이란전쟁의 수혜자가 될 중국

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When Computers Went To Sea | 페르시아만 국가들, 미래를 재평가해야 할 순간에 이르다 - Daum 카페

페르시아만 국가들, 미래를 재평가해야 할 순간에 이르다

When Computers Went To Sea | 이집트와 사우디, 홍해를 가로질러 연결하는 육로 건설 계획 발표 - Daum 카페

이집트와 사우디, 홍해를 가로질러 연결하는 육로 건설 계획 발표

When Computers Went To Sea | 호르무즈 해협을 통하지 않는 파이프라인 계획 - Daum 카페

호르무즈 해협을 통하지 않는 파이프라인 계획

채텀하우스의 글입니다. 중국이 미국을 대신해 중동의 안보 보증자가 되진 않겠지만 걸프 국가들이 전략을 재검토하는 가운데 중요한 역할을 할 순 있다고 보네요. 미국(과 미군기지)이 안보 보증자가 아니라 안보 위협이 돼 버려 중동 국가들이 무기도입선을 다변화하는 가운데, 이란의 드론 등에 대응하기 위한 무기체계 공급선으로 기능할 수도 있고, 호르무즈 해협 의존도를 낮추기 위한 인프라 개발 사업에 뛰어들 수도 있다고 봅니다. 이스라엘을 경유하는 IMEC는 후순위가 될 거라고 예상하네요. 또한 어차피 공존해야만 하는 중동국가와 이란의 중재자가 될 수도 있다고 분석합니다. 

미군기지가 안보 원천이 아니라 부담이 됐다는 분석은 우리에게도 적용되는 문제겠습니다. 양안전쟁에서 주한미군 시설이 이용되는 거야 당연하겠습니다만, 중국 원점을 타격하는 전투기나 폭격기들을 오산이나 군산에서 아무 말 없이 띄울 수도 있겠단 생각이 듭니다. 

중국은 트럼프와 테헤란 간 어떤 합의와 무관하게 이란 전쟁의 수혜자가 될 것이다
중국은 미국을 대신해 지역 안보 보증국이 되지는 않을 것이지만, 걸프 국가들이 안보 전략을 재검토하는 가운데 새로운 지역 질서를 구축하는 데 중요한 역할을 할 수 있다.

전문가 논평

2026년 5월 6일 게시 —
4분 읽기

이미지 — 아부다비 왕세자 셰이크 칼레드 빈 모하메드 빈 자이드 알 나흐얀이 2026년 4월 14일 베이징에서 시진핑 주석과 회담하는 모습을 쇼핑몰 외부 대형 스크린이 보여주고 있다. (사진: Pedro PARDO/AFP via Getty Images)

Ahmed Aboudouh
중동 및 북아프리카 프로그램 준연구원

이란 전쟁은 걸프 지역에서 중국의 미래 입장을 더욱 불확실하게 만들었다. 일부 분석가들은 이 전쟁이 중국의 부재를 드러냈으며 미국만이 걸프 국가들의 신뢰할 수 있는 안보 파트너임을 입증했다고 성급히 결론 내렸다. 반면 다른 이들은 미국의 우위가 약화되면서 걸프 국가들이 중국에 더욱 가까워졌다고 주장한다.

이러한 이분법적 시각은 베이징의 중동 정책에서 핵심 요소 하나를 간과한다. 중국의 정책은 균형자나 안보 제공자 모델에 기반하지 않는다. 실제로 중국은 이 지역의 지정학적 변화를 어떻게 헤쳐 나갈지에 대한 명확한 방향성조차 부족하다. 그러나 워싱턴에 대한 불만과 걸프 지역의 우선순위 재편이 중국 개입을 가능하게 하는 곳에서는, 중국이 미국을 희생시키면서 정치적·규범적·평판상의 이익을 얻을 수 있다.

따라서 이번 전쟁의 주요 효과는 중국이 미국을 대체해 지역 안보 제공자로 나서는 길을 연 것이 아니다. 오히려 베이징이 새로운 지역 질서를 형성하는 데 역할을 할 수 있는 조건을 만들어냈을 가능성이 있다. 

새로운 걸프 안보 역학

이란 전쟁은 걸프 안보와 향후 정렬 방향에 대해 세 가지 핵심 역학을 드러냈다.

첫째, 미국 군사력에는 한계가 있으며, 확전이 반드시 억지의 대체물이 되는 것은 아니라는 점이다. 걸프 국가들에게 미국 군사기지는 더 이상 안보의 원천이 아니라 부담이 되었을 수도 있다. 그리고 걸프 국가들은 이 전쟁을 선택하지 않았다. 실제로 미국은 전쟁을 피하라는 그들의 요구를 무시했다. 따라서 걸프 안보를 보장해야 할 국가가 오히려 이를 위험에 빠뜨린 셈이다. 물론 걸프 국가들에 배치된 미국산 방어 체계가 미사일과 드론 공격으로부터 주민들을 보호하는 데 핵심적 역할을 했음에도 불구하고 말이다.

둘째, 이란은 미사일과 드론 능력, 그리고 호르무즈 해협을 지렛대로 사용하는 전략을 결합해 미국과 이스라엘에 대한 억지 균형을 형성할 수 있음을 보여주었다. 이는 테헤란이 전술적·정치적 차원에서 상당한 양보를 이끌어낼 수 있게 해준다.

셋째, 미국과 중국은 걸프 지역에서 전쟁과 평화 문제를 두고 경쟁하지 않는다. 실제로 양국의 이해관계는 일치하는 것으로 드러났다.

봉쇄 종식을 둘러싼 중국의 입장은 그 명확성 측면에서 주목할 만하다. 시진핑 주석은 사우디 왕세자 모하메드 빈 살만과의 통화에서 호르무즈 해협이 “정상적인 항행을 위해 개방된 상태를 유지해야 하며, 이는 지역 국가들과 국제사회의 공동 이익에 부합한다”고 말했다.

베이징은 걸프 국가들과 이란 간 대화를 촉진하고 중기적으로 실질적인 관계를 구축하는 데 유리한 위치에 있다.

이 통화는 시진핑이 베이징에서 아부다비 왕세자 셰이크 칼레드 빈 모하메드 빈 자이드와 회담한 지 며칠 뒤 이루어졌다. 시진핑은 이란 지도부와는 직접 접촉하지 않았지만, 이란 외무장관 아바스 아라그치는 이번 주 베이징에서 왕이 중국 외교부장과 만나 전쟁 문제를 논의했다. 회담 이후 중국은 이란과 미국 모두에게 해협을 개방할 것을 촉구했다.

중국은 이란의 해협 봉쇄와 미국의 이란 선박 봉쇄 모두에 대해 미묘한 불만의 메시지를 보내는 동시에, 걸프 국가들의 우선순위와 보조를 맞추고 있다는 신호를 보내고 있다. 그러나 해협 개방을 원하는 중국의 입장은 곧 열릴 시진핑-트럼프 정상회담을 앞두고 트럼프의 우선순위와도 일치한다.

이러한 역학은 걸프 지역 전략 사고의 변화를 가속화했다. 그 즉각적인 효과 중 하나는 걸프 국가들이 미국 보호 의존도를 줄이기 위해 자국 내 첨단 방위 기술 역량 구축을 추진하게 된 것이다. 드론 방어 기술을 대가로 연료를 제공하는 우크라이나와의 거래도 그 노력의 일환으로 보인다.

다변화된 조달

이는 장기적으로 미국뿐 아니라 영국, 우크라이나, 파키스탄, 터키, 한국 등을 포함한 파트너들과 산업·기술적 다중 정렬에 기반한 보다 다변화된 조달 모델로 이동하고 있음을 반영한다.

워싱턴에서 영향력을 확보하기 위해 고가의 미국 방어 플랫폼을 구매하던 기존 교리는, 이제 상대적으로 저렴하면서 대량 생산 가능한 플랫폼을 통해 이란의 미사일과 드론 위협에 대응하는 방향으로 바뀔 가능성이 높다.

중국은 그 노력에서 일정 역할을 할 수 있다. 실제로 중국의 이중용도 물자 수출과 위성 접근 지원은 이란의 전쟁 수행을 돕는 데 사용된 것으로 알려졌다.

그러나 사우디아라비아와 아랍에미리트는 이미 중국 드론 및 기타 방위 기술의 주요 구매국이며, 워싱턴에서 안보 위협으로 간주되지 않는 분야에서 중국과 방위 협력을 강화하는 것이 베이징 내 영향력을 확대하고 이란 외교를 견제하는 신중한 전후 전략이라고 판단할 수 있다.

대화와 투자 촉진

그러나 안보 협력 다변화만으로 걸프 지역의 지속적인 평화를 보장할 수는 없다. 미국과 이란 간 어떤 평화 합의가 체결되더라도, 걸프 국가들과 이란은 결국 포괄적 지역 안보 체계를 구축하기 위해 불편한 현실을 인정해야 할 것이다. UAE 고위 관계자 Reem Al Hashimy가 5월 3일 말했듯 “지리는 결국 승리한다… 걸프 국가들과 이란은 서로 함께 살아가야 한다.”

이 지점에서 중국은 중요한 역할을 할 수 있다. 파키스탄, 터키, 일부 유럽 국가들(영국 포함)과 함께, 베이징은 걸프 국가들과 이란 간 대화를 촉진하고 중기적 협력 관계를 구축하는 데 유리한 위치에 있다.

중국은 6월 열릴 제2차 중국-걸프 정상회의를 활용해 새로운 안보 역학에 부합하는 글로벌 안보 구상 원칙에 기반한 걸프 안보 체계를 제시할 수 있다.

시진핑은 셰이크 칼레드와의 회담에서 중동 안정 구축을 위한 중국의 원칙을 강조하며, “걸프 국가들의 관계 개선을 지원하고, 공동·포괄·협력·지속 가능한 안보 구조를 구축하기 위해 노력할 준비가 되어 있다”고 말했다. 이러한 원칙 자체는 새로운 것이 아니지만, 미국이 절대적 안보 보장을 제공하지 않는 상황에서는 지역 국가들에게 더 현실적이고 매력적으로 보일 수 있다.

지역 안보에 대한 중국의 구상은 사우디 관리들의 사고 변화와도 맞물린다. 리야드는 이제 호르무즈 위험 완화의 중심 허브가 되기 위해 해협을 우회해 걸프와 홍해를 연결하는 인프라 구축을 우선시하고 있다.

이러한 인프라 개발은 ‘일대일로(BRI)’ 투자자들에게 매력적인 사업이 될 수 있으며, 전쟁 피해 복구 사업 역시 마찬가지다.

이는 장기적으로 위안화 중심 거래 확대에 도움이 될 수 있으며, 베이징 입장에서는 지역과의 인프라 및 무역을 더욱 매력적으로 만들 수 있다.

한편 IMEC과 같이 이스라엘과의 지역 통합을 위해 설계된 경제 회랑은 후순위로 밀릴 가능성이 있다. 리야드와 다른 걸프 국가들이 이스라엘과의 관계 정상화를 배제하고, 이란과의 긴장 완화 및 공존 요구가 커지고 있기 때문이다.

따라서 이번 전쟁은 걸프 국가들을 중국으로 “밀어붙인” 것도 아니고, 베이징을 걸프 계산에서 제거한 것도 아니다. 오히려 중국 외교 개입이 증가하고 안보 환경이 다층적·사안별·다변화된 구조로 변화하는 시점에서, 걸프 국가들이 헤징 전략의 이점을 새롭게 인식하게 만든 것이다.

미국은 여전히 주요 안보 제공자로 남을 것이다. 그러나 이는 걸프 전역의 관리된 긴장 완화 속에서 이루어질 것이며, 그 과정에서 중국의 투자·상품·외교에 대한 수요는 크게 증가할 것이다.

China will benefit from the Iran war, regardless of any deal between Trump and Tehran | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank

China will benefit from the Iran war, regardless of any deal between Trump and Tehran

China will benefit from the Iran war, regardless of any deal between Trump and Tehran

China will not displace the US as regional security guarantor, but it could play an important role building a new regional order, as Gulf states rethink their security strategies.

Expert comment

Published 6 May 2026 —4 minute READ

Image — A giant screen outside a shopping mall shows Abu Dhabi's Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan meeting President Xi Jinping in Beijing on 14 April 2026. (Photo by Pedro PARDO/AFP via Getty Images)

Ahmed Aboudouh

Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

The war in Iran has made China’s future posture in the Gulf more uncertain. Some analysts have rushed to conclude that the war has revealed China’s absence and proved that the US is the only reliable security partner for the Gulf states. Others claim that the war has pushed Gulf states closer to China as US predominance has declined.  

This binary outlook overlooks a key factor in Beijing’s Middle East policies: they are not built on a balancer or security provider model. In fact, China lacks a clear direction for navigating geopolitical shifts in the region. But it could reap political, normative, and reputational wins where dissatisfaction with Washington, and reorganized priorities across the Gulf, allow it to intervene at the expense of the US. 

The war’s main effect has not, therefore, been to set China on a path to replace the US as the region’s security provider. But it may have created the conditions for Beijing to play a role in shaping a new regional order.

New Gulf security dynamics

The war in Iran revealed three key dynamics for Gulf security and future alignment. 

First, US military power has limits, and escalation is not necessarily a substitute for deterrence. For the Gulf, US military bases may have become a liability, not a source of security. And Gulf states did not choose this war. Indeed, the US ignored their calls to avoid it. The country that was supposed to ensure Gulf security, therefore, imperilled it – even if largely US-made defences deployed by Gulf States were critical in shielding their populations from missile and drone attack.

Second, Iran has shown that its missile and drone capabilities, coupled with its use of the Strait of Hormuz as leverage, can create a balance of deterrence with the US and Israel – one that allows Tehran to extract valuable concessions in tactical and political terms.  

Third, the US and China don’t compete over matters of war and peace in the Gulf. In fact, their interests have been shown to align.     

China’s position on ending the blockade has been eye-catching for its clarity. In a phone call with Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman, President Xi Jinping called for Hormuz ‘to remain open to normal passage, as this serves the common interests of regional countries ‌and ⁠the international community’. 

Beijing is well positioned to facilitate dialogue between the Gulf and Iran and foster a working relationship in the medium term. 

The call came days after Xi met with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled Bin Mohamed bin Zayed in Beijing. Xi has made no such direct contact with Iran’s leadership, although Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, in Beijing this week to discuss the war. After the meeting the Chinese called on both Iran and the US to open the Strait. 

China has been sending a subtle message of discontent to Iran for its closing of the strait – and to the US for its blockade of Iranian shipping – while signalling convergence with Gulf priorities. But its desire to open the Strait does reflect Trump’s stated priority – laying the groundwork ahead of the forthcoming Xi–Trump summit. 

These dynamics have accelerated shifts in Gulf strategic thinking. One immediate effect has been a push by Gulf states to reduce reliance on US protection by creating domestic, cutting-edge defence technology capabilities. Deals reportedly signed with Ukraine, providing fuel in exchange for drone defence expertise, are likely part of that effort. 

Diversified procurement

That reflects a move in the long term towards a more diversified procurement model based on industrial and technological multi-alignment with partners including the US – but also the UK, Ukraine, Pakistan, Turkey and South Korea. 

Related work

What lessons will China, India and other Asian nations draw from the Iran war? Independent Thinking Podcast

Previous doctrine, based on acquiring expensive US defence platforms to purchase leverage in Washington, will likely shift towards addressing the threat of Iran’s missiles and drones by procuring relatively cheap platforms produced at scale.

China can play a part in that effort. True, Chinese dual-use material exports and satellite access has reportedly helped support the Iranian war effort. 

But Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are already among the biggest buyers of Chinese drones and other defence technologies – and they may calculate that enhancing defence cooperation with China in areas that are not perceived as a security threat in Washington might be a prudent post-war strategy, to boost influence in Beijing and counter Iranian diplomacy.  

Facilitating dialogue – and investment

But diversifying security cooperation can’t guarantee sustained peace across the Gulf. Regardless of any peace deal between the US and Iran, the Gulf states and Iran will, at some point, have to reckon with uncomfortable realities by agreeing to establish an inclusive regional security framework. As UAE official Reem Al Hashimy said on 3 May, ‘geography prevails… we’re going to have to live with each other, the Gulf states and Iran’.

Here, China can play a crucial role. Along with Pakistan, Turkey, and some European powers (including the UK), Beijing is well positioned to facilitate dialogue between the Gulf and Iran and foster a working relationship in the medium term. 

China may use the second China-Gulf Summit in June to promote its normative model for a Gulf security framework, built on the Global Security Initiative’s principles, which align with these new dynamics. 

During his meeting with Sheikh Khaled, Xi affirmed Chinese principles for creating stability in the Middle East – saying Beijing is ready to ‘support Gulf states in improving their ties, work to build a common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security architecture’ in the Gulf. While not new, these principles may look more realistic and appealing to countries in the region in the absence of absolute security commitments from the US. 

Buying into China’s ideas for regional security complements a shift in Saudi officials’ thinking. Riyadh is now prioritizing an effort to become the central node for mitigating Hormuz risks, creating infrastructure that can bypass the strait and link the Gulf with the Red Sea. 

Topics

• China’s foreign relations

Regions

• China
• Gulf states
• Iran

Departments

• Middle East and North Africa Programme

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Article 2nd half

Developing that infrastructure could be an attractive enterprise for ‘Belt and Road’ (BRI) investors – as could opportunities to rebuild what the damage done by the war.  

That could help make Renminbi-dominated transactions expand in the long term, making infrastructure and trade with the region more attractive for Beijing. 

Meanwhile, economic corridors designed for regional integration with Israel, such as IMEC, may be put on the back burner, as Riyadh and other Gulf countries dismiss normalization with Israel, and calls for de-escalation and coexistence with Iran rise.

The war has not therefore ‘pushed’ the Gulf towards China or removed Beijing from the Gulf calculus. It has rather changed the Gulf’s perception of the benefits of hedging at a time of increased Chinese diplomatic involvement in a region that is transforming towards a layered, issue-based, and diversified security landscape. 

The US will remain the principal security provider. But it will do so in the context of managed de-escalation across the Gulf – in which the appetite for Chinese investment, products and diplomacy is much increased.

[여행자김씨]

과연 부동산 폭탄에 내부가 썩은 중국이 과연 수혜자가 될 수 있을 지 의문이군요 ㅋㅋㅋ

[위종민]

중국은 과잉생산으로 인한 버블이 문제라, 그 탈출구로 전쟁을 택하는 오판을 할 수 있지 않을까 걱정은 살짝 됩니다.