미국의 호르무즈 봉쇄; 누가 우위에 서 있는가?

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RUSI의 기사입니다. 

이란은 원거리 봉쇄를 시행하는 미해군 함정을 타격할 수단이 거의 없고, 통행료로는 석유수출 감소분을 상쇄하기가 어렵지만, 대신 미국도 선박들이 이란에 통행료를 냈는지를 (특히나 소규모 금융기관을 통해 위안화로 냈다면) 추적하기 힘들 거라고 합니다. 대신 미국은 선주들이 이란 주변 항로가 아니라 오만 주변 항로를 이용하라고 강요하기가 어렵고, 이란 연계 선박들의 환적을 추적하는 데에는 비용이 많이 들고 배도 많이 필요하며, 미해병대 등 저항을 물리치고 화물선에 승선할 수 있는 요원들도 필요하다고 하네요. 

기뢰 등을 이용한 근접봉쇄는 이란 경제에 더 치명적일 수 있지만, 그만큼 이란의 거센 반격(푸자이라의 석유산업지대, 사우디나 카타르의 LNG 플랜트, 대함미사일이나 미젯 등을 이용한 선박 공격 등)을 불러일으킬 수 있다고 합니다. 

호르무즈에 대한 미국의 봉쇄: 누가 우위를 점하고 있는가?
Dr Sidharth Kaushal 및 Dan Marks
2026년 5월 5일
10분 읽기

USS Rafael Peralta(DDG 115) 함교에서 미 해군 수병이 이란 항구 및 연안 지역으로 출입하는 선박들에 대한 해상 봉쇄 작전 중 항적을 모니터링하고 있다.

미국과 이란이 걸프 지역 석유·가스 흐름을 방해하려는 노력은 최종 합의에 영향을 미치려는 의도 면에서 서로를 반영하고 있다. 

미국의 호르무즈 해협 봉쇄는 이제 3주째에 접어들었다. 미 해군은 이란과 연계된 선박 38척의 항로 변경을 강제했고, 걸프 지역과 인도양 먼바다에서 이란 선박들을 승선 검색했다. 한편 이란은 선택적 봉쇄 전략을 재개해, 비이란 선박의 해협 통과를 개별 사례별로만 허용하고 있으며, 명백히 통행료를 대가로 요구하고 있다. 이란 의회는 현재 통행료 징수 권한을 공식화하는 법안을 통과시키는 절차를 진행 중이다. 5월 4일 미국은 머스크(Maersk) 소속 미국 국적 선박 최소 1척의 통과도 지원했고, 이에 대응해 이란은 지역 인프라를 공격했다.

전략적 최종 목표는 점점 더 명확해지고 있다. 이란은 자국 수출을 회복하고, 호르무즈 통제력을 수익화하며, 이를 통해 레바논 휴전과 나아가 헤즈볼라를 보호하려 한다. 반면 트럼프 행정부는 최소한 이란 핵 프로그램, 어쩌면 재래식 미사일 전력까지 포함하는 더 광범위한 합의와 압박을 연계하려는 것으로 보인다. 문제는 어느 쪽이 우위를 점하고 있느냐이다.

원거리 봉쇄의 한계

이란은 오만만 외곽이나 그 너머에서 작전 중인 미 해군 함정을 직접 타격할 수 있는 선택지가 거의 없다. 이란 혁명수비대(IRGC)는 이런 거리에서 해상 표적을 추적하는 데 필요한 저지연 데이터를 확보하는 데 한계가 있으며, 많은 대함순항미사일과 기타 능력도 페르시아만 자체를 위협할 수 있는 케심(Qeshm) 같은 전초기지에 집중되어 있다. 혁명수비대 해군은 미군의 기뢰 제거 작전 등을 방해할 수는 있지만, 원거리 봉쇄에 대응할 군사적 선택지는 제한적이다. 미 해군에 대한 가장 큰 위험은 선박 보호를 위해 걸프 내부로 전진 배치될 경우 발생할 것이며, 현재 그런 움직임이 제한적으로 시작되고 있다.

이란의 첫 번째 간접 대응 수단은 비이란 항구로 향하는 선박들에 더 높은 통행료를 부과해 수출 감소분을 상쇄하는 것이다. 트럼프 행정부는 이러한 통행료를 지불하는 선박에 비용을 부과하겠다고 위협했지만, 실제 준수 여부를 입증하기는 쉽지 않다. 선박이 혁명수비대가 지정한 이란 연안 인접 항로를 따른다면, 그것이 통행료 지급의 증거인가, 아니면 단순히 선원 안전을 위한 결정인가? 만약 지불이 달러 체계 노출이 적은 소규모 금융기관을 통해 위안화로 이뤄진다면, 입증 문제는 더욱 복잡해진다.

그러나 통행료만으로는 하루 약 150만 배럴 규모의 석유 수출 수익 손실을 대체하기 어렵다. 현재 호르무즈 통과 선박 수가 하루 수십 척 수준에 머무는 상황에서, 높은 통행료조차 수출 감소분을 보전하지 못할 것이다. 문제는 단순한 단기 현금 흐름만이 아니다. 이란이 석유를 수출하지 못하면 육상 저장시설이 포화되고, 임시 저장시설과 폐쇄 시설에 의존하게 되며, 결국 유정 가동 중단과 이에 따른 장기적 생산 설비 손상 위험에 직면하게 된다. 어떤 수준의 통행료도 이란이 대체할 수 없는 해상 수입 감소의 경제적 충격을 완화할 수는 없다.

봉쇄 돌파 시도가 늘어날 경우, 그 부담은 이란보다 미국에 더 크게 작용할 가능성이 높다.

통행료 체계를 의미 있게 만들기 위해서는 이란이 호르무즈를 통한 선박 통과량을 회복시켜야 한다. 그래야 통행료 수익이 늘어나고, 선박 간 환적(ship-to-ship transfer)을 통해 이란산 석유 이동을 위장할 기회도 생긴다. 러시아산 석유와 과거 이란-이라크 유조선 전쟁, 흑해 사례처럼 새로운 선주들, 비P&I 보험사, 그림자 선단 운영자 시장이 형성될 수도 있다. 러시아 그림자 선단용으로 건조된 동아시아 초대형 유조선(VLCC) 공급 과잉도 도움이 될 것이다. 이란이 통행료를 낸 선박들에 안전 통항을 제공한다면, 설령 이들이 이란 항구를 피하더라도 미국의 차단을 회피할 유인이 커질 것이다.

그 결과 역할이 역전되는 상황이 만들어질 수 있다. 이란은 자국 조건 아래서라도 해협 통과 선박을 장려할 유인을 갖게 되고, 반대로 미국은 이를 제한할 유인을 갖게 된다.

미국은 난처한 문제에 직면하게 된다. 오만 인근 항로를 개방·장려하면서 혁명수비대가 요구하는 라라크(Larak) 인근 항로를 이용하는 선박은 차단하는 방식으로 이란 전략을 거울처럼 모방할 수도 있다. 그러나 이는 선주들이 정치적 이유가 아니라 안전상의 이유로 이란 지시를 따른 것이라고 주장할 여러 국가 선박들의 항로를 바꾸거나 차단해야 함을 의미한다. 선박 간 환적으로 이란산 석유를 수령한 선박은 보다 명확한 근거로 차단할 수 있지만, 이를 위해서는 높은 수준의 상황 인식이 필요하다. 이런 환적 추적은 자원 소모가 크다. 북한 제재 집행에도 P-8 포세이돈 같은 제한된 수량의 자산이 필요했다. 또한 제3국 선박을 겨냥할 경우 외교적 마찰도 초래할 수 있다.

원거리 압박에서 근접 봉쇄로

봉쇄 돌파 시도가 증가하면 부담은 이란보다 미국에 더 크게 작용할 가능성이 높다. 현재 미국 전력은 제한적 차단 작전은 수행할 수 있지만, 대규모 차단은 전혀 다른 문제다. 실제로 일부 이란 연계 선박들이 미국 봉쇄를 빠져나가고 있다는 조짐도 나타나고 있다. 보다 포괄적인 봉쇄는 미국의 글로벌 군사 태세에 상당한 영향을 줄 것이다. 예를 들어 유고슬라비아 무기 금수 조치를 집행했던 NATO의 샤프 가드(Operation Sharp Guard)는 동시에 22척을 배치 상태로 유지하기 위해 약 100척의 연합 함정을 필요로 했다. 비슷한 강도의 호르무즈 작전 역시 더 많은 미 해병대 또는 특수부대 승선·검색·압수팀이 필요할 것이다. 이란이 원유 운반 선박 일부에 무장 경비원을 배치할 경우, 미 해군 승선팀은 원래 저항이 있는 승선을 상정하지 않기 때문이다. 장기적인 원거리 봉쇄는 미 해군, 해병대, 특수부대의 글로벌 태세에 상당한 파급효과를 미칠 것이다.

이란은 또한 잠재적 봉쇄 돌파 세력에 대해 우위를 유지할 것이다. 혁명수비대 해군은 미국 해군이 상선에 대해 사용하기 어려운 수준의 치명적 무력을 행사할 수 있으며, 이는 선주들이 이란 규칙을 따르도록 유도한다. 잠재적 운영자들 상당수는 이미 이란산 혹은 러시아산 석유 운송 경험이 있는 네트워크 출신일 것이다. 또한 미국과 달리 이란은 접근 자체를 수익화할 수 있다.

따라서 시간이 지날수록 원거리 봉쇄는 더 많은 미군 전력을 끌어들이고, 결국 이란 항구에 대한 근접 봉쇄 유인을 만들어낼 수 있다. 트럼프 행정부는 두 가지 선택지에 직면하게 된다. 이란의 저장 위기가 테헤란 입장 변화를 빠르게 강요할 것이라 기대하거나, 아니면 보다 강압적인 근접 봉쇄로 이동하는 것이다. 후자는 베트남전 당시 미국이 하이퐁 항만에 대해 했던 것처럼 공중 투하 기뢰로 수행할 수 있다. F/A-18 같은 항공기에서 투하된 Quickstrike 기뢰는 이란 항구와 이란 연안 항로 주변에 부설된 뒤, 법적으로 필요한 경고 기간 이후 활성화될 수 있다. 최소한 이는 상호 봉쇄 상태를 만들 것이다. 양측 모두 고통스럽지만, 이란에 더 큰 피해를 주는 형태다.

상호 봉쇄와 확전

이란이 근접 봉쇄를 상쇄할 만큼 충분한 통행료 체계를 구축하지 못할 경우, 최선의 선택은 모든 선박의 통과를 불가능하게 만들겠다는 위협을 현실화하는 것이다. 혁명수비대 해군은 이를 위한 여러 수단을 보유하고 있다. 무인수상정, 중국 C-802 기반 Noor 해안방어 순항미사일, 후티 Samad 계열과 유사한 UAV, 그리고 제한적 항속거리와 항구 내 취약성을 가지지만 은밀히 기뢰를 부설할 수 있는 북한 Yono급 기반 Ghadir 소형 잠수함 등이 그것이다.

이란은 또한 워싱턴과 미국 동맹국들에 긴박감을 조성하기 위해 걸프 지역 다른 곳에 대한 선택적 공격을 재개할 유인도 갖고 있다. 최근 UAE 푸자이라 석유 산업지대에 대한 드론 공격은 미국 접근법이 바뀔 경우 앞으로 더 많은 공격이 이어질 가능성을 보여주는 전조일 수 있다. 호르무즈 봉쇄 자체도 피해가 크지만, 보다 장기적인 피해는 사우디 라스타누라와 카타르 라스라판 LNG 시설을 포함한 저장·정제 인프라 공격에서 발생할 수 있다. 과잉 원유 생산 능력 문제는 이란만의 문제가 아니다. 사우디 역시 생산 감축을 피하기 위해 해상 벙커링에 의존해왔다.

그러나 대규모 육상 인프라 공격은 이란이 자국 인프라와 헤즈볼라 보호를 위해 의존하는 걸프·레바논 부분 휴전을 위태롭게 할 것이다. 보다 가능성 높은 시나리오는 선택적 신호 발신이다. 즉 2019년 아브카이크·쿠라이스 공격과 유사한 공격, 그리고 사우디가 육상 파이프라인 이후 일부 원유를 이동시키는 얀부 같은 시설에 대한 후티 압박이 결합될 가능성이다.

경제적 영향 역시 심각할 수 있다. 12개월 이상 LNG 공급 제약, 육상 인프라 중대한 피해, 장기적 해협 봉쇄가 결합된 시나리오에서는 유럽 가스 수요를 약 150억 입방미터 줄여야 할 수 있으며, 이는 소비량의 약 12%에 해당한다. 이는 2022년과 비슷한 수준이지만, 대체 수입 확보는 훨씬 어려운 상황에서 발생한다. 미국 입장에서 문제는 단순히 동맹국들의 고통만이 아니다. 탄화수소 가격 상승, 소비자 비용 증가, 인플레이션 압력 등 2차 경제 효과가 연준 결정과 연말 중간선거에도 영향을 미칠 수 있다. 초과이윤세나 특정 산업 지원이 충격을 완화할 수는 있지만, 정치적 실현 가능성은 불확실하다.

그러나 이란 역시 강한 압박을 받을 것이다. 경화와 산업 투입재 상실이 자동적으로 체제 붕괴로 이어지지는 않는다. 이란-이라크 전쟁 당시 이란 총외환보유액(금 포함)은 30억 달러를 약간 넘는 수준까지 떨어졌으며, 사담 후세인 시절 이라크 같은 체제는 국내 통화 지급과 희소 상품에 대한 특권적 접근을 통해 핵심 지지층을 유지할 수 있었다. 혁명수비대 공식 예산은 무기 조달 같은 비급여 비용을 포함해 약 60억 달러이며, 많은 핵심 비용은 국내에서 충당 가능하다.

그럼에도 근접 봉쇄는 원거리 봉쇄보다 이란을 훨씬 더 약화시킬 것이다. 테헤란은 고통을 견딜 수는 있지만 선택지는 확전, 협상, 혹은 협상을 강요하기 위한 확전으로 좁혀질 것이다. 각각 상당한 위험을 수반한다. 그러나 정치적 균형은 트럼프 행정부의 국내 정치 관점에서는 다르게 보일 수 있다. 교착이 길어질수록 가격 상승, 동맹국 혼란, 미 해군 자원 소모가 커지고, 작전상 우위를 전략적 성공으로 전환하기는 더욱 어려워진다.

다음 단계

이란은 해협 통과 조건을 강제해야 하고, 미국은 이를 막아야 한다. 합의나 결정적 타격이 없는 상황에서는, 보다 표적화되고 지속적인 공격이 확대되며 장기적 인프라 피해를 초래할 가능성이 높다. 미국 국적 선박 호위 통과는 이미 걸프 탄화수소 우회 경로 핵심인 푸자이라에 대한 이란 공격을 촉발했다. 따라서 현재 균형은 미국이 자원 소모가 큰 방어 임무에 투입될 수밖에 없는 상황 속에서 이란 쪽으로 기울고 있다.

이 상황은 흔히 반군 진압전에 비유되며, 이는 시간과 주도권 측면에서 이란의 우위를 강조한다. 그러나 미국 역시 보다 포괄적인 봉쇄를 시행할 수 있다면 “시계를 지배”할 수 있다.

근접 봉쇄는 이란의 봉쇄 돌파를 제한함으로써 미국의 주도권을 회복시킬 수 있지만, 동시에 걸프 인프라에 대한 공격 격화를 초래할 가능성이 높다. 미국은 여전히 유연성 측면에서 강압적 우위를 가진다. 항구 기뢰 부설은 되돌릴 수 있지만, 미사일 피해는 그렇지 않기 때문이다. 이란은 미국이 무시할 수 있는 수준의 가역적 피해를 줄 것인지, 아니면 협상 카드 하나를 실제 사용·소모하는 수준으로 확전할 것인지 선택해야 한다. 동시에 근접 봉쇄는 돌이킬 수 없는 피해가 누적되기 전 이란의 협상 가능 기간을 압축할 수 있다.

그렇다 해도 이는 이란 정권의 항복을 보장하지는 못한다. 포괄적 합의보다는 군사력이 해협의 전략적 중요성을 둘러싼 협상의 일부로 이해되어야 한다. 즉각적 핵 합의와 연계되지 않은 이란의 개방 제안은, 레바논 작전 및 과산화나트륨 같은 군사 투입재를 겨냥한 향후 미국의 검역(quarantine) 모델과도 분리될 수 있다면 미국 이익에도 부합할 수 있다. 이란은 이를 거부할 수도 있지만, 그러면 이중 봉쇄 비용을 감수해야 한다. 이란이 자국 입지를 체제 생존 위협에 대한 헤지 수단으로는 사용할 수 있지만, 상호 경제 파괴 위험 때문에 다른 분야 양보를 얻어내는 데 활용하지는 못하는 상황이야말로, 이 더 넓은 분쟁 속에서 가장 수용 가능한 최종 상태일 수 있다.

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The US Blockade of Hormuz: Who Holds the Advantage? | Royal United Services Institute

The US Blockade of Hormuz: Who Holds the Advantage?

The US Blockade of Hormuz: Who Holds the Advantage?

Dr Sidharth Kaushal and Dan Marks

5 May 202610 Minute Read

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The efforts by the US and Iran to interfere with the flow of oil and gas from the Gulf mirror each other in their intent to affect any final settlement.

The US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has entered its third week. The US Navy has compelled 38 vessels linked to Iran to divert and boarded Iranian vessels both in the region and further afield in the Indian Ocean. Iran, meanwhile, has resumed a strategy of selective closure, allowing non-Iranian shipping through the strait only case by case and, apparently, in exchange for tolls. Iran’s parliament is in the process of passing legislation which would formalise its ability to charge tolls for transit. On 4 May, the US also supported the transit of at least one US-flagged vessel belonging to Maersk, prompting strikes from Iran on regional infrastructure.

The strategic end states are becoming clearer. Iran wants to restore its own exports, monetise its control over Hormuz and use that leverage to protect the fragile ceasefire in Lebanon, and by extension Hezbollah. The Trump administration, by contrast, appears determined to link any end with pressure to a wider settlement covering at least Iran's nuclear programme and perhaps its conventional missile arsenal. The question is, which side holds the advantage?

The Limits of a Distant Blockade

Iran has few options for directly targeting US naval vessels operating at the edge of the Gulf of Oman and beyond. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has limited access to the low-latency data needed to track maritime targets at these ranges, while many of its anti-ship cruise missiles and other capabilities are concentrated around outposts such as Qeshm, from where the Persian Gulf itself can be contested. The IRGC Navy could challenge operations such as US mine-clearance, but its military options against a distant blockade are constrained. The greatest risk to the US Navy would come if it were forced forward into the Gulf to protect shipping- something currently beginning on a limited basis.

Iran's first indirect option is to offset lost export revenue by charging higher tolls on shipping heading to non-Iranian ports. The Trump administration has threatened costs against vessels paying such tolls, but compliance would be hard to prove. If a vessel follows an IRGC-mandated route close to Iranian waters, is that evidence of payment or simply a crew-safety decision? If payments are made in renminbi through small financial institutions with little exposure to the dollar system, the evidentiary problem becomes still harder.

Yet tolls alone are unlikely to replace the loss of roughly 1.5 million barrels per day of oil revenue. With daily Hormuz transits currently in the low double digits, even high tolls would not compensate Iran for lost exports. Nor is the problem only immediate cashflow. If Iran cannot export oil, it will exhaust onshore storage, rely on improvised storage and disused facilities and eventually face the costly prospect of shutting in wells and the risk of long-term damage to production assets this entails. No amount of toll could mitigate the economic impact of lost seaborne imports which Iran cannot substitute.

If blockade-running grows, the strain is likely to fall more heavily on the US than on Iran

To make a toll meaningful, Iran needs shipping volumes through Hormuz to recover. That would both increase toll revenue and create opportunities for ship-to-ship transfers to disguise the movement of Iranian oil. A market of new shipowners, non-P&I club insurers (in other words, insurers outside of any association of protection and indemnity insurers) and shadow-fleet operators could emerge, as it has around Russian oil and in past conflicts, from the Iran-Iraq tanker war to the Black Sea. The oversupply of very large crude carriers in East Asia built for the Russian shadow fleet would help. Iranian offers of safe passage to ships that paid tolls, even if they avoided Iranian ports and thus US interdiction, would strengthen the incentive.

That would create an inversion of roles. Iran would have incentives to encourage shipping through the strait, albeit on its terms, while the US would have incentives to restrict it.

The US would then face an awkward problem. It could seek to mirror Iran's approach by clearing and encouraging routes closer to Oman while interdicting vessels using routes near Larak demanded by the IRGC. But this would require Washington to reroute or interdict vessels from several countries whose owners would argue they were obeying Iranian instructions for safety, not politics. Vessels receiving Iranian oil through ship-to-ship transfers could be interdicted on firmer grounds, but only with high-quality situational awareness. Tracking such transfers is resource-intensive: sanctions enforcement against North Korea has required assets such as P-8 Poseidon aircraft which are available in finite numbers. It would also generate diplomatic friction if third-country vessels were targeted.

From Distant Pressure to Close Blockade

If blockade-running grows, the strain is likely to fall more heavily on the US than on Iran. The present US force in the region can manage limited interdictions, but interdiction at scale is different. Indeed, there is already some indication that some Iran linked vessels are slipping through the US blockade. A more comprehensive blockade would significantly impact the US global posture. Operation Sharp Guard, the NATO operation enforcing the UN arms embargo on Yugoslavia, involved around 100 allied vessels to keep 22 on station at any time. A Hormuz operation of comparable intensity would also need more visit, board, search and seizure teams from the US Marine Corps or Special Forces if Iran placed armed guards on some vessels carrying its crude, since US Navy boarding teams are not normally used for opposed boardings. An extended distant blockade would have significant ramifications for the global posture of the US Navy, marine corps and special forces.

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Iran would also retain advantages with prospective blockade-runners. The IRGC Navy can threaten levels of lethal force the US Navy is less likely to use against commercial vessels, giving shipowners an incentive to follow Iranian rules. Many prospective operators would come from networks already experienced in moving Iranian or Russian oil. And unlike the US, Iran can monetise access.

Over time, therefore, a distant blockade could draw in more US force structure and create incentives for a close blockade of Iranian ports. The Trump administration would have two choices: bet that Iran's storage crisis forces a rapid shift in Tehran's position, or move to a more coercive close blockade. The latter could be achieved with air-launched mines, as the US did against Haiphong harbour during the Vietnam war. Quickstrike mines deployed from aircraft such as the F/A-18 could be laid around Iranian ports and routes near Iranian waters and activated after a legally necessary warning period. At a minimum, this would create mutual denial: painful for both sides, but more damaging to Iran.

Mutual Denial and Escalation

If Iran cannot establish a toll regime large enough to offset a close blockade, its best option would be to make good on threats to render the strait impassable for all shipping. The IRGC Navy has several tools for this: uncrewed surface vessels, coastal-defence cruise missiles such as the Noor, a variant of the Chinese C-802, UAVs comparable to the Houthi Samad family and Ghadir midget submarines derived from the North Korean Yono class that can lay mines covertly, albeit with limited endurance and vulnerability in port.

Iran would also have incentives to resume selective strikes elsewhere in the Gulf to create urgency in Washington and among US allies. A recent drone attack on the UAE’s Fujairah Petroleum Industrial Zone may be a harbinger of more to come if the US approach shifts. Closure of Hormuz is damaging, but longer-term harm would come from attacks on storage and processing infrastructure, including Saudi Arabia's Ras Tanura and Qatar's Ras Laffan LNG facilities. The problem of excess oil capacity is not uniquely Iranian: Saudi Arabia has also relied on offshore bunkering to avoid cutting production.

Large-scale attacks on onshore infrastructure would, however, jeopardise the partial ceasefire in the Gulf and Lebanon on which Iran depends to protect both its own infrastructure and Hezbollah. More likely is selective signalling: attacks comparable to Abqaiq and Khurais in 2019, possibly coupled with Houthi pressure on facilities such as Yanbu, through which Saudi Arabia is moving some oil after overland pipeline transit.

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The economic effects could still be severe. A scenario involving more than 12 months of constrained LNG supply, significant damage to onshore infrastructure and extended closure of the strait could require European gas demand to be reduced by around 15 billion cubic metres – roughly 12% of consumption – comparable to 2022, but in a context where alternative imports would be harder to secure. For the US, the issue would not only be allied hardship, but second-order economic effects: higher hydrocarbon prices, consumer costs and inflationary pressure that could complicate Federal Reserve decisions and influence mid-term elections later in the year. Windfall taxes or targeted relief for exposed sectors might soften the blow, but their political viability is uncertain.

Iran, however, would also be under intense pressure. Loss of hard currency and industrial inputs would not automatically collapse the state. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran's total reserves (including gold) fell to just over $3 billion and regimes such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq showed that coercive systems can sustain core loyalists through domestic currency payments and privileged access to scarce goods. The IRGC's declared budget is around $6 billion, including non-salary costs such as weapons procurement, and many critical costs can be met domestically.

Even so, a close blockade would weaken Iran far more than a distant one. Tehran could sustain pain, but its choices would narrow to escalation, settlement or escalation designed to force settlement. Each carries significant risk. However, the political balance may look different through the Trump administration's domestic lens: the longer the standoff drives prices, disrupts allies and consumes US naval capacity, the more difficult it becomes to translate operational advantage into strategic success.

Next Steps

Iran must enforce its conditions on traffic through the strait, while the US must prevent this. In the absence of a deal or a knockout blow, escalation involving more targeted and consistent attacks with the potential to cause deeper, long-term damage to infrastructure appears likely. The escorted transit of a US-flagged vessel has already prompted Iranian strikes on Fujairah, a key bypass route for Gulf hydrocarbons. As such, the balance is currently tilting in Iran’s favour as the US is compelled to commit to a resource intensive defensive mission.

While the situation is often analogised to counterinsurgency – favouring Iran’s advantages of time and initiative – the US can also ‘own the clock’ if it can impose a more comprehensive blockade

Both sides retain plausible theories of success. While the situation is often analogised to counterinsurgency – favouring Iran’s advantages of time and initiative – the US can also ‘own the clock’ if it can impose a more comprehensive blockade.

A close blockade could restore US initiative by constraining Iranian blockade running but would likely provoke intensified strikes on Gulf infrastructure. The US would retain a coercive advantage in flexibility – mining ports can be reversed, whereas missile damage is not. Iran would have a choice regarding whether to inflict reversible damage which the US could potentially ignore or escalating in a way that uses – and thus expends – one of its bargaining chips. Simultaneously, a close blockade could compress Iran’s negotiating window before irreversible damage accumulates.

Even this will not secure the capitulation of the Iranian regime. Instead of a comprehensive settlement, military force should be viewed as a negotiation of the strait’s strategic significance. Arguably, the opening proposed by Iran, which would not be linked to an immediate nuclear settlement, could serve US interests if it was also de-linked from operations in Lebanon and a future US-shift to a quarantine model targeting military inputs like sodium perchlorate. Iran could choose to reject this but would then have to accept the costs of a dual blockade. A situation in which Iran can use its position as a hedge against existential threats to the regime but where it cannot leverage it to secure concessions elsewhere due to the risk of mutual economic destruction might prove the most acceptable end-state in this part of the wider conflict.

© RUSI, 2026.

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