9월 20일 인도네시아에 도착할 전 ITS 주세페 가리발리함

[위종민]

이탈리아의 퇴역항모 ITS 주세페 가리발디가 9월 20일 인도네시아에 도착하네요. 생각보다 진행이 빠릅니다. 

모항은 람풍주 라타이만이라고 하는데, 접안시설 공사와 준설작업이 아직도 진행중이고 운용기체는 바이락타르 TB3와 아킨지, 헬리콥터를 운영할 거라고 예상하네요. 그 외 아스피데 SAM 등 각종 장비의 개조 여부도 불확실하고, 이를 뒷받침할 개조 및 운용예산 확보도 물음표인 모양입니다. 

인도네시아의 새 항공모함 가리발디, 9월 20일 도착 — 동남아 최초의 드론 항공모함이 인도·태평양 세력 균형을 재편한다

퇴역한 이탈리아 해군 기함, 라타이만을 모항으로 삼아 동남아시아의 핵심 해상 요충지 전역에서 드론 기반 원양 전력 투사에 나설 예정

2026년 7월 22일

주세페 가리발디

곧 인도네시아의 주세페 가리발디가 될 함정

(디펜스 시큐리티 아시아) — 인도네시아 국방부는 2026년 7월 20일 하원 제1위원회에서 퇴역한 이탈리아 경항공모함 주세페 가리발디가 2026년 9월 20일 인도네시아 해역에 진입할 것이라고 확인했다. 이 날짜는 의도적으로 10월 5일 인도네시아군 창설기념일에 앞서도록 정해졌다.

이번 이전은 사실상 무상에 가까운 증여를 전략적 전환점으로 바꾸는 것으로, 인도네시아는 태국의 차크리 나루에벳에 이어 동남아시아에서 지속적인 원양 작전이 가능한 평갑판 항공 플랫폼을 운용하는 두 번째 국가가 된다.

무함마드 알리 해군참모총장은 항공모함의 도착 시점을 상징적이면서도 작전적인 이정표로 규정하며, 이를 프라보워 수비안토 대통령의 국방정책 아래 추진되는 광범위한 해군 현대화 구상과 연결했다.

주세페 가리발디

주세페 가리발디

획득 방식 자체도 지정학적 무게를 지닌다. 2026년 3월부터 4월 사이 이탈리아 상원이 비준한 정부 간 증여, 즉 무상 양도 방식은 통상 무기 판매에 수반되는 외교적 마찰 없이 주권적 군사 역량을 이전한다.

핀칸티에리가 인도네시아에서 계속 유지하고 있는 산업적 기반은 이미 PPA급 호위함 KRI 브라위자야와 KRI 프라부 실리왕이를 통해 확인되고 있으며, 이는 단일 함정을 넘어 잠수함, 훈련기, 해상초계기까지 확대되는 로마와 자카르타 간 협력 축의 심화를 보여준다.

전략적으로 항공모함의 지정 모항인 람풍주 라타이만은 인도네시아 해군 항공전력을 세계 무역과 해저 케이블 기반시설에서 인도·태평양의 가장 중요한 해상 요충지 가운데 하나인 순다 해협에 즉시 접근할 수 있는 위치에 배치한다.

이러한 배치가 중요한 이유는 순다 해협 인근에 항공작전 능력을 갖춘 전력이 지속적으로 존재할 경우, 역내 컨테이너 및 에너지 해운의 상당 부분이 통과하는 해역에서 항행의 자유에 도전하려는 어떤 행위자의 계산도 복잡해지기 때문이다.

국영 조선업체 PT PAL이 이끌고 이탈리아의 기술 지원이 계속되는 개조 사업은 냉전기 대잠수함전용 선체를 고정익 타격 항공모함이 아니라 인도네시아의 군도 방어 요구에 최적화된 헬리콥터·드론 혼합 항공모함으로 전환하도록 설계됐다.

하원 제1위원회 내 분석가들은 이미 가리발디의 40년 된 선체가 사용 가능한 운용 기간을 제한한다고 지적했다. 이에 따라 자카르타는 신속한 전력 확보의 이점과 구형 NATO 시대 선체를 운용하는 장기 유지 부담을 저울질해야 한다.

항공모함 자체에 대해 4억5,000만 달러의 차관 한도를 설정하고 별도의 헬리콥터 도입 패키지를 결합한 금융 구조는 원양 해군을 향한 야망의 진정한 비용이 선체 획득이 아니라 항공전력 통합에 있음을 보여준다.

이하에서는 인도네시아가 한 세대 만에 추진하는 가장 중대한 해군 전력 획득의 배경이 된 획득 구조, 플랫폼 능력, 군수 기반, 드론 항공모함 전환 교리, 재정적·전략적 위험 계산을 분야별로 분석한다.

획득 방식: 무상 선체에 수십억 달러 규모의 전략적 조건이 따라붙다

주세페 가리발디의 이전은 상업적 판매가 아닌 정부 간 증여 방식으로 구성돼 있으며, 이는 인도네시아가 배수량 1만3,850~1만4,150톤의 선체 자체에 대한 획득 비용을 지불하지 않는다는 의미다.

이러한 금융 구조는 자카르타가 통상 항공모함 사업을 수년간 지연시키는 막대한 초기 획득 비용 단계를 우회할 수 있도록 해 인도네시아가 실질적인 원양 작전 능력을 확보하는 데 필요한 일정을 단축한다는 점에서 전략적으로 중요하다.

2026년 3월부터 4월 사이 이탈리아 상원이 무상 양도를 승인하면서 핀칸티에리가 건조해 거의 40년간 운용된 함정이 인도네시아 해군의 관리 아래로 정식 이전되는 절차가 확정됐다.

이탈리아는 더 큰 강습상륙함 트리에스테로 가리발디를 대체한 뒤 2024년 10월 이 함정을 퇴역시켰다. 이는 신속한 전력 확보를 원하는 신흥 인도·태평양 해군으로 NATO의 구형 항공모함 선체가 점차 이전되는 양상과 유사하다.

그러나 무상 증여 구조는 훨씬 더 큰 재정적 부담을 감추고 있다. 인도네시아는 국책 차관을 통해 수송, 개조, 전투체계 통합 비용을 별도로 부담해야 하기 때문이다.

디펜스 시큐리티 아시아의 보도에 따르면 전체 패키지는 DGK급 소형 잠수함 6척과 레오나르도 M-346 고등훈련기 24대를 포함해 이탈리아산 장비에 대한 수십억 달러 규모의 추가 인도네시아 조달 사업으로 이어질 수 있다.

이러한 패키지 구성은 이탈리아가 가리발디 이전을 산업적 교두보로 활용해 잠수함, 훈련기, 해상초계기 분야에서 인도네시아 방산시장에 장기적으로 접근하려 한다는 점을 시사한다.

전체 패키지에 포함된 것으로 알려진 ATR-72 해상초계기 3대는 항공모함 단독으로 제공할 수 있는 수준을 훨씬 넘어 인도네시아의 해양 상황인식 능력을 확대할 것이다.

이전 과정에서 함정은 수송 항해를 위해 공격용 무기체계를 제거하고 추진, 안전, 거주 관련 설비만 유지한다. 이는 국제해역을 통과하는 동안 외교적 민감성을 줄이기 위한 조치다.

2026년 7월 이탈리아에 파견된 약 100명 규모의 인도네시아 선발대는 함정의 체계가 완전히 가동되기도 전에 자국 승조원의 숙련도를 확보해야 한다는 작전적 긴급성을 보여준다.

이탈리아의 전체 문서화 절차는 기술적으로 2026년 12월까지 이어질 수 있지만, 자카르타가 9월 도착을 고집한 것은 행정적 편의보다 상징적 시점을 더 중시한다는 사실을 보여준다.

플랫폼 능력: 지중해 대잠수함 사냥꾼에서 군도 방어의 전력 증폭기로

가리발디는 길이 180.2미터, 폭 33.4미터, 만재배수량 약 1만4,000톤으로, 미국이나 중국이 운용하는 초대형 항공모함이 아니라 경항공모함 범주에 속한다.

약 8만1,000마력의 출력을 내는 LM2500 가스터빈 4기는 함정을 30노트 이상으로 추진하며, 이는 유사시 인도네시아의 광대한 군도 해상교통로 전역에서 신속하게 위치를 변경할 수 있게 한다.

20노트 속도에서 약 7,000해리에 이르는 항속거리는 인도네시아 작전계획 담당자들이 잦은 보급 지원 없이 말라카, 순다, 롬복 해협 전역에 전력을 투사하기에 충분한 지속력을 제공한다.

가리발디는 원래 AV-8B 해리어 II 단거리 이륙·수직 착륙 전투기를 위한 스키점프 비행갑판을 중심으로 설계됐으며, 대형 항공모함의 전형적인 고정익 타격 임무보다 대잠수함전을 우선하는 설계 철학을 채택했다.

16~18대의 항공기 또는 헬리콥터를 수용할 수 있는 격납고는 현재 인도네시아 해군이 운용하는 어떤 플랫폼보다도 훨씬 높은 항공작전 처리 능력을 제공하며, 해군이 자체적으로 운용할 수 있는 공중지원 능력의 상한을 근본적으로 바꾼다.

NATO의 1999년 코소보 공중전, 아프가니스탄의 항구적 자유 작전, 2011년 리비아 개입에 이르는 실전 이력은 가리발디가 검증되지 않았거나 단순히 의전용으로 사용되는 함정이 아니라 실제 전투를 경험한 플랫폼임을 보여준다.

시 스패로와 아스피데 함대공미사일, 오토 멜라라 40밀리미터 함포, 어뢰발사관, 오토마트 대함미사일 등 기존 자위체계는 인도네시아가 현대화 방향을 결정할 때까지 원래 선체 구조에 남아 있다.

분석가들은 종합적인 개조 이후 노후 선체에 15~20년의 실질적인 잔여 수명이 있을 것으로 추정한다. 이 기간은 플랫폼의 유한한 수명과 비교해 자카르타가 전투체계 개량에 얼마나 적극적으로 투자해야 하는지를 좌우한다.

PT PAL이 계획한 현대화 작업은 인도네시아가 기존 이탈리아 자위체계를 유지할지, 아니면 인도네시아 해군의 기존 지휘망과 호환되는 새로운 센서 및 무기체계를 통합할지를 결정하게 된다.

냉전기 대잠수함 사냥꾼에서 헬리콥터·드론 지휘함으로 향하는 이 플랫폼의 전환은 현재 인도·태평양 지역 해군에서 진행되는 항공모함 개조 교리 가운데 가장 이례적인 사례 중 하나다.

군수 기반: 라타이만과 순다 해협 접근로의 군사화

순다 해협을 정면으로 마주보는 수마트라섬 남단 람풍주의 라타이만이 가리발디의 영구 모항으로 선정됐다. 이 결정은 해상 요충지 안보 구조에 즉각적인 영향을 미친다.

2026년 7월 중순 기준 람풍 해군기지의 접안구역 건설은 76퍼센트 진행됐으며, 이는 확인된 9월 도착 일정에 맞추기 위해 기반시설 공사가 가속화되고 있음을 보여준다.

배수량 1만4,000톤급 선체에 충분한 수심을 확보하기 위한 준설 작업은 간단하지 않은 공사다. 라타이만의 기존 기반시설이 원래 이러한 배수량급 함정을 위해 설계되지 않았기 때문이다.

접안시설 공사와 함께 진행되는 전력 기반시설 개량은 인도네시아가 라타이만을 임시 또는 의전용 정박지로 취급하는 것이 아니라 지속적인 육상 전력 공급과 정비 능력을 구축하고 있음을 시사한다.

순다 해협의 전략적 가치는 혼잡한 말라카 해협을 대체할 수 있는 해상 통로라는 역할에서 비롯된다. 이곳은 상당한 규모의 역내 해운과 함께 동남아시아 연결성에 필수적인 해저 통신 기반시설이 통과한다.

이 요충지 인근에 항공모함이 지속적으로 배치되면, 과거 자체 항공지원이 훨씬 부족한 상태로 감시되던 통로에서 인도네시아의 해양 상황인식 능력이 실질적으로 향상된다.

물리적 기지 개량을 보완하기 위해 인도네시아 해군은 수라바야의 주안다 해군항공기지에 가리발디의 정확한 크기와 일치하는 실물 크기 모의 비행갑판을 건설했다. 이를 통해 조종사와 갑판 승조원들은 실제 함정이 도착하기 전에 훈련할 수 있다.

이러한 모의훈련 우선 방식은 지금까지 이 정도 규모의 고정익 또는 회전익 항공모함을 운용해본 적이 없는 해군이 완전히 새로운 항공작전 교리를 도입할 때 발생하는 작전 위험을 줄인다.

초기 100명 규모의 선발대 외에도 수백 명의 추가 인원을 대상으로 폭넓은 승조원 교육이 계획돼 있다. 이는 인도네시아의 기존 상륙함 및 호위함 전력과 범주 자체가 다른 플랫폼을 운용하기 위해 대규모 제도적 재교육이 필요함을 보여준다.

라타이만의 군수 기반 확충과 주안다 모의훈련 시설을 함께 고려하면, 인도네시아가 단순히 한 척의 선체를 인수하는 것이 아니라 전체적인 항공모함 항공작전 생태계를 구축하고 있음을 알 수 있다.

교리적 전환: 바이락타르 기반 드론 항공모함과 동남아 최초의 혼합 항공단

디펜스 시큐리티 아시아는 가리발디를 헬리콥터·드론 혼합 항공모함으로 개조하려는 계획을 전체 획득 사업에서 가장 교리적으로 중요한 요소로 규정한다. 이는 가리발디를 동남아시아 최초의 무인체계 운용 전용 항공모함 플랫폼으로 자리매김하게 한다.

계획에는 튀르키예산 바이락타르 TB3 함재 무인전투기 약 60대와 바이락타르 아킨지 9대의 통합이 포함된 것으로 알려졌다. 이 구성이 실현되면 인도네시아는 분쟁 가능성이 있는 군도 해역 전역에 지속적인 무인 타격 및 감시 능력을 갖게 된다.

이러한 드론 중심 접근법은 미국, 중국, 인도 같은 전통적 항공모함 강국이 운용하는 훨씬 비싼 유인 고정익 타격 항공단 대신 비용 대비 비대칭적 효과를 제공하는 무인전력을 선택한 의도적인 교리적 결정이다.

PT PAL의 개조 과정에서 계획된 구조 보강 작업은 UAV 운용에 특화된 요구사항을 수용해야 한다. 여기에는 갑판 표식의 재조정과 이탈리아 해군 시절 물려받은 기존 헬리콥터 승강기 구조와 구별되는 전용 승강기가 포함된다.

회전익기와 무인기로 구성된 혼합 항공단 운용을 위해 격납고를 재구성하려면 인도네시아는 기존 인도네시아 해군 교리에 존재하지 않는 완전히 새로운 정비, 발진, 회수 절차를 개발해야 한다.

인도네시아 지휘망에 맞춘 지휘통제체계 현대화는 바이락타르 통합이 실제로 네트워크화된 무인 타격 능력으로 기능할지, 아니면 기존 항공단에 고립된 감시 기능만 추가하는 데 그칠지를 결정할 것이다.

초기 보도에서는 플랫폼의 원래 설계 목적을 활용해 AV-8B 해리어 II를 통합할 가능성이 제기됐지만, 현재 계획은 주력 항공작전 교리로 헬리콥터·드론 구성에 확실하게 무게를 옮겼다.

무인체계로의 이러한 전환은 튀르키예 기업들과 합작사업을 추진하려는 인도네시아의 광범위한 방위산업적 관심과 부합한다. 이는 유인 타격 항공전력의 과도한 비용을 보완하기 위해 중견국들이 튀르키예산 무인전투기 기술을 채택하는 인도·태평양 지역의 더 큰 흐름을 반영한다.

기존 시 스패로, 아스피데, DARDO 방어체계의 유지 또는 선택적 개량 여부는 이 플랫폼이 단순한 인도주의 및 군수 임무에 제한되지 않고 분쟁 가능성이 있는 해역 인근에 배치될 경우 어느 정도 생존성을 유지할 수 있는지를 좌우할 것이다.

계획이 완전히 실현된다면 가리발디의 드론 항공모함 전환은 그러한 체계를 자체적으로 건조할 산업 기반은 없지만 항공모함 기반 무인 타격 능력을 원하는 중견국 해군에 완전히 새로운 조달 모델을 제시하게 된다.

재정적 부담과 분석가들의 회의론: 원양 해군의 야망과 유지 위험의 비교

개발 국책지원 금융 구조는 항공모함 획득, 특수 장비, 기반시설 개량에 4억5,000만 달러의 차관 한도를 설정하고 있으며, 수송헬리콥터에 별도로 2억5,000만 달러가 배정돼 있다.

항공모함 운용에 최적화된 다목적 헬리콥터를 위해 추가로 3억 달러가 책정되면서, 전체 사업의 회전익기 통합 비용을 포함한 항공전력 및 선체 패키지의 총액은 약 10억 달러에 이른다.

이 총액은 신조 항공모함 건조에 일반적으로 필요한 15억~30억 달러보다 상당히 낮으며, 비교적 적은 초기 비용으로 신속하게 전력을 확보한다는 이번 획득의 핵심 가치 제안을 뒷받침한다.

개조 및 현대화 비용은 인도네시아가 최종적으로 선택하는 전투체계와 센서 패키지의 범위에 따라 7조2,000억 루피아에서 16조8,000억 루피아, 미화 약 4억5,000만 달러에서 8억 달러 이상으로 각각 추정된다.

연간 운용비는 5,000만~8,000만 달러로 예상된다. 이러한 반복적인 유지 부담은 초기 획득 비용보다 인도네시아의 장기 국방예산 운용 능력을 훨씬 더 크게 시험할 것이다.

하원 제1위원회 소속 의원들은 가리발디의 40년 된 선체가 실질적으로 신뢰할 수 있는 운용 수명을 약 10년밖에 유지하지 못할 수 있다는 우려를 제기했다. 이는 디펜스 시큐리티 아시아의 광범위한 분석에서 제시된 15~20년 전망보다 훨씬 보수적인 추정이다.

운용 비용과 기술적 복잡성으로 인해 성능은 갖췄지만 거의 출동하지 못하는 자산, 이른바 ‘항구의 여왕’이 될 위험은 방위정책 분야에서 반복적으로 제기되는 우려로 남아 있다.

인도네시아에는 현재 확립된 항공모함 항공작전 교리가 없다. 따라서 새로운 훈련 체계, 정비 절차, 지휘구조는 기존 제도적 경험을 응용하는 것이 아니라 사실상 처음부터 구축해야 한다.

개조 과정에서 PT PAL에 실질적인 기술이전이 어느 정도 이뤄질지를 둘러싼 의문도 남아 있다. 이는 인도네시아 국내 조선업 기반이 지속적인 산업 역량을 확보할지, 아니면 일시적인 하청 경험만 얻는 데 그칠지를 결정할 요소다.

이러한 해결되지 않은 위험에도 불구하고 획득 사업에 대한 의회의 초당적 지지는 여전히 강하다. 이는 유지 비용의 불확실성을 감수하더라도 원양 항공모함 능력이 심화되는 인도·태평양 해군 경쟁 속에서 인도네시아가 필수적이라고 판단하는 전략적 신호 효과를 제공한다는 광범위한 정치적 합의를 반영한다.

Indonesia's New Aircraft Carrier Garibaldi Arrives September 20 — Southeast Asia's First Drone-Carrier Reshapes Indo-Pacific Power Balance - Defence Security Asia

Indonesia's New Aircraft Carrier Garibaldi Arrives September 20 — Southeast Asia's First Drone-Carrier Reshapes Indo-Pacific P

Indonesia’s New Aircraft Carrier Garibaldi Arrives September 20 — Southeast Asia’s First Drone-Carrier Reshapes Indo-Pacific Power BalanceEx-Italian Navy Flagship Set To Homeport At Ratai Bay As Jakarta Pivots Toward Drone-Enabled Blue-Water Power Projection Across Southeast Asia's Most Vital Chokepoints

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By admin On Jul 22, 2026

Soon to be Indonesia's Giuseppe Garibaldi

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(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Indonesia’s Ministry of Defence confirmed on July 20, 2026, before Commission I of the House of Representatives, that the decommissioned Italian light carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi will enter Indonesian waters on September 20, 2026, a date deliberately sequenced ahead of the TNI’s October 5 anniversary.

The transfer converts a nearly cost-free grant into a strategic inflection point, positioning Jakarta as only the second Southeast Asian state, after Thailand’s Chakri Naruebet, to field a flat-deck aviation platform capable of sustained blue-water presence.

Navy Chief Admiral Muhammad Ali has framed the timeline as both a symbolic and operational milestone, tying the carrier’s arrival to a broader narrative of naval modernization under President Prabowo Subianto’s defence agenda.

Giuseppe Garibaldi

The acquisition mechanism itself carries geopolitical weight because a government-to-government hibah, or free cession, ratified by the Italian Senate between March and April 2026, transfers sovereign military capability without the diplomatic friction typically attached to arms sales.

Fincantieri’s continued industrial footprint in Indonesia, already visible through the PPA-class frigates KRI Brawijaya and KRI Prabu Siliwangi, signals a deepening Rome-Jakarta axis that extends beyond a single hull into submarines, trainer aircraft, and maritime patrol platforms.

Strategically, the carrier’s designated homeport at Ratai Bay in Lampung places Indonesian naval aviation within immediate reach of the Sunda Strait, one of the Indo-Pacific’s most consequential maritime chokepoints for global trade and undersea cable infrastructure.

This positioning matters because a persistent aviation-capable presence near Sunda complicates any actor’s calculus for contesting freedom of navigation through waters that carry a substantial share of regional container and energy shipping traffic.

The refit program, led by state-owned PT PAL with continued Italian technical support, is engineered to convert a Cold War anti-submarine hull into a hybrid helicopter-and-drone carrier optimized for Indonesia’s archipelagic defence requirements rather than fixed-wing strike aviation.

Analysts within Commission I have already flagged that the Garibaldi’s four-decade-old airframe compresses its usable service window, forcing Jakarta to weigh rapid capability gain against the long-term sustainment burden of operating a legacy NATO-era hull.

The financing structure, anchored by a US$450 million loan ceiling for the carrier itself alongside separate helicopter procurement packages, reveals that the true cost of blue-water ambition sits in aviation integration rather than the hull acquisition.

What follows is a sector-by-sector breakdown of the acquisition mechanics, platform capability, logistics footprint, drone-carrier conversion doctrine, and the financial and strategic risk calculus behind Indonesia’s most consequential naval acquisition in a generation.

The Acquisition Mechanism: A Zero-Cost Hull With Multi-Billion-Dollar Strategic Strings Attached

The Giuseppe Garibaldi transfer is structured as a government-to-government grant rather than a commercial sale, meaning Indonesia acquires the 13,850-to-14,150-tonne hull without paying acquisition cost for the vessel itself.

This financial structure is strategically significant because it allows Jakarta to bypass the capital-intensive procurement phase that typically delays carrier programs by years, compressing Indonesia’s timeline toward operational blue-water capability.

The Italian Senate’s approval of the free cession between March and April 2026 formalized nearly four decades of Fincantieri-built service history transferring directly into Indonesian Navy custody.

Italy decommissioned the Garibaldi in October 2024 after replacing it with the larger LHD Trieste, a substitution pattern that mirrors how legacy NATO carrier hulls increasingly migrate toward emerging Indo-Pacific navies seeking rapid capability injection.

The grant’s zero-cost structure nonetheless conceals a far larger financial commitment, since Indonesia must independently fund transport, refit, and combat-system integration through sovereign loan mechanisms.

Defence Security Asia’s reporting indicates the broader package could unlock additional multi-billion-dollar Indonesian procurements from Italy, including six DGK-class midget submarines and twenty-four Leonardo M-346 advanced jet trainers.

This bundling pattern suggests Rome is using the Garibaldi transfer as an industrial anchor point to secure long-term Indonesian defence-market access across submarines, training aircraft, and maritime patrol platforms.

Three ATR-72 maritime patrol aircraft reportedly included in the broader package would extend Indonesia’s maritime domain awareness capability well beyond what the carrier alone could provide.

The transfer’s delivery configuration strips offensive weapons systems for the transit voyage, retaining only propulsion, safety, and habitability systems, a precaution that reduces diplomatic sensitivity during the vessel’s passage through international waters.

Indonesia’s advance team of roughly one hundred personnel, dispatched to Italy in July 2026, reflects the operational urgency of building indigenous crew competency before the ship’s own systems are even fully activated.

The full Italian documentation process could technically extend into December 2026, yet Jakarta’s insistence on a September arrival underscores the political premium placed on symbolic timing over administrative convenience.

Platform Capability: From Mediterranean Anti-Submarine Hunter To Archipelagic Force Multiplier

The Garibaldi’s core specifications, a 180.2-meter length, 33.4-meter beam, and full-load displacement near 14,000 tons, place it firmly in the light-carrier category rather than among supercarrier-class platforms operated by the United States or China.

Four LM2500 gas turbines generating roughly 81,000 horsepower drive the vessel past 30 knots, a speed profile that enables rapid repositioning across Indonesia’s vast archipelagic sea lanes during contingency operations.

An operational range near 7,000 nautical miles at 20 knots gives Indonesian planners sufficient endurance to project presence across the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok Straits without requiring frequent replenishment support.

Originally engineered around a ski-jump flight deck for AV-8B Harrier II short takeoff and vertical landing jets, the Garibaldi’s design philosophy prioritized anti-submarine warfare over the fixed-wing strike missions typical of larger carrier doctrines.

Its hangar capacity for sixteen to eighteen aircraft or helicopters provides Indonesia with an aviation throughput far exceeding any platform currently in TNI AL service, fundamentally altering the navy’s organic air-support ceiling.

The vessel’s combat record, spanning NATO’s 1999 Kosovo air campaign, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and the 2011 Libya intervention, establishes it as a genuinely combat-tested platform rather than an unproven or purely ceremonial acquisition.

Legacy self-defence systems including Sea Sparrow and Aspide surface-to-air missiles, Oto Melara 40mm guns, torpedo tubes, and Otomat anti-ship missiles remain embedded in the hull’s original architecture pending Indonesia’s modernization decisions.

Analysts estimate the aging hull retains fifteen to twenty years of viable service life following a comprehensive refit, a window that shapes how aggressively Jakarta should invest in combat-system upgrades relative to the platform’s finite remaining lifespan.

PT PAL’s planned modernization work will determine whether Indonesia retains legacy Italian self-defence systems or integrates newer sensor and weapons architectures compatible with existing TNI AL command networks.

The platform’s transformation trajectory, from Cold War anti-submarine hunter toward a helicopter-and-drone command ship, represents one of the more unconventional carrier-conversion doctrines currently unfolding across any Indo-Pacific navy.

Logistics Footprint: Ratai Bay And The Militarization Of The Sunda Strait Approach

Ratai Bay in Lampung province, situated at the southern tip of Sumatra facing the Sunda Strait directly, has been selected as the Garibaldi’s permanent homeport, a decision with immediate implications for chokepoint security architecture.

As of mid-July 2026, berthing-area construction at Lanal Lampung had reached seventy-six percent completion, reflecting an accelerated infrastructure timeline designed to synchronize with the carrier’s confirmed September arrival date.

Dredging operations to achieve sufficient water depth for a 14,000-tonne hull represent a nontrivial engineering undertaking, since Ratai Bay’s existing infrastructure was not originally designed around vessels of this displacement class.

Electrical infrastructure upgrades accompanying the berthing work suggest Indonesia is building sustained shore-power and maintenance capacity rather than treating Ratai Bay as a temporary or ceremonial mooring location.

The Sunda Strait’s strategic value stems from its role as an alternative maritime corridor to the more heavily trafficked Malacca Strait, carrying significant volumes of regional shipping alongside undersea communications infrastructure vital to Southeast Asian connectivity.

A persistent carrier presence anchored near this chokepoint materially increases Indonesia’s maritime domain awareness capacity across a corridor historically monitored with far less organic aviation support.

Complementing the physical base upgrades, the Indonesian Navy constructed a full-scale mock flight deck matching the Garibaldi’s exact dimensions at Juanda Naval Air Station in Surabaya, enabling pilot and deck-crew training before the actual hull arrives.

This simulation-first approach mitigates the operational risk of introducing an entirely new aviation doctrine to a navy that has never previously operated a fixed-wing or rotary carrier platform of this scale.

Broader crew training beyond the initial hundred-person advance team is planned for hundreds of additional personnel, reflecting the scale of institutional retraining required to operate a platform categorically different from Indonesia’s existing amphibious and frigate fleet.

The logistics buildout at Ratai Bay, taken alongside the Juanda simulation facility, indicates Indonesia is constructing an entire carrier-aviation ecosystem rather than simply accepting delivery of a single hull.

Doctrinal Shift: The Bayraktar-Enabled Drone Carrier And Southeast Asia’s First Hybrid Air Wing

Defence Security Asia’s reporting identifies the Garibaldi’s intended conversion into a hybrid helicopter-and-drone carrier as the most doctrinally significant element of the entire acquisition, positioning it as Southeast Asia’s first dedicated unmanned-capable carrier platform.

Plans reportedly include integration of around sixty Turkish Bayraktar TB3 naval unmanned combat aerial vehicles alongside nine Bayraktar Akinci systems, a configuration that would give Indonesia persistent unmanned strike and surveillance reach across contested archipelagic waters.

This drone-centric approach represents a deliberate doctrinal choice favoring cost-asymmetric unmanned capability over the far more expensive fixed-wing strike-fighter air wings operated by traditional carrier powers such as the United States, China, or India.

Structural reinforcement work planned during the PT PAL refit will need to accommodate UAV-specific operational requirements, including recalibrated deck markings and dedicated elevators distinct from the conventional helicopter-elevator architecture inherited from Italian service.

Reconfigured hangar space designed for mixed rotary-wing and unmanned air-wing operations would require Indonesia to develop entirely new maintenance, launch, and recovery procedures not present in any existing TNI AL doctrine.

Command-and-control modernization suited to Indonesian networks will determine whether the Bayraktar integration functions as a genuinely networked unmanned strike capability or merely an isolated surveillance addition to the existing air wing.

Early reporting had floated potential AV-8B Harrier II integration inherited from the platform’s original design purpose, though current planning has shifted decisively toward the helicopter-and-drone configuration as the primary aviation doctrine.

This pivot toward unmanned systems aligns with Indonesia’s broader defence-industrial interest in joint ventures with Turkish firms, mirroring a wider Indo-Pacific trend of middle powers adopting Turkish UCAV technology to offset the prohibitive cost of manned strike aviation.

The retention or selective upgrade of legacy Sea Sparrow, Aspide, and DARDO defensive systems will shape how survivable the platform remains if deployed near contested waters rather than confined to routine humanitarian or logistics missions.

If fully realized, the Garibaldi’s drone-carrier conversion would establish an entirely new procurement template for middle-power navies seeking carrier-enabled unmanned strike capability without the industrial base required to build such systems domestically.

Financial Exposure And Analyst Scepticism: Weighing Blue-Water Ambition Against Sustainment Risk

The Development Sovereign Assistance financing structure places a US$450 million loan ceiling against the carrier acquisition, specialized equipment, and infrastructure upgrades, separate from an additional US$250 million allocated specifically for transport helicopters.

A further US$300 million earmarked for carrier-optimized utility helicopters brings the total aviation-and-hull package to approximately US$1 billion when combined with rotary-wing integration costs across the program.

This total remains substantially below the US$1.5 to US$3 billion typically required for new-build carrier construction, reinforcing the acquisition’s core value proposition of rapid capability gain at comparatively reduced upfront cost.

Refit and modernization estimates independently range from Rp 7.2 trillion to Rp 16.8 trillion, equivalent to roughly US$450 million to over US$800 million, depending on the scope of combat systems and sensor packages Indonesia ultimately selects.

Annual operating costs are projected between US$50 and US$80 million, a recurring sustainment burden that will test Indonesia’s long-term defence-budget discipline far more than the initial acquisition figures suggest.

Parliamentary lawmakers within Commission I have raised concerns that the Garibaldi’s forty-year-old hull may retain only around ten years of genuinely reliable service life, a sharply more conservative estimate than the fifteen-to-twenty-year projection cited by Defence Security Asia’s broader analysis.

The risk of the carrier becoming what analysts describe as a “port queen,” a capable but rarely deployed asset sidelined by operating expense and technical complexity, remains a recurring concern voiced across defence policy circles.

Indonesia currently lacks an established carrier-aviation doctrine, meaning new training pipelines, maintenance protocols, and command structures must be built essentially from scratch rather than adapted from existing institutional knowledge.

Questions persist regarding the extent of genuine technology transfer to PT PAL during the refit process, a factor that will determine whether Indonesia’s domestic shipbuilding base gains lasting industrial capability or merely temporary contractor experience.

Despite these unresolved risks, cross-party parliamentary support for the acquisition remains strong, reflecting a broader political consensus that blue-water carrier capability, even carrying sustainment uncertainty, delivers strategic signalling value Indonesia considers indispensable amid intensifying Indo-Pacific naval competition.

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40년 된 중고 경항모에 TB3... 좀 쌩뚱맞네요.