미국, 광물의 적성국 조달 문제 해결을 위한 행정명령 발표

[위종민]

중국이나 러시아, 북한, 이란산 소재가 방산물자에 쓰이는 것을 최대한 막기 위한 행정명령이 발표됐네요. 그 동안은 면제 조항을 업체들이 남용했었고, 주요 방산업체 중 공급망을 추적해 지도를 작성한 곳은 6%밖에 안 됐다고 합니다.
 
미 국내 공급원 확보를 위해 계약업체가 공급원 인증을 위해 노력했다는 증거가 필요하다고 하고, 또한 공급망 가시성을 계약상 의무로 만들어 각 계약업체들이 부품을 원재료 원산지까지 추적할 수 있게 자재 명세서를 제출해야 한다고 합니다. 
 
면제 조항에 함정이 있었다: 새로운 광물 조달 규정은 판도를 어떻게 바꿀 것인가

지속 가능한 미국 국내 광물 공급망을 구축하려면 미국의 주요 방산업체뿐 아니라 중소기업과 신규 진입기업 간에도 더 긴밀한 협력이 필요할 가능성이 크다고 애비게일 헌터는 말한다.

애비게일 헌터
2026년 7월 31일 오전 10시 27분

수년 동안 방산업체들은 중국, 러시아, 북한, 이란산 소재가 미국 무기체계에 들어가는 것을 막기 위한 법률 아래에서 사업을 해왔다. 그러나 현실에서 이 법을 제대로 집행하는 일은 쉽지 않았다. 도널드 트럼프 대통령이 7월 20일 발표한 행정명령 「미국의 국방 공급망 보호 및 핵심소재의 국내 조달 보장」은 법 조문과 국방부가 실제로 집행하는 내용 사이의 간극을 좁히려는 진지한 시도다.

이 명령은 문제를 정확히 짚고 있으며, 해결책에서도 의미 있는 진전을 이뤘다.

근거법인 미국법전 제10편 제4872조는 이미 국방부가 규제 대상 국가로부터 사마륨-코발트 자석과 네오디뮴-철-붕소 자석, 텅스텐, 탄탈럼, 몰리브데넘을 구매하는 것을 금지하고 있으며, 저마늄과 갈륨도 2027년 12월부터 목록에 추가될 예정이다. 그러나 이 법은 동시에 광범위한 면제 권한도 두었다. 규정을 준수하는 소재가 적절한 품질이나 수량으로, 또는 합리적인 가격에 조달 가능하지 않으면 국방부는 간단히 예외를 승인할 수 있었다. 실제로는 이런 재량권이 규정 자체를 압도했다. 문제의 핵심은 면제 조항에 있었다.

이것이 전적으로 계약업체들의 잘못은 아니다. 중국이 이들 광물 가운데 상당수의 유일하게 현실적인 공급원이라는 사실 자체가 바로 문제다. 따라서 방산업체들이 대체 공급원을 확보하는 데 어려움을 겪어온 것은 놀라운 일이 아니다. 가공능력은 수십 년에 걸쳐 해외에 집중됐고, 미국 국내의 채굴과 정제 역량은 충분한 규모로 발전하지 못했으며, 새로운 공급원을 무기체계에 사용할 수 있도록 인증하는 데는 해당 소재가 존재하더라도 수년이 걸릴 수 있다. 더구나 방산 수요만으로는 국내 광물 공급망을 일으켜 세울 수 없다. 상업 부문의 구매력이 필요하지만, 일부 자동차업체를 제외하면 대부분의 광범위한 산업기반은 공급망을 중국에서 분리하도록 유도받지 못했다.

이러한 현실에 직면하면서 면제는 가장 저항이 적은 선택지가 됐고, 대체 공급원에 투자한 계약업체는 거의 없었다. 게다가 연구에 따르면 주요 방산업체 가운데 공급망을 추적해 지도를 작성한 곳은 6%에 불과하다. 자신이 인식조차 하지 못하는 위험에서 벗어나 공급원을 다변화하기가 얼마나 어려운지는 쉽게 알 수 있다. 우리 단체는 이러한 정보 격차를 해소하기 위해 국방부가 공급망 투명성을 우선해야 한다고 요구해 왔다.

새 행정명령은 면제를 없애지는 않지만, 그 사용을 제한하고 면제가 승인되더라도 행정부의 더 광범위한 전략을 계속 지원하도록 보장한다. 2027년 1월 1일부터 국방장관은 계약업체가 규정을 준수하는 소재를 찾기 위해 철저히 노력했음을 문서로 입증하고, 승인된 위험 완화 계획을 제출한 경우에만 면제를 승인할 수 있다. 이 계획은 규정을 준수하지 않는 공급원을 명시하고, 규정에 맞는 소재가 실제로 उपलब्ध하지 않았음을 입증하며, 해당 소재를 공급망에서 제거하기 위한 구체적인 조치를 제시하고, 이를 이행할 엄격한 일정을 약속해야 한다.

미국 국내 공급원을 인증하지 못했다는 사실은 이제 계약업체가 해당 공급원을 인증하기 위해 실제로 자금을 투입해 노력하고 있음을 보여주지 않는 한 더 이상 변명이 되지 않는다. 이제 면제를 받으려면 자신이 무엇을 했는지 입증해야 하며, 면제는 영구적인 탈출구가 아니라 전환을 위한 수단이 된다.

이 명령은 이 규정과 함께 두 번째이자 더 광범위한 요구사항을 제시한다. 공급망 가시성이 모범관행이 아니라 계약상 의무가 되는 것이다. 모든 단계의 계약업체는 각 부품을 원재료의 원산지까지 추적할 수 있도록 완전한 계층형 자재명세서를 제출해야 하며, 공급업체의 재무 곤란, 외국 소유 또는 통제 여부, 제조 위험을 점검해야 한다. 이는 법률에 명시된 소수의 민감 소재를 훨씬 넘어선다. 베이징이 앞으로 악용할 수 있는 취약점이 반드시 현재 규제 목록에 있는 것과 같지는 않다는 점을 인정한 것이다.

면제 규제 강화만큼 중요한 세 번째 요소도 있다. 다른 광물정책을 강화하는 것이다. 이 명령은 프로젝트 볼트를 통한 조달과 미국 수출입은행, 국제개발금융공사, 국방부, 상무부, 에너지부 등이 자금을 지원하거나 보증하는 모든 사업을 예외로 인정한다. 그 목적은 방산 조달과 워싱턴이 국내외에서 대체 핵심광물 사업을 개발하는 데 투입한 수십억 달러를 연결하는 데 있다. 방산업체가 정부 지원으로 만들어진 생산업체로부터 구매할 이유가 없다면 이러한 정부 지출은 아무 의미가 없다. 미국 국내 핵심광물 사업의 성공은 수요에서 시작해 수요에서 끝난다. 이 명령은 연방정부가 지원한 공급과 국방부 수요가 서로 연결되도록 설계됐다는 점을 지금까지 가장 분명하게 보여주는 신호다.

규정을 준수하기까지의 길은 험난할 것이다. 실제로 ‘핵심 공급망’을 정의하고, 자재명세서 형식을 정하며, 국방부가 공급망 지도 작성 결과와 면제 신청을 어떻게 비교 평가할지를 결정할 규정은 앞으로 90일에서 180일 후에야 나올 예정이다. 규정을 제대로 만들려면 최대 규모의 주요 계약업체뿐 아니라 중소기업과 신규 진입업체도 실제로 적용할 수 있어야 하며, 국방부도 새로 확보한 집행 수단을 실제로 사용해 상황을 진전시켜야 한다.

그럼에도 방향은 옳다. 정부가 미국 국내 생산을 재정적으로 뒷받침하려는 의지를 점점 더 강화하는 흐름과 결합할 때, 이 명령은 핵심광물을 국방부가 군사 대비태세에 필요한 다른 모든 투입요소를 다루는 방식과 동일하게 취급한다. 즉, 우연이나 면제에 맡기기에는 지나치게 중요한 요소로 보는 것이다.

애비게일 헌터는 SAFE 핵심광물전략센터의 사무국장이다. SAFE는 워싱턴에 기반을 둔 초당파적 에너지안보 및 국가안보 단체다.

주제: 중국, 핵심광물, 행정명령 14415호, 행정명령, 기고·논평
 
The devil was in the waivers: How new minerals procurement rules will change the game - Breaking Defense

The devil was in the waivers: How new minerals procurement rules will change the game - Breaking Defense

 
The devil was in the waivers: How new minerals procurement rules will change the game

Establishing durable domestic mineral supply chains will likely require closer coordination between US defense primes as well as small businesses and new entrants, says Abigail Hunter.

By Abigail Hunter on July 31, 2026 10:27 am
 
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For years, defense contractors have operated under a law that was supposed to keep Chinese, Russian, North Korean and Iranian materials out of American weapons system — but real-world implementation has been elusive. President Donald Trump’s July 20 executive order, “Securing America’s Defense Supply Chains and Ensuring Domestic Acquisition of Critical Materials,” is a serious attempt to close the gap between what the statute says and what the Pentagon actually enforces. 
The order correctly identifies the problem, and makes meaningful progress on the solutions. 
The underlying law, 10 U.S.C. 4872, already bars the Department of Defense from buying samarium-cobalt and neodymium-iron-boron magnets, tungsten, tantalum and molybdenum from covered nations, with germanium and gallium set to join the list in December 2027. But the statute also built in wide waiver authorities: If compliant material wasn’t available in the right quality, quantity, or at a reasonable price, the Pentagon could simply approve an exception. In practice, that discretion overwhelmed the rule itself. The devil is in the waivers.
That’s not entirely contractors’ fault. The fact that China is the only viable source for many of these minerals is, well, the problem — so it’s no surprise that defense manufacturers have struggled to source alternatives. Processing capacity concentrated overseas over decades, domestic mining and refining capacity never developed to scale, and qualifying a new source for use in a weapons system can take years even when the material exists. Furthermore, defense demand alone cannot stand up domestic mineral supply chains — the buying power of the commercial sector is necessary, and with the exception of a few automakers, most of the broader industrial base has not been incentivized to decouple their supply chains from China.
Faced with that reality, waivers became the path of least resistance, and few contractors invested in alternative sources. Furthermore, research shows that only 6 percent of defense primes have mapped their supply chains, and it’s not hard to see the challenges of diversifying away from a risk you are not even aware of. Our organization has been calling on the Pentagon to prioritize transparency of its supply chains to address this knowledge gap.
The new executive order does not eliminate waivers, but it limits their usage and ensures that if issued, they will still support the administration’s broader strategy. Starting January 1, 2027, the Secretary of Defense may only approve a waiver if a contractor documents exhaustive efforts to find compliant material and submits an accepted mitigation plan. This plan must identify the noncompliant source, prove compliant material genuinely wasn’t available, lay out concrete steps to remove that material from the supply chain and commit to a strict timeline for doing it. 
Failure to qualify a domestic source no longer counts as an excuse unless the contractor can show active, funded efforts to qualify one. Now, to get a waiver, you have to show your homework and waivers become transition tools, not permanent escape hatches.
The order pairs that rule with a second, broader requirement: Supply-chain visibility becomes a contractual obligation, rather than a best practice. Contractors at every tier will have to submit a complete indentured bill of materials tracing every component back to the origin of its raw materials, and to screen their suppliers for financial distress, foreign ownership or control and manufacturing risk. That reaches well beyond the handful of sensitive materials named in the statute — a recognition that the vulnerabilities Beijing could exploit next are not necessarily the ones already on a restricted list.
There’s a third piece that is as important as the crackdown on waivers: a reinforcement of other minerals policies. The order exempts sourcing through Project Vault and any project financed or backed by EXIM, DFC, the Pentagon, the Departments of Commerce, Energy, etc. The purpose here is to marry defense procurement with the billions Washington has spent developing alternative critical minerals projects abroad and at home. None of that government spending matters if defense contractors have no reason to buy from the producers it created. Success of domestic critical minerals projects begins and ends with demand, and this order is the clearest signal yet that federally backed supply and Pentagon demand are meant to connect.
The path towards compliance will be arduous. The regulations that will actually define “critical supply chain,” set the format of the bill of materials and determine how the Pentagon weighs a mapping exercise against a waiver request are still 90 to 180 days out. Getting them right means they need to be workable for small businesses and new entrants, not just the largest prime — and the Pentagon will need to actually use its new enforcement tools to move the ball forward.
Still, the direction is correct. Combined with the government’s growing willingness to underwrite domestic production, this order treats critical minerals the way the Pentagon treats every other input to military readiness: as something too important to leave to chance, or to a waiver.
Abigail Hunter is Executive Director of SAFE’s Center for Critical Minerals Strategy. SAFE is a nonpartisan energy security and national security organization based in Washington.

Topics: 

• China  
• critical minerals  
• EO 14415  
• executive order  
• Op-Ed Commentary