The Popularity of Consumerist Culture Imported from the West. Interview with Polish sociologist and philosopher Prof. Zygmunt Bauman

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The Popularity of Consumerist Culture Imported from the West. Interview with Polish sociologist and philosopher Prof. Zygmunt Bauman

Consumerist CultureZygmunt Bauman

Kourosh Ziabari (KZ), – Prof. Zygmunt Bauman is a world-renowned, award-winning sociologist, philosopher and historian. He was born on November 19, 1925 in Poland and has been living in the UK since 1971. He is an emeritus professor at the University of Leeds and is best known for his work on modernity’s struggle with ambiguity, postmodern ethics and consumerism. He is influenced by such people as Max Weber, Jacques Derrida and Anthony Giddens. The Guardian described Bauman as “one of the world’s most influential sociologists.”

“The rising popularity of the consumerist life-model has been imported from the West or rather imposed by the globalization of Western standards… conspicuous consumption had been cut off from the task to satisfy survival needs and put in the service of positional rivalry and cut-throat competition for social standing, renown and prestige,” said Prof. Bauman in an exclusive interview with me.

Bauman has written 64 books the latest of which was published in 2012 titled “This is Not a Diary.” His books have been translated into a dozen of languages, and several authors and academicians have written articles and books about his life and his work.

In September 2010, the University of Leeds launched The Bauman Institute in its School of Sociology and Social Policy to recognize his decades-long services and contributions to the science of sociology and philosophy.

He received European Amalfi Prize for Sociology and Social Sciences in 1992 and the Theodors W. Adorno Award of the city of Frankfurt in 1998.

Kourosh Ziabari: In one of your articles, you have alluded to the fact that today they are not the parents, bosses or public authorities who can give compelling answers to the many questions and challenges of our youths. They encounter problems and find the solutions on Wikipedia, Facebook and Twitter. What’s the reason for the emergence of this addiction to technology? Does it have plagues and entail perils for the young generation, as well?

Zygmunt Bauman: You write “find the solutions”. More prudent would be to say that the young are seeking solutions on “social websites”. Whether they found them or not is a moot question; at any case this is not a question that can be answered by an unambiguous “yes” or “no”.

Why “the addiction to technology”, you ask, but also provide one part of the answer, when you say that “parents, bosses and public authorities” (what they have in common, is having been formed in times that changed considerably since) can no more “give compelling answers”. When online, the young are among their age-mates with whom they share their life experiences and the challenges they meet in their life pursuits. Another part of the answer rests however with the digital or informatics technology itself. Major attraction of that technology is the speed with which responses to queries crop up and the deceptive facility of the “solutions” such responses offer. Off-line reality calls for a lengthy and time-consuming reflection, while it renders all and any action risk-ridden and uncertain as to its results. Online, on the other hand, everything seems easy to perform, calling for little if any effort, and risk-free. Answers seem to be much more straightforward than the offline realities. And every action on internet, unlike the actions conducted in that other, offline reality, is in principle revocable – so the actors avoid mortgaging their future and so appear to be insured against unpleasant consequences of what they have done.

KZ: What do you think about the growth of the consumerism culture, especially in the developing world? It seems that it was the civilized West that exported consumerism to the developing south. Do you see any relationship between the rise of consumerism and the deeper penetration of materialism in the Western societies? Do you agree with Thorstein Veblen that people are lavishly spending their money on inessential goods and commodities just in order to attain higher social status and displaying their economic affluence?

ZB: I answer “yes” to all those questions; you got all the answers right. Indeed, the rising popularity of the consumerist life-model has been imported from the West or rather imposed by the globalization of Western standards. And yes, as in Veblen, conspicuous consumption had been cut off from the task to satisfy survival needs and put in the service of positional rivalry and cut-throat competition for social standing, renown and prestige. But you need add other functions for which consumer markets promise to cater, and for which public demand is growing fast: shopping lifted to the rank of universal substitute for morally inspired deeds, or perceived as a prime strategy to deploy in human search for happiness and “good life”.

KZ: In one of your articles, you wrote that even in some resourceful countries, people witness the government’s obedience to the market and the fact that it waits for permission by the market to put into effect its decisions and what it intends to do. Why is it so? Which countries are you specifically referring to?

ZB: The cause is the on-going divorce between power (i.e., ability to have things done) and politics (i.e., ability to decide what things are to be done). Much of the power previously possessed or at least supposed to be possessed by a sovereign territorial state has evaporated into the no-man’s land of extraterritorial, global space – whereas politics remains, as before, a thoroughly local affair, unable to reach the terrains where reside and act most of the powers setting and confining the set of options open to political decisions. That applies, even if in varying degree, to all states (all of them being territorial). Powers of numerous (and a growing number of) states have been reduced to the role of police precincts – supervising the obedience to law and order on their territory but playing little or no role in their selection.

KZ: The gradual globalization of economy and the elimination of geographical borders, as manifested in the socio-political and economic integration of European nations in the mould of European Union have contributed to the diminishing and disappearance of the Westphalian society and the independent nation-states. Can we say that the indigenous cultures are immune to such unification? How do you analyze this development?

ZB: On the contrary, very few existing states are capable of defending or promoting their “indigenous culture”, and more generally their identity, on their own – using their own, mostly inadequate, resources. That task is made somewhat easier by uniting their forces; European Union is an armour inside which the national identities of member states stand a greater chance of surviving that they would be able otherwise to contemplate, let alone to achieve and make safe.

KZ: Talking about the Machiavelli’s instruction to the Prince on how to rule the people, you wrote about the U.S. military expeditions in Afghanistan and Iraq: “the U.S. killed about one hundred thousand uniformed and un-uniformed Iraqis, but lost millions of sympathizers.” But it seems that the superpowers don’t much pay attention to the fact that their popularity and international standing steadily decreases as they wage wars and kill innocent people. Can we say that lawlessness and irresponsibility are two essential components of the superpowers’ behaviour?

ZB: All power corrupts, and the greater is the power differential the more insidious is the temptation of irresponsibility and lawlessness. The difference between “superpowers” and other, minor powers is one of quantity, not of quality – of degree, not the substance. This is in no way the uniqueness of superpowers; all powers would be inclined to submit to that temptation in as far as being able to get away with it. The danger of resorting to lawlessness and irresponsibility can be countered only with setting an effective web of checks and balances – but in our globalized and disorganized, multi-centred world of divorce between power and politics, we have not as yet seriously embarked on weaving such a web.

KZ: You have spoken of the dichotomy of hard power and soft power the governments resort to in order to further their objectives. We know that the hard power is referred to the military capability and economic strength of a nation. What about the soft power? What elements represent this soft power? Can we say that the media are crucial to the consolidation of the nations’ soft power? Are the media outlets used in a morally decent way to contribute to the empowerment of the governments, especially when they are used as propaganda instruments for attacking the “enemies”?

ZB: Instead of “yes or no”, one needs to speak of “yes and no” in any attempt to answer that question. “Media”, as their name suggests, are indeed tools, instruments, techniques, methods of transferring and delivering information – but as all tools they may be used for diverse loads – are, so to speak, indifferent to the contents of information they carry; just like the trains may be used to carry holiday-makers or the resorts they selected or the condemned to the concentration camps that have been for them selected for them. Don’t blame the messenger (or at least not him alone) for the contents of the message.

KZ: In assessing human’s individual and communal behaviours, do you give priority to lawfulness and legality instead of morality and ethicality? Let’s look at the recent shooting rampage in a Connecticut-based elementary school. Bearing arms is legal according to the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, but what has happened is actually the result of resorting to a legal excuse for doing an illegal and immoral action. Do we have to postulate that moral behaviour should be dismissed simply because it is not quantifiable and concrete while we can formulate tangible laws and regulations and so it should be only law that rules our behaviour?

ZB: The difference between morality and law cannot be overcome. One cannot be reduced to the other. Any code of law is composed on the tacit assumption that any conduct, unless explicitly prohibited, is “innocent” (allowed, tolerated) in the eyes of law. Morality would not, however, accept such premise; it could not accept it without becoming something else than morality. Besides, moral conscience would allow itself to be in such a way deceived. Moral responsibility, unlike the precept of law, is by its nature unlimited and unconditional – it requires much more than obedience to the law of land; ethical conscience, the “supreme court“ in the realm of morality, wouldn’t take the verdicts pronounced by the supreme court of the land as the sufficient proof of innocence.

KZ: You have compared capitalism’s capacity of resurrection and regeneration to that of the parasites. Why do you think so? Do you also share the viewpoint of the progressive thinkers who believe that capitalism can no longer respond to the needs and demands of the human society? They cite the Occupy Wall Street movement protests as a sign that capitalism is not sustainable anymore and that the people are fed up with it. What’s your take on that?

ZB: Being “unsustainable” (as it indeed is) is not tantamount to being “at its end” (which it is not). I wrote about the capitalism’s evident ingenuity in finding or creating ever new “host organisms”, or “virgin lands”, after the previous ones having been used-up and exhausted. The last “virgin land”, exceedingly profitable and sufficient to keep capitalism alive for thirty of more years, was people-not-living-on-credit, saving instead of borrowing money and not spending money-as-yet-unearned. That land has been however stretched to its limits and beyond, causing the 2007 banking system’s collapse. At the moment capitalism is desperately seeking a replacement, thus far in vain. And so the economic depression continues.

Via KouroshZiabari.Com

http://nsnbc.me/2013/04/18/the-popularity-of-consumerist-culture-imported-from-the-west-interview-with-polish-sociologist-and-philosopher-prof-zygmunt-bauman/

Does The Richness Of The Few Benefit Us All? By Zygmunt Bauman

28/01/2013 by Zygmunt Bauman

A most recent study by the World Institute for Development Economics Research at the United Nations University reports that the richest 1% of adult humans alone owned 40% of global assets in the year 2000, and that the richest 10% of adults accounted for 85% of the total world wealth. The bottom half of the world adult population owned 1% of global wealth. [i] This is, though, but a snapshot of the on-going process… Yet more and more bad and ever worse news for equality of humans, and so also for the quality of life of all of us, are lining up daily.

“Social inequalities would have made the inventors of the modern project blush of shame” – so Michel Rocard, Dominique Bourg and Floran Augagner conclude in the article “Human species, endangered” they co-authored and published in Le Monde of 3^rd April 2011. In the era of the Enlightenment, during the lifetimes of Francis Bacon, Descartes or even Hegel, in no place of Earth the standard of living was more than twice as high as in its poorest region. Today, the richest country, Qatar, boasts an income per head 428 times higher than the poorest, Zimbabwe. And these are, let’s never forget, comparisons between averages – and so akin to the facetious recipe for the hare-and-horsemeat paté: take one hare and one horse…

The stubborn persistence of poverty on a planet in the throes of economic-growth fundamentalism is enough to make thoughtful people to pause and reflect on the direct as much as the collateral casualties of that redistribution of wealth. The deepening abyss separating the poor and prospect-less from the well off, sanguine, self-confident and boisterous – an abyss of the depth already exceeding the ability of any but the most muscular and the least scrupulous hikers to climb – is an obvious reason to be gravely concerned. As the authors of the quoted article warn, the prime victim of deepening inequality will be democracy – as increasingly scarce, rare and inaccessible paraphernalia of survival and acceptable life become the object of a cut-throat rivalry (and perhaps wars) between the provided-for and the left-unaided needy.

One of the basic moral justifications for free market economics, namely that the pursuit of individual profit also provides the best mechanism for the pursuit of common good, has been thereby cast in doubt and all but belied. In the two decades preceding the start of the latest financial crisis, across the great bulk of OECD nations the real household incomes for the top 10 per cent grew much faster than for the poorest 10 per cent. In some countries, real incomes of those at the bottom have actually fallen. Income disparities have therefore widened markedly. “In the US, the average income of the top 10 per cent is now 14 times the bottom 10 per cent” – feels obliged to admit Jeremy Warner, assistant editor of The Daily Telegraph, one of the dailies with a long record of enthusiastic affirmation of the dexterity and proficiency of the “invisible hand” of markets trusted by the editors and subscribers alike to resolve as many (if not more) problems as markets create. And he adds: “Growing income inequality, though obviously undesirable from a social perspective, doesn’t necessarily matter if everyone is getting richer together. But when most of the rewards of economic progress are going to a comparatively small number of already high income earners, which is what’s been happening in practice, there’s plainly going to be a problem.” [ii]

That admission, gingerly and half-hearted as it sounds and feeling but no more than half-true as it in fact is, arrives on the crest of a rising tide of research findings and official statistics documenting the fast growing distance that separates those at the top from those at the bottom of the social hierarchy. In jarring opposition to political pronouncements intended to be recycled into a popular belief – no longer reflected upon, questioned and checked – the wealth amassed at the top of society has blatantly failed to “trickle down” and make the rest of us any richer or feel more secure and more optimistic about our and our children’s future, or happier…

In human history, inequality with its all-too-visible propensity for extended and accelerated self-reproduction is hardly news. And yet what have recently brought the perennial issue of inequality as well as its causes and consequences back into the focus of public attention, making it into a topic of passionate debates and eye-opening departures.

The most seminal among the departures is the discovery, or rather the somewhat delayed realisation, that the “big divide” in American, British, and a growing number of other societies “is now less between the top, the middle and the bottom, than between a tiny group at the very top and nearly everyone else.” [iii] For instance, “the number of billionaires in the US multiplied forty times in the 25 years to 2007 – whereas the aggregate wealth of the 400 richest Americans rose from $169 to $1500 billion.” After 2007, during the years of credit collapse followed by economic depression and rising unemployment, the tendency has acquired a truly exponential pace: rather than hitting everyone in equal measure as it had been widely expected and portrayed, the scourge proved to be ruggedly and tenaciously selective in the distribution of its blows: the number of billionaires in the US reached in 2011 its historical record to date of 1210, while their combined wealth has grown from $3,500 in 2007 to $4,500 billion in 2010.

“In 1990, you needed a fortune of £50 million to make it into the list of the 200 richest residents in Britain compiled annually by the Sunday Times. By 2008, that figure had soared to £430 million, a near-nine fold increase.” [iv] All in all, “the combined wealth of the world’s richest 1000 people is almost twice as much as the poorest 2.5 billion.” According to the Helsinki-based World Institute for Development Economics, people in the richest one percent of the world population are now almost 2000 times richer than the bottom 50 per cent. [v] Having recently collated available estimates of global inequality, Danilo Zolo [vi] concluded that “very little data is needed to dramatically confirm‎ that the sun is setting on the “Age of Rights” in the globalisation era. The International Labour Organization estimates that 3 billion people are now living below the poverty line, set at US$2 per day. John Galbraith, in the preface to the Human Development Report of the United Nations in 1998, documented that 20% of the world’s population cornered 86% of all goods and services produced worldwide, while the poorest 20% of them consumed only 1.3%; whereas today, after nearly 15 years, these figures have gone from bad to worse: the richest 20% of the population consumes 90% of the goods produced, while the poorest 20% consumes 1%. It is also estimated that 40% of the world’s wealth is owned by 1% of the world population, while the 20 richest people in the world have resources equal to those of the billion poorest people.

Ten years ago Glenn Firebough [vii] has noted that a longstanding trend in the world-wide inequality showed signs of reversing – from rising inequality across nations and a constant or declining inequality between nations, to declining inequality across nations and rising inequality within them. While the “developing” or “emergent” national economies scored a massive influx of capital-in-search-of new quick-profit promising “virgin lands”, populated by cheap and meek labour as yet uncontaminated by the bacillus of consumerism and ready to work bare-survival wages – work places in the “developed” economies vanished on an accelerated pace leaving the local labour force in a fast deteriorating bargaining position. Ten years later François Bourguignon [viii] found out that while the planetary inequality (between national economies), if measured by the average income per head, continues thus far to shrink, the distance between richest and poorest national economies continues to grow, and internal income differentials inside countries continue to expand.

When interviewed by Monique Atlan and Roger-Pol Droit [ix], the economist and Prix-Goncourt-laureate novelist Erik Orsenna summed up the message all such and many other similar figures convey. He insisted that recent transformations benefit only an infinitely small minority of the world’s population; their genuine scale would elude us were we to confine our analysis, as we used to do still a decade ago, to the average gains of the top 10 per cent. To comprehend the mechanism of the presently on-going mutation (as distinct from a mere “phase in a cycle”), one needs to focus on the top 1 per cent, perhaps even 0.1 per cent. Failing to do so, one would miss the true impact of the change, which consists in the degradation of “middle classes” to the ranks of the “precariat”.

That suggestion is confirmed by every study whether focusing on the researcher’s own country or arriving from far and wide. In addition, however, all studies agree on yet another point: almost everywhere in the world inequality is growing fast and that means that the rich, and particularly the very rich, get richer, whereas the poor, and particularly the very poor, get poorer – most certainly in relative, but in a growing number of cases also in the absolute terms. Moreover: people who are rich are getting richer just because they are rich. People who are poor get poorer just because they are poor. Nowadays, inequality goes on deepening by its own logic and momentum. It needs no more help or kick from outside – no outside stimuli, pressures, nor blows. Social inequality seems nowadays ever closer to turning into the first perpetuum mobile in history – which humans, after innumerable failed attempts, have finally managed to invent and set in motion. This is the second among the departures that obliges us to think about social inequality from a new perspective.

As long ago as in 1979, a Carnegie study [x] vividly demonstrated what an enormous amount of evidence available at that time suggested and common life experience continued daily to confirm‎: that each child’s future was largely determined by the child’s social circumstances, by the geographical place of its birth and its parents’ place in the society of its birth – and not by its own brains, talents, efforts, dedication. The son of a big company lawyer had then 27 times greater chance than the son of an on-and-off employed minor official (both sons sitting on the same bench in the same class, doing equally well, studying with the same dedication and boasting the same IQ) that by the age of forty he would be paid a salary putting him in the top ten percent of the richest people in the country; his classmate will only have a one in eight chance of earning even a median income. Less than three decades later, in 2007, things got much worse – the gap has widened and deepened, becoming less bridgeable than ever before. A study by the Congressional Office Bureau has found the wealth of the richest 1% of Americans to total $16.8 trillion, two trillion more than the combined wealth of the bottom 90% of the population. According to The Center for American Progress, during those three decades the average income of the bottom 50% of Americans grew by 6% – while income of the top 1% increased by 229%.

In 1960, the average pay after taxes for chief executives at the largest U.S. corporations was 12 times greater than the average wage of factory workers. By 1974, the CEO’s salaries and perks raised to about 35 times that of the company’s average worker. In 1980 the average CEO was making already 42 times as much as the average blue-collar worker, doubling ten years later to 84 times. But then, about 1980, a hyper-acceleration of inequality took off. By the mid-1990s, according to Business Week, the factor was already 135 times as big; in 1999 it had reached the 400-fold level and in 2000 jumped again to 531. And these are but a few of a fast growing numbers of similar “facts of the matter” and figures attempting to grasp them, quantify and measure. One can go on infinitely quoting them, as there is no shortage of new figures which each and every successive research adds to the mass already accumulated.

What are, however, the social realities, which those figures reflect?

This is how Joseph Stiglitz sums up the revelations brought up by the dramatic aftermath of the two or three arguably most prosperous decades-in-a-row in history of capitalism that preceded the 2007 credit collapse, and of the depression that followed: inequality has always been justified on the grounds that those at the top contributed more to the economy, performing the role of “job creators” – but “then came 2008 and 2009, and you saw these guys who brought the economy to the brink of ruin walking off with hundreds of millions of dollars.” Most obviously, you couldn’t this time justify the rewards in terms of their beneficiaries’ contribution to society; what the latter contributed was not new jobs, but the lengthening lines of “redundant people” (as the jobless are now dubbed – not without sound reasons). In his latest book The Price of Inequality (WW Norton & Company 2012), Stiglitz concludes that the US has become a country “in which the rich live in gated communities, send their children to expensive schools and have access to first-rate medical care. Meanwhile, the rest live in a world marked by insecurity, at best mediocre education and in effect rationed health care.” This is a picture of two worlds – with few if any interfaces or meeting points between them, and so also with their inter-communication all but broken (in the US as much as in Britain, families have started to set aside an ever greater part of their income to cover the costs of living geographically as well as socially away, the further away the better, from “other people”, and particularly the poor among them).

In his sharp and brilliant vivisection of the present state of inequality, Daniel Dorling, the Sheffield University Professor of Human Geography [xi], puts flesh around the bones of Stiglitz’ skeleton synthesis – while rising simultaneously the perspective from a one-country to the planetary level: the poorest tenth of the world’s population regularly go hungry. The richest tenth cannot remember a time of hunger in their family’s history. The poorest tenth can only rarely secure the most basic education for their children; the richest tenth are concerned to pay sufficient school fees to ensure that their children need only mix with their so-called “equals” and “betters” and because they have come to fear their children mixing with other children. The poorest tenth almost always live in places where there is no social security, no unemployment benefit. The richest tenth cannot imagine themselves ever having to try to live on those benefits. The poorest tenth can only secure day work in town, or are peasants in rural areas; the richest tenth cannot imagine not having a secure monthly salary. Above them, the top fraction of a percent, the very richest cannot imagine surviving on a salary rather than on the income coming from the interest that their wealth generates.

And he concludes: “as people polarize geographically, they begin to know less and less of each other and imagine more and more”… While in his most recent statement titled “Inequality: the real cause of our economic woes” [xii], Stewart Lansey falls in with Stiglitz’s and Dorling’s verdicts that the power-assisted dogma meriting the rich with rendering society service by getting richer is nothing more than a blend of a purposeful lie with a contrived moral blindness: according to economic orthodoxy, a stiff dose of inequality brings more efficient and faster growing economies. This is because higher rewards and lower taxes at the top – it is claimed – boost entrepreneurialism and deliver a larger economic pie.

So has the 30-year experiment in boosting inequality worked? The evidence suggests no. The wealth gap has soared, but without the promised economic progress. Since 1980, UK growth and productivity rates have been a third lower and unemployment five times higher than in the more egalitarian post-war era. The three post-1980 recessions have been deeper and longer than those of the 1950s and 1960s, culminating in the crisis of the last four years. The main outcome of the post-1980 experiment has been an economy that is more polarised and more prone to crisis.

Having noted that “falling wage shares suck demand out of economies which are heavily dependent on consumer spending” and in effect “consumer societies lose the capacity to consume”, and that “concentrating the proceeds of growth in the hands of a small global financial elite leads to asset bubbles”, Lansey comes to an inevitable conclusion: harsh realities of social inequality are bad for everyone or almost everyone within society. And he suggests a sentence that ought, yet thus far did not, to have followed such a verdict: “the central lesson of the last 30 years is that an economic model that allows the richest members of society to accumulate a larger and larger share of the cake will eventually self-destruct. It is a lesson, it appears, that has yet to be learned”.

To learn that lesson we need and to learn it we must – lest we reach a point of no return: a moment when the current “economic model”, having emitted all the warnings of approaching catastrophe while failing to capture our attention and to prompt us to act, fulfills its “self-destructive” potential. Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, themselves the authors of an eye-opening study The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better (Allen Lane 2009), point out in their jointly written “Foreword” to Dorling’s book, that the belief in “paying the rich huge salaries and bonuses” being right because of their “rare talents” “benefitting the rest of society” is a straightforward lie. A lie which we can swallow with equanimity only at our own peril – and, eventually, at the cost of our own self-destruction.

Since the appearance of Wilkinson’s and Pickett’s study the evidence of the detrimental, quite often devastating impact of high and rising levels of inequality on pathologies in human cohabitation and the gravity of social problems has all but accrued and goes on accruing. The correlation between high levels of income inequality and a growing volume of social pathologies has by now been amply confirmed. A growing number of researchers and analysts point out however that in addition to its negative impact on the quality of life inequality has also an adverse, halting effect on economic performance; instead of enhancing, it holds it down. In the already quoted study, Bourguignon picks some of the causes of the latter phenomenon – as depriving the potential entrepreneurs of access to bank credits because of their lack of collateral the creditors require, or rising costs of education that strip the talented youngsters of the chances to acquire the skills needed to develop and apply their abilities. He adds the negative impact of the rise in social tension and the ambiance of insecurity – the fast growing costs of security services eating into the resources that could be turned to better economic uses.

And so, to sum up: is it not true what so many of us believe, and what all of us are pressed and nudged to believe while all-too-often feeling tempted, and inclined, to accept? Is it true that “richness of the few benefits us all”? It is not true, in particular, that all and any tampering with the natural inequality of humans is harmful to the health and vigour, as well as to the creative and productive powers of the society which each and every human member of society has vested interests in magnifying and holding at the highest conceivable level. And it is not true that the differentiation of social positions, capacities, entitlements and rewards reflects the differences in natural endowments and in the contributions of its members to the well-being of society. Lie is the most loyal of allies (or is it a foundation?) of social inequality.

---

[i] The World Distribution of Household Wealth. James B. Davies, Susanna Sandstrom, Anthony Shorrocks, and Edward N. Wolff. 5 December 2006.

[ii] http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/jeremywarner/100010097/scourge-of-inequality-is-getting-worse-and-worse/

[iii] Stewart Lansey, The Cost of Inequality, Gibson Square 2012, p.7.

[iv] See above, p.16.

[v] See J.B. Davies et al., “The World Distribution of Household Wealth”, United Nations University 2008.

[vi] See www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/NI26Dj01.html.

[vii] See Glen Firebough, The New Geography of Global Income inequality, Harvard University Press 2003.

[viii] See François Bourguignon, La mondialisation de l’inégalité, Seuil 2012.

[ix] See Humain: Une enquête philosophique sur ces révolutions  qui changent  nos vies, Flammarion 2012, p.384.

[x] See http://www.trinity.edu/mkearl/strat.html.

[xi] Daniel Dorling, Injustice: why social inequality persists, Policy Press 2012, p.132.

[xii] http://www.socialenterpriselive.com/section/comment/policy/20120802/inequality-the-real-cause-our-economic-woes.

A new book by Zygmunt Bauman on the same topic will be published later this year by Polity Press.

http://www.social-europe.eu/2013/01/does-the-richness-of-the-few-benefit-us-all/

지그문트 바우만

위키백과, 우리 모두의 백과사전.

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지그문트 바우만

지그문트 바우만 (폴란드어: Zygmunt Bauman, 1925년 11월 19일 - )은 폴란드 출신의 사회학자이다. 폴란드공산당에 의해 조직된 반유대주의 축출운동에 의해 1971년 망명한 이후에 영국에서 거주하고 있다. 리즈 대학에서 사회학 교수(1990년부터는 명예 교수)로서, 바우만은 근대성과 홀로코스트 그리고 포스트모던 소비주의 사이의 연관성에 관한 분석으로 매우 잘 알려져 있다.

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• 1 생애
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  • 2.1 초기 저작
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• 3 주요 수상
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[편집] 생애

지그문트 바우만은 1925년 폴란드의 포즈난에서 비유대교의 유대계 폴란드인 부모로부터 태어났다. 1939년 폴란드가 나치에 의해 점령당하였을 때, 그의 가족은 소비에트 연방쪽을 향하여 동쪽으로 탈출하였다. 바우만은 소비에트연방이 지휘하는 폴란드 의용군에 자원하였고, 정치교육 교관으로 복무하였으며 콜버그와 베를린의 전투에 참가하였다. 1945년 5월 무공십자훈장을 받았다.

2006년 5월에, 보수적 잡지 오존에 발표된 폴란드 민족기억연구소의 한 역사가의 반공식적인 진술에 의하면, 1945년부터 1953년까지 바우만은 폴란드 레지스탕스의 잔당과 싸우기 위해 조직된 군사 조직인 KBW에서 비슷한 기능을 수행했다.

그 잡지의 주장에 의하면, 바우만은 상당수의 지하 조직원을 체포했던 부대의 리더로서 활약했다. 게다가, 그 저자는 바우만이 1945년부터 1948년까지 군 첩보기관의 정보원으로 일했다는 증거를 제시한다. 그러나, 당시에 정확히 어떤 상황이었고 어떻게 그만두었는지뿐만 아니라 그의 협력의 실체와 범위는 알려지지 않은 채 남아있다.^[1]

가디언 지와의 인터뷰에서, 바우만은 제2차 세계대전 기간에 공산주의 활동에 가담했으며, 그것을 결코 숨긴 적이 없다며 이를 시인했다. 그러나 그는 19세의 나이로 군사 첩보 임무에 가담했고, 그것이 비록 "바보같은" 사무직 일이었다 할지라도 실수였다고 인정하였으며, 누군가를 밀고 했었는지는 기억에 없다고 말했다. ^[2]

KBW에 복무하는 동안, 바우만은 바르샤바의 폴란드 사회과학원에서 처음 사회학을 공부하기 시작했다. 그는 철학 공부를 하기 위해 - 사회학은 폴란드 교육 과정에서 "부르주아" 학문이라 하여 제외되어 있었다 - 바르샤바 대학에 진학하였는데, 여기에는 그의 선생이 된 스타니슐파프 오소프스키와 율리안 호치펠드가 포함되어 있었다.

KBW에서 바우만은, 1953년에 그의 부친이 이스라엘로 이주할 목적으로 바르샤바에 있는 이스라엘 대사관에 접촉한 후에, 갑작스러운 불명예 제대하기 전까지는 소령 계급까지 진급을 하였다. 바우만이 그의 부친과 시오니즘 경향성을 공유하지도 않았고, 오히려 그는 강한 반-시오니스트였기 때문에, 그에 대한 면직 처분은 가혹하게 받아들여졌다. 실업 상태에 있는 동안에 그는 석사 학위를 마쳤으며, 1954년에 바르샤바 대학에서 강사가 되어 1968년까지 강의했다.

런던 정경대에 머물고 있는 동안에, 그의 지도 교수는 로버트 맥킨지였으며, 그는 영국 사회주의 운동에 관한 포괄적인 연구를 준비하였으며, 이것이 그의 첫 번째 주요 저작이 되었다. 1959년 폴란드에서 출판되었고, 1972년에 개정되어 영어로 번역 출판되었다.

바우만이 "일상 생활에서의 사회학"(1964년)을 포함하여 다른 책들을 출판하러 갔을 때, 폴란드에는 상당히 대중적인 독자들이 있었고, 이는 나중에 영어로 쓴 교과서 "사회학적으로 생각하기"(1990년)의 기초가 되었다.

처음에, 바우만은 거의 정통 마르크스주의 교의를 유지했으나, 안토니오 그람시와 게오르크 지멜의 영향으로 그는 폴란드 공산 정부를 비판적으로 보게 되었다. 이 때문에 그는 교수자격시험을 통과한 후에도, 교수직을 맡으려 하지 않았다. 그의 이전 스승 율리안 호치펠드가 1962년 파리에서 사회 과학을 위한 유네스코 부서의 부의장이 되었을 때, 바우만은 사실상 호치펠드의 자리를 승계하였다.

대중추수주의적인 장관 미에테크 모차르에 의해 반시오니즘 운동이 지도되고, 정치적 압력의 증가에 직면하자, 바우만은 1968년 1월 집권당인 폴란드 공산당을 탈당했다. 1968년 3월, 폴란드의 정치적 위기와 함께, 반-시오니즘 운동은, 남아있는 폴란드 유대인들을 대부분 국외로 떠나도록 하는 추방령이 정점에 달했는데, 공산 정부로부터 신임을 잃은 많은 지식인들이 포함되어 있었다. 여기에는 바르샤바 대학으로부터 자리를 잃은 바우만도 속해 있었다. 출국을 허락 받기 위해, 폴란드 시민권을 포기한 후에, 그는 처음에 텔아비브 대학에서의 교직을 위해 이스라엘에 갔었지만, 리즈 대학이 그에게 사회학 자리를 수락하였고, 그는 여기서 간헐적으로 학과장의 자리를 맡았다. 그때 이래, 그는 그의 세 번째 언어인 영어만으로 거의 출판하였고, 그의 명성은 기하급수적으로 커졌다. 사실, 1990년대 말부터 바우만은 반세계화 또는 대안 세계화 운동에서 상당한 영향력을 발휘했다.

바우만은 작가 자니아 바우만과 결혼하여 세 명의 딸을 두었고, 그 중에 리디아 바우만는 화가이며 이레나 바우만은 건축가이다.

[편집] 저작

바우만이 출판한 저서는 거의 30여권이나 되고, 100여 항목이 넘는다. ^[3]. 이 책들의 대부분은 거의 공통된 주제를 다루는 데, 그것은 세계화와, 근대성, 포스트모더니티. 소비주의 그리고 윤리학에 관한 것들이다.

[편집] 초기 저작

영어로 출판한 바우만의 저작 중 가장 빠른 것은 영국의 노동 운동, 계급과 사회 계층론의 관계에 관한 연구인데, 오리지널은 1960년 폴란드에서 출판된 것이다. ^[4]. 그는 1980년대 초까지 계급과 사회 갈등에 관한 주제로 출판을 계속했고, 그의 마지막 책은 "계급의 기억"에 관한 주제였다. ^[5]. 그의 후기 책들에서는 계급의 문제를 직접적으로 거론하지 않았지만, 그는 사회주의자로서 자신을 기술하는 것은 계속했고, 결코 마르크스주의를 완전히 거부하지 않았다. ^[6]. 특히, 마르크스주의 사상가 안토니오 그람시는 그에게 가장 크게 영향을 준 사람의 하나였다.

[편집] 근대성과 합리성

1980년대말과 1990년대초에 바우만은 근대성과 관료제, 합리성과 사회적 배제 사이의 관계를 다룬 여러 권의 책을 출판했다.^[7]. 바우만은 프로이트를 따라서, 유럽인의 근대성을 일종의 교환(거래)으로 평가하기에 이르렀는 데, 유럽 사회가 증가된 개인적 안정성의 이득을 얻기 위해, 일정 수준의 자유를 보류하는 데 동의했다고 주장했다. 바우만은 근대성(그는 이를 나중에 '정형화된' 형태로 정의하기에 이르렀다.)을 잘 알려지지않은 것들과 불확실한 것들을 제거하는 것이라고 주장하였는데 이는 자연을 지배하는 것, 위계적 관료제, 법과 규정, 관리와 범주화-익숙하고 정돈되어 있는 인간의 삶에 나타나서 혼돈적 모습을 불러 일으키는 개인적인 불안들을 점진적으로 제거하기 위해 시도되는 모든 것-를 포함한다. 그러나 여러 권의 책에서 바우만은, 그런 질서를 만들려는 시도를 통해서는 자신이 원하는 결과들을 이루는 데 결코 관리하지 못한다는 입장을 전개하기 시작했다. 삶을 익숙하고 관리 가능한 범주 내에 구성하고자 할 때, 그곳에는 그 집단의 구성원들은 분리하거나 지배하고, 관리할 수 없는 사회적 집단이 항상 존재하게 된다고 그는 주장했다. "근대성과 양가성"이라는 책에서 바우만은 "이방인"이라는 은유적인 인간 군상을 도입함으로써, 그런 불확정적인 사람들을 이론화하기 시작했다. 게오르크 지멜의 사회학과 자크 데리다의 철학에 기반을 두고, 바우만은 지금 그 '사회'의 "미결정"이고, 아직 "익숙치 않은" 사람을 그 이방인으로 묘사하기에 이른다.

"근대성과 양가성"에서 바우만은, 근대 사회가 그 낯선 사람들을 받아들이는 서로 다른 접근법들을 설명하려고 시도했다. 그는, 한편으로는, 소비자 지향의 경제에서 그 낯섦과 익숙치 않음은 항상 매혹적-다른 스타일의 음식, 다른 패션과 여행, 뭔가 익숙치않은 매력을 경험했을지 모를 여행에서-이다라고 주장했다. 아직 이 낯섦은 아직 부정적인 면이 있다. 그 이방인들은, 그가 통제되거나 규제받을 수 없기 때문에, 항상 공포의 대상이다. 그는 잠재적인 강도이거나, 그 사회의 영역 밖에서 끊임없이 위협하는 사람들이다. 바우만의 가장 유명한 책 "근대성과 홀로코스트"는, 이러한 종류의 공포들에 대한 위험성을 설명하려는 시도이다. 전체주의와 계몽 운동에 관한 해나 아렌트와 테오도어 아도르노의 책을 끌어들여서, 바우만은 홀로코스트가 단순히 유태인 역사에 나타난 하나의 사건도 아니며, 전근대적인 야만주의로의 후퇴도 아니라는 주장을 전개했다. 오히려, 그는 홀로코스트를 근대성과 그 질서를 만들려는 시도에 깊이 연결되어 있는 것으로 보아야한다고 주장했다. 절차적 이성, 업무를 더 작고 작게 만드는 노동의 분업, 다른 종들에 대한 분류학적 범주화, 규칙을 따르는 것이 도덕적으로 모두 선한 것이라고 간주하게 하는 경향성, 바우만은 이것들이 그 홀로코스트에서 발생하는 자신의 역할을 연기했다고 주장했다. 그리고 그는 이런 이유 때문에, 각 현대 사회들이 그 홀로코스트로부터의 교훈을 완전히 취하지 못했다고 주장했다. 이는 일반적으로 - 바우만의 은유를 사용해서 - 벽에 걸린 그림처럼, 일부의 교훈들만을 제공하는 것으로 간주된다. 바우만의 분석에 의하면, 유태인들은 유럽에서 "특별한"(par excellence) "이방인"이 되었다^[8]; 그에 의해 묘사된 최종적인 해결책은, 그들 안에 있는 기존의 거북하고 해결할 수 없는 요소들을 잘라내기 위하여, 사회들에 의해 그 시도들의 극단적인 예가 만들어졌다는 것이다. 철학자 조르조 아감벤처럼 바우만은, 홀로코스트에서 발생했던 그 같은 배제의 과정이 확장이 되고 있으며, 아직 활동하고 있다고 강력히 주장했다.

[편집] 포스트모더니티와 소비주의

1990년대 중후반, 바우만의 책들은^[9]두 개의 다른, 그러나 서로 관련을 맺고 있는 주제 - 포스트모더니티와 소비주의 - 를 주목하기 시작했다. 바우만은 20세기 후반기에 현대 사회에서 어떤 전이가 발생했다라는 견해를 전개하기 시작했다 - 그것은 생산자들의 사회에서 "소비자들"의 사회로 바꿘 것을 말한다. 이 치환은, 바우만이 주장한, 프로이드의 "근대적" 가치교환 개념을 뒤집었다. 이때 안전은 증가된 자유를 즐기고, 인생을 즐기고, 구매하고 소비하는 자유를 위해 포기되었다. 1990년대 그의 책에서 바우만은 "모더니티"로부터 "포스트모더니티"으로의 전환처럼, 이 전환에 대해 썼다. 밀레니엄 이후, 그의 책들에서 "유동적" 그리고 "고정적" 모더니티라는 은유를 사용함으로써, 그는 "포스트모더니티"라는 용어를 둘러싼 혼란을 피하려고 노력했다. 현대의 소비주의에 관한 그의 책에서 바우만은 아직 "고정된" 모더니티에 관해, 그의 저작에서 묘사한 것과 같은 어떤 불확실한 것에 관해 쓰고 있다; 그러나 이 책들에서 그는 속박하기 위해 더 산만해지고 곤란하게 하는 이 두려움들에 대해 쓰고 있다. 사실 그것들은, 그의 책 중에서 하나에 제목으로 사용된 "유동적 공포"(liquid fears) - 예를 들면 무형성이고 쉽게 식별할 수 없는 대상이다.^[10]

[편집] 주요 수상

바우만은 1992년에 사회학 및 사회과학 부문 유럽 아말피 상과 1998년에 프랑크푸르트시의 테오도어 아도르노 상을 수상했다.

[편집] 참조

1. ↑ Piotr Gontarczyk, "Towarzysz 'Semjon': Profesor Zygmunt Bauman, intelektualny patron nowej lewicy, był oficerem i agentem komunistycznej bezpieki" [Comrade "Semjon": 신좌파의 지적 후원자, 지그문트 바우만 교수, 공산당 보안 기구의 장교이자 첩보원이었다], 오존, no. 23/2006.
2. ↑ Aida Edemariam, "Professor with a past", The Guardian, April 28, 2007 [1] "가디언지" 인터뷰어는 그 오존의 기사가 독일에서 활동하는 보수적 폴란드 역사가 보그단 무지얼에 의해 씌여진 것이라는 것은 잘못되었다고 주장한다. 사실, 그것은 폴란드 민족기억연구소의 직원 피오트르 곤타르지크가 썼고, 뮤지얼은 단지 독일의 프랑크푸르터 알게마이네 자이퉁에서 피오트르 곤타르지크의 발견을 언급한 것이다.
3. ↑ 리즈 대학, 바우만의 저서 목록, [2]
4. ↑ 《계급과 엘리트. 영국 노동 운동의 진화: 사회학 연구》. 맨체스터: 맨체스터 대학 출판부, 1972.
5. ↑ 《계급의 기억: 계급의 역사-이전과 삶-이후(Memories of Class: The Pree-History and After-Life of Class)》. 런던: 루트레지 & 케건 폴
6. ↑ Madeleine Bunting, "열정과 비관론", 가디언 지, 2003년 4월 5일 [3]
7. ↑ 특히 "근대성과 양가성", Cambridge: Polity, 1991과 "근대성과 홀로코스트", Cambridge: Polity/Blackwell, 1990. 참조
8. ↑ "모더니티와 홀로코스트", p. 53.
9. ↑ Such as "노동, 소비주의 그리고 새로운 빈곤층(Work, Consumerism and the New Poor), Open University, 1998.
10. ↑ 《정치의 발견 (In Search of Politics)》, Polity, 1999. 참조

[편집] 이력

[편집] 바우만의 저서

[편집] 바르샤바 시기

• 1957: Zagadnienia centralizmu demokratycznego w pracach Lenina [Questions of Democratic Centralism in Lenin's Works]. Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza.
• 1959: Socjalizm brytyjski: Źródła, filozofia, doktryna polityczna [British Socialism: Sources, Philosophy, Political Doctrine]. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.
• 1960: Klasa, ruch, elita: Studium socjologiczne dziejów angielskiego ruchu robotniczego [Class, Movement, Elite: A Sociological Study on the History of the British Labour Movement]. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.
• 1960: Z dziejów demokratycznego ideału [From the History of the Democratic Ideal]. Warszawa: Iskry.
• 1960: Kariera: cztery szkice socjologiczne [Career: Four Sociological Sketches]. Warszawa: Iskry.
• 1961: Z zagadnień współczesnej socjologii amerykańskiej [Questions of Modern American Sociology]. Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza.
• 1962 (with Szymon Chodak, Juliusz Strojnowski, Jakub Banaszkiewicz): Systemy partyjne współczesnego kapitalizmu [The Party Systems of Modern Capitalism]. Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza.
• 1962: Spoleczeństwo, w ktorym żyjemy [The Society We Live In]. Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza.
• 1962: Zarys socjologii. Zagadnienia i pojęcia [Outline of Sociology. Questions and Concepts]. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.
• 1963: Idee, ideały, ideologie [Ideas, Ideals, Ideologies]. Warszawa: Iskry.
• 1964: Zarys marksistowskiej teorii spoleczeństwa [Outline of the Marxist Theory of Society]. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.
• 1964: Socjologia na co dzień [Sociology for Everyday Life]. Warszawa: Iskry.
• 1965: Wizje ludzkiego świata. Studia nad społeczną genezą i funkcją socjologii [Visions of a Human World: Studies on the social genesis and the function of sociology]. Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza.
• 1966: Kultura i społeczeństwo. Preliminaria [Culture and Society, Preliminaries]. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.

[편집] 리즈 시기

• 1972: Between Class and Elite. The Evolution of the British Labour Movement. A Sociological Study. Manchester: Manchester University Press ISBN 0-7190-0502-7 (Polish original 1960)
• 1973: Culture as Praxis. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ISBN 0-7619-5989-0
• 1976: Socialism: The Active Utopia. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers. ISBN 0-8419-0240-2
• 1976: Towards a Critical Sociology: An Essay on Common-Sense and Emancipation. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ISBN 0-7100-8306-8
• 1978: Hermeneutics and Social Science: Approaches to Understanding. London: Hutchinson. ISBN 0-09-132531-5
• 1982: Memories of Class: The Pre-history and After-life of Class. London/Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ISBN 0-7100-9196-6
• c1985 Stalin and the peasant revolution: a case study in the dialectics of master and slave. Leeds: University of Leeds Department of Sociology. ISBN 0-907427-18-9
• 1987: Legislators and interpreters - On Modernity, Post-Modernity, Intellectuals. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-2104-7
• 1988: Freedom. Philadelphia: Open University Press. ISBN 0-335-15592-8
  • 2002년: 《자유》, 문성원(옮긴이), 이후(시울). ISBN 978-89-88105-45-0
• 1989: Modernity and The Holocaust. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1989. ISBN 0-8014-2397-X
• 1990: Paradoxes of Assimilation. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
• 1990: Thinking Sociologically. An introduction for Everyone. Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell. ISBN 0-631-16361-1
• 1991: Modernity and Ambivalence. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-2603-0
• 1992: Intimations of Postmodernity. London, New York: Routhledge. ISBN 0-415-06750-2
• 1992: Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies. Cambridge: Polity. ISBN 0-7456-1016-1
• 1993: Postmodern Ethics. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. ISBN 0-631-18693-X
• 1994: Dwa szkice o moralności ponowoczesnej [Two sketches on postmodern morality]. Warszawa: IK.
• 1995: Life in Fragments. Essays in Postmodern Morality. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. ISBN 0-631-19267-0
• 1996: Alone Again - Ethics After Certainty. London: Demos. ISBN 1-898309-40-X
• 1997: Postmodernity and its discontents. New York: New York University Press. ISBN 0-7456-1791-3
• 1997: Ciało i przemoc w obliczu ponowoczesności [Body and Violence in the Face of Postmodernity]. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika. ISBN 83-231-0654-1
• 1997: (with Roman Kubicki, Anna Zeidler-Janiszewska) Humanista w ponowoczesnym świecie - rozmowy o sztuce życia, nauce, życiu sztuki i innych sprawach [A Humanist in the Postmodern World - Conversations on the Art of Life, Science, the Life of Art and Other Matters]. Warszawa: Zysk i S-ka. ISBN 83-7150-313-X
• 1998: Work, consumerism and the new poor. Philadelphia: Open University Press. ISBN 0-335-20155-5
• 1998: Globalization: The Human Consequences. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-7456-2012-4
  • 2003년: 《지구화, 야누스의 두 얼굴》, 김동택(옮긴이), 한길사. ISBN 978-89-356-5525-0
• 1999: In Search of Politics. Cambridge: Polity. ISBN 0-7456-2172-4
• 2000: Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity ISBN 0-7456-2409-X
• (2000 [ed. by Peter Beilharz]: The Bauman Reader. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. ISBN 0-631-21492-5)
• 2001: Community. Seeking Safety in an Insecure World. Cambridge: Polity. ISBN 0-7456-2634-3
• 2001: The Individualized Society. Cambridge: Polity. ISBN 0-7456-2506-1
• 2001 (with Keith Tester): Conversations with Zygmunt Bauman. Cambridge: Polity. ISBN 0-7456-2664-5
• 2001 (with Tim May): Thinking Sociologically, 2nd edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. ISBN 0-631-21929-3
• 2002: Society Under Siege. Cambridge: Polity. ISBN 0-7456-2984-9
• 2003: Liquid Love: On the Frailty of Human Bonds, Cambridge: Polity. ISBN 0-7456-2489-8
• 2003: City of fears, city of hopes. London: Goldsmith's College. ISBN 1-904158-37-4
• 2004: Wasted Lives. Modernity and its Outcasts. Cambridge: Polity. ISBN 0-7456-3164-9
• 2004: Europe: An Unfinished Adventure. Cambridge: Polity. ISBN 0-7456-3403-6
• 2004: Identity: Conversations with Benedetto Vecchi. Cambridge: Polity. ISBN 0-7456-3308-0
• 2005: Liquid Life. Cambridge: Polity. ISBN 0-7456-3514-8
• 2006: Liquid Fear. Cambridge: Polity. ISBN 0-7456-3680-2
• 2006: Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty. Cambridge: Polity. ISBN 0-7456-3987-9
• 2007: Consuming Life. Cambridge: Polity. ISBN 0-7456-4002-8
• 2008: Does Ethics Have a Chance in a World of Consumers?. Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-02780-9

[편집] 바우만에 관한 저서

• 1995: Richard Kilminster, Ian Varcoe (eds.), Culture,Modernity and Revolution: Essays in Honour of Zygmunt Bauman. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-08266-8
• 2000: Peter Beilharz, Zygmunt Bauman: Dialectic of Modernity. London: Sage. ISBN 0-7619-6735-4
• 2000: Dennis Smith, Zygmunt Bauman: Prophet of Postmodernity (Key Contemporary Thinkers). Cambridge: Polity. ISBN 0-7456-1899-5
• 2004: Keith Tester, The Social Thought of Zygmunt Bauman. Palgrave MacMillan. ISBN 1-4039-1271-8
• 2005: Tony Blackshaw, Zygmunt Bauman (Key Sociologists). London/New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-35504-4
• 2006: Keith Tester, Michael Hviid Jacobsen, Bauman Before Postmodernity: Invitation, Conversations and Annotated Bibliography 1953-1989. Aalborg: Aalborg University Press. ISBN 87-7307-738-0
• 2007: Keith Tester, Michael Hviid Jacobsen, Sophia Marshman, Bauman Beyond Postmodernity: Conversations, Critiques and Annotated Bibliography 1989-2005. Aalborg: Aalborg University Press. ISBN 87-7307-783-6
• 2007: Anthony Elliott (ed.), The Contemporary Bauman. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-40969-1
• 2008: Michael Hviid Jacobsen, Poul Poder (eds.), The Sociology of Zygmunt Bauman: Challenges and Critique. London: Ashgate. ISBN 0-7546-7060-0.

[편집] 바깥 고리

• Bauman's resume on the official staff list of the University of Leeds's School of Sociology and Social Policy
• Bibliography of English-language publications, 1962-2001
• Free full-text download of Alone Again - Ethics After Certainty (1996) from the official publisher Demos (PDF)
• Europe of Strangers - Oxford University Transnational Communities Programme Working Paper (PDF)
• Zygmunt Bauman Liquid Modernity (in spanish)
• Culture in a Globalised City - Zygmunt Bauman's contribution to Occupied London

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