2035년까지 중국의 위협에서 대만을 단독으로 지킬 수 없는 미공군

[위종민]

1945에 실린 기사를 미첼연구소 홈페이지에서 전재한 기사인데, 미첼연구소에서 실시한 워게임 결과 항공기가 모자라 2035년까지 미공군 단독으로 대만을 지킬 수가 없다고 하네요. 

워게임 결과, 미국은 2035년까지 대만을 중국에 잃을 것으로 나타났다. 미국 공군은 이를 저지할 항공기가 부족하다

작성자: 잭 벅비
게시일: 3일 전

2023년 3월 25일 텍사스주 다이스 공군 기지에서 열린 '다이스 빅 컨트리 에어 페스트 2023'에서 F-22 랩터 공중 시연팀원들이 공연을 선보이고 있습니다. F-22 랩터 공중 시연은 미국인과 동맹국에 영감을 주고 외국 적대 세력을 억제하기 위해 일련의 전투 기동을 실행함으로써 기체의 타의 추종을 불허하는 기동성을 보여줍니다. (미 공군 사진: Michael Bowman 하사)

미첼 항공우주 연구소(Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies)가 실시한 새로운 워게임 평가가 향후 10년 내 대만을 방어할 수 있는 미국의 능력에 대해 심각한 의문을 제기했습니다. 보고서 『미국 공군력 재건: 동급 분쟁에 대비한 공군 전투 부대의 균형 조정』에 따르면, 미국 공군은 현재의 현대화 궤도상에서 2035년까지 중국의 대만 침공을 확실하게 막아낼 수 없을 것입니다. 

2026년 4월에 발표된 이 결과는 대만 분쟁 시나리오에서 서로 다른 부대 구조를 테스트한 상세한 워게임을 바탕으로 합니다.  결론은 충격적이었습니다. 현재 구조의 미국 공군은 다른 핵심 임무를 동시에 유지하면서 중국의 공격을 물리치는 데 필요한 규모, 생존성, 타격 능력이 부족하다는 것입니다. 보고서에 따르면, 이 기간 내에 중국의 침공을 막지 못할 경우 미국의 안보 공약과 서태평양 전역에서의 군사적 존재감을 약화시키는 등 더 넓은 결과를 초래할 것입니다. 

보고서의 저자인 퇴역 미 공군 대령 마크 건징거(Mark Gunzinger)와 전직 F-16 조종사 헤더 페니(Heather Penney)는 공군의 쇠퇴를 방치하는 것은 "선택"이며, "인도-태평양 및 기타 지역에서 동급 적대국에 맞서 억제하고 싸워 이기기 위해 치명적인 전투 능력과 질량을 제공해야 하는 공군에게" 더 이상 유효한 선택이 아니라고 주장했습니다. 

대만이 중요한 이유와 중국과 분쟁이 발생할 수 있는 이유

보고서의 분석은 대만과 같이 방어된 거대한 섬을 점령하기 위한 인민해방군(PLA)의 교리인 '합동 섬 상륙 작전(JILC)'에 초점을 맞추고 있습니다. JILC는 먼저 대만의 방어력을 마비시키기 위해 장거리 정밀 타격과 결합된 조직적인 사이버 공격 및 전자전으로 시작될 것입니다. 그 후 봉쇄가 뒤따르고, 이어서 해안 지역과 비행장을 포함한 항구 및 상륙 지점을 겨냥한 상륙 및 공중 강습이 이어질 것입니다. 이 시점의 목표는 방어 전력을 최대한 빨리 무력화하는 것입니다. 보고서에서 설명하듯이, 중국은 "외부 세력이 JILC에 개입하기 전에 기정사실화(fait accompli)를 달성할 수 있도록 대만에 충분한 병력을 신속하게 상륙시키는 것"을 목표로 할 것이며, 인민해방군 문헌들은 우위를 점하고 대만에 대한 통제권을 공고히 하기 위해 모든 영역에서 작전을 동기화해야 할 필요성을 강조하고 있다고 언급했습니다. 

이 계획은 일본에서 대만을 거쳐 필리핀으로 이어지는 방어선인 제1도련선 밖으로 미군을 밀어내고, 서태평양에서 지배적인 군사 강국으로 자리매김하려는 중국의 더 큰 전략의 일부일 뿐입니다.  미국에 미치는 영향은 상당할 것입니다. 안보 공약을 이행하고 서태평양에서 신뢰할 수 있는 군사적 존재감을 유지하는 미국의 능력을 감소시킬 것이기 때문입니다. 대만관계법(Taiwan Relations Act)에 따라 워싱턴은 대만이 스스로를 방어할 수 있도록 보장할 의무가 있으며, 무력으로 대만의 미래를 결정하려는 모든 시도를 "중대한 우려" 사안으로 간주합니다. 

워게임 테스트 내용

2025년 6월에 실시된 미첼 연구소의 워게임은 대만 분쟁에서 서로 다른 공군 구조가 어떤 성과를 낼지 테스트하기 위해 설계되었습니다. 이 워게임은 비기밀이었으나 미 공군 요원, 방위 산업 전문가, 영국·호주·일본의 장교 등 약 60명이 참여했습니다. 

워게임은 두 가지 경쟁 부대 모델을 사용했습니다. 첫 번째인 "팀 둘리틀(Team Doolittle)"은 2035년까지 진화할 것으로 현재 예상되는 공군을 대변했습니다. 이 부대는 구형 항공기와 원거리 무기에 크게 의존했으며, 위성과 외부 표적 시스템에 의존하는 장거리 킬 체인을 사용했습니다. 두 번째인 "팀 미첼(Team Mitchell)"은 40대의 차세대 전투기 F-47과 스텔스 폭격기 B-21의 숫자를 세 배로 늘린, 보다 공격적으로 현대화된 부대를 대변했습니다. 

워게임은 배치 및 억제로 시작하여, 중국 본토를 타격하는 동시에 중국의 침공에 대응하는 단계로 이동한 뒤, 장기화된 분쟁에서 작전을 유지하는 총 세 단계로 전개되었습니다. 중국 전문가들로 구성된 전담 "레드 팀"은 미국의 결정에 대응하여 인민해방군 전략을 능동적으로 조정하며 두 "블루 팀"이 실시간으로 계획을 수정하도록 강제했습니다.  또한 블루 팀은 다른 미군 군종이나 동맹국 군대에 의존하는 것이 금지되었습니다. 이는 공군을 고립시켜 침공을 막기에 충분한 전투력을 (단독으로) 창출할 수 있는지 테스트하기 위함이었습니다. 

진행 경과 및 현재 부대가 실패한 이유

보고서는 워게임을 통해 근본적인 작전상의 문제가 즉각 드러났다고 밝혔습니다. 두 팀 모두 초기에는 출격 횟수를 극대화하고 중국의 행동을 억제하기 위해 제1도련선 내부로 항공기를 전진 배치했으나, 이러한 전진 배치 태세는 공군 기지에 대한 중국의 미사일 공격에 매우 취약하게 만들었습니다. 보고서에 따르면 이러한 타격은 결정적이었으며, 미사일 공격으로 인한 예상 지상 손실이 공중전으로 인한 손실을 초과했습니다. 

이러한 손실을 줄이기 위해 두 팀 모두 항공기를 호주, 디에고 가르시아, 알래스카 등 더 먼 곳으로 후퇴시켰습니다.  이는 한 가지 문제를 해결했으나 다른 문제를 야기했습니다. 거리가 멀어짐에 따라 출격률이 감소하고 공중 급유에 대한 의존도가 높아졌으며, 표적 상공에 머무는 시간이 제한되었습니다. 그 결과 지속적인 압박을 유지하는 대신 미군이 간헐적으로 타격 파상 공세를 퍼붓는 이른바 "맥동형(pulsed)" 작전이 이루어졌습니다. 각 맥동 사이의 간격 동안 중국군은 전력을 재정비하고 강화하며 침공을 계속할 수 있었습니다. 

두 부대의 차이점이 분명해진 지점은 바로 여기였습니다. 역량이 부족한 팀 둘리틀은 중국 본토 깊숙이 타격할 능력이 부족하여 침공 함대를 공격하는 데 집중했으나, 중국의 나머지 전쟁 수행 노력은 방해하지 못했습니다. 중국은 내부적으로 병력을 이동시키며 공격을 지속할 수 있었습니다. 반면 팀 미첼은 B-21 폭격기와 F-47 전투기를 사용하여 중국 내부의 공군 기지, 미사일 기반 시설, 지휘 노드를 타격했습니다. 이러한 타격은 궁극적으로 중국의 침공 지속 능력을 저하시켰습니다. 

보고서는 공군이 이러한 시나리오를 효과적으로 방어하기 위해서는 "장거리에 걸쳐 동기화된 대공 작전, 정밀 타격 및 기타 전투 임무를 동시에 수행할 수 있는" 역량을 갖춰야 한다고 결론지었습니다. 또한 섬에 대한 중국의 공격을 물리치기 위한 국방부의 승리 이론은 인민해방군이 "섬에 돌이킬 수 없는 병력 거점을 확보하는 것"을 막는 데 중점을 두고 있다고 명시했습니다. 이를 방지하기 위해 공군은 JILC 부대와 중국 본토의 다른 핵심 자산에 대해 고강도 타격을 수행해야 합니다. 

보고서의 뼈아픈 결론은 공군이 현재 이러한 필수 임무를 동시에 수행하고, 미국 본토를 방어하며, 핵 위협을 억제할 수 있는 역량이 부족하다는 것입니다. 저자들은 "인민해방군의 JILC를 물리치지 못하는 것은 중국의 승리로 귀결될 것이며, 이는 안보 공약을 이행하고 서태평양에서 군사적 존재감을 유지하는 미국의 능력을 감소시킬 것"이라고 썼습니다. 

권고 사항

보고서는 미국의 장거리 침투 타격 능력을 신속하게 확장하는 데 중점을 둔 일련의 해결책을 권고했습니다. 저자들은 최근 펜타곤이 두 번째 생산 라인을 적극적으로 검토하고 있다는 보도와 일맥상통하게 B-21 레이더의 조달 가속화를 촉구했습니다. 또한 저자들은 전투 질량을 늘리고 타격 주기 사이의 압박을 유지하기 위해 협동 전투기(CCA) 드론 프로그램을 대폭 확장할 것을 권고했습니다. 보고서는 특히 지상에서의 생존성을 향상시켜야 할 필요성을 강조하며, 전진 공군 기지를 위한 미사일 방어에 더 많은 투자를 하고 중국의 타격으로 인한 손실을 줄이기 위해 더 탄력적이고 분산된 운영 모델을 도입할 것을 촉구했습니다. 

작성자 소개: 잭 벅비

잭 벅비는 뉴욕에 기반을 둔 국방 및 국가 안보 전문 영국인 연구원이자 분석가입니다. 그의 연구는 군사 능력, 조달 및 전략적 경쟁에 초점을 맞추고 있으며, 정책 및 국방 독자들을 위한 분석을 생산하고 편집합니다. 그는 19FortyFive와 National Security Journal에서 1,000편 이상의 기사를 작성 및 편집한 폭넓은 경험을 보유하고 있으며, 이전에는 극단주의 및 탈사회화에 관한 책과 논문을 저술했습니다.

이 기사의 키워드:
B-21, 중국, F-22, F-35, F-47, 군사, 대만

A Wargame Just Showed the U.S. Losing Taiwan to China by 2035. The U.S. Air Force Doesn't Have Enough Planes to Stop It - 19FortyFive

A Wargame Just Showed the U.S. Losing Taiwan to China by 2035. The U.S. Air Force Doesn't Have Enough Planes to Stop It

A Wargame Just Showed the U.S. Losing Taiwan to China by 2035. The U.S. Air Force Doesn’t Have Enough Planes to Stop It

By

Jack Buckby

Published

3 days ago

• 

Members of the F-22 Raptor Aerial Demonstration Team perform at the Dyess Big Country Air Fest 2023, Dyess AFB, TX, March 25th, 2023. The F-22 Raptor Aerial Demonstration showcases the unmatched maneuverability of the airframe by executing a series of combat maneuvers to inspire Americans and their allies, and deter foreign adversaries. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Michael Bowman)

A new wargame assessment conducted by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies has raised serious questions about the United States’ ability to defend Taiwan in the next decade. According to the report, Rebuilding American Airpower: Balancing the Air Force’s Combat Forces for Peer Conflict, the U.S. Air Force – on its current modernization trajectory – would not be able to reliably prevent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan by 2035.

The findings, released in April 2026, are based on a detailed wargame that tested different force structures in a Taiwan conflict scenario.

The conclusion was shocking: the U.S. Air Force, as it is currently structured, lacks the size, survivability, and strike capacity required to defeat a Chinese assault while simultaneously maintaining other core missions.

According to the report, a failure to stop a Chinese invasion in this period would carry wider consequences, weakening U.S. security commitments and its military presence across the Western Pacific. 

The authors, retired U.S. Air Force Colonel Mark Gunzinger and former F-16 pilot Heather Penney, argued in the report that allowing the Air Force to continue its decline is a “choice,” and that it is no longer a viable one “for an Air Force that must provide the lethal combat capabilities and mass to deter, fight, and win against peer adversaries in the Indo-Pacific and other regions.” 

Why Taiwan Matters and Why A Conflict May Occur with China

The report’s analysis focuses on the Joint Island Landing Campaign (JILC), which is the People’s Liberation Army’s doctrine for seizing a large, defended island like Taiwan.

A JILC would begin with coordinated cyberattacks and electronic warfare combined with long-range precision strikes to first paralyze Taiwan’s defenses.

It would then be followed by blockades, and later by amphibious and airborne assaults targeting ports and landing zones – including coastal sites and airfields.

The objective at this point would be to neutralize defenses as quickly as possible.

As the report explains, China would aim to “rapidly land enough forces on Taiwan to achieve a fait accompli before outside forces could intervene against the JILC,” noting that PLA writings stress the need to synchronize operations across all domains to establish its dominance and consolidate control over Taiwan. 

Image: Creative Commons.

The plan is just one part of a larger Chinese strategy that involves pushing U.S. forces out of the first island chain – the defensive perimeter that runs from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines – and establishing itself as the dominant military power in the Western Pacific.

The implications for the United States would be significant; it would diminish America’s ability to meet its security commitments and maintain a reliable military presence in the Western Pacific. 

Under the Taiwan Relations Act, Washington is committed to ensuring Taiwan can defend itself and treats any attempt to determine Taiwan’s future by force as a matter of “grave concern.” 

What the Wargame Tested

The Mitchell Institute’s wargame, conducted in June 2025, was designed to test how different Air Force structures would perform in a Taiwan conflict.

It was unclassified but involved around 60 participants, including U.S. Air Force personnel, defense industry experts, and officers from the United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan. 

The wargame used two competing force models. The first, known as “Team Doolittle,” represented the Air Force as it is currently projected to evolve by 2035.

The force relied heavily on legacy aircraft and standoff weapons, using long-range kill chains dependent on satellites and external targeting systems. 

The second, “Team Mitchell,” represented a more aggressively modernized force that included 40 F-47 next-generation fighters and triple the number of stealthy B-21 bombers. 

B-21 Raider. Image Credit: U.S. Air Force.

The wargame then unfolded in three phases, starting with deployment and deterrence, moving to countering a Chinese invasion while launching strikes into mainland China, and then sustaining operations in a prolonged conflict.

A dedicated “red team” of China experts actively adapted PLA strategy in response to U.S. decisions, forcing both blue teams to adjust their plans in real time. The blue teams were also prohibited from relying on other U.S. services or allied forces, as the exercise was intended to isolate the Air Force and test whether it could (alone) generate enough combat power to stop an invasion.

How It Played Out, and Why the Current Force Failed

The report revealed that the wargames quickly exposed a fundamental operational problem. Both teams initially deployed aircraft forward into the first island chain to maximize sortie generation and deter Chinese action – but that forward posture made them highly vulnerable to Chinese missile strikes on airbases. 

According to the report, those strikes proved decisive, with expected ground losses from missile attacks exceeding those from air combat. 

To reduce those losses, both teams pulled aircraft back to more distant locations, including Australia, Diego Garcia, and Alaska.

That solved one problem but created another – distance reduced sortie rates and increased reliance on aerial refueling, and limited time over target. It resulted in what’s known as “pulsed” operations – where, instead of maintaining constant pressure, U.S. forces launched intermittent waves of strikes. Between each pulse, the Chinese forces were capable of regrouping and reinforcing their power and continuing the invasion. 

It was at this point that the difference between the two forces became clear. 

The less capable Team Doolittle lacked the ability to strike deep into mainland China, focusing on attacking the invasion fleet, but could not disrupt the rest of the Chinese war effort. China was able to move forces internally and sustain the assault. 

But Team Mitchell used the B-21 bombers and F-47 fighters to strike Chinese airbases, missile infrastructure, and command nodes inside China. Those strikes ultimately degraded China’s ability to sustain the invasion. 

F-47 Fighter. Image Credit: U.S. Air Force.

F-47 Fighter from U.S. Air Force.

The report concluded that in order for the Air Force to effectively defend against such a scenario, it must have the capacity to “simultaneously conduct synchronized counterair operations, precision strikes, and other combat missions over long ranges.”

It states that the Department of Defense’s theory of victory for defeating a Chinese assault on the island centers on preventing the PLA from “achieving an irreversible force lodgement on the island.”

To prevent that, the Air Force would need to conduct high-intensity strikes against JILC forces and other key assets on the Chinese mainland. 

Its damning conclusion was that the Air Force presently lacks the capacity to simultaneously perform these necessary missions, defend the U.S. homeland, and deter nuclear threats. 

“Failing to defeat a PLA JILC would result in a victory for China that diminishes America’s ability to meet its security commitments and maintain its military presence in the Western Pacific,” the authors write. 

What It Recommended

The report makes a series of recommendations to resolve the problem, with a focus on rapidly expanding American long-range, penetrating strike capability.

B-21 Raider Bomber. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

B-21 Raider. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

The authors call for accelerated procurement of the B-21 Raider – which fits with recent reports of a second production line being actively considered by the Pentagon. The authors also recommend significantly expanding the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drone program to increase combat mass and sustain pressure between strike cycles. 

The report also stresses the need to improve survivability, particularly on the ground, calling for greater investment in missile defenses for forward airbases and a more resilient and distributed operating model to reduce losses from Chinese strikes. 

About the Author: Jack Buckby 

Jack Buckby is a British researcher and analyst specializing in defense and national security, based in New York. His work focuses on military capability, procurement, and strategic competition, producing and editing analysis for policy and defense audiences. He brings extensive editorial experience, with a career output spanning over 1,000 articles at 19FortyFive and National Security Journal, and has previously authored books and papers on extremism and deradicalization.

In this article:B-21, China, F-22, F-35, F-47, Military, Taiwan

Written ByJack Buckby

Jack Buckby is 19FortyFive's Breaking News Editor. He is a British author, counter-extremism researcher, and journalist based in New York. Reporting on the U.K., Europe, and the U.S., he works to analyze and understand left-wing and right-wing radicalization, and reports on Western governments’ approaches to the pressing issues of today. His books and research papers explore these themes and propose pragmatic solutions to our increasingly polarized society.

[백선호]

대만도 이란처럼 땅굴 파고 '독종'이 되면 어떻게 버틸 것 같기도 하네요...

[위종민]

대만과 한국 포함, 등 따숩고 배부르게 살았던 1세계 국민들이 그런 독종이 될 수 있을지가 문제겠죠? ㅜㅜ