중국이 태평양상으로 SLBM 시험발사

[위종민]

중국이  호주와 피지가 동맹을 체결한 지 몇시간 뒤인 7월 6일 태평양으로 탄도미사일 시험발사를 실시했네요. ASPI의 THE STRATEGIST에 실린 분석글 두 건입니다. 

중국의 태평양 탄도미사일 시험 발사 ― ASPI 분석가들의 견해

2026년 7월 6일

ASPI 편집진

중국은 7월 6일 자국 잠수함 한 척이 태평양으로 탄도미사일 시험 발사를 실시했다고 밝혔다. 이는 호주와 피지가 동맹을 체결한 지 불과 몇 시간 뒤에 이루어진 일이었다.

ASPI 분석가들은 이에 대해 다음과 같은 견해를 제시했다.

말콤 데이비스(Malcolm Davis), 선임 분석가

7월 6일 호주와 피지가 역사적인 동맹을 체결한 지 얼마 지나지 않아 베이징은 남태평양을 향한 잠수함발사탄도미사일(SLBM) 시험 발사로 대응했다. 이 무기는 핵전쟁을 위해 설계된 무기이다. 이는 호주와 피지가 상호방위협정인 '평화의 바다 동맹(Ocean of Peace Alliance)', 즉 베이타치니 조약(Veitacini Treaty)을 체결한 것에 대한 결코 미묘하지 않은 대응이었다.

이번 협정 체결로 피지는 미국, 뉴질랜드, 파푸아뉴기니에 이어 호주의 네 번째 완전한 동맹국이 되었다.

이번 시험은 특히 중국의 영향력 확대나 군사적 전진 배치를 견제하려는 호주의 역내 협력 강화 시도를 중국이 좌시하지 않겠다는 분명한 경고로 받아들여야 한다. 이러한 시험 준비에는 보통 수개월이 걸리지만, 최종적인 발사 시점이 우연이었다고 보기는 어렵다.

이번 시험은 핵전력을 포함한 중국의 군사력에 대한 자신감도 보여준다. 이번은 중국의 네 번째 시험 발사였다. 직전 시험은 2024년 9월로, DF-31형 대륙간탄도미사일이 하이난에서 발사되어 프랑스령 폴리네시아 인근 해역까지 비행했다. 따라서 이번 시험의 탄두가 피지에 얼마나 근접했는지도 흥미로운 관찰 대상이 될 것이다.

호주는 이번 중국의 대응을 심각하게 받아들여야 하며, 지난해 중국 해군의 전개와 같은 맥락에서 이해해야 한다. 지난해 3월에는 중국 해군이 호주를 일주하면서 태즈먼해에서 사전 통보 없이 미사일 훈련을 실시했다. 베이징은 캔버라와 웰링턴, 그리고 남서태평양 국가들에게 군사력 사용 가능성을 내비치며 전략적 목표를 달성하기 위해 강압을 사용할 것이라는 분명한 메시지를 보내고 있다. 이 경우 중국의 목표는 중국의 존재와 영향력을 받아들이는 순응적인 남서태평양을 만드는 것이다. 호주 주변 지역에서 이루어진 SLBM 시험은 의도를 보여주는 가장 강력한 신호 가운데 하나이다.

마이크 휴즈(Mike Hughes), 국방전략프로그램 책임자

이번 시험이 호주-피지 협정과 직접적으로 연결되어 있을 가능성은 낮다. 그리고 베이징은 지역 국가들이 이번 시험을 단지 그 정도로만 받아들인다면 오히려 만족할 것이다. 여기서 핵심은 중국의 군사력과 핵전력 현대화가 계속 빠르게 진행되고 있다는 사실이다. 바로 이것이 역내 국가들의 불안을 키우는 요소이며, 피지와 파푸아뉴기니 같은 국가들이 호주와 동맹을 맺는 핵심 이유이기도 하다. 이제 중국이 경제, 기술, 군사 전 분야에서, 그리고 해양·공중·사이버공간·우주에 이르는 모든 영역에서 역내 지배를 추구하고 있다는 점에는 더 이상 의심의 여지가 없어야 한다.

저스틴 바시(Justin Bassi), 사무총장

7월 6일 중국의 시험은 지속적으로 확대되고 있는 군사력 증강의 또 다른 단계이며, 호주와 더 넓은 인도·태평양 지역에 매우 우려스러운 전략적 신호를 보내고 있다.

이번 사건은 베이징이 자국 연안을 훨씬 넘어서는 지역까지 군사력을 투사하려는 의지가 커지고 있음을 보여준다. 중국은 태평양 국가가 아니지만, 점점 더 공세적인 군사 활동을 통해 이 지역에서 영향력을 구축하려 하고 있다. 중국은 세계적으로는 보다 점진적이고 은밀한 방식으로 영향력을 확대해 왔지만, 태평양에서는 훨씬 노골적인 방식으로 접근하며 군사력 과시와 전략적 강압에 점점 더 의존하고 있다.

이번 도발의 시점은 우연이 아니다. 이는 호주가 가까운 우방이자 이웃인 피지와 새로운 동맹을 체결하는 등 주요 태평양 국가로서의 입지를 계속 강화하는 시점에 이루어졌다. 태평양 국가들은 평화와 안정에 관한 중국의 수사가 아니라 행동을 기준으로 중국을 평가해야 한다. 이번 군사력 시위는 중국 공산당이 진정한 협력과 상호 존중이 아니라 위협과 강압, 군사력 과시를 통해 역내 질서를 재편하려 한다는 우려를 더욱 강화하고 있다.

라이너스 코언(Linus Cohen), 연구원

지금쯤 수바 항구를 둘러본다면 온갖 종류의 안테나와 레이돔, 위성 접시가 빼곡히 설치된 독특한 선박 한 척을 볼 수 있을 것이다. 위안왕 5호(Yuan Wang 5)는 중국 인민해방군 항공우주군, 즉 중국 우주군이 운용하는 위성 추적 및 원격계측 선박이다. 이 선박의 임무 가운데 하나는 탄도미사일 시험이 얼마나 성공적으로 이루어졌는지 측정하는 것이다.

전면적인 핵전쟁을 위해 설계된 전략미사일의 중국 시험이라는 점에서 이번 월요일의 시험은 현실적인 장거리 비행을 수행했다는 점에서 이례적이었다. 미사일은 발사 지점 근처에 떨어지도록 높은 각도로 발사되지 않았으며, 대신 보다 완만하고 일반적인 탄도로 비행했다. 그리고 위안왕 5호는 바로 그 임무를 지원하기 위해 현장에 배치되어 있었다.

라지 라자고팔란(Raji Rajagopalan), 상주 선임연구원

이번 중국의 시험은 소규모 국가들에 대한 중국의 공격적인 행동을 보여주는 또 하나의 사례이다. 호주와 피지의 협정 직후 이루어졌다는 점에서, 캔버라가 자국 주변 지역의 안보를 강화하려는 데 대한 중국의 불만을 드러내는 시위이기도 하다.

긍정적인 측면도 있다. 이러한 행동은 역내 국가들에게 이런 위협에 맞서 상호 협력이 필요하다는 점을 보여준다. 우리는 이미 중국 해군이 호주를 일주했으며, 남중국해와 대만을 상대로도 공격적인 행동을 계속해 왔다. 이제 이러한 행동은 남태평양으로까지 확대되고 있다.

이번 시험은 중국이 전례 없는 규모로 핵전력을 확대하고 있으면서도 그 이유를 설명하지 않고 있다는 점에도 다시 주목하게 만든다. 이는 이미 여러 국가가 핵무장을 추진하면서 흔들리고 있는 국제 핵비확산 체제에도 부정적인 영향을 미칠 가능성이 크다.

매디 존스(Madi Jones), 분석가

중국 핵미사일 시험의 효과는 이후 태평양 도서국들의 반응으로 가장 잘 측정될 것이다. 중국은 이들 국가가 상호 안보 협력을 도발적인 행동으로 인식하기를 바라고 있다. 따라서 이번 시험의 정치적 성과는 기술적 목적과는 별개로, 호주와의 안보 동맹이 역내 안정을 해치는 것으로 보는 인식이 확산되는지 여부로 평가될 수 있다.

중국은 이미 6월 29일 체결된 바누아투와의 나카말 협정을 중국의 역내 이익을 겨냥한 것으로 규정하며, 역내 안정에 도움이 되지 않는다고 비판해 왔다. 지난 일주일 동안 태평양에서는 솔로몬제도 총리가 집단안보를 위한 역내 협력을 촉구했고, 이어 피지와 '평화의 바다' 조약이 체결되어 모든 태평양 도서국에 개방되었다. 이러한 일련의 움직임은 중국이 늘어나는 안보 협정을 자국 이익에 대한 위협으로 인식하고 있음을 시사한다.

태평양에서 군사력을 과시하는 것은 추가적인 안보 협력을 억제하려는 목적일 수 있다. 그러나 오히려 태평양 도서국들이 집단안보를 더욱 추구하도록 만드는 정반대의 결과를 낳을 수도 있다. 중국이 2024년 미사일 시험을 실시했을 당시에도 피지와 팔라우를 비롯한 여러 태평양 국가는 역내에 대한 존중을 촉구하며 무력 시위를 비난했다.

에릭 프레콩(Eric Frecon), 방문연구원

이번과 같은 시험은 두 달 뒤 열릴 차기 태평양도서국포럼(Pacific Islands Forum) 정상회의를 앞두고 장기적으로는 중국에 역효과를 가져올 수 있다. 군사화는 이 지역의 핵심 관심사이며, 지난 5월 매슈 웨일 총리가 취임한 이후 솔로몬제도에서 중국의 영향력은 약화되고 있다.

이번 시험은 태평양에서 중국이 평범한 도서국 주민들의 옹호자라는 이미지를 구축해 온 기존의 매우 효과적인 서사와도 모순된다.

키리바시처럼 중국의 우주 추적기지를 수용한 일부 새로운 우방국조차도 2024년 시험 당시 강하게 항의했다. 이제 남은 문제는 미국이 2024년처럼 태평양 도서국 상공에서 다시 시험 발사로 대응할 것인지 여부이다.

리처드 그레이(Richard Gray), 상주 선임연구원

이번 발사는 핵무기를 보유하지 않았으며, 개별적으로나 집단적으로나 중국에 군사적 위협이 되지 않는 지역 국가들을 상대로 한 핵전력 과시이다. 중국이 설명한 것처럼 단순한 통상적인 시험은 아니었다. 이 지역에서는 이를 노골적인 위협으로 받아들일 것이다. 또한 불과 몇 시간 전에 중국이 참여하지 않은 호주-피지 안보동맹이 체결된 데 대한 대응으로 해석될 것이다.

이는 장기적으로 중국에 역효과를 낳을 가능성이 크며, 중국이 상황과 자신의 행동이 가져올 결과를 또다시 잘못 판단한 사례가 될 것이다. 호주를 비롯한 역내 국가들은 이러한 노골적인 위협을 있는 그대로 인식하고, 상호 안보 협력을 계속 강화하며 지역 질서를 흔드는 중국의 과도한 영향력을 거부하는 방향으로 대응해야 한다.

이처럼 위협적인 행동이 한 단계 더 강화된 것은 중국과의 양자 관계에서 안정성을 우선시하는 호주의 정책이 과연 어떤 이익을 가져오는지에 대해서도 새로운 의문을 제기한다.

이 글은 다른 분석가의 논평을 추가하여 업데이트되었다.

저자

중국 JL-3 잠수함발사탄도미사일(SLBM) 운반 차량 사진: 장레이(VCG)/게티이미지.

이 기사에는 AI가 어떠한 아이디어도 제공하지 않았다. — 말콤 데이비스, 마이크 휴즈, 저스틴 바시, 라이너스 코언, 라지 라자고팔란, 매디 존스, 에릭 프레콩, 리처드 그레이.

중국의 미사일 시험은 단순한 신호가 아니다. 이는 우려스러운 핵전력 증강의 일부이다.

2026년 7월 8일

프랭크 로즈

사람들은 월요일 중국이 실시한 잠수함발사탄도미사일(SLBM) 시험의 가장 중요한 의미를 놓치고 있다. 그것은 중국의 힘을 과시하기 위한 신호가 아니라는 점이다. 물론 그러한 의도도 거의 확실히 포함되어 있었을 것이다. 그러나 더 중요한 것은 이번 시험이 무엇을 입증했는가이다. 중국은 이제 잠수한 잠수함에서 신형 장거리 미사일을 성공적으로 시험함으로써 핵억지력을 해상으로 확장했고, 신뢰할 수 있는 핵 3축 체제(triad)에 한층 가까워졌다.

이는 중국이 진행 중인 우려스러운 핵전력 현대화와 증강의 한 요소에 불과하다. 이에 대응하기 위해서는 두 가지 노력이 동시에 필요하다. 미국과 동맹국들은 자체 억지력을 현대화해야 하며, 동시에 중국의 핵전력 증강을 억제하기 위한 수단으로 군비통제를 다시 작동시키는 방안을 찾아야 한다. 다만 가까운 시일 내에 이 분야에서 획기적인 진전이 이루어질 가능성은 낮다.

7월 6일 실시된 시험에서는 핵추진 잠수함이 장거리로 미사일을 발사해 남태평양에 탄착시켰다. 이처럼 장거리에서 이루어진 시험이 공개적으로 확인된 것은 처음이다. 중국 관영 신화통신은 미사일이 모의 탄두를 탑재했으며, 역내 각국 정부에 사전 통보한 뒤 지정된 해역에 탄착했다고 보도했다. 또한 이번 발사는 특정 목표를 겨냥한 것이 아닌 "통상적인 일정"이라고 설명했다.

역내 반응은 신속하고도 분명했다. 호주가 피지와 새로운 방위협정을 체결한 지 불과 몇 시간 뒤 수바에서 발언한 페니 웡 호주 외교장관은 이번 시험을 "역내 안정을 해치는 행위"라고 규정하며, "역내 국가들이 기대하는 의도에 대한 투명성과 안심을 제공하지 못한 채 중국이 급속한 군사력 증강을 진행하고 있다는 맥락에서 이해되어야 한다."고 말했다. 윈스턴 피터스 뉴질랜드 외교장관도 마찬가지로 "반갑지 않고 우려스러운 전개"라고 평가하며, 태평양은 "이러한 시험이 정상적이거나 일상적인 일로 받아들여지도록 방치해서는 안 된다."고 경고했다.

실제로 이번 시험의 시점은 거의 확실히 우연이 아니었다. 다만 중국이 군사력을 과시하는 신호를 보낸 직접적인 계기가 호주-피지 동맹 체결이었을 가능성은 낮다. 오히려 중국은 앙카라에서 열리는 NATO 정상회의를 하루 앞두고, 동시에 러시아와의 연합 해군훈련과 시기를 맞추어 힘을 과시하려 했을 가능성이 더 크다.

그럼에도 미국을 포함한 핵보유국들은 대륙간탄도미사일(ICBM)과 잠수함발사탄도미사일(SLBM)을 정기적으로 시험 발사한다는 점을 기억해야 한다.

이번 시험의 직접적인 중요성은 신형 미사일과 신형 잠수함이 모두 설계된 대로 정상적으로 작동한다는 사실을 입증했다는 데 있다. 이는 중국 핵억지력의 기반이 보다 안전한 해양으로 확대되고 있음을 의미한다. 이것은 중국의 전략적 태세에서 중요하고 지속적인 변화이며, 워싱턴과 동맹국들이 진지하게 받아들여야 하는 것은 월요일의 헤드라인 자체가 아니라 이러한 추세이다.

중국은 오래전부터 ICBM과 SLBM을 시험해 왔지만, 전통적으로는 자국 영토 내에서 실시했다. 그러나 2024년 9월에는 중국 남부 하이난섬에서 ICBM을 발사해 프랑스령 폴리네시아 인근 남태평양까지 비행시켰다. 이번 시험은 한 가지 중요한 차이가 있다. 전문가들은 이번 시험이 중국의 최신 현역 탄도미사일 잠수함인 094형에서 발사된 신형 JL-3 SLBM일 가능성이 가장 높다고 평가하고 있다.

1960년대 첫 핵무기 시험 이후 중국은 사일로와 이동식 발사대를 기반으로 한 지상발사 ICBM을 중심으로 핵억지력을 구축해 왔다. 그러나 지난 10년 동안 베이징은 미국과 러시아처럼 지상·공중·해상이라는 세 가지 운반수단을 모두 갖춘 보다 생존성이 높은 핵억지력을 구축하기 위해 분명히 노력해 왔다. 내 동료인 에번 메데이로스는 "가장 기본적으로 중국은 최신 잠수함발사탄도미사일을 기술적으로 검증할 필요가 있었다."고 지적하면서도, "더 큰 메시지는 중국이 이제 완전한 핵 3축 체제를 운용하게 되었다는 것이다."라고 덧붙였다. 나는 이러한 분석이 본질적으로 옳다고 생각한다.

다만 미국도 자체 전략핵잠수함에서 정기적으로 SLBM 시험을 실시한다는 점은 기억할 필요가 있다. 미국 해군의 실증 및 검증운용(DASO) 프로그램은 배치 전에 승조원의 전투 준비태세와 무기체계를 검증하기 위해 잠항 중인 잠수함에서 비무장 트라이던트 II D5 미사일을 발사한다. 2021년 9월, 내가 미국 핵무기 비축분을 개발하고 유지하는 기관인 국가핵안보국(NNSA)의 수석 부국장으로 재직하던 당시 USS 와이오밍함에 승선해 DASO 시험 발사를 직접 참관할 기회를 가졌다. 솔직히 말해 그것은 놀라운 경험이었다. 영국(미국 DASO 프로그램의 일환), 프랑스, 러시아도 이와 유사한 시험을 실시하고 있다.

따라서 전체적으로 볼 때 미국과 호주, 일본을 포함한 동맹국들은 시험 발사 자체를 지나치게 우려할 필요는 없다. 우리가 우려해야 할 것은 이번 시험이 인도·태평양의 전략적 균형과 러시아·중국·미국 사이의 보다 광범위한 핵전력 균형에 의미하는 바이다. 주목해야 하는 것은 개별 사건으로서의 시험이 아니라, 그것이 갖는 지정학적·전략적 함의이다.

내가 다른 글에서 썼듯이, 오늘날 인도·태평양에서 미국과 동맹국들이 직면한 가장 중요한 전략적 도전은 중국의 부상과 거의 아무런 제약 없이 진행되고 있는 급속한 핵전력 증강이다. 베이징은 핵전력을 빠른 속도로 확대하고 다양화하고 있으며, 이는 미국의 전력 구조와 확장억제 공약, 그리고 역내 위기 고조 관리에 직접적인 영향을 미친다.

미국 국방부는 지난해 중국 군사력 연례보고서에서 "중국의 핵탄두 보유량은 2024년에도 600기 초반 수준에 머물러 이전보다 생산 속도가 다소 느려졌지만, 이러한 둔화에도 불구하고 인민해방군은 대규모 핵전력 증강을 계속하고 있으며, 2030년까지 1,000기 이상의 핵탄두를 보유할 것으로 예상된다."고 밝혔다.

내 견해로는 미국과 동맹국들은 이러한 상황에 대응해 몇 가지 구체적인 조치를 취해야 한다.

첫째, 미국은 신형 센티넬 ICBM, B-21 폭격기, 장거리 스탠드오프 순항미사일, 컬럼비아급 전략핵잠수함을 포함한 핵 3축 전력을 계속 현대화해야 하며, 국가핵안보국을 통해 에너지부의 핵 관련 기반시설도 현대화해야 한다.

둘째, 미국은 일본, 한국, 호주 등 역내 동맹국들과 긴밀히 협의하여 지역 억지를 위해 어떤 전구 핵전력이 필요한지 결정해야 한다. 미국은 이미 2030년대 초 배치를 목표로 핵탄두 탑재 해상발사 순항미사일을 개발하고 있다. 또한 F-35와 같은 이중 운용 항공기가 운반할 수 있는 공중발사 체계의 실현 가능성도 검토해야 한다. 이는 미국의 핵무기 운반 수단을 더욱 다양화할 것이다.

셋째, AUKUS를 구성하는 호주·영국·미국 3개국이 이 구상을 계속 추진하는 것이 매우 중요하다. AUKUS의 제1축(Pillar One)은 핵추진 공격잠수함 배치에 초점을 맞추고 있으며, 제2축(Pillar Two)은 자율무인체계를 포함한 첨단 기술에 초점을 맞추고 있다. 이러한 전력이 실전 배치되면 역내에서 보다 유리한 재래식 전력 균형을 유지하는 데 도움이 될 것이다.

마지막으로 미국은 일본의 토마호크 순항미사일 도입과 같은 동맹국들의 정밀 재래식 타격능력 확보를 지원해야 한다. 내가 6월 *더 스트래티지스트* 기고문에서 지적했듯이, 여기서 가장 큰 문제 가운데 하나는 미국 방위산업 기반의 생산능력이 제한되어 있어 이러한 판매가 지연되고 있다는 점이다. 따라서 미국은 핵심 탄약의 공동생산 협정을 통해 동맹국들과 함께 생산능력과 공급망 회복력을 확대해야 한다.

이는 근본적인 질문을 제기한다. 결국 중국을 어떻게 의미 있는 군비통제 체제로 끌어들일 수 있는가 하는 것이다. 빌 클린턴 대통령 이후 모든 미국 행정부는 중국과 이 문제를 논의하려 했지만 모두 실패했다. 베이징은 핵군비통제에 관한 실질적인 외교적 협의를 지속적으로 거부해 왔다. 중국이 수백 기 수준의 핵탄두만 보유했을 때는 이러한 태도를 어느 정도 용인할 수 있었을지 모르지만, 현재와 같은 속도와 규모의 핵전력 증강이 진행되는 상황에서는 더 이상 지속 가능한 입장이 아니다.

역사는 중국이 다른 국가들의 군사 배치로 인해 실질적인 전략적·경제적 비용을 부담하게 될 때에야 협상장에 나올 가능성이 가장 크다는 점을 시사한다. 이는 1980년대 NATO가 소련의 중거리 핵전력 배치에 대응한 끝에 결국 모스크바를 협상장으로 끌어냈던 사례와 유사하다. 안타깝지만 이는 미국이 결국 군비통제를 위한 여건을 조성하기 위해 먼저 일부 군사능력을 확대해야 할 수도 있음을 의미한다.

중국의 SLBM 시험이 제기하는 근본적인 문제는 중국의 전략적 방향이 어디를 향하고 있는가이다. 현재까지의 증거는 베이징이 2030년대 중반까지 실전 배치된 핵전력에서 미국과 대등한 수준에 접근하려 한다는 점을 보여준다. 따라서 진정한 질문은 미국이 인도·태평양 동맹국들과 함께 이 도전에 어떻게 대응할 것인가이다. 내 생각에는 핵전력과 재래식 전력을 적절히 조합하는 동시에, 장기적으로는 군비통제를 통해 중국의 능력을 제한하려는 지속적인 노력이 필요하다. 다만 그러한 결과는 미국과 동맹국들이 베이징이 협상장에 나오도록 만들 만큼 충분한 비용을 중국에 부담시킬 수 있을 때까지는 기대하기 어려울 것이다. 

China’s Pacific ballistic missile test – Views from ASPI analysts | The Strategist

China’s Pacific ballistic missile test – Views from ASPI analysts | The Strategist

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China’s Pacific ballistic missile test – Views from ASPI analysts

6 Jul 2026|ASPI staffASPI staff

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China said on 6 July that one of its submarines had test-launched a ballistic missile into the Pacific Ocean. This followed the signing of an alliance between Australia and Fiji by only hours.

ASPI analysts provide their views on this:

Malcolm Davis, senior analyst

The ink was barely dry on the historic 6 July alliance between Australia and Fiji when the response came from Beijing: a test into the South Pacific of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), a weapon designed for nuclear war. This was hardly a subtle riposte to Australia and Fiji achieving a mutual defence agreement, called the Ocean of Peace Alliance (or Veitacini Treaty).

With the signing of the agreement, Fiji became Australia’s fourth full ally, after the United States, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea.

The test should be seen as a clear warning by Beijing of its intent to challenge any effort by Australia to strengthen regional ties, particularly any that counter Chinese efforts for forward influence or even military presence. Although preparing for such a test usually takes months, the final timing can hardly be seen as coincidental.

The test also reinforces Chinese confidence in its military capabilities, including its nuclear weapons capabilities. This has been the fourth such test by China. The most recent had occurred in September 2024, when an intercontinental ballistic missile of the DF-31 type flew from Hainan to seas near French Polynesia. So, it’ll be interesting to see how close this test’s warhead came to Fiji.

Australia should take this Chinese response seriously and see it in a similar light to last year’s naval deployments – the first of which, in March, circumnavigated Australia, conducting unannounced missile drills in the Tasman Sea along the way. Beijing is sending a clear message to Canberra, Wellington and Southwest Pacific states that it will coerce through implied military force to achieve its strategic objectives. In this case, China’s goal is a Southwest Pacific that is compliant and accepting of Chinese presence and influence. An SLBM test in Australia’s region is about as strong a signal of intent as it can get.

Mike Hughes, Defence Strategy Program director

It is unlikely the test is directly linked to the Australia–Fiji deal. And Beijing would be happy if that’s all the region takes from the test. The key story here is that China’s military and nuclear modernisation continues apace – the very thing that causes anxiety across the entire region and likely a core driver for states such as Fiji and Papua New Guinea to form alliances with Australia. There should be no remaining doubt about China’s intent for dominance in the region, across every field of the economy, technology and the military and across every domain from the sea to the sky, cyberspace and space itself.

Justin Bassi, executive director

China’s 6 July test represents an escalation in its ongoing military expansion and sends a deeply concerning strategic signal to Australia and the wider Indo-Pacific.

This development demonstrates an increasing willingness by Beijing to project power far beyond its own shores. China is not a Pacific nation, yet it is seeking to establish power in the region through increasingly assertive military activities. While Beijing has pursued global influence through a more gradual and surreptitious strategic approach, its engagement throughout the Pacific has been far more overt, increasingly relying on demonstrations of military capability and strategic coercion.

The timing of this provocation is no coincidence. It comes as Australia continues to strengthen its position as a leading Pacific nation, including through the signing of a new alliance with one of its closest friends and neighbours, Fiji. Countries across the Pacific should judge Beijing not by its rhetoric about peace and stability but by its actions. This latest demonstration of military power reinforces concerns that the Chinese Communist Party is seeking to reshape the regional order through intimidation, coercion and the projection of military strength, rather than through genuine partnership and mutual respect.

Linus Cohen, researcher

Wander on down to the port of Suva about now and you may notice an odd-looking ship bedecked with just about every kind of antenna, radome, and satellite dish you can point a camera at. Yuan Wang 5 is a satellite-tracking and telemetry vessel operated by the People’s Liberation Army Aerospace Force – China’s space force. One of its jobs is to help determine how well ballistic missile tests go.

For a Chinese test of a strategic missile – that is, one designed for full nuclear war – Monday’s was unusual in flying the weapon over a realistically long distance. The missile didn’t fly steeply to ensure it would fall close to its launch site. Instead, it flew at a shallower, more normal angle. And Yuan Wang 5 was on hand for the occasion.

Raji Rajagopalan, resident senior fellow

China’s test is another example of its aggressive behaviour towards smaller countries. Coming on the heels of Australia’s agreement with Fiji, this is also a demonstration of China’s displeasure at Canberra trying to secure its backyard.

On the positive side, it demonstrates to the region the need for mutual cooperation in the face of such behaviour. We have already seen the Chinese navy circumnavigate Australia, adding to its aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea and against Taiwan. The same Chinese behaviour is now being extended to the South Pacific.

The test also draws attention to China’s unprecedented and unexplained expansion of its nuclear forces. This is also likely to have a deleterious effect on the global non-proliferation order, which is already crumbling with many more countries pursuing nuclear ambitions.

Madi Jones, analyst

The effectiveness of China’s nuclear missile test might best be measured in the subsequent reactions of Pacific island nations. China would like them to see security cooperation with each other as provocative. So the political success of the test, quite apart from its technical objectives, could be measured by any shift towards seeing security alliances with Australia as destabilising for the region.

China has been clear in its pushback on the 29 June Nakamal agreement with Vanuatu, framing it as targeting China’s interests in the region and arguing that it was not conducive to regional stability. The past week has seen a swell of activity in the Pacific, with prime minister of Solomon Islands calling for regional cooperation on collective security and now the Ocean of Peace treaty signed with Fiji and open to all Pacific island countries. Taken together, this suggests that China sees the mounting agreements as a threat to its own interests in the region.

A show of military power over the Pacific may aim to deter further security cooperation there. However, it may instead have the opposite effect, encouraging Pacific island nations to seek collective security. In response to China’s 2024 missile testing, Pacific nation responses, including from Fiji and Palau, urged respect for the region and condemned the show of force.

Eric Frecon, visiting fellow

A test such as this one could be counter-productive for China in the long term, two months before the next Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting. Militarisation is a key concern in the region, and Beijing’s influence in Solomon Islands has waned since the appointment of Prime Minister Matthew Wale in May.

This test seems to contradict China’s usual and very effective narrative in the Pacific, one in which it portrays itself as an advocate for ordinary islanders.

Some of its new partners, like Kiribati (which has hosted a Chinese space tracking station), had vehemently complained about its 2024 test. The question is now whether the US will reply with a test, as it did in 2024 – also over the heads of the Pacific islanders.

Richard Gray, resident senior fellow

The launch is a show of nuclear force to a region in which the nations have no nuclear weapons and do not, individually or collectively, present a military threat to China. It was not a routine test, as China described it. It will be seen as a naked threat. It will be interpreted in the region as a response to the latest signing of a regional security agreement that does not involve China, the Australia–Fiji alliance signed hours before.

This is likely to be counter-productive for China in the longer term, another example of its misreading of the context and consequences of its actions. Regional countries including Australia should see this blunt threat for what it is and respond accordingly – with a firm determination to keep seeking security with each other and by rejecting the regionally disruptive influence of an overbearing China.

The clear escalation in threatening behaviour also raises questions for Australia about the benefits of a policy prioritising stability in our bilateral relationship with China.

This article has been updated with comments from another analyst.

Author

Image of transporter trucks for Chinese JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles: Zhang Lei/VCG via Getty Images.

AI contributed no ideas to this article — Malcolm Davis, Mike Hughes, Justin Bassi, Linus Cohen, Raji Rajagopalan, Madi Jones, Eric Frecon,

Forget the signalling: China’s missile test is part of an alarming nuclear buildup | The Strategist

Forget the signalling: China’s missile test is part of an alarming nuclear buildup | The Strategist

Forget the signalling: China’s missile test is part of an alarming nuclear buildup

8 Jul 2026|Frank Rose

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People are missing the most important implication from China’s test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) on Monday. It’s not the signalling of China’s power, though that was almost certainly in there. In part, it’s what the test confirm‎s: China has now validated a new, long-range missile from a submerged submarine, extending its nuclear deterrent to sea and moving closer to a credible triad.

This, in turn, is just one element of a worrying Chinese nuclear modernisation and buildup. Countering this requires two parallel efforts: the United States and its allies must modernise their own deterrent capabilities, and they must simultaneously find ways to bring arms control back into play as a tool for constraining China’s buildup – though a near-term breakthrough on that front remains unlikely.

The 6 July test involved a nuclear-powered submarine firing the missile at long range into the South Pacific. It was the first publicly acknowledged test of this kind at this distance. The missile carried a dummy warhead and landed in a designated area following advance notification to regional governments, according to China’s state Xinhua news agency, which characterised the launch as a ‘routine arrangement’ not directed at any target.

Regional reaction was swift and pointed. Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong, speaking in Suva just hours after Canberra had signed a new defence pact with Fiji, called the test ‘destabilising to the region’ and said it must be viewed ‘in the context of a rapid military buildup by China, which is lacking in the transparency and reassurance as to intent that the region expects.’ New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters was equally direct, describing the launch as ‘an unwelcome and concerning development’ and warning that the Pacific ‘should not sit by and allow such tests to become normalised or routine.’

Indeed, the timing was almost certainly not accidental, though the signing of the Australia–Fiji alliance was probably not the occasion that China was thinking of as it sent a signal of its military prowess. More likely, it wanted to put on a show a day ahead of a NATO summit in Ankara and to coincide with a joint naval exercise it was conducting with Russia.

Still, we should remember that nuclear powers, including the US, test their intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and SLBMs routinely.

The immediate importance of this one is that it has proven that the missile and the submarine, both of new design, worked as designed. This means that the basing of China’s nuclear deterrent is extending into the safety of the sea. That is a significant and lasting shift in China’s strategic posture – and it’s the trend, not Monday’s headline, that Washington and its allies need to take seriously.

China has long tested its ICBMs and SLBMs, but it has traditionally done so within its own territory. In September 2024, however, it test-fired an ICBM from Hainan Island in southern China into the South Pacific near French Polynesia. This week’s test differs in one important respect: experts assess that it most likely involved a newer JL-3 SLBM, launched from a submarine of the Type 094 class, China’s newest ballistic-missile submarine design in service.

Since testing its first nuclear weapon in the 1960s, China has focused its strategic deterrent primarily on silo- and mobile-based land ICBMs. Over the past decade, however, Beijing has clearly been working to build a more survivable deterrent, one that, like the US’s and Russia’s, rests on a full triad of delivery systems, with delivery from the land, air and sea. As my colleague Evan Medeiros noted, ‘Most basically, China needed to technically validate its newest submarine-launched ballistic missile,’ but he added that ‘there was a broader message to the world – China now has a fully operational nuclear triad.’ I think that analysis is essentially correct.

That said, it’s worth remembering that the US regularly tests SLBMs from its own ballistic-missile submarines. The US Navy’s Demonstration and Shakedown Operation (DASO) program involves launching unarmed Trident II D5 missiles from a submerged submarine to verify a crew’s combat readiness and the weapon system before deployment. In September 2021, while serving as principal deputy administrator of the US National Nuclear Security Administration – the agency that develops and maintains the US nuclear stockpile – I had the opportunity aboard USS Wyoming to observe a DASO shot. It was, to put it mildly, an extraordinary experience. Britain (as part of the US DASO program), France and Russia conduct comparable tests.

So, on balance, the US and its allies, including Australia and Japan, should not be overly concerned about the test itself. What should concern us is what the test represents for the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific, and for the broader nuclear balance among Russia, China and the US. It is the geopolitical and strategic implications of the test, not the test as a discrete event, that warrant our attention.

As I have written elsewhere, the central strategic challenge confronting the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific today is the rise of China and its rapid, largely unconstrained nuclear buildup. Beijing is expanding and diversifying its nuclear forces at a pace that directly affects US force structure, extended deterrence commitments, and escalation management across the region.

As the US Department of Defense noted last year in its annual report on China’s military power, ‘China’s stockpile of nuclear warheads remained in the low 600s through 2024, reflecting a slower rate of production when compared to previous years. Despite this slowdown, the [People’s Liberation Army] has continued its massive nuclear expansion… [and] the PLA remains on track to have over 1,000 warheads by 2030.’

In my view, the US and its allies need to take several concrete steps in response to these developments.

First, the US needs to continue modernising its nuclear triad, with new Sentinel ICBMs, B-21 bombers, Long-Range Stand-Off cruise missiles and Columbia-class submarines, and it needs to update the Department of Energy’s nuclear infrastructure through its National Nuclear Security Administration.

Second, the US should consult closely with regional allies such as Japan, South Korea and Australia to determine what theatre nuclear capabilities are needed for regional deterrence. The US is already developing a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile, currently scheduled for deployment in the early 2030s. Washington should also consider the feasibility of an air-delivered system that could be carried by dual-capable aircraft such as the F-35, which would expand US delivery options.

Third, it is critical that the three nations in AUKUS – Australia, Britain and the US – continue to advance that initiative. AUKUS’s Pillar One focuses on deploying nuclear-powered attack submarines, while Pillar Two focuses on advanced capabilities, including autonomous systems. As these capabilities come online, they will help sustain a more favourable conventional balance of power in the region.

Finally, the US should support allied efforts to acquire precision conventional strike capabilities, such as Japan’s acquisition of Tomahawk cruise missiles. As I noted in a June article for The Strategist, one of the central challenges here is constrained US defence-industrial capacity, which is delaying these sales. It is therefore imperative that the US work with allies to expand production capacity and resilience through co-production agreements on key munitions.

This raises a fundamental question: how can China eventually be brought into a meaningful arms control framework? Every US administration since president Bill Clinton’s has tried and failed to engage China on this issue. Beijing has consistently declined meaningful diplomatic engagement on nuclear arms control. That posture may have been tolerable when China possessed only a few hundred warheads; it is no longer sustainable given the pace and scale of China’s current buildup.

History suggests China may be most willing to come to the negotiating table only when faced with deployments by others that impose tangible strategic and economic costs – much as NATO’s response to Soviet deployments of intermediate-range nuclear forces in the 1980s eventually brought Moscow to the table. Regrettably, this implies the US may first need to expand certain military capabilities to create the conditions necessary for eventual arms control.

The fundamental issue arising from China’s SLBM is where China’s strategic trajectory is headed. The available evidence suggests Beijing is seeking to approach parity with the US in deployed nuclear forces by the mid-2030s. The real question, then, is how the US should work with its Indo-Pacific allies to address this challenge. In my view, that will require a mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, alongside a sustained effort to eventually constrain Chinese capabilities through arms control – though that outcome is unlikely until the US and its allies find ways to impose enough costs on Beijing to bring it to the table.

Author

Frank A Rose is president of Cheval‎ier Strategic Advisors, a strategic advisory firm focused on the intersection of defence, geopolitics and emerging technology. He previously served as principal deputy administrator of the US National Nuclear Security Administration, an assistant secretary of state, a professional staff member on the House Armed Services Committee and a policy official in the US Department of Defense.

Image of a Chinese SLBM launch from an unspecified location in the Pacific on 6 July: PLA Navy Photo/China Military Bugle via X.

AI contributed no ideas to this article – Frank Rose.

[백선호]

어디에서 쏴 어디에 떨어졌는지 보여주는 지도 그림이 있을까요?

[위종민]

https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-slbm-test-underscores-importance-ballistic-missile-launch-notification-agreement , https://x.com/josephwutw/status/2074121838410752035/photo/1

CSIS에서 올린 글에는 트위터에서 올린 글에 링크된 지도를 첨부했네요. CNN이나 THE DIPLOMAT의 기사에도 발사와 탄착지를 표시하지 않은 걸 보니 중국의 공식 발표는 없나 봅니다. 대만 남서쪽 남중국해에서 발사해 나우루 남동쪽까지 7,300km를 날아간 것 같다고 합니다.

[김유철]

돌아가는 이야기가 서로 다른 지점에서 두 발을 쐈나봅니다. 한 발은 JL-3로 남중국해에서 나우루 방면으로 쏜 것이고, 또 한 발은 발해만에서 일본 동쪽 원해로 쏜 것인데 발해만에서 쏜 것은 발사체도 플랫폼도 설왕설래인가 봅니다. 27년 진짜 불안해지네요.

[백선호]

요렇게 두 곳에서 쏜 것 같네요.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-slbm-test-underscores-importance-ballistic-missile-launch-notification-agreement