보니 99년 조차 얘기도 나왔던데요. 

덴마크가 모리셔스처럼 그린란드를 내줄 지 모르겠네요. 당장 유럽 안보는 유럽보고 책임지라면서, 미국 지켜야 되니 그린란드 내놓으라는 것 부터가... 

골든 돔에 그린란드가 중요한 이유
2026년 1월 27일 | 말콤 데이비스, ASPI 스태프

공유
이 글 인쇄

모든 것은 지리다. 그린란드는 미국의 새로운 골든 돔 미사일 방어 프로젝트에 중요하다. 가장 심각한 위협 가운데 일부가 북극점 근처를 지나 미국으로 접근할 것이기 때문이다.

따라서 극지 방향에 센서, 미사일, 통신 장비를 배치하는 것은 큰 도움이 된다.

골든 돔은 장거리 미사일과 잠재적으로는 첨단 드론을 포함한 광범위한 위협에 대해 포괄적인 방어를 제공하도록 설계됐다. 여기에는 러시아, 중국, 북한의 핵 대륙간탄도미사일(ICBM)과 잠수함발사탄도미사일(SLBM)이 포함된다. 또한 극초음속 무기가 제기하는 새로운 도전을 포함해 장거리 순항미사일에 대응하는 것도 목표로 하며, 현재 러시아와 중국이 모두 보유한 분수궤도 폭격 체계에도 대응하도록 의도돼 있다.

골든 돔을 통해 트럼프 행정부는 다층 미사일 방어 아키텍처를 구축하려 하고 있으며, 여기에는 발사 직후 아직 가속 중인 탄도미사일의 부스트 단계에서 이를 파괴하도록 설계된 우주 기반 요격 체계가 포함된다. 골든 돔은 이전 행정부들의 제한적인 탄도미사일 방어 능력에서 크게 방향을 전환하는 것을 의미한다. 대중적으로 ‘스타워즈’로 알려진 레이건 시대의 전략방위구상과 마찬가지로, 대규모 미사일 공격에 대응하는 것을 목표로 한다.

그린란드는 골든 돔과 관련해 두 가지 측면에서 중요하다. 첫째, 러시아의 북극 요새에서 미국으로 향하는 모든 ICBM과 SLBM의 비행 경로 아래에 위치해 있다. 위협에 더 가까운 지상 시설에 미사일 조기경보 센서와 요격기를 전진 배치하면, 비행 초기 단계에서 해당 미사일을 파괴할 가능성이 더 높아진다.

그린란드에 기반한 요격 미사일은 골든 돔의 창끝에 해당하는 우주 기반 요격 체계 다음의 두 번째 방어선을 제공할 것이다. 이 두 번째 방어선은 적의 탄도미사일이 우주를 활공하는 중간 비행 단계 초기에 이를 요격하기에 유리한 위치에 놓이게 된다. 세 번째 미사일 방어 층은 알래스카와 캘리포니아에 있는 기존 체계로 구성되며, 규모가 확대될 가능성이 크다. 이들은 중간 비행 단계 후반이나, 혹은 미사일이 대기를 통과하며 하강하는 종말 단계에서 요격할 수 있을 것이다.

ICBM의 전형적인 비행 프로파일. 출처: 바이런 일리스/ASPI.

둘째, 그린란드는 이미 미사일 조기경보와 우주 영역 인식을 위해 사용되는 피투픽(구 툴레) 우주기지를 보유하고 있다. 그러나 그린란드의 위치는 골든 돔의 우주 기반 구성 요소에 대해 확실한 지휘통제를 제공하는 새로운 역할도 가능하게 한다. 이와 관련해 미래 지휘통제에서 메시 네트워크의 역할은 매우 중요하다. 미 국방부는 저지구 궤도의 소형 위성 대규모 군집 간에 데이터를 가장 효율적으로 전달하도록 자동으로 구성되고 적응하는 ‘분산형 네트워크’인, 이른바 ‘확산형 전투원 우주 아키텍처(PWSA)’를 추진하고 있다. 이 접근법은 국방부의 합동 전영역 지휘통제 개념과 골든 돔의 중추가 될 것이다. 피투픽은 고위도 위치—더 넓게 보면 그린란드의 지리 자체—가 PWSA를 지원하는 데 이상적이기 때문에 중요하다. 그린란드의 차갑고 건조한 공기는 고속 V-밴드 무선과 레이저를 이용한 지상과 궤도 위성 간 통신에 이상적이다.

골든 돔의 우주 기반 구성 요소는 낮은 위도에서의 지휘통제에 어려움을 겪는다. 우주 기반 요격기가 접근하는 탄도미사일에 도달하려면 북극점을 넘거나 그 근처를 지나야 하기 때문이다. 따라서 그린란드의 지상국을 통해 통신을 중계하는 것이 바람직하다. 골든 돔의 우주 기반 부문—센서와 요격기 모두—의 중요성은, 이 체계가 부스트 단계나 중간 비행 단계 초기에 대규모 미사일 공격을 격퇴할 실제적인 가능성을 가지려면 결정적이다. 이로써 그린란드는 골든 돔이 작동하는 데 있어 운영상의 지렛점이 된다.

골든 돔이 제대로 작동할 것인지에 대해서는 정당한 회의론이 있으며, 개발에는 막대한 비용이 들 것이 분명하다. 3년이라는 프로젝트 일정은 아마 지켜지지 못할 것이다. 또한 골든 돔은 기술적·비용적·사업적 도전에 직면할 것이며, 이는 이 체계가 결코 완벽하게 방어가 새지 않는 시스템이 될 수 없음을 거의 확실히 의미한다. 따라서 골든 돔을 뒷받침할 신뢰할 수 있는 핵 억지력은 항상 필요할 것이다. 더 나아가, 이러한 능력이 억지 안정성을 강화할지 약화시킬지의 문제부터, 동맹과 파트너의 중대한 이익에 도전하기보다는 협력할 필요성에 이르기까지, 정치적·국제 안보적 함의 역시 고려돼야 한다.

미국은 이제 나토(NATO) 내 파트너들과 협력해 골든 돔을 지원하는 데 필요한 추가 인프라를 그린란드에 구축하는 것을 가능하게 할 상호 합의를 모색해야 한다. 이러한 논의는 1월 19일부터 23일까지 열린 2026년 다보스 세계경제포럼에서 이루어졌지만, 구체적인 내용은 많지 않고 모호하다. 중요한 것은 골든 돔이, 우주 부문을 지원하는 데 필수적인 PWSA를 뒷받침하기 위해 그린란드에 필요한 인프라와 지휘통제 체계를 갖추는 것이다. 이것이 포함되지 않는다면, 골든 돔은 미사일 위협을 격퇴하는 데 훨씬 덜 효과적일 것이다. 러시아, 중국, 북한으로부터 증가하는 위협에 대응해 미국과 동맹의 미사일 방어를 강화하는 동시에, 그린란드의 이익과 덴마크의 주권을 존중하는 합의가 분명히 필요하다.

저자
말콤 데이비스는 ASPI의 수석 분석가다.

이미지: 조이스 N 보고시안/백악관/플리커.

AI는 이 기사에 어떠한 아이디어도 제공하지 않았다 — 말콤 데이비스.

Why Greenland is important for Golden Dome | The Strategist

Why Greenland is important for Golden Dome | The Strategist

Why Greenland is important for Golden Dome

27 Jan 2026|Malcolm DavisASPI staff

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It’s all about geography. Greenland is important to the United States’ new Golden Dome missile-defence project because some of the most serious threats would approach the US by passing close to the North Pole.

So it helps a lot to put sensors, missiles and communications equipment up towards the pole.

Golden Dome is designed to provide comprehensive defence against a broad range of threats including long-range missiles and potentially advanced drones. These include Russian, Chinese and North Korean nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). It is also intended to deal with long-range cruise missiles, including the emerging challenge posed by hypersonic weapons, and also fractional orbital bombardment systems, which are now possessed by both Russia and China.

With Golden Dome, the Trump Administration seeks to build a layered missile defence architecture, including space-based missile interceptor systems that are designed to destroy a ballistic missile in its boost phase, when it’s still accelerating shortly after launch. Golden Dome represents a significant pivot away from a limited ballistic missile defence capability of previous administrations. Like the Reagan-era Strategic Defense Initiative, popularly known as Star Wars, it is intended to counter large-scale missile attacks.

Greenland is important in two ways in relation to Golden Dome. Firstly, it’s under the flight paths of any ICBMs and SLBMs heading to the US from Russia’s arctic bastion. By forward-basing missile early-warning sensors and interceptors in ground installations closer to the threat, there’s a better chance of destroying those missiles earlier in flight.

Greenland-based interceptor missiles would provide the second line of defence, after the space-based interceptor systems that are the tip of Golden Dome’s spear. That second line would be well positioned to intercept an adversary ballistic missile early in its mid-course phase, when it’s coasting through space. The third layer of missile defence would be formed by existing systems in Alaska and California that would likely be expanded in scale. They could intercept later in the mid-course phase, or potentially in the terminal phase, when the missile is descending through the atmosphere.

Typical flight profile of an ICBM. Source: Byron Illyes/ASPI.

Secondly, Greenland already hosts Pituffik (formerly Thule) Space Base, which is used for missile early warning and space domain awareness. But Greenland’s location also opens a new role in providing assured command and control of the space-based components of Golden Dome. The role of mesh networks in future command and control is critical in this regard. The US Department of War is pursuing what it calls a Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) that is a ‘decentralised type of network that automatically configures and adapts itself to route data most efficiently’ between large constellations of small satellites in low-earth orbit. This approach will be the backbone of the Department of Defense’s Joint All Domain Command and Control concept, as well as Golden Dome. Pituffik is important because its high latitude location—and more broadly, the geography of Greenland itself—is ideal for supporting PWSA. Greenland’s cold, dry air is ideal for communications between the Earth and satellites in orbit by high-speed V-band radio and lasers.

The space-based leg of Golden Dome faces challenges in command and control from lower latitudes, because space-based interceptors must go over or near the North Pole to reach incoming ballistic missiles. So routing communications through ground stations in Greenland is preferable. The importance of Golden Dome’s space-based segments, both sensors and interceptors, is crucial if the system is to have any real chance of defeating a large missile attack in the boost phase or early in the mid-course phase. Greenland thus becomes an operational fulcrum upon which Golden Dome must operate.

There is justifiable scepticism about whether Golden Dome will work, and it will certainly be developed at great expense. The project timeline of three years probably won’t be met. Furthermore, Golden Dome will confront the technological, cost and program challenges that almost certainly mean it will never be leak-proof, and there will always be a need for a credible nuclear deterrent to back up Golden Dome. Certainly, the political and international security implications also need to be considered, ranging from whether such a capability will strengthen or undermine the stability of deterrence, through to the need to work with allies and partners rather than challenge their vital interests.

The US should now work with its partners in NATO towards a mutual agreement that could see additional infrastructure on Greenland necessary to support Golden Dome. Discussions occurred at the 2026 Davos World Economic Forum, held from 19 to 23 January, but details are few and vague. What would be important is that Golden Dome has the necessary infrastructure and systems in Greenland for providing the critical command and control capabilities to support a PWSA that is vital to support the space segment of Golden Dome. If it doesn’t include this, then Golden Dome will be much less effective in defeating missile threats. There is a clear need for agreement that respects Greenland’s interests and Denmark’s sovereignty while enhancing US and allied missile defence against growing threats from Russia, China and North Korea.

Author

Malcolm Davis is a senior analyst at ASPI.

Image: Joyce N Boghosian/The White House/Flickr.

AI has contributed no ideas to this article—Malcolm Davis.