전쟁 지속능력의 중요성을 보여준 이란 전쟁

[위종민]

미국-이스라엘이 군사적 측면에선 분명 완승을 거뒀지만, 이란은 상당한 피해를 입으면서도 전쟁을 견디는 능력을 보여줌으로써 전략적 측면에서 승리를 거뒀다는 THE STRATEGIST의 분석입니다. 

이란 전쟁의 교훈은 화력(firepower)이 아니라 지속력(staying power)일 수 있다

2026년 6월 23일

Justin Bassi, Adel Abdel Ghafar (ASPI)

미국과 이란 간 전쟁을 평가하려면 겉보기에 서로 모순되는 두 가지 사실을 동시에 받아들여야 한다. 미국은 분명 군사적으로 승리했지만, 이란 정권은 어쩌면 전략적으로 더 강해졌을 수도 있다. 세계는 더 나아졌는가, 아니면 더 나빠졌는가? 대답은 "그럴 수도 있다"이다.

호주에게 이러한 모순은 자국의 가장 중요한 동맹국인 미국과의 관계를 유지하는 동시에, 호주 영토 내에서 공격을 지시한 정권과 어떻게 마주할 것인지에 영향을 미친다.

누가 더 큰 승리를 거두었는지를 둘러싼 논쟁은 이미 지난 이야기다. 더 중요한 질문은 어느 결과가 더 중요한가가 아니라, 두 결과가 어떻게 서로 영향을 주는가이다. 물질적으로는 약화됐지만 정치적으로는 여전히 공고한 정권은 단순한 승리나 패배보다 훨씬 복잡한 문제를 제기한다. 이러한 조합이 앞으로의 대립 국면과 그로부터 형성될 국제질서를 결정하게 될 것이다.

군사적 측면은 비교적 명확하다. 미국과 이스라엘의 작전은 이란의 핵시설, 방공망, 지휘통제체계에 상당한 피해를 입혔다. 또한 핵 프로그램과 대리세력 지원 능력 측면에서 이란의 군사력이 약화된 것은 세계에 긍정적인 결과다. 그러나 보다 광범위한 전략적 결과는 훨씬 복잡하다. 이란 정권이 살아남았다는 사실 자체가 테헤란에게는 의미 있는 승리이기 때문이다.

미국과 이란 간 양해각서(MOU)의 세부 내용은 아직 명확하지 않고 현재 스위스에서 협상이 진행 중이지만, 우리는 이란이 즉각적인 이익을 얻고 있다고 본다. 휴전, 해상 봉쇄 해제, 그리고 호르무즈 해협을 통한 이란산 원유 수출을 가능하게 하는 제재 면제가 그것이다. 반면 지속 가능한 합의를 뒷받침해야 할 핵심 요소들, 즉 핵 문제의 영구적 해결, 검증 가능한 탄도미사일 프로그램 제한, 지역 대리세력 지원 중단은 최종 합의로 미뤄졌으며, 그 성사 여부도 불확실하다. 위험은 이번 합의가 실질적으로 이란에 너무 많은 양보를 했다는 것이 아니라, 뒤로 미뤄진 절반이 끝내 실현되지 않을 수 있다는 점이다. 이란은 즉각적인 이익만 확보한 채 더 어려운 문제들은 해결되지 않고, 결국 대립이 다시 시작될 수도 있다.

이러한 불균형은 합의가 성사된 과정 자체를 반영한다. 합의의 시점과 내용은 전장의 상황보다는 장기 대결을 지속하려는 미국의 의지가 약화된 데 더 큰 영향을 받은 것으로 보인다. 그 배경에는 11월 중간선거 이전에 사태를 마무리해야 한다는 미국 국내 정치의 압력이 커지고 있는 점이 있다. 동시에 미국의 NATO 및 아시아 동맹국들은 경제적 부담을 호소하고 있으며, 자국 지역의 긴장 완화를 원하는 걸프 동맹국들의 조용한 압력도 존재한다. 여기에 다음 달 예정된 미국 건국 250주년 기념행사를 성공적으로 치르려는 도널드 트럼프 대통령의 의지도 일정 부분 영향을 미쳤을 가능성이 있다.

이란은 처음부터 미국과 동맹국들이 장기적인 대결을 버틸 인내력을 갖고 있지 않다고 판단했다. Gil Merom은 2003년 저서 *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*에서 개방사회는 장기전에 따른 비용을 지속적으로 감당하기 어렵다고 주장했다. 권위주의 국가와 달리 민주주의 국가는 증가하는 전쟁 비용과 인명 피해를 국민이 쉽게 받아들이지 못하기 때문이다. 이러한 계산은 이번 전쟁 이전부터 존재했지만, 이제는 그 타당성이 매우 분명하게 드러났다.

레바논은 미국과 이란 간 협상이 실패할 수 있는 잠재적인 지점이다. 현재의 합의가 레바논 상황 속에서도 유지될지는 트럼프 대통령이 베냐민 네타냐후 총리에게 이스라엘의 군사작전을 자제하도록 얼마나 압박할 수 있거나 실제로 압박할 의지가 있는지에 달려 있다. 그러나 네타냐후에게는 그럴 의무가 없다. 이스라엘은 이번 양해각서의 당사자가 아니기 때문이다. 테헤란은 레바논에서의 제한적인 이스라엘 군사활동 정도는 감내할 수 있겠지만, 대규모 공격이나 장기적인 군사 주둔은 받아들이기 어려울 것이다. 이 문제는 워싱턴도, 테헤란도 완전히 통제할 수 없다.

중국도 이를 면밀히 지켜보고 있다. 중국은 이란이 입은 군사적 피해를 보며 분명 충격을 받을 수밖에 없다. 또한 향후 전략을 세우면서 미국이 다시 군사력을 사용할 의지를 보였다는 점도 고려해야 한다. 그러나 중국 전략가들에게 더 중요한 교훈은 군사력 자체보다 지속력에 관한 것이다. 이번 전쟁은 미국이 장기적인 대결에서 경제적·정치적·군사적 비용을 얼마나 오래 감당할 수 있는지에 대한 의문을 제기한다.

중국은 대만을 둘러싼 위기가 발생할 경우 그것이 며칠이나 몇 주가 아니라 수개월, 어쩌면 수년에 걸쳐 진행될 가능성이 높다고 보고 있다. 따라서 중국은 미국의 군사적 성과뿐 아니라 시간이 흐르는 동안 미국의 정치적 의지, 동맹의 결속력, 경제적 회복력, 국민의 지지가 얼마나 지속되는지도 함께 평가할 것이다.

호주에게도 이러한 결과는 지리적 거리만큼 먼 문제가 아니다. 해상 교통과 에너지 흐름이 이란의 영향력 아래 놓일 수 있는 걸프 지역, 변화한 지역 억제 균형, 그리고 미국과 유럽 사이의 갈등 가능성은 모두 캔버라가 고려해야 할 전략 환경에 영향을 미친다. 이번 전쟁은 서아시아가 지금보다 훨씬 더 지속적으로 호주의 전략적 사고 속에 포함되어야 함을 보여주었다. 지금까지 호주는 위기가 발생할 때만 이 지역에 관심을 기울였고, 당장의 위험이 사라지면 다시 관심을 거두곤 했다. 보다 계획적이고 지속적인 관여가 이루어진다면 호주는 앞으로 어떤 상황이 전개되더라도 훨씬 더 잘 대비할 수 있을 것이다.

저자

Justin Bassi는 ASPI의 사무총장이며, Adel Abdel Ghafar는 ASPI 선임연구원이다.

2026년 3월 테헤란 공습 이후 연기가 피어오르는 모습. (Fatemeh Bahrami/Anadolu via Getty Images)

이 기사의 작성에는 AI가 어떠한 아이디어도 제공하지 않았다. — Justin Bassi, Adel Abdel Ghafar.

The lesson of the Iran War may be staying power, not firepower | The Strategist

The lesson of the Iran War may be staying power, not firepower

23 Jun 2026|Justin Bassi and Adel Abdel GhafarASPI staff

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Any assessment of the war between the United States and Iran must come to grips with two seemingly contradictory observations. The US definitely secured a military win and the Iranian regime perhaps emerged strategically stronger. Is the world both better off and worse off? Definitely maybe.

For Australia, these contradictions shape how Canberra manages its most important ally while contending with a regime that has directed attacks on Australian soil.

Debate over who has come out more victorious is already old news. The most useful question is not which of the outcomes is worth the greatest notice but how they interact. A regime that has been materially weakened yet left politically entrenched presents a more complicated problem than either a straightforward defeat or victory would. It is that combination which will shape the next phase of the confrontation and the international order that emerges from it.

The military dimension is more straightforward. The US and Israeli campaign inflicted substantial damage on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, air defences and command and control networks. And military weakening of Iran (in terms of its nuclear program and ability to support its terror proxies) is to the world’s benefit. The broader strategic consequences are less straightforward. The regime’s survival is, in itself, a meaningful victory for Tehran.

While the terms of the US–Iran memorandum of understanding are less clear and still in negotiation in Switzerland, we see immediate benefits for Iran: the ceasefire, the lifting of the naval blockade and the oil waivers now returning Iranian crude to market through the Strait of Hormuz. The provisions that would underwrite a durable settlement – a lasting resolution of the nuclear question, verifiable curbs on Iran’s ballistic missile program and an end to its support for regional proxies – are deferred to a final agreement, the conclusion of which is uncertain. The danger is not that the deal concedes too much to Iran in substance but that the deferred half is never delivered. Iran could pocket its immediate gains while the harder questions are left unanswered and confrontation returns.

The imbalance reflects how the agreement came together. Its timing and shape seem to owe less to conditions on the ground than to a diminishing American appetite for a sustained confrontation. Among the sources of that waning resolve are mounting US political demands for resolution before the November midterm elections. Meanwhile America’s NATO and Asian allies are complaining of economic pain, and there’s quiet pressure from Gulf allies anxious for de-escalation on their shores. Arguably, Donald Trump’s wish to let the pomp and ceremony of the US’s 250th anniversary next month take centre stage may have also played a part.

Iran wagered from the outset that the US and its allies lacked the endurance for a prolonged confrontation. As Gil Merom argued in his 2003 book How Democracies Lose Small Wars, open societies struggle to sustain the costs of protracted conflict. Unlike an authoritarian adversary, they’re constrained by a public unwilling to tolerate mounting monetary expense or casualties. The calculation predates this war but is now demonstrated with unusual clarity.

Lebanon is a potential point of failure in the US–Iran negotiations. Whether the arrangement survives events in Lebanon depends in part on how much pressure Trump can or will exert on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to restrain Israeli operations there. Netanyahu is under no such obligation: Israel was not a party to the understanding. Tehran can probably absorb low-intensity Israeli activity in Lebanon without abandoning the deal, but not an Israeli major assault or a sustained military presence there. Neither Washington nor Tehran fully controls the answers.

China is watching closely. It can only be alarmed by the military destruction that Iran has copped. And in its planning, it must consider renewed American willingness to use force. The more consequential lesson available to Chinese strategists, however, concerns endurance rather than capability. The conflict raises questions about the extent to which the US is willing to sustain the economic, political and military costs of a prolonged confrontation.

For Beijing, any crisis over Taiwan would likely be measured in not days or weeks but potentially months or years. Chinese planners will therefore be looking at both US military performance and the durability of American political resolve, alliance cohesion, economic resilience and public support over time.

For Australia, the consequences are less remote than the geography suggests. A Gulf in which maritime traffic and energy flows are subject to Iranian leverage, a regional deterrence balance that has shifted and the possibility of friction between Washington and Europe all bear on the strategic environment Canberra has to plan against. This conflict has shown that West Asia deserves a more sustained place in Australian strategic thinking than it currently holds. For too long, the region has drawn Canberra’s attention only when a crisis has forced it to, and then lost that attention once the immediate danger has passed. A more deliberate and continuous engagement would leave Australia far better prepared for whatever the next phase brings.

Author

Justin Bassi is executive director and Adel Abdel Ghafar is a senior fellow at ASPI.

Image of smoke rising following strikes on Tehran in March 2026: Fatemeh Bahrami/Anadolu via Getty Images.

AI contributed no ideas to this article – Justin Bassi and Adel Abdel Ghafar.