이란 전쟁과 재편되는 사우디의 국가전략

[위종민]

채텀하우스에 실린 기사입니다. MBS가 기존의 느리고, 합의중심적이고 예측가능했던 국가운영 방침을 저버리고 공세적이고 예측불가능한 외교정책을 추진해왔지만 이란 전쟁으로 한계에 부딪쳤고, 다시 과거의 방식으로 돌아갈 거라고 보네요. 

호르무즈 해협 의존도를 줄이고 홍해로 무역선을 돌려야 하지만, 홍해에도 후티가 있기 때문에 어느 정도 이란에 유화적인 정책을 추진해야 할 필요가 있는데 이 때문에 UAE와의 관계가 악화되고 있다고 하네요. 또한 UAE도 홍해에 거점을 구축하고 있습니다. 

또한 전쟁을 핑계로 수익이 안 났던, LIV 골프나 사우디 축구클럽에 대한 투자 등 투자를 빙자한 과시적 소비를 줄이고 있다고 하네요. 

이란 전쟁이 사우디 전략을 어떻게 재편하고 있는가: 호르무즈, 후티, 그리고 UAE의 OPEC 탈퇴까지
호르무즈 해협 봉쇄는 사우디아라비아의 비전 2030 전략과 경제 전환 계획에 대한 핵심 위협을 드러냈다.

전문가 논평

2026년 5월 1일 게시

2026년 5월 5일 업데이트 —
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이미지 — 2025년 11월 18일 워싱턴 DC 백악관 집무실에서 도널드 트럼프 미국 대통령(사진 없음)과 회담 중인 사우디아라비아 왕세자 모하메드 빈 살만. 사진: BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/AFP via Getty Images.

Dr Neil Quilliam
중동 및 북아프리카 프로그램 준연구원

미국-이스라엘의 대이란 전쟁은 사우디아라비아에 많은 도전을 안겨주었다. 여기에는 호르무즈 해협 봉쇄, UAE와의 갈등 심화, 그리고 UAE의 석유 카르텔 OPEC 탈퇴가 포함된다. 이 전쟁은 또한 사우디 왕세자 모하메드 빈 살만(MBS)에게 깊은 재고의 시간을 안겨주었다.

MBS 이전의 사우디 정책은 느리고 합의 중심적이었으며 대체로 예측 가능했다. 그러나 왕세자는 국내 환경을 활성화했고, 훨씬 더 공세적이며 때로는 예측 불가능한 외교 정책을 추진해 사우디를 여러 곤경에 빠뜨렸다.

그러나 이란 전쟁은 왕국 지도부가 장기 전략을 재평가하면서 다시금 의사결정 속도를 늦추게 만들었다. 지도부는 분쟁 결과가 어떻든 향후 최소 20년간 지역의 미래를 결정하게 될 것임을 절실히 인식하고 있다. 

호르무즈 해협에서 홍해로

호르무즈 해협을 통과하는 두 척의 유조선

관련 기사
장기적으로 호르무즈 해협을 어떻게 개방 상태로 유지할 것인가

놀랍지 않게도 사우디의 재평가는 이제 대부분의 석유 수출과 기타 물자가 통과하는 호르무즈 해협에 집중되고 있다. 사우디는 오래전부터 이 병목 지점에 대한 취약성을 인식해왔지만, 지속적인 봉쇄는 역사적으로 매우 가능성이 낮은 일로 여겨졌다. 그러나 이번 봉쇄는 무역뿐 아니라 국가 비전 2030 전략 성공 자체의 핵심 취약성을 드러냈다.

호르무즈가 한 번 봉쇄된 이상, 앞으로도 언제든 다시 발생할 수 있다는 위험은 항상 존재하게 되었다. 이는 사우디의 무역 흐름과 경제 전환 계획에 대한 장기적 위협이다. 반복적이거나 장기적인 혼란은 수입, 투자자 신뢰, 그리고 왕국이 자신을 안정적인 무역·물류·금융 허브로 제시하려는 능력에 부담을 줄 것이다. 비전 2030과 후속 전략들의 야망은 예측 가능한 에너지 및 수익 흐름, 그리고 안전한 해상 환경에 달려 있다.

따라서 사우디는 경제 지리를 재검토하기 시작했으며, 호르무즈 의존도를 줄이고 정책 방향을 홍해로 전환하고 있다. 사우디 서부 해안선의 항만, 산업지대, 관광 개발 프로젝트들이 이제 핵심 우선순위가 될 것이다. 두 개의 해안선을 가진 사우디는 이웃 국가들에 비해 상당한 지리적 이점을 가지고 있으며, 이를 활용해—특히 UAE와 차별화되도록—지역의 주요 수출 및 물류 허브로 자리잡으려 할 것이다.

서쪽으로의 이동은 국영 석유기업 사우디 아람코가 원유 수출을 홍해 방향으로 재조정하거나, 최소한 전쟁 이전 수준의 수출량을 맞추기 위해 하루 700만 배럴을 수송할 수 있는 역량을 구축해야 함을 의미한다. 현재 사우디는 동부에서 서부로 파이프라인을 통해 하루 약 400만 배럴의 원유를 수송해 홍해 연안 얀부 터미널을 통해 수출하고 있다. 현재 수출량은 감소했지만, 사우디는 수출이 여전히 걸프 지역에 묶여 있는 다른 걸프 국가들보다 더 유리한 위치에 있다. 유가는 배럴당 약 120달러로 전쟁 이전 대비 두 배 수준이며, 리야드는 일정 수준의 재정적 회복력을 유지하고 있다.

그러나 사우디가 지역 무역 허브로 자리잡기 위해서는, 특히 석유를 포함한 상품들이 홍해와 걸프 지역 주요 도시들 사이를 이동할 수 있도록 하는 인프라에 상당한 장기 투자가 필요하다. 더 긴 시간과 더 높은 비용은 불가피하지만, 호르무즈 문제의 구조적 성격상 사우디에게는 선택지가 거의 없다.

그러나 호르무즈를 우회한다고 해서 위험이 사라지는 것은 아니다. 단지 위험의 위치가 바뀔 뿐이다. 이란과 연계된 후티 세력이 홍해 선박을 공격한 사례는, 해상 불안정이 사우디의 서방 전환 전략에서 부차적 문제가 아니라 핵심 제약 요소가 될 것임을 보여준다.

이란 전쟁이 UAE와의 갈등을 재점화하다

UAE 산업지대에서 피어오르는 연기

The World Today

관련 기사
이란과 가자 분쟁이 걸프 국가들에 가르쳐준 강경 군사력의 교훈

홍해 전략에 대한 해상 불안정 위협은 사우디가 이란 전쟁에 직접 개입하는 것을 꺼리고 추가 확전에 반대하는 이유를 설명해준다. 지도부는 이란 공격에 군사적으로 대응할 경우 자국 에너지 시설과 핵심 인프라 위험이 증가할 뿐 아니라 후티 세력을 분쟁에 더욱 깊이 끌어들일 수 있다는 점을 인식하고 있다. 그렇게 되면 사우디의 대체 수출 경로도 위협받게 되며, 이는 호르무즈 의존 탈피 전략을 약화시킨다.

이는 또한 사우디와 UAE가 전쟁에 대해 다른 입장을 취하고 양국 간 긴장이 커지는 이유를 설명해준다. 아부다비는 이란에 대해 강경한 태도를 취했으며, 걸프 이웃국들보다 미국과 이스라엘에 훨씬 가까운 입장을 보여왔다. UAE 고위 관리들은 UAE 영토를 공격한 이란 지도부뿐 아니라, 더 강경하게 대응하거나 더 큰 지지를 보여주지 않은 지역 파트너들까지 비판했다.

사우디는 이제 이스라엘과 그 행동을 지역 안보에 대한 위협으로 인식하고 있으며, 따라서 UAE의 대이스라엘 정렬을 부정적으로 보고 있다. 결과적으로 UAE의 태도는 리야드의 점점 더 큰 불만 요인이 되고 있다. UAE의 OPEC 탈퇴 결정 역시 사우디에게 또 다른 타격이다. 사우디는 여전히 OPEC 내 지배적 국가로 남겠지만, 상당한 여유 생산 능력을 가진 유일한 주요 산유국이 될 것이며, 향후 UAE의 증산을 상쇄하기 위해 자국 생산과 수출을 줄여야 할 가능성이 있다.

무엇보다 홍해에서의 영향력 경쟁은 더욱 치열해질 전망이다. 수로 접근, 항로, 안보 통제는 사우디의 경제 및 전략 계산에서 점점 더 중심 요소가 될 것이다. 한편 UAE는 세계 무역로를 확보하고 경제적 영향력을 투사하기 위해 홍해와 아프리카의 뿔 지역 전역에 전략적 항만 및 군사기지 네트워크를 구축하고 있다.

전략적 재고

사우디 지도부는 또한 이번 전쟁을 활용해 위기 상황이라는 명분 아래 지출 우선순위를 재조정하고 있다. 초대형 프로젝트 재평가는 이미 전쟁 이전부터 진행 중이었으며, 이란 전쟁은 실패로 비쳐질 위험 없이 투자 전략에 추가적이고 상당한 변화를 가할 정당한 이유를 제공하고 있다.

현재는 국가 발전과 경제 안보에 필수적인 국내 산업에 다시 초점이 맞춰지고 있다. 사우디 국부펀드 PIF는 LIV 골프, 뉴욕 메트로폴리탄 오페라와 관련된 후원 및 파트너십 등 대외적 상징성이 큰 사업에서 발을 빼기 시작했다. 또한 사우디 대표 축구 클럽 중 하나인 알 힐랄 지분 일부 매각에도 합의했다. 이어 알 나스르, 알 아흘리, 알 이티하드도 그 뒤를 이을 예정이다. 이는 과시적 프로젝트에서 벗어나 보다 신중한 지출과 엄격한 자본 규율로 이동하고 있음을 보여준다.

MBS는 예멘 개입을 통해 두 가지 뼈아픈 교훈을 배웠다. 첫째, 충동적 의사결정에는 대가가 따른다는 점. 둘째, 빠르게 끝나는 전쟁 같은 것은 존재하지 않는다는 점이다. 이것이 그가 이란 전쟁 참여를 꺼리고, 심지어 이를 적극 지지하지 않는 이유일 수 있다. 대신 사우디는 거의 과거의 방식으로 돌아가, 단기적 이익보다 신중함과 인내, 그리고 장기적 포지셔닝을 중시하게 되었다.

How the Iran war is reshaping Saudi strategy: From Hormuz and Houthis to the UAE’s OPEC exit | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank 

How the Iran war is reshaping Saudi strategy: From Hormuz and Houthis to the UAE’s OPEC exit

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has revealed a key threat to Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 strategy and plans for economic transformation.

Expert comment

Published 1 May 2026

Updated 5 May 2026 —4 minute READ

Image — Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman during a meeting with US President Donald Trump (not pictured) in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC on 18 November 2025. Photo: BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/AFP via Getty Images.

Dr Neil Quilliam

Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

The US–Israel war against Iran has presented many challenges for Saudi Arabia, including the Strait of Hormuz closure, a deepening rift with the UAE, and the latter’s exit from the oil cartel OPEC. The war has also given Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, or MBS, pause for thought.

Before MBS, Saudi policy was slow and consensus driven – and largely predictable. The crown prince energized the domestic environment and pursued a far more assertive and, at times, unpredictable foreign policy that got Saudi Arabia into hot water.

However, the Iran war has once again slowed the kingdom’s decision making process as the leadership reassesses its long-term strategy. It is acutely aware that whatever the outcome of the conflict, it will determine the region’s future for at least the next two decades.

From the Strait of Hormuz to the Red Sea

Related work

How to keep the Strait of Hormuz open in the long term

Unsurprisingly, Saudi Arabia’s reassessment now centres on the Strait of Hormuz, through which most of its oil exports and other goods pass. Although the kingdom has long recognized its exposure to disruption at this chokepoint, a sustained closure was historically viewed as highly unlikely. The closure has revealed a key vulnerability not only for trade, but also for the success of the country’s Vision 2030 strategy.

Now that Hormuz has been closed once, there will always be the risk that it could happen again. This poses a long term threat to Saudi Arabia’s trade flows and economic transformation plans. Repeated or prolonged disruption would weigh on revenues, investor confidence, and the kingdom’s ability to present itself as a stable hub for trade, logistics and finance. The ambitions of Vision 2030 and its successor frameworks depend on predictable energy – and revenue – flows and a secure maritime environment.

Hence, the kingdom is beginning to reassess its economic geography, reducing its dependence on Hormuz and reorienting policy towards the Red Sea. Projects along Saudi Arabia’s western coastline, including ports, industrial zones and tourism developments, will now become key priorities. The country’s two coastlines give it a significant geographical advantage over its neighbours, which it will look to capitalize on to distinguish itself – especially from the UAE – as the region’s main export and logistics hub.

Its westward shift means the national oil company Saudi Aramco will need to reorient crude exports to the Red Sea or at least build capacity to convey 7 million barrels a day to match pre-war exports. It is currently transporting around 4 million barrels per day of crude by pipeline from east to west and exporting it via the Yanbu terminal on the Red Sea. While current exports are lower, Saudi Arabia is in a stronger position than many of its Gulf neighbours, whose exports remain locked into the Gulf. With oil prices at around $120 per barrel, roughly double pre war levels, Riyadh retains a degree of financial resilience.

However, significant long-term investment will be needed in infrastructure that allows goods – especially oil – to move between the Red Sea and major urban centres across the Gulf if Saudi Arabia is to establish itself as a regional trading hub. Longer timelines and higher costs will be unavoidable, but the structural nature of the Hormuz problem leaves Saudi Arabia with little choice.

But rerouting away from Hormuz will not eliminate risk, only relocate it. Attacks on Red Sea shipping by the Iran-aligned Houthis show that maritime insecurity will become a central constraint on Saudi Arabia’s westward reorientation, not a secondary concern.

Iran war has renewed rift with the UAE

The World Today

Related work

Iran and Gaza conflicts teach Gulf states a hard-power lesson

The threat of maritime insecurity to its Red Sea ambitions helps explain Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to engage directly in the war against Iran and its lobbying against further escalation. The leadership recognizes that a kinetic response to Iranian strikes would not only increase risks to its energy assets and critical infrastructure but could also draw the Houthis more directly into the conflict. That, in turn, would place Saudi Arabia’s alternative export routes under threat, undermining its essential diversification away from Hormuz.

This also helps explain the different positions taken by Saudi Arabia and the UAE towards the war, and the growing tensions between them. Abu Dhabi has taken a strong line against Iran, with a position much closer to the US and Israel than to its Gulf neighbours. Senior Emirati officials have criticized both the Iranian leadership for striking targets on UAE soil and regional partners for failing to respond more forcefully or show greater support.

Regions

• Gulf states
• Iran

Departments

• Middle East and North Africa Programme

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content

Saudi Arabia has come to view Israel and its actions as a threat to regional security and therefore sees the UAE’s alignment with it in a poor light. As a result, the UAE’s posture has become a growing source of frustration for Riyadh. Abu Dhabi’s decision to leave OPEC, though not wholly unexpected, is another blow for the kingdom. Although Saudi Arabia will still be the dominant player in OPEC, it will be the only major producer with significant spare capacity and may be forced to cut its production and exports in the future to compensate for increases by the UAE. 

Most importantly, their competition for influence in the Red Sea is set to sharpen. Control over access, routes and security along the waterway will become increasingly central to Saudi Arabia’s economic and strategic calculations. Meanwhile, the UAE is building a strategic network of ports and military bases across the Red Sea and Horn of Africa to secure global trade routes and project economic influence.

A strategic rethink

The Saudi leadership is also using the war to reprioritize its spending under the cover of crisis. A re-eval‎uation of its mega projects was already underway pre-conflict and the war with Iran provides a justifiable reason to make further, significant changes to its investment strategy, without risking judgement of failure.

There is a renewed focus on domestic industries essential to its national development and economic security. Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund PIF has begun pulling back from high profile overseas commitments, including LIV Golf and its sponsorship and partnerships linked to the Metropolitan Opera in New York. It has also agreed the partial sale of a major stake in Al Hilal, one of the kingdom’s flagship football clubs. Three others – Al Nassr, Al Ahli and Al Ittihad – are up next. This signals a move towards more cautious spending and tighter capital discipline – and away from vanity projects.

MBS learned two painful lessons over the Saudi intervention in Yemen: one, there is a cost to impulsive decision-making; two, there is no such thing as a quick war. This might explain his reluctance to participate in the war against Iran or even cheerlead for it. Instead, Saudi Arabia has almost reverted to form, favouring caution, patience and long-term positioning over short-term gains.

[백선호]

돈은 있는데 사람과 싸울 의지가 없는 나라... 옛날 송나라에서 인구를 확 줄이면 딱 사우디네요.

[위종민]

당장 이젠 예멘 인구가 사우디를 뛰어넘지 않았을까 싶은데, 서하나 금나라 인구가 송보다 많다는 얘기네요 ㄷㄷㄷ