이란 전쟁으로 손 안대고 코푼 푸틴

[위종민]

푸틴은 교착상태에 이른 우크라이나 휴전협상에서 양보를 하나도 하지 않으면서, 이란과의 핵협상에서 이란 농축우라늄을 관리하겠다고 제안하는 등 미국에 도움을 주며 미국의 적대국에서 미국의 파트너로 위치를 바꾸는데 성공했다는 분석입니다. 

푸틴은 단 한 발도 쏘지 않고 이란 전쟁에서 승리했다
작성자 Andrew Latham
게시 14초 전

우크라이나에서 사용된 것과 같은 155mm 포탄. 이미지 출처: Creative Commons. 이라크 모술, 2009년 4월 23일, 제3보병사단 제2중여단전투단 소속 제1-9 야전포병대 병사들이 Destiny 사격장에서 M109A6 팔라딘으로 30발 이상의 포탄을 발사하며 사격 교정 훈련을 실시하고 있다.

워싱턴의 일반적인 시각은 이란 휴전이 이제 미국의 외교적 에너지를 다시 우크라이나 전쟁에 집중할 수 있게 만들었다는 것이다. 그러나 이러한 해석은 인과관계를 완전히 거꾸로 보고 있다. 2026년 1월과 2월 UAE와 스위스에서 열린 미국·우크라이나·러시아 간 세 차례 회담은 오퍼레이션 에픽 퓨리가 시작되기도 전에 이미 결렬되었으며, 이는 이란에 첫 폭탄이 떨어지기 며칠 전에 우크라이나 평화 프로세스가 사실상 사문화되었음을 의미한다. 

푸틴: 진짜 이란 전쟁의 승자

이번 주 워싱턴이 받아들인 낙관적 해석을 일단 인정해보자. 에픽 퓨리는 끝났고, 이란 휴전은—명목상으로나마—유지되고 있으며, 이제 미국의 외교적 관심은 다시 우크라이나로 돌아갈 수 있다는 것이다.

하지만 그 해석은 인과관계를 거꾸로 이해하고 있다.

이미 망가져 있던 것

2026년 1월과 2월 UAE와 스위스에서 열린 미국·우크라이나·러시아 간 세 차례 회담은 아무런 성과 없이 끝났다. 그 실패는 오퍼레이션 에픽 퓨리보다 며칠 앞서 발생했다. 2월 28일 이란 폭격이 시작되었을 때, 우크라이나 평화 프로세스는 중단된 것이 아니라 이미 사문화된 상태였다.

이란 전쟁은 제대로 작동하던 외교 과정을 미국의 관심 밖으로 밀어낸 것이 아니다. 그것은 이미 망가진 과정을 묻어버렸고, 그 과정은 분쟁 당사자 중 한쪽에 상당히 유리한 조건 아래 묻혔다.

우크라이나에서 사용된 것과 같은 MLRS. 이미지 출처: Creative Commons. 대한민국 육군 제5포병여단 MLRS 실사격 훈련.

우크라이나를 위한 MLRS?

MLRS 무기체계. 이미지 출처: Creative Commons.
MLRS 로켓 시스템. 이미지 출처: Creative Commons.
MLRS 로켓 시스템. 이미지 출처: Creative Commons.

아무도 이름 붙이지 않는 거래

지난주 트럼프와 푸틴의 전화 통화는 지금보다 훨씬 더 주목받아야 한다.

푸틴은 이란의 농축 우라늄 비축분 관리에 러시아가 협력하겠다고 제안했다. 이 제안은 트럼프가 이란 협상에서 가장 까다로운 기술적 문제에 대한 체면을 살릴 해결책이 필요했던 정확한 시점에 나왔다. 그리고 크렘린은 그 해결책을 제공함으로써, 제재를 받는 적대국이 아니라 미국의 가장 시급한 외교 위기를 해결하는 데 필수적인 파트너로 자신을 자리매김했다.

같은 통화에서 트럼프는 우크라이나를 위한 “작은 휴전” 아이디어를 제시했다. 며칠 뒤 푸틴은 전승절 휴전을 발표했다. 그것은 소련 기념일에 맞춘 일시적 중단이었으며, 모스크바에 아무런 비용도 들지 않았다. 러시아의 이란 관련 전략적 협력은 크렘린에 아무런 대가도 요구하지 않는 우크라이나 휴전 제안과 동시에 이루어졌다. 5월 5일, 루비오가 에픽 퓨리 종료를 선언한 바로 그날, 라브로프는 이란과 우크라이나를 동시에 다루는 통화를 국무장관에게 요청했다. 모스크바는 두 사안을 공개적으로, 그리고 거리낌 없이 연결한 것이다.

이 순서만으로 공모를 입증할 수는 없으며, 그럴 필요도 없다. 중요한 것은 모스크바가 워싱턴의 가장 시급한 문제에 대해 정확히 필요했던 순간 해결책을 제공했고, 그 대가로 우크라이나 문제에서 눈에 띄는 양보를 하지 않았다는 점이다. 우크라이나는 이 거래의 암묵적 통화였으며, 이를 다르게 해석하는 것은 전략적 오류다.

의도된 동결 분쟁

대부분의 분석은 우크라이나 교착 상태를 협상 실패로 본다. 즉, 양측 입장이 양립할 수 없으며 아직 어떤 중재자도 이를 연결하지 못했다는 식이다. 그러나 그런 해석은 실제로 벌어지고 있는 일을 과소평가한다.

러시아의 요구는 이 기간 동안 단 한 치도 변하지 않았다. 모스크바는 여전히 자국군이 점령한 적도 없는 상당한 영토를 포함한 4개 주 전체에 대한 인정, 우크라이나의 NATO 영구 배제, 그리고 어떤 안보 보장도 실질적으로 무의미하게 만들 수준의 우크라이나 군사력 제한을 요구하고 있다. 우크라이나는 2025년 말 20개 항의 역제안을 제출했지만, 러시아 외무부는 해당 문서를 받은 적이 없다고 발표했다.

이 동결 분쟁은 중재 실패의 산물이 아니다. 그것은 모스크바가 선호하는 최종 상태이며, 그 구조적 논리는 복잡하지 않다. 무기한의 불확실성은 우크라이나의 NATO 가입 경로를 차단하고, 재건을 지연시키며, 군사 태세 정상화를 막는다. 반면 러시아는 지도상 국경처럼 보이는 휴전선을 뒤로 한 채 산업 기반을 재건한다.

유럽은 공백을 메우기 위해 진지하게 노력해왔다. “의지의 연합”은 실제로 존재하며, 안보 보장 체계는 트럼프가 강제력의 최종 보증인 역할을 하겠다는 약속을 중심으로 형성되어 왔다. 그러나 러시아는 우크라이나 영토 내 NATO 국가 병력의 존재를 거부해왔으며, 신뢰할 수 있는 미국의 집행력 없는 안보 보장은 동결 분쟁이 악용하도록 설계된 바로 그 구조적 모호성이다.

재무장은 수년에 걸친 프로젝트이며, 우크라이나의 외교적 시간은 그렇지 않다.

이것이 워싱턴에 의미하는 것

젤렌스키는 이번 주 예레반에서 유럽 지도자들에게 여름이 오면 푸틴이 선택을 강요받게 될 것이라고 말했다. 전쟁을 확대하든지 외교로 향하든지 둘 중 하나라는 것이다. 그 해석은 아마 맞을 것이다. 그러나 여기서 드러나는 점에 주목해야 한다. 우크라이나는 스스로 결정을 강요하기보다 러시아의 결정을 기다리고 있다. 그 비대칭성이 실제 레버리지가 어디에 있는지를 보여주며, 이는 호르무즈 해협과는 아무런 관련이 없다.

상황이 다르게 전개될 가능성이 전혀 없는 것은 아니다. 트럼프가 이란 문제에서 얻은 동력을 바탕으로 우크라이나 협상에 나서, 푸틴의 프레임에 끌려가기보다 진정한 양보를 압박할 수도 있다.

푸틴이 지금까지 피해온 전면 동원 없이 러시아 경제 압박이 더욱 심화될 수도 있다. 이란의 대리 세력 네트워크 약화가 결국 모스크바의 더 넓은 영향력 구조 일부를 약화시켜 우크라이나 계산에 영향을 줄 가능성도 있다.

그러나 그런 가능성은 현재 관측 가능한 기록에는 없다. 기록에 존재하는 것은 제스처로 제안된 휴전, 거래로 제시된 우라늄 제안, 그리고 이란 전쟁이 모스크바에 추가로 10주를 벌어주기 전부터 이미 실패하고 있던 평화 프로세스다.

동결 분쟁은 이란 전쟁에서 시작된 것이 아니다. 그것은 에픽 퓨리 이전부터 존재해왔으며, 거부될 수밖에 없는 러시아의 요구와, 워싱턴의 관심이 다른 곳으로 이동할 때 이미 실패 중이던 중재 과정에 뿌리를 두고 있었다.

이란 전쟁이 푸틴에게 준 것은 전장에서의 우위보다 더 유용한 것이었다. 그것은 워싱턴이 모스크바를 필요로 했던 10주였으며, 러시아를 제재받는 국제적 고립국에서 필수적 파트너로 재정의한 거래였다. 그것도 우크라이나에서 크렘린이 아무런 대가를 치르지 않은 채 말이다.

이란 전쟁은 미국 방산 기반의 잔혹한 위기를 드러냈다

이란 전쟁은 미국 방산 기반의 잔혹한 현실을 드러냈다. 미군은 4주 동안 850발 이상의 토마호크 순항미사일을 소모했는데, 이는 연간 평시 생산량 90발의 9배에 달한다. 또한 첫 96시간 동안 35종 이상의 탄약 5,000발 이상을 사용했다. 국방부는 이를 따라갈 수 없다.
19FortyFive

워싱턴이 집중해야 할 우크라이나 문제는 바로 이것이며, 이란과의 휴전은 그 해답이 아니다.

저자 소개: Andrew Latham 박사

Andrew Latham은 미네소타주 세인트폴 소재 Macalester College의 국제관계 및 정치이론 교수다. X에서 @aakatham 계정을 통해 팔로우할 수 있다. 그는 19FortyFive.com에 매일 칼럼을 기고하고 있다.

Putin Just Won the Iran War Without Firing a Shot - 19FortyFive

Putin Just Won the Iran War Without Firing a Shot

Putin Just Won the Iran War Without Firing a Shot

By

Andrew Latham

Published

14 seconds ago

• 

Blasting a 155mm Howitzer round during a gun calibration exercise at Destiny Range, Soldiers from 1-9 Field Artillery make the earth tremble as they fire over 30 rounds from an M109A6 Paladin, 2nd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, Mosul, Iraq, April 23.

The conventional wisdom in Washington is that the Iran ceasefire now frees up American diplomatic energy to refocus on the war in Ukraine—but that reading gets the causality completely backward. Three rounds of U.S., Ukrainian, and Russian talks held in the UAE and Switzerland between January and February 2026 already collapsed before Operation Epic Fury even began, meaning the Ukraine peace track was buried as a dead letter days before the first bomb fell on Iran.

Putin: The Real Iran War Winner 

Grant the optimistic reading Washington has settled on this week: Epic Fury is over, the Iran ceasefire is holding — however nominally — and American diplomatic attention can finally pivot back to Ukraine.

That reading gets the causality backward.

What Was Already Broken

Three rounds of US, Ukrainian, and Russian talks held in the UAE and Switzerland between January and February 2026 collapsed without producing anything. That failure predates Operation Epic Fury by days. When the bombing of Iran began on February 28, the Ukraine peace track was not interrupted — it was already a dead letter.

The Iran war did not divert American attention from a functioning diplomatic process. It buried a broken one, and buried it under conditions that suited one party to the conflict considerably more than the others.

MLRS combat firing practice, Republic of Korea Army The 5th Artillery Brigade.

MLRS weapons system. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

MLRS rocket system. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

The Transaction Nobody Is Naming

Trump’s phone call with Putin last week deserves more attention than it has received.

Putin offered Russia’s assistance in managing Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile. The offer arrived at the precise moment Trump needed a face-saving resolution to the thorniest technical issue in the Iran negotiations — and the Kremlin produced one, positioning Russia not as a sanctioned adversary seeking accommodation but as Washington’s indispensable partner in resolving America’s most urgent foreign crisis.

The same call was the one in which Trump floated the idea of “a little ceasefire” for Ukraine. Putin responded within days by announcing a Victory Day truce — a pause timed to a Soviet anniversary, and one that cost Moscow nothing. Russia’s strategic cooperation with Iran coincided with a Ukrainian ceasefire proposal that cost the Kremlin nothing. On May 5, the same day Rubio declared Epic Fury concluded, Lavrov requested a call with the Secretary of State covering both Iran and Ukraine in the same breath — Moscow doing the linking explicitly, and without embarrassment.

The sequencing alone doesn’t establish coordination, and it doesn’t need to — what it demonstrates is that Moscow produced a solution for Washington’s most urgent problem at the precise moment one was needed, and extracted no visible concession on Ukraine in return. Ukraine was the unspoken currency of that exchange, and treating it as anything else is a strategic error.

The Frozen Conflict by Design

Most analyses frame the Ukraine stalemate as a negotiating failure — two sides with incompatible positions that no mediator has yet bridged. That framing understates what is actually happening.

Russia’s demands have not shifted a single degree throughout this period. Moscow still insists on recognition of all four claimed oblasts — including substantial territory its forces have never occupied — Ukraine’s permanent exclusion from NATO, and a ceiling on Ukrainian military strength that would render any security guarantee meaningless in practice. Ukraine submitted a 20-point counterproposal in late 2025; the Russian Foreign Ministry announced it had never received the document.

The frozen conflict is not the product of failed mediation — it is Moscow’s preferred end state, and the structural logic is not complicated. Indefinite limbo forecloses Ukraine’s NATO pathway, stalls reconstruction, and prevents any normalization of its military posture, while Russia rebuilds its industrial base behind a ceasefire line that looks, on a map, like a border.

Europe has been genuine in its efforts to fill the gap — the coalition of the willing is real, and the security guarantee framework has taken shape around a Trump commitment to serve as a hard-force backstop. But Russia has rejected any NATO-country presence on Ukrainian soil, and security guarantees without credible American enforcement are precisely the structural ambiguity a frozen conflict is built to exploit.

Rearming is a multi-year project, and the diplomatic window for Ukraine is not.

What This Means for Washington

Zelenskyy told European leaders in Yerevan this week that summer would force Putin’s hand — expand the war or move toward diplomacy. That read is probably correct. But note what it reveals: Ukraine is waiting on a Russian decision rather than forcing one. That asymmetry defines where the leverage actually sits, and it has nothing to do with the Strait of Hormuz.

Sponsored Content

The scenarios in which this breaks differently are not zero. Trump could arrive at Ukraine negotiations with Iran-derived momentum and press for genuine concessions rather than be drawn into Putin’s framing.

Russian economic strain could intensify without the full mobilization Putin has so far avoided. The degradation of Iran’s proxy network could eventually reduce one element of Moscow’s broader leverage architecture in ways that register in the Ukraine calculus.

None of that is in the observable record. What is in the record is a ceasefire offered as a gesture, a uranium offer extended as a transaction, and a peace process that was already failing before the Iran war gave Moscow 10 additional weeks to let it fail completely.

The frozen conflict was not born from the Iran war — it predates Epic Fury by years, rooted in Russian demands designed to be rejected and a mediation track already failing when Washington’s attention moved elsewhere.

What the Iran war gave Putin was something more useful than battlefield advantage: ten weeks during which Washington needed Moscow more than Moscow needed Washington, and a transaction that recast Russia from a sanctioned pariah to an indispensable partner — at no cost to the Kremlin in Ukraine.

You Might Also Like

The Iran War Just Exposed America's Brutal Defense Industrial Base CrisisThe U.S. military's industrial base just got a brutal reality check from the Iran war. American forces burned through 850+ Tomahawk cruise missiles in 4 weeks—9x the annual peacetime production of just 90—and expended 5,000+ munitions across 35 types in the first 96 hours. The Pentagon cannot keep up.19FortyFive

That is the Ukraine problem Washington should be focused on — and a ceasefire with Iran is not the answer.

About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham

Andrew Latham is a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. You can follow him on X: @aakatham. He writes a daily column for 19FortyFive.com.

In this article:Defense, featured, Iran, Military, NATO, Russia, Ukraine, War in Ukraine

Written ByAndrew Latham

Andrew Latham is a Senior Washington Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. You can follow him on X: @aalatham. Dr. Latham is a daily columnist for 19FortyFive.com

[백선호]

이 기사가 생각나네요. ㅎㅎ

http://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/5q2/407

[위종민]

이란이 저 제안을 받았을 지 모르겠습니다 ㅎㅎ