트럼프 행정부의 마약밀매 차단 작전은 실패했다

[위종민]

마약밀매 보트를 부숴댄다는 뉴스를 본 지가 오래됐는데, 미군의 마약밀매 차단 작전이 효과가 적다는 뉴스입니다. 공습으로 마약밀매 보트를 부수고 마약을 압수해도 마약 소비자가 변화가 거의 없었다고 하네요. 게다가 미국의 일방적 작전으로 무고한 사람들이 희생될 수 있고, 또 무고한 이의 희생을 우려한 영국이나 네덜란드 등 전통적 파트너들이 미국과의 협력을 줄이고 있다고 합니다. 마약 밀매업자들을 그냥 죽여버리면 그들이 제공할 수 있었던 정보들도 날려버리는 거라고.. 

미군의 마약 밀매 차단 작전은 실패했다. 이제는 중단할 때다.

이 임무는 핵심 목표를 달성하지 못했으며, 미국이 인력과 탄약 모두에서 여력이 부족한 시기에 군 인력과 탄약을 소모하고 있다고 대니얼 R. 디페트리스는 썼다.

대니얼 디페트리스

2026년 7월 21일 오전 11시 42분

백악관이 마약 밀수업자들이 운용했다고 밝힌 소형 보트가 미 국방부에 의해 파괴되는 모습. (트루스 소셜/도널드 트럼프)

미군이 이란에 공습을 퍼붓고 있고, 도널드 트럼프 대통령이 테헤란이 호르무즈 해협을 다시 개방하지 않을 경우 이란의 기반시설을 파괴하겠다고 재차 위협하는 가운데, 미국과 훨씬 가까운 곳에서도 또 다른 전쟁이 벌어지고 있다. 그러나 연일 주요 뉴스로 다뤄지는 중동의 대치와 달리, 미국이 속한 반구에서 계속되는 이 전투는 거의 주목받지 못하고 있다.

지난해 11월 피트 헤그세스 국방장관은 서반구의 이른바 마약 테러리스트들을 격퇴하기 위한 미군 작전인 ‘서던 스피어 작전’의 개시를 선언했다. 이 임무는 미 국방부가 카리브해와 동태평양을 거쳐 미국으로 마약을 운반한 것으로 추정되는 소형 보트들을 폭격하기 시작한 지 두 달도 지나지 않아 시작됐다.

이후 미국은 66차례의 공습을 실시했다. 이 과정에서 약 221명이 사망한 것으로 알려졌으며, 그중 일부는 실제로 마약을 밀수하지 않았을 가능성도 있다. 그럼에도 이 임무는 핵심 목표를 달성하지 못했다. 게다가 미국이 인력과 탄약 모두에서 여유가 없는 시기에 군 인력과 탄약을 소모하고 있다.

트럼프 행정부는 이번 공습이 과거의 마약퇴치 정책을 시급히 개혁한 것일 뿐만 아니라, 라틴아메리카 범죄조직의 가장 아픈 곳, 즉 자금줄을 타격하는 정책 변화라고 주장한다. 지난 6월 트럼프는 해상을 통한 마약 밀매가 97퍼센트 감소했다고 자랑했다. 백악관은 계속되는 보트 공습을 이른바 ‘돈로 독트린’의 가시적인 사례로 제시한다. 이는 1823년 먼로 독트린을 변형한 표현으로, 미국의 배타적 영향권에서 미국의 힘을 공격적이고 거리낌 없이 행사한다는 의미다.

그러나 트럼프 행정부가 내놓는 낙관적인 말들은 말에 불과하다. 트럼프 행정부가 주장하는 마약퇴치 성과에는 사실적 근거가 없다. 밀매업자들이 실제로 사망했고 코카인 포대가 태평양 바다로 가라앉은 것도 분명하지만, 보트 공습은 주된 목표인 미·멕시코 국경에 도달하는 마약의 양을 줄이는 데 실패하고 있다. 더 나쁜 점은 마약퇴치를 군사화함으로써 워싱턴이 오히려 마약퇴치 목표를 달성하기 더 어렵게 만들고, 그 과정에서 자국의 평판까지 훼손할 위험이 있다는 것이다.

공해에서 문자 그대로 마약과의 전쟁을 벌이는 것이 올바른 정책인 이유를 설명하면서, 마코 루비오 국무장관은 미 해안경비대가 주도한 역내 해상 차단 작전이 밀매업자들의 마약 북송을 막지 못했다고 주장했다. 그는 “그들을 막을 수 있는 것은 그들을 폭파하고 제거하는 것”이라고 말했다. 그러나 미국은 지난 9개월 동안 마약 밀매 혐의자들을 폭파해 왔고, 서반구의 마약 밀매는 여전히 계속되고 있다.

마약 거래가 어떻게 운영되는지 조금이라도 아는 사람이라면 이는 전혀 놀라운 일이 아니다. 다른 사업과 마찬가지로 마약 카르텔도 수요와 공급의 원리에 반응하며, 시장점유율을 확대할 기회를 끊임없이 찾는다. 미국과 전 세계에서 불법 마약 수요가 매우 높기 때문에 밀매업자들은 생산을 계속할 강력한 금전적 유인을 갖고 있다. 생산을 중단하면 수천억 달러 규모의 시장에서 경쟁자들이 더 큰 몫을 차지할 여지만 생긴다. 세계적 수요가 증가하고 있는 코카인의 경우 특히 그렇다.

이상적인 상황이라면 미국의 공습은 밀매업자들이 목숨을 보전하기 위해 새로운 생업을 찾도록 만들었을 것이다. 그러한 상황이라면 미국 법집행기관은 국경에서 압수되는 마약 건수의 감소와 함께, 공급 축소로 인한 미국 내 마약 가격 급등을 기록했어야 한다. 그러나 예상했던 대로 공습에도 불구하고 마약은 계속 유입되고 있다.

미 세관국경보호국에 따르면, 보트 공습이 시작된 뒤 8개월 동안 미국 당국이 압수한 코카인의 양은 그 이전 8개월보다 더 많았다. 같은 기간 코카인 가격도 안정적으로 유지됐으며, 이는 공급 충격이 없다는 것을 시사한다. 시장에는 물량이 충분히 공급되고 있다. 요컨대 미국의 목표가 밀매를 줄이는 것이라면, 워싱턴 자체 통계는 서던 스피어 작전이 아무런 효과도 내지 못하고 있음을 보여준다.

트럼프 행정부의 군사 중심 마약퇴치 정책은 비효율적인 수준을 넘어 비용도 많이 든다. 미 국방부 특별감찰관에 따르면, 현재 확인 가능한 가장 최근 수치인 2026년 1월부터 3월 사이 서던 스피어 작전에 약 5억2,700만 달러가 배정됐다. 브라운대학교는 남부사령부 증강이 시작된 2025년 8월까지 거슬러 올라가면 비용 추산액이 50억 달러에 가깝다고 평가했다. 여기에는 세계 다른 지역의 전력을 남부사령부로 이동시키면서 발생하는 위험은 포함되지 않았다.

이는 현재 미군이 수행 중인 더 비용 집약적인 임무들에 비하면 매우 적은 수준이다. 비교하자면 이란 전쟁 비용은 1,000억 달러에 이를 수 있다. 그럼에도 2027년 국방수권법이 교착 상태에 빠져 있고, 일부 공화당 의원들조차 연방예산의 다른 분야에서 그에 상응하는 삭감 없이 대규모 추가 국방예산을 배정하는 데 점점 더 회의적인 상황에서, 이는 국방부 관계자들이 고려해야 할 또 하나의 지출이다.

워싱턴은 라틴아메리카 국가들에게 역내에서 활개 치는 카르텔과 갱단에 맞서 미국 편에 설 것을 촉구해 왔다. 이는 대체로 지역 파트너들이 미국식 접근법을 채택하도록 유도하는 것을 의미하며, 그 접근법에서는 마약 밀매업자들을 제거돼야 할 테러리스트로 취급한다.

그러나 백악관이 몇 번을 다르게 말하더라도 마약 밀매는 국제 테러리즘이 아니다. 멕시코 카르텔은 경쟁자를 살해하고, 주민들을 굴복시키며, 지역 경찰을 겁주거나 매수하기 위해 테러와 유사한 전술을 사용할 수 있다. 그러나 유사성은 거기까지다. 허무주의적 정치 목표를 위해 정부를 전복하고 사람을 죽이려는 알카에다나 ISIS 같은 테러조직과 달리, 카르텔의 목표는 돈을 벌고 사업을 더 쉽게 운영하는 것이다.

이 점이 왜 중요한가. 가장 기본적인 이 사실을 이해하지 못하면 잘못된 정책으로 이어지기 때문이다. 오늘날 역내에서 바로 그런 일이 벌어지고 있다. 라틴아메리카의 많은 정부는 살해와 체포만으로 이 문제에서 벗어날 수 있다고 점점 더 믿고 있다. 이는 좋은 헤드라인을 만들고 정치인들이 자랑할 거리를 제공할 수 있지만, 장기적으로는 더 많은 문제를 만들어낸다.

가장 중대한 문제 가운데 하나는 역내 해역에서 벌어지는 미국의 일방적 작전이 미국 정책에 원칙적으로 동의하지 않거나, 워싱턴과의 정보 협력이 무고한 사람들의 죽음으로 이어질 수 있다고 우려하는 전통적 파트너들을 소외시킬 위험이다. 영국, 콜롬비아, 네덜란드는 부당한 사망에 대한 잠재적 책임을 피하기 위해 미국과의 일부 마약퇴치 정보 공유 경로를 차단했다. 실제로 부당한 사망이 발생했다는 증거도 있다. 미국의 공습으로 숨진 피해자 두 명의 가족은 미국법과 국제인권법 위반을 주장하며 현재 미국 정부를 상대로 소송을 제기하고 있다.

보트 공습의 작전상 영향도 무시할 수 없다. 공해에서 마약 밀매업자들을 살해하면, 그들이 어느 범죄조직을 위해 일하는지, 누구의 지시를 받는지, 생산이 어디에서 이루어지는지 등 이들이 제공할 수 있는 정보 가치도 함께 사라진다. 따라서 보트 공습은 잠재적 정보원과 제보자를 제거함으로써 미국 법집행기관의 업무를 오히려 더 어렵게 만들 수 있다.

도널드 트럼프는 강경한 범죄 대응이 밀매업자들로 하여금 사업을 접게 할 것이라고 생각한 최초의 미국 대통령은 아니다. 그러나 미군을 동원해 이 이론을 시험한 최초의 대통령이다. 결과는 나왔다. 효과가 없다. 서던 스피어 작전은 조기에 종료돼야 한다.

대니얼 R. 디페트리스는 디펜스 프라이오리티스의 연구원이다.

The US military campaign to stop drug trafficking has failed. It’s time to move on. - Breaking Defense

The US military campaign to stop drug trafficking has failed. It’s time to move on. - Breaking Defense

The US military campaign to stop drug trafficking has failed. It’s time to move on.

The mission has not succeeded in its core goals, and it’s using up military manpower and munitions at a time when the US is stretched on both, writes Daniel R. DePetris.

By Daniel DePetris on July 21, 2026 11:42 am

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An image of a small boat that the White House says was being operated by drug smugglers and was destroyed by the Pentagon. (Truth Social/Donald Trump)

At a time when the US military is pummeling Iran with airstrikes and President Donald Trump again threatens to destroy Iranian infrastructure if Tehran doesn’t re-open the Strait of Hormuz, another war is raging much closer to home. But unlike the confrontation in the Middle East, which remains on the front pages, the ongoing battle in America’s own hemisphere is barely raising eyebrows. 

Last November, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth declared the initiation of Operation Southern Spear, a US military campaign designed to defeat so-called narco-terrorists in the Western Hemisphere. The mission came less than two months after the Pentagon began bombing small boats that were allegedly carrying drugs to the US through the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific Ocean. 

The United States has since conducted 66 strikes. Aside from reportedly killing an estimated 221 people in the process, some of whom may not actually be smuggling drugs, the mission has not actually succeeded in its core goals. And it’s using up military manpower and munitions at a time when the US is stretched on both.   

The Trump administration claims the strikes are not only a much-needed reform to the anti-drug policies of the past but a policy change that is hitting Latin America’s criminal organizations where it hurts: in their wallets. In June, Trump boasted about a supposed 97 percent decline in sea-bound drug trafficking. The White House points to the ongoing boat strikes as a visible example of the so-called “Donroe Doctrine,” a play on the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, in which US power is wielded aggressively and unapologetically in America’s exclusive sphere of influence.

But all the happy-talk coming from the Trump administration is just that: talk. The Trump administration’s claims of counternarcotics success have no basis in fact. While traffickers have indeed been killed and bags of cocaine have no doubt sunk in the waters of the Pacific, the boat strikes are failing in their principal aim: cutting down on the amount of drugs reaching the US-Mexico border. Worse still, by militarizing counternarcotics, Washington runs the risk of making its counternarcotics goals more difficult to achieve and tainting its own reputation in the process.

In justifying why waging a literal war against drugs on the high seas is the right policy, Secretary of State Marco Rubio asserted that US Coast Guard-led interdictions in the region’s waters weren’t stopping traffickers from sending their product north. “What will stop them,” he said, “is when you blow them up, when you get rid of them.” Yet the United States has been blowing up alleged drug peddlers for the last nine months, and drug trafficking in the Western Hemisphere is still occurring. 

This is not a surprise to anyone who has an even cursory understanding of how the drug trade operates. Like any other business, drug cartels respond to the rules of supply-and-demand and are constantly searching for the opportunity to grow their share of the market. Because the demand for illegal narcotics is so high in the United States and around the world, traffickers retain a major financial incentive to continue producing. Failing to do so merely leaves room for competitors to corner more of the market that’s valued in the hundreds of billions of dollars. This is especially true with cocaine, whose global demand is rising.

In an ideal world, US strikes would lead traffickers to save their own skins and look for a new line of work. In such a scenario, US law enforcement agencies would register a lower number of drug seizures at US borders and a spike in drug prices inside the United States as the supply dwindles. But as anticipated, drugs continue to flow despite the bombings. 

According to US Customs and Border Protection, more cocaine was seized by US authorities in the eight months since the boat strikes started compared to the eight months preceding them. Cocaine prices have remained stable across this time frame as well, which suggests there aren’t any supply shocks. The market is well stocked. In short, if the US objective is to reduce trafficking, then Washington’s own statistics show that Operation Southern Spear is doing absolutely nothing.

The Trump administration’s military-centric anti-drug policy is beyond ineffective — it’s also costly. According to the Pentagon’s Special Inspector General, approximately $527 million was allocated for Operation Southern Spear between January-March 2026, the most recent figures available. Brown University has estimated that, if you go back to Aug 2025 when the buildup in SOUTHCOM began, cost estimates are closer to $5 billion. And that doesn’t count any incurred risk from having to shift forces out of other parts of the world to go to SOUTHCOM. 

While this is a far cry from the more financially-intensive missions the US military is presently conducting — in comparison, the price tag for the war in Iran could reach $100 billion — it’s nevertheless another expense that Pentagon officials need to account for at a time when the 2027 National Defense Authorization Act is stalled and even some Republican lawmakers are increasingly skeptical about appropriating large US defense supplementals without comparable reductions in other areas of the federal budget. 

Washington has encouraged countries in Latin America to bandwagon with the United States against the cartels and gangs running amok in the region. More often than not, this means enticing regional partners to adopt the US paradigm, where traffickers are treated as terrorists who deserve to be eliminated.  

Yet drug trafficking is not international terrorism, no matter how many times the White House says otherwise. Mexico’s cartels may deploy terrorist-like tactics to kill their rivals, cow the population into submission and scare — or buy off — local police forces. But that’s where the similarities end. Unlike terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda or ISIS, which seek to subvert governments and kill in the name of a nihilistic political objective, the cartels’ goal is to cash in and make their business easier to conduct. 

Why is this important? Because failing to grasp this most basic fact will translate into bad policy. This is playing out in the region today. Many of Latin America’s governments increasingly believe they can kill or arrest their way out of the problem. This may make for good headlines and give politicians something to brag about, but over the long-term, more problems are created. 

One of the most significant is the risk that unilateral US operations in the region’s waters will alienate traditional partners who don’t agree with US policy as a matter of principle or are otherwise concerned that intelligence cooperation with Washington could result in the deaths of innocent people. The United Kingdom, Colombia and the Netherlands have eliminated certain lines of information sharing with the United States on counter-narcotics in order to insulate themselves from being potentially liable for wrongful deaths. And there’s evidence that wrongful deaths have indeed occurred — the families of two victims killed by American strikes are currently suing the US government for what they allege are violations of both US law and international human rights law.

The operational impacts of the boat strikes can’t be ignored either. Killing drug traffickers on the high seas eliminates whatever intelligence value those traffickers may hold, including which criminal group they’re working for, who they’re taking orders from and where the production is happening. The boat strikes could therefore be making US law enforcement’s job even harder as potential sources and informants are eliminated.

Donald Trump isn’t the first American president who thought a tough-on-crime approach would compel traffickers to fold up shop. But he is the first to use the US military to test the theory. The results are in: it’s not working. Operation Southern Spear should be cut short.

Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities.