중국군은 통합 상륙작전을 훈련중

[위종민]

중국군이 2025년 8월 대규모 상륙 종합훈련을 실시했다고 하네요. 여러 지역에서의 동시다발적 상륙작전, 부유 접안시설 운용, 페리를 이용한 해상 상장차 전개, 양식시설과 해안 장애물 주변에서의 작전 등을 연습했다고 합니다. 

중국은 상륙작전만 연습하고 있는 것이 아니다

2026년 6월 15일

기고자

제이슨 왕, 마빈 베르나르도, 페이젠 우, 앤드루 S. 에릭슨

수년 동안 중국 공산당의 대만 침공 가능성을 둘러싼 논의는 하나의 질문에 집중되어 왔다. 즉, 인민해방군이 대만해협을 건너 침공 병력을 수송할 만큼 충분한 상륙 수송 능력을 갖추고 있는가 하는 것이다. 이 질문은 여전히 중요하다. 그러나 최근 중국의 훈련은 인민해방군이 단순히 병력을 대만 해안에 상륙시키는 문제만 해결하려는 것이 아님을 보여준다. 인민해방군은 여러 지역에 걸쳐 대규모 상륙작전을 어떻게 이동시키고, 유지하며, 은폐할 것인지를 연습하고 있다.

2025년 8월 인민해방군은 중국 남동부 해안을 따라 대규모 상륙 종합훈련(capstone exercise)을 실시했다. 상업용 위성영상과 자동선박식별장치(AIS) 자료에 따르면, 이번 훈련은 이전까지 개별적으로 시행되던 여러 훈련을 보다 일관된 작전 시뮬레이션으로 통합한 것이었다. 훈련에는 여러 지역에서의 동시다발적 상륙활동, 민간 상륙전차(LCT)를 이용한 직접 해안 상륙, 부유식 접안시설(floating causeway) 운용, 차량수송선(Ro-Ro Ferry)에서의 해상 상륙장갑차 전개, 항만 하역, 양식시설과 해안 장애물 주변에서의 작전이 포함되었다.

가장 중요한 교훈은 중국이 대만 침공 문제를 해결했다는 것이 아니다. 아직은 그렇지 않다. 상륙작전은 여전히 수행하기 가장 어려운 군사작전 가운데 하나이며, 2025년 훈련 역시 양호한 해상 및 기상 조건에서 실시되었다. 그러나 인민해방군은 대만을 상정한 상륙작전의 작전적 절차를 연습하는 데 있어 눈에 띄는 진전을 이루고 있다. 따라서 관찰자들은 특정 훈련 하나가 침공 준비 완료를 입증하는지에 집착하기보다, 각각의 훈련이 중국의 변화하는 가정, 군수 개념, 지리적 선택지, 작전 설계에 대해 무엇을 보여주는지에 더 주목해야 한다.

민군 군수체계로 메우는 수송력 격차

중국의 상륙능력을 둘러싼 논쟁은 주로 인민해방군 해군이 전용 상륙함을 충분히 보유하지 못했다는 점에 초점이 맞춰져 있다. 그러나 인민해방군은 다양한 지리적 환경에서 이러한 한계를 해결하기 위해 민간 해상자산을 군수체계에 적극적으로 실험하고 통합하고 있다. 중국의 대규모 상선단은 차량수송선, 갑판화물선, 상륙전차, 기타 선박을 통해 인민해방군의 수송 능력을 대규모로 보완할 수 있다.

2025년 훈련은 이러한 민간 선박이 더 이상 주변적인 존재가 아니라는 점을 보여준다. 이들은 이제 작전 개념의 일부가 되었다. 8월 종합훈련 동안 인민해방군은 여러 종류의 민군 겸용 선박을 활용했다. 민간 차량수송선은 상륙장갑차의 해상 전개와 회수를 지원했고, 상륙전차는 해안에 직접 장비를 하역했다. 다른 민간 선박들은 군용 공기부양정과 함께 부유식 접안시설 운용을 지원했다. 이러한 조합은 단순히 수송 능력만 늘려주는 것이 아니다. 중국 지도부에 보다 은밀한 선택지를 제공한다.

전용 군용 상륙함은 수가 적고 눈에 잘 띈다. 반면 군 장비를 실은 민간 선박은 상황이 다르다. 위기 상황에서 이들의 동원은 조기경보와 상황판단을 더욱 어렵게 만들 수 있다. 여러 소규모 민간 항만에 분산된 증원은 평상시의 해상 활동과 구별하기 어려울 것이다. 이는 대만과 미국, 역내 동맹국들의 감시 부담을 필연적으로 증가시킨다. 인민해방군은 분명 이러한 문제, 즉 대규모 수송 능력을 확보하면서도 명백한 군사적 징후를 최소화하는 다양한 해법을 실험하고 있는 것으로 보인다.

더욱 복잡해진 작전 시뮬레이션

2025년 종합훈련은 크게 두 단계로 진행되었다. 첫 번째 단계는 산웨이 인근 홍하이만에서 실시되었다. 이곳에서 인민해방군은 장비와 차량을 해안으로 이동시키는 여러 방법을 연습했다. 항만 직접 하역, 부유식 접안시설 활용, 흘수가 얕은 상륙전차를 이용한 직접 해안 상륙, 그리고 차량수송선에서 상륙장갑차를 해상 전개한 것으로 추정되는 활동 등이 포함되었다.

두 번째 단계는 더욱 의미심장했다. 첫 번째 단계 이후 선박들은 푸젠성 연안의 허우강만, 첸후만, 허우차이만 등 여러 지역으로 북상해 분산되었다. 이곳에서 차량수송선들은 서로 떨어진 여러 지역에서 상륙장갑차를 전개하고 회수했다. 이는 단일 해변 상륙뿐 아니라 여러 축선에서의 작전을 동시에 조정하는 상황까지 모의한 것이다. 이는 중요한 발전이다. 이전까지 인민해방군의 상륙훈련은 차량수송선 통합, 부유식 접안시설, 해상 장갑차 전개 등 군수 문제의 개별 요소를 보여주는 경우가 많았다. 그러나 2025년 훈련은 이러한 요소들을 하나로 통합함으로써 기술적 실험 단계에서 작전적 통합 단계로 전환되고 있음을 시사했다.

인민해방군은 서로 다른 상륙 환경에 맞는 다양한 해법도 연습한 것으로 보인다. 홍하이만에서는 상륙전차를 이용한 직접 상륙을 실시했고, 북부 지역에서는 양식시설 장애물이 많은 해역에서 차량수송선을 이용한 상륙장갑차 운용을 실시했다. 이는 인민해방군이 해변, 항만, 해안 거리, 장애물 환경에 따라 다양한 접근 방식을 개발하고 있음을 보여준다.

지리적 요소의 중요성

이번 훈련에서 사용된 지리적 환경은 운용된 플랫폼만큼이나 중요하다. 최남단에서 최북단까지 약 360km에 걸친 훈련 구간은 타이베이에서 가오슝까지 이어지는 대만 서해안과 비슷한 거리이다. 훈련 장소 자체가 대만의 특정 침공 지점을 그대로 재현한 것은 아니지만, 대만을 마주한 방향에서 이루어진 거리, 배치, 활동 집중도는 단순한 상륙훈련 이상의 의미를 시사한다. 이는 군대가 단순한 기술만이 아니라 작전의 기하학적 구조까지 훈련하기 때문이다. 거리, 순서, 시간, 군수 이동 경로는 모두 중요한 작전 변수이다. 인민해방군이 대만 서해안과 비슷한 거리에서 훈련한다면, 대만을 상정한 분산 상륙작전을 어떻게 조율할 것인지 시험하고 있을 가능성이 있다. 물론 현재 단계에서 대만 해안방어를 그대로 재현했다고 단정하거나 직접 비교해서는 안 된다. 이번 훈련이 보여주는 핵심은 민간 선박을 활용한 상륙 군수체계 통합이 더욱 정교해지고 있으며, 그 연습 범위가 실제 목표 지역과 유사한 지리적 규모로 확대되고 있다는 점이다.

장애물 극복이 훈련의 일부가 되다

또 다른 중요한 변화는 환경적·전술적 장애물을 포함했다는 점이다. 과거 훈련에서는 상륙장갑차 훈련 전에 연안의 양식시설을 철거하는 경우가 많았다. 그러나 2025년에는 인민해방군 차량들이 여러 지역에서 양식시설을 통과하거나 우회하는 모습이 관찰되었다. 대만 서해안에는 밀집된 양식장과 갯벌 등 상륙작전을 어렵게 만드는 지형이 많다. 민간 해양시설은 군사시설은 아니지만, 상륙부대가 해안에 도달하기도 전에 선박의 이동을 방해하거나 항해상의 위험을 초래할 수 있다. 인민해방군은 또한 해안의 상륙저지시설과 각종 해안 장애물 인근에서도 훈련을 실시했다. 이러한 요소들은 상륙부대가 복잡하고 제한된 방어 환경에서 작전하도록 만들어 훈련의 현실성을 높여준다. 이는 인민해방군이 이상적인 상륙이 아니라 보다 현실적인 침공 조건을 준비하고 있음을 시사한다.

물론 한계도 있다. 이번 훈련은 비교적 잔잔한 해상 조건에서 실시되었으며, 차량수송선은 통제된 환경에서 상륙장갑차를 전개하기 위해 해상에 머물렀다. 지금까지 인민해방군은 공중 및 해상에서 적의 저항을 받는 상황에서 이와 유사한 작전을 수행하는 능력을 보여주지 못했다. 그럼에도 이번 훈련은 기본적인 훈련을 넘어 여러 요소를 하나의 군수작전으로 통합하는 단계로 발전하고 있음을 보여준다. 다음 단계는 적의 방해를 가정한 보다 복잡한 시나리오가 될 가능성이 있다. 다만 평시 훈련에는 현실적인 한계가 있다. 지휘관들은 단지 대만해협 횡단의 가장 어려운 상황을 재현하기 위해 악천후나 거친 해상에서 병력과 장비를 위험에 빠뜨리지는 않을 것이다. 따라서 가까운 시기의 훈련은 보다 복잡한 작전 양상을 보이겠지만, 여전히 비교적 통제된 환경에서 이루어질 가능성이 높다.

2026년에 분석가들이 주목해야 할 점

분석가들은 2025년 종합훈련을 보다 현실적인 전투훈련과 합동지휘, 민군 군수체계를 발전시키기 위한 인민해방군의 광범위한 노력의 일부로 이해해야 한다. 이는 중국이 대만을 성공적으로 침공할 수 있다는 것을 입증하는 것은 아니다. 그러나 인민해방군이 그러한 작전이 요구하는 실제 문제들을 체계적으로 실험하며 해결해 나가고 있음을 보여준다.

관찰자들은 다음 종합훈련에서 다섯 가지 지표를 주목해야 한다. 첫째, 인민해방군이 더 다양한 선박과 지역, 분산 기법을 더 넓은 지역에서 사용하는지 살펴봐야 한다. 훈련 지역의 배치가 계속 대만, 일본 또는 필리핀의 지리적 환경과 유사한지 여부도 중요하다. 둘째, 차량수송선, 상륙 바지선(일명 수이차오), 상륙전차가 보다 복잡한 해상 수송 조합으로 운용되는지 추적해야 한다. 셋째, 해상과 공중을 통한 여러 장비 전개 방식이 통합되는지 확인해야 한다. 특히 대형 공중수송기나 공중강습부대가 같은 지역이나 인근 지역에 투입되는지를 살펴볼 필요가 있다. 넷째, 향후 훈련이 보다 악천후나 거친 해상 조건에서 실시되는지를 관찰해야 한다. 마지막으로, 양식장과 해안 장애물, 항만 봉쇄 조건을 넘어 대만군의 정밀타격 능력까지 모의한 보다 발전된 상륙저지 환경에서 작전하는 훈련이 이루어지는지 주목해야 한다.

핵심은 훈련 하나를 보고 침공 시점을 예측하는 것이 아니다. 중요한 것은 인민해방군이 무엇을 우선순위에 두고 연습하고 있으며, 더 나아가 어떤 작전적 가정이 그들의 작전 설계의 기초가 되고 있는지를 파악하는 것이다. 2025년 8월 훈련은 인민해방군이 더 이상 개별 훈련에서 상륙 능력만 과시하는 것이 아님을 보여준다. 민간 수송능력, 군 상륙부대, 해상 전개, 항만 접근, 부유식 기반시설, 분산된 지휘통제체계가 제1도련선과 관련된 작전에서 어떻게 결합될지를 연습하고 있는 것이다. 대만은 중국이 인도·태평양에서 영향력을 확대하려는 여러 목표 가운데 하나일 뿐이다. 이는 동맹국들의 정보수집과 작전계획, 거부전략을 더욱 정교하게 만드는 계기가 되어야 한다.

중국의 상륙 수송력 부족을 둘러싼 논쟁이 의미를 잃은 것은 아니다. 그러나 관점은 바뀌어야 한다. 이제 핵심 질문은 중국이 충분한 선박을 보유하고 있는가가 아니라, 인민해방군이 군과 민간 자산을 독특하게 결합하여 충분히 빠른 속도로, 충분히 많은 지역에서, 최소한의 징후만 드러내면서 병력을 이동시키고 유지할 수 있는지, 그리고 대만과 동맹국들이 이를 방해하기 전에 이를 성공적으로 수행할 수 있는가이다.

대만과 제1도련선 국가들은 인민해방군을 억제하기 위한 전통적 전력과 비대칭 전력에 계속 투자해야 한다. 전통적 전력에는 연안방어 미사일, 기뢰, 기동포병, 드론 군집 등이 포함된다. 그러나 대만과 제1도련선 국가들은 이러한 전통적인 물리적 수단을 넘어 민간 항만에서 병력과 장비의 집결을 대규모로 식별할 수 있는 정보능력도 개발해야 한다. 특히 민군 겸용 선박이 쉽게 접근할 수 있는 소규모 민간 항만과 같은 임시 군수거점을 식별하고 교란할 수 있는 능력에 특별한 관심을 기울여야 한다. 중국의 비정규전 대응을 위한 방위계획은 중국의 민간 해운 부문 자체를 보다 큰 전략적 문제의 일부로 다루어야 한다. 이는 모든 중국 민간 선박을 군사자산으로 간주하라는 뜻이 아니다. 그러나 특정 종류의 선박과 기업, 항만, 이동 양상은 감시와 방위계획에 반드시 포함되어야 한다. 중국의 비정규전 전술과 기술, 절차를 드러내는 것은 급진적인 수준의 투명성을 만들어 인민해방군의 전쟁계획을 비대칭적으로 어렵게 만들고, 중국 공산당의 서사를 약화시킬 수 있다.

면책 조항

이 글은 다음 연구의 핵심 내용을 요약한 것이다. 제이슨 왕, 마빈 하모르 베르나르도, 페이젠 우, 앤드루 S. 에릭슨, 『Everything Everywhere All at Once: The Growing Complexity of PLA Amphibious Exercises』, China Maritime Report 제52호(로드아일랜드주 뉴포트: 미 해군대학 중국해양연구소, 2026년 4월 22일). 이 글에서 제시된 견해는 공개 자료만을 바탕으로 한 저자들의 개인적인 견해이며, 저자들이 소속된 어떠한 기관의 공식 입장을 대표하지 않는다.

제이슨 왕은 국가안보 연구원이자 실리콘밸리의 지리정보 분석기업 ingeniSPACE의 최고운영책임자(COO)이다.

마빈 하모르 베르나르도는 대만 국립정치대학교 박사과정에 재학 중이며, ingeniSPACE에서 해양영역 분석가로 활동하고 있다.

페이젠 우는 국가안보 연구원이자 ingeniSPACE의 영상정보 분석가이다.

앤드루 S. 에릭슨 박사는 미 해군대학 중국해양연구소 전략학 교수이며, 하버드대학교 아시아센터 방문학자이다. 

China Is Rehearsing More Than Amphibious Landings | Center for International Maritime Security

China Is Rehearsing More Than Amphibious Landings | Center for International Maritime Security

China Is Rehearsing More Than Amphibious Landings

June 15, 2026 Guest Author Leave a comment

By Jason Wang, Marvin Bernardo, Pei-Jhen Wu, and Andrew S. Erickson

For years, the public debate over a possible Chinese Communist invasion of Taiwan has focused on a single question: Does the People’s Liberation Army have sufficient amphibious lift to move an invasion force across the Taiwan Strait? That question remains important. However, recent Chinese exercises suggest that the People’s Liberation Army is not simply trying to solve the problem of getting forces onto a Taiwanese beach. It is rehearsing how to move, sustain, and conceal a large amphibious campaign across multiple locations.

In August 2025, the People’s Liberation Army conducted a large-scale amphibious capstone exercise along China’s southeastern coastline. Commercial satellite imagery and Automatic Identification System data indicates the exercise consolidated several previously separate training exercises into a more coherent campaign simulation. The operation included synchronized amphibious activity across multiple geographic locations, direct-to-shore landing by civilian landing craft tank vessels, use of a floating causeway, offshore deployment of amphibious fighting vehicles from roll-on/roll-off ferries, port offloading, and operations around aquaculture structures and beach obstacles.

The most important lesson is not that China has solved the Taiwan invasion problem. It has not… yet. Amphibious operations remain among the most difficult military operations to conduct, and the 2025 exercise still occurred under favorable sea and weather conditions. The People’s Liberation Army is making visible progress in rehearsing the operational mechanics of a Taiwan-relevant amphibious campaign. Observers should therefore pay less attention to whether any single exercise proves invasion readiness and more attention to what each exercise reveals about evolving Chinese assumptions, logistics concepts, geographic options, and campaign design.

From Lift Gap to Civil-Military Logistics

Much of the debate over China’s amphibious capability centers on the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s shortage of dedicated gray-hull amphibious ships. But the People’s Liberation Army is actively experimenting with and integrating civilian maritime assets into military logistics to solve this limitation for a range of geographic locations. China’s large commercial fleet can at-scale augment the People’s Liberation Army military lift with roll-on/roll-off ferries, deck cargo ships, landing craft tanks, and other vessels.

The 2025 exercise shows that these civilian vessels are no longer peripheral. They are part of the operational concept. During the August capstone exercise, the People’s Liberation Army used multiple categories of dual-use vessels. Civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries supported offshore deployment and recovery of amphibious fighting vehicles. Landing craft tank vessels conducted direct-to-beach offloading. Other civilian vessels worked in concert with military hovercraft to support floating causeway operations. This mix gives the People’s Liberation Army more than additional capacity. It gives Chinese leadership with low-observable options.

Dedicated military amphibious ships are scarce and highly visible. Civilian vessels tasked with military equipment are a different story. In a crisis, their mobilization could complicate indications and warnings. A buildup distributed across multiple smaller commercial ports would be harder to distinguish from routine maritime activity. Invariably, this increases the monitoring cost burden on Taiwan, the United States, and regional partners. The People’s Liberation Army appears to be experimenting with various solutions to this problem: how to generate large-scale lift while minimizing unmistakable military signatures.

A More Complex Campaign Simulation

The 2025 capstone exercise unfolded in two broad phases. The first phase took place around Honghai Bay near Shanwei. There, the People’s Liberation Army practiced several methods of moving vehicles and equipment ashore: direct-to-port unloading, the use of a floating causeway, direct beach landings by shallow-draft landing craft tanks, and probable offshore deployment of amphibious fighting vehicles from a roll-on/roll-off ferry.

The second phase was more revealing. After the first phase, vessels dispersed northward to separate locations along the Fujian coast, including Hougang Bay, Qianhu Bay, and Houcai Bay. At these sites, roll-on/roll-off ferries deployed and recovered amphibious vehicles across geographically separated areas. The exercise thus simulated not only landing at a single beach but coordinating activity across multiple axes. This is a significant evolution. In previous years, People’s Liberation Army amphibious exercises often demonstrated discrete pieces of the sustainment problem: ferry integration, floating causeways, or offshore vehicle deployment. The 2025 exercise brought these pieces together, suggesting a shift from technical experimentation toward operational integration.

The People’s Liberation Army also appears to have rehearsed different solutions for different landing environments. At Honghai Bay, landing craft tanks conducted direct-to-shore landings. At the northern sites, roll-on/roll-off ferries supported amphibious vehicle activity in waters with heavier aquaculture obstacles. This variation suggests the People’s Liberation Army is developing a menu of approaches tailored to different beaches, ports, offshore distances, and obstacle environments.

The Geography Matters

The exercise’s geography is as important as the range of platforms used. Stretching roughly 360 kilometers from the southernmost to northernmost locations, the distance is comparable to Taiwan’s western coastline from Taipei to Kaohsiung. While the exercise locations were not perfect analogues for specific invasion locations on Taiwan, the spacing, orientation, and concentration of activity opposite Taiwan suggest more than generic amphibious training. This matters because militaries train not only tasks, but also campaign geometry. Distance, sequencing, timing, and logistics routes are operational variables. If the People’s Liberation Army practices across distances that approximate Taiwan’s western coastline, it may be testing how to coordinate a distributed amphibious campaign across a Taiwan-relevant battlespace. However, we must caution against direct geographic comparison or expectation of replication of Taiwan’s coastal defense at this stage of development. The insight derived from these exercises is a growing sophistication in the logistical integration of civilian vessels in amphibious lift capacity that is now being rehearsed in a similar geographical scope as its possible target.

Navigating Obstacles Are Becoming Part of the Training

Another important development includes environmental and tactical obstacles. In previous exercises, personnel often removed nearshore aquaculture rafts before amphibious vehicle exercises. In 2025, People’s Liberation Army vehicles appeared to maneuver through or around aquaculture structures at multiple locations. Taiwan’s western coastline features dense aquaculture zones, mudflats, and other features that could complicate amphibious operations. Civilian maritime structures may not be military defenses, but they can still obstruct movement, create navigational hazards disabling vessels even before they reach the beachhead. The People’s Liberation Army also trained near shoreline anti-landing barriers and apparent beach obstacles. All of these features increase realism by forcing amphibious units to deal with cluttered, constrained, and defended littoral environments. Their inclusion suggests the People’s Liberation Army is moving beyond idealized landings toward more realistic invasion conditions.

Even so, there are limits. The exercise took place under relatively calm sea conditions, with ferries remaining offshore while deploying amphibious vehicles in a controlled environment. To date, the People’s Liberation Army has not demonstrated the ability to conduct comparable operations under contested air and maritime conditions. Nevertheless, the exercise still reflects moving from basic training towards integration of elements into a single simulated logistics operation. A logical next step would be more complex scenarios conducted under contested conditions. However, in peacetime training, there are practical limits to how far such exercises are likely to go: commanders would be unlikely to risk personnel and equipment in severe weather or rough sea states merely to replicate the most challenging conditions for a Taiwan Strait crossing. As a result, any near-term exercises are likely to show greater operational complexity, but only within relatively controlled environmental conditions.

What Analysts Should Watch For in 2026

Analysts should understand the 2025 capstone exercise as part of a broader People’s Liberation Army effort to improve realistic combat training, joint command, and civil-military logistics. It does not prove that China can successfully invade Taiwan. But it does show that the People’s Liberation Army’s systematic experimentation working through the practical challenges such a future operation poses.

Observers should scrutinize the next capstone exercise for five indicators.  First, does the People’s Liberation Army deploy a wider range of vessels, locations, and dispersion techniques across a wider range of locations? Does the spacing continue to resemble the geography of Taiwan, Japan, or the Philippines? Second, analysts should track civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries, landing barges (a.k.a. Shuiqiaos), and landing craft tanks appear in more complex sealift combinations. Third, they should examine the integrated use of multiple equipment deployment methods by both sea and air. In particular, whether they incorporate heavy airlift or air cavalry insertions at or nearby locations. Fourth, monitor whether future exercises occur under more difficult sea or weather conditions. Finally, they should watch for more deliberate efforts to operate around sophisticated anti-landing techniques beyond aquaculture fields, beach obstacles, and port-denial conditions that include simulated precision-strike capabilities of the Taiwanese.

The point is not to predict an invasion date from an exercise. It is to identify what the People’s Liberation Army is prioritizing, practicing and most importantly, what operational assumptions possibly underlie its campaign design. China’s August 2025 exercise suggests that the People’s Liberation Army is no longer merely demonstrating amphibious capacity in isolated drills. It is rehearsing how civilian lift, military landing forces, offshore deployment, port access, floating infrastructure, and dispersed command and control might fit together in a First Island Chain-relevant campaign. Taiwan is merely one objective in China’s intention to assert control over the Indo-Pacific. That should sharpen the focus of allied intelligence, planning, and denial strategies.

The debate over China’s amphibious lift gap is not obsolete. But it should be reframed. The key question is no longer simply whether China has enough ships. It is whether the People’s Liberation Army can coordinate and sustain its warfighters using a unique combination of military and civilian assets, quickly enough, with minimum signature across enough locations before Taiwan and its partners can disrupt it. 

Taiwan and the countries within the First Island Chain must continue investing in traditional and asymmetric capabilities that deter the People’s Liberation Army.  Traditional capabilities of course include coastal defense missiles, mines, mobile artillery and drone swarms.  However, Taiwan and First Island Chain countries must look beyond traditional kinetic solutions, such as the development of intelligence capabilities that can scale to identify troops and materiel mass at civilian ports. Special attention should be given to capabilities that can identify and disrupt temporary logistic nodes, i.e. smaller civilian ports that can be easily accessed using dual use vessels. Defense planning to address China’s irregular warfare must treat China’s civilian maritime sector as part of the wider strategic problem. This does not mean that every Chinese civilian vessel is a military asset, but certain classes of vessels, companies, ports, and movement patterns should be integrated into surveillance and defense planning. Exposing China’s irregular warfare tactics, techniques, procedures, can create the radical transparency that will asymmetrically complicate PLA war planning and counter CCP narratives.

Disclaimer

This article distills key insights from a detailed study: Jason Wang, Marvin Hamor Bernardo, Pei-Jhen Wu, and Andrew S. Erickson, Everything Everywhere All at Once: The Growing Complexity of PLA Amphibious Exercises, China Maritime Report #52 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 22 April 2026), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/52/. The views expressed here, based solely on open-source research, are those of the authors alone and do not represent those of any organization with which they are affiliated.

Jason Wang is a national security researcher and COO of ingeniSPACE, a Silicon Valley geo-intelligence analytics house.

Marvin Hamor Bernardo is a PhD candidate at the National Chengchi University, Taiwan, and serves as a maritime domain analyst at ingeniSPACE.

Pei-Jhen Wu is a national security researcher and imagery analyst at ingeniSPACE.

Andrew S. Erickson, Ph.D. is Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute and a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University’s Asia Center.

Featured Image: Composite of Honghai Bay on 23 August 2025 at 1004 CST. (ingeniSPACE composite)