우크라이나 국방장관 해임을 둘러싼 갈등들

[위종민]

2026년 1월 취임한 미하일로 페도로우 우크라이나 국방장관이 최근 해임됐는데,군 효율성 강화를 위한 개혁 와중에 올렉산드르 시르스키 총사령관과 충돌이 있었나 봅니다. 젤렌스키 대통령은 페도로우 국방장관을 해임하면서도 후임자가 그의 개혁을 이어가야 한다는 애매한 스탠스를 취했네요.  

우크라이나 국방장관 해임

잭 와틀링 박사

2026년 7월 21일

읽는 데 5분

장관들의 모임: 미하일로 페도로우(왼쪽에서 두 번째)가 당시 영국 국방장관 존 힐리, 독일 국방장관 보리스 피스토리우스, NATO 사무총장 마르크 뤼터와 함께 서 있다. 사진: 제바스티안 골/알라미

페도로우의 해임으로 국방부와 총참모부 사이의 핵심 쟁점들은 해결되지 않은 채 남게 됐다.

우크라이나 국방장관 미하일로 페도로우의 해임은 전국적인 시위를 촉발했다. 볼로디미르 젤렌스키 대통령은 처음에는 이를 페도로우와 우크라이나군 총사령관 올렉산드르 시르스키 장군 사이의 개인적 충돌에서 비롯된 결과로 설명했다. 그러나 실제로 이 정치적 위기는 우크라이나의 향후 전쟁수행 방식과 우크라이나 국가의 성격을 둘러싼 본질적인 논쟁에 걸쳐 있다. 페도로우의 해임으로 이 논쟁이 끝나지는 않을 것이다. 그러나 우크라이나 시민사회가 이를 끝낼 수는 있다.

개혁과 전력 발전

페도로우가 2026년 1월 국방부 장관으로 임명됐을 때, 그는 우크라이나 방어군이 직면한 문제에 결코 낯선 인물이 아니었다. 이전에 제1부총리 겸 디지털전환부 장관으로 재직하면서 그는 우크라이나의 무인기 생산 및 운용 확대, 표적 우선순위를 정하기 위한 인센티브 체계 활용, 그리고 우크라이나군이 러시아군에 지속적이고 막대한 손실을 입힐 수 있도록 뒷받침한 병력의 디지털 네트워크화를 감독했다. 최고통수기구인 스타브카의 일원으로서 그는 또한 신병을 보병으로 충분히 전환하지 못하는 문제, 작전을 계획하고 실행할 수 있는 규모의 한계, 더 큰 적을 상대로 기술적 우위를 유지해야 하는 절박한 필요성 등 군이 받고 있는 압박을 뚜렷하게 인식하고 있었다.

따라서 페도로우는 계획을 갖고 국방부에 들어왔고, 의회로부터 부여받은 권한을 바탕으로 이를 공격적으로 실행하기 시작했다. 우크라이나 부대들의 성과를 초기 감사한 뒤, 그는 우크라이나의 120개 여단 가운데 약 6분의 1이 부실한 지휘로 인해 불균형적으로 큰 문제를 겪고 있으며, 그 결과 전장에서 지속적으로 저조한 성과를 보이고 있다고 결론 내렸다. 이에 그는 성과가 개선될 가능성이 낮은 부대의 손실을 보충하기 위해 신병을 계속 투입하는 대신, 이들 여단을 통합하고 병력을 지휘는 우수하지만 만성적으로 인력이 부족한 부대로 재배치하자고 제안했다.

2014년 존엄의 혁명의 목표가 민주주의에 힘을 부여하고 유럽 통합을 향한 진로를 설정하는 것이었다면, 군에 대한 문민통제는 우크라이나가 얼마나 진전했는지를 보여주는 중요한 척도다.

또 다른 과제는 병력 교대였다. 페도로우는 훈련 과정에서 병력 잔류율을 높여 인력 부족을 완화하려면 복무 경험이 개선돼야 한다고 판단했다. 우크라이나군 감찰총감은 병력을 40일 이내에 교대시켜야 한다고 결론 내렸지만, 우크라이나 여단장들은 교대를 수행할 자산도, 안전하게 교대할 조건을 조성할 화력도 부족했다. 그 결과 병사들이 한 번에 최대 200일까지 전투지역에 머무는 일이 발생했다. 이를 해결하기 위해 페도로우는 육군 군단을 강화하고, 각 군단에 일관된 예하부대 구성을 부여해 자원을 집중하고 담당 구역에서 병력 교대를 시행할 수 있도록 하려 했다. 그가 취임했을 당시 우크라이나 군단의 예하 여단들은 서로 이어지지 않은 전선 지역에 흩어져 있었고, 이는 지휘를 극도로 복잡하게 만들었다. 페도로우는 한 군단을 구성하는 여단들을 같은 지역에 배치하고자 했다. 우크라이나 방어를 더 지속 가능하게 만들기 위한 또 다른 노력은 기술을 통해 우크라이나군의 인명손실을 줄이는 것이었다. 이를 위해 페도로우는 새로운 방식으로 기술을 가장 잘 활용해 더 적은 비용으로 전투 임무를 수행하는 지휘관들을 찾아내고, 이들에게 인력과 장비를 제공해 권한을 강화하고자 했다.

그는 전력구조와 전투방식에 관한 그 밖의 수많은 변화도 추진하려 했지만, 국방부가 이러한 개혁을 시행하려 하자 일정한 양상이 나타나기 시작했다. 국방부가 여단을 통합하라고 지시하자 시르스키 장군은 3개의 여단을 추가 창설했다. 국방부가 우크라이나 군단을 통합하라고 지시하자 시르스키는 우크라이나의 최정예 부대 여러 곳을 전선 양끝으로 나눠 배치했다. 상황이 심각해진 시점은 페도로우의 팀이 기술적으로 혁신적인 부대에 자원을 지원하려 했지만, 인력이 제425강습연대에 우선 배정되고 있다는 사실을 발견했을 때였다. 이 연대는 인명 중심의 고손실 공격을 계속했고 자체 병력을 학대했다는 비난을 받는 한편, 페도로우가 지원하려 했던 혁신적 부대 지휘관들에게서 지원 장비를 빼앗아갔다. 유능하고 혁신적인 지휘관들을 식별하려던 페도로우의 시도가 오히려 군 수뇌부에 의해 바로 그 인물들의 권한을 약화시키는 결과로 이어질 것임이 분명해진 순간, 국방부와 총참모부 사이의 균열은 돌이킬 수 없게 됐다.

시르스키 장군의 관점에서 그는 지휘체계의 완전성을 지키고 있었다. 페도로우가 필수적인 개혁이라고 본 것을 시르스키는 조달에 집중해야 할 국방부가 총참모부와 군 수뇌부를 우회해 야전 개별부대를 직접 지휘하려는 권력 장악 시도로 인식했다. 페도로우의 입장에서는 혁신이 최전선에서 가장 빠르게 이루어지는 전쟁에서 조달을 전투 수행과 그렇게 쉽게 분리할 수 없었다. 양립할 수 없는 입장이 맞서자 모든 사안이 젤렌스키에게 올라가기 시작했다. 그는 이러한 상황이 지속될 수 없다고 판단했고 페도로우를 해임했다.

문민통제

젤렌스키가 논쟁의 본질에서도 시르스키 편을 들었다면, 그 결정은 인기가 없었겠지만 일관성은 있었을 것이다. 그러나 그는 그렇게 하지 않았다. 페도로우는 개혁을 실행하라는 권한을 부여받고 장관으로 의회의 승인을 받았으며, 젤렌스키는 후임자가 개혁을 계속해야 한다는 점을 분명히 했다. 가장 중요하고 논쟁적인 개혁은 우크라이나의 징병제도에 관한 것이었다.

현재 우크라이나 남성은 군에 의해 직접 징집될 수 있다. 지상군 부대들은 할당된 인원에 맞춰 징집 대상자를 찾아 구금하는 임무를 맡는다. 이는 매우 인기가 없는 제도로, 우크라이나 전역의 남성들이 가족의 미래를 확실히 계획할 수 없게 만든다. 이 과정은 좋지 않은 결과도 낳는다. 인구 전체로 보면 충분한 징집 기반이 있음에도 우크라이나 전선부대는 계속 인력 부족을 겪고 있다.

그러나 페도로우가 징집 문제를 검토했을 때 그는 사람들을 동원하는 방식에는 상당한 개선 여지가 있지만, 기존 제도가 거리에서 충분하고도 남는 인원을 데려오고 있다는 점을 확인했다. 이상적으로는 당사자들이 신변을 정리할 수 있도록 사전 통지를 하고, 정해진 제한된 기간 동안 징집하며, 징집을 회피하면 제재를 가하는 방식이 필요했다. 문제는 훈련과 인사관리, 부패로 인해 매달 동원된 인원 가운데 실제 전투부대에 도달하는 사람이 소수에 불과하다는 것이었다. 따라서 의회와 대통령으로부터 지시받은 동원제도 개혁은 군이 신병을 관리하고 훈련하는 방식을 바꾸지 않고서는 달성할 수 없었다. 이러한 상황에서 군 관리방식의 변경을 위해 국방부와 협력하기를 거부한 시르스키의 태도는 징병제 개혁을 실패하게 만들 것이었다.

이러한 역학은 갈등의 전체 맥락을 성격과 정책의 문제에서 원칙의 문제로 바꾼다. 2014년 존엄의 혁명의 목표가 민주주의에 힘을 부여하고 유럽 통합을 향한 진로를 설정하는 것이었다면, 군에 대한 문민통제는 우크라이나가 얼마나 진전했는지를 보여주는 중요한 척도다. 따라서 군이 개혁 의제를 실행하도록 대통령과 의회가 임명한 장관의 정책 지시를 거부한 것은 우크라이나의 전쟁수행과 저항이 기반하고 있는 전제 자체에 의문을 제기했다. 많은 우크라이나인이 두려워한 것은 페도로우의 후임자가 말로는 개혁을 이야기하더라도 실제로 실행하려 하면 시르스키와 똑같이 충돌할 것이고, 실행하지 않는다면 군이 문민 지도부에 정책을 지시하게 되리라는 점이었다. 이것이 페도로우를 옹호하며 시작된 시위가 빠르게 시르스키의 해임을 요구하는 움직임으로 변한 이유다. 우크라이나 사회는 페도로우의 기록을 통해 체계가 개선될 수 있다는 사실을 확인했기 때문이다.

이 과정의 비극은 우크라이나가 전술적으로 러시아에 막대한 압박을 가해 더 큰 우위를 확보할 기회를 만들어낸 바로 그 시점에 이러한 일이 벌어졌다는 데 있다. 이는 또한 혹독한 겨울과 러시아의 추가 동원 가능성을 앞두고 우크라이나의 방어력을 강화하는 진전을 마비시켰다. 전쟁을 성공적으로 끝낼 수 있다는 전망을 잠시 엿본 우크라이나 시민사회에, 엘리트들의 다툼으로 우크라이나의 희망이 질식할 수 있다는 두려움은 받아들일 수 없는 결과다. 따라서 2014년과 2022년의 경우처럼 다시 한번 시민사회가 우크라이나를 스스로로부터 구해야 한다.

© RUSI, 2026.

이 논평에 표현된 견해는 저자 개인의 것이며, RUSI나 다른 어떠한 기관의 입장도 대변하지 않는다.

The Dismissal of Ukraine's Defence Minister | Royal United Services Institute

The Dismissal of Ukraine's Defence Minister

The Dismissal of Ukraine's Defence Minister

Dr Jack Watling

21 July 20265 Minute Read

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Fedorov's removal leaves critical issues unresolved between the Defence Ministry and General Staff.

The removal of Ukrainian Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov sparked protests across the country. Initially presented by President Zelensky as the result of a personal clash between Fedorov and Ukraine’s Command-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrsky, the political crisis in fact straddles a substantive debate about the future of Ukraine’s way of war, and the character of the Ukrainian state. Fedorov’s dismissal will not settle that debate; but Ukrainian civil society might.

Reform and Force Development

When Fedorov was appointed to the Ministry of Defence in January 2026 he was far from a stranger to the issues facing Ukraine’s defenders. From his previous post as First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Digital Transformation he had overseen Ukraine’s scaling of UAV production and employment, the use of incentive structures to prioritise targeting, and the digital networking of its forces that has underpinned Ukraine’s ability to inflict sustained and heavy losses on the Russian military. As a member of Stavka he was also acutely aware of the strain the military was under, including an inadequate conversion of recruits into infantry, the limited scale at which operations could be planned and executed and the desperate need to retain the technological edge against a larger adversary.

Fedorov therefore arrived at the defence ministry with a plan and, armed with a mandate from Parliament, set about aggressively implementing it. After an initial audit of Ukrainian unit performance, he concluded that of Ukraine’s 120 brigades, around a sixth suffered disproportionately from poor leadership, leading to sustained underperformance on the battlefield. He therefore proposed to consolidate these brigades, reallocating their personnel to the better led units that were often chronically short of manpower, rather than having to push recruits to replace losses in units whose performance was unlikely to improve.

If the aim of the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 was to empower democracy and chart a course towards European integration, civilian control of the military is an important measure of Ukraine’s progress.

Another challenge was troop rotation. Fedorov reasoned that if retention during training was to improve – easing the shortage of manpower – then the experience of service had to rise. While Ukraine’s Inspector General of the Armed Forces concluded that troops should be rotated in less than 40 days, Ukrainian brigade commanders lacked the assets to rotate, or the firepower to create conditions where it was safe to do so, leaving soldiers in the combat area for up to 200 days at a time. To address this, Fedorov wanted to strengthen the Army Corps, giving them a consistent set of units under command so that they could group resources and establish a rotation in their sectors. When he came into office, Ukrainian corps had their subordinate brigades distributed along the front in non-contiguous geography, massively complicating command. Fedorov wanted to collocate a corps’ constituent brigades. A further line of effort in making Ukraine’s defence more sustainable was to reduce Ukrainian casualties through technology. To do this Fedorov wanted to identify those commanders who were best leveraging technology in new ways to carry out combat tasks at a lower cost, and to empower them with people and equipment.

There was a raft of other changes to how the force was structured and fought that he wanted to pursue, but as the Ministry set about trying to implement these reforms a pattern began to emerge. The Ministry directed that brigades be consolidated: General Syrskyi proceeded to establish three additional brigades. The Ministry directed the consolidation of Ukraine’s corps. Syrskyi took several of Ukraine’s best units and deployed them as a split formation across opposite ends of the front. The point at which things became dire was when Fedorov’s team started to try and resource technically innovative units, only to find that personnel were prioritised to 425 Assault Regiment, which persisted in human centric, high casualty attacks – accused of abuse of its own personnel – while stripping away supporting equipment from commanders of innovative formations that Fedorov had wanted to enable. At the point where it became clear that Fedorov’s desire to identify competent and innovative commanders would see those very individuals disempowered by the military leadership, the rift between the Ministry and General Staff became irreconcilable.

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From General Syrskyi’s point of view he was defending the integrity of the command system. What Fedorov saw as necessary reform, Syrskyi perceived as a Ministry that should be focussed on procurement making a power grab to directly command individual units in the field, bypassing the General Staff and military leadership. For Fedorov, procurement could not be so easily split off from the conduct of battle in a war where innovation was fastest at the edge. Faced with irreconcilable positions, everything began to be elevated to Zelensky. He determined that such a situation was unsustainable and so removed Fedorov.

Civilian Control

Had Zelensky also sided with Syrskyi on the substance of the arguments the move would have been unpopular yet coherent. But he did not. Fedorov had been voted in as Minister with a mandate to implement reforms and Zelensky was clear that the reforms should be continued by his successor. The most significant and contentious reform was of Ukraine’s conscription system.

At present Ukrainian men are liable to be conscripted directly by the military. Units of the Ground Forces are tasked with finding recruits against a quota and detaining them. It is a deeply unpopular system, leaving men across Ukraine with no certainty or ability to plan for their family. And the process leads to poor results. Ukrainian frontline units remain short of manpower, despite an adequate recruitment base in the population.

When Fedorov looked at the recruitment problem, however, he noted that while significant improvements could be made to how people were mobilised – ideally with notification in advance to settle their affairs, conscription for defined and limited period, and with enforcement if they evaded the draft – the existing system was bringing in more than enough people from the street. The problem was that training, personnel management, and corruption was seeing only a minority of those mobilised reach combat units each month. Fixing mobilisation, therefore, which he had been directed to do by the Parliament and the President, could only be achieved by making changes to how the force handled and trained recruits. In this context, Syrskyi’s refusal to work with the Ministry to change how the force was managed would make the reform of conscription fail.

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This dynamic shifts the entire context of the disagreement from one of personality and policy to a question of principle. If the aim of the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 was to empower democracy and chart a course towards European integration, civilian control of the military is an important measure of Ukraine’s progress. For the military to defy policy direction from a Minister appointed by the President and Parliament to implement a reform agenda therefore brought into question the premise of Ukraine’s war effort and resistance. The fear for many Ukrainians was that while rhetorically, Fedorov’s successor would speak of reform, if he tried to implement it, he would run into the same clash with Syrskyi, and if he did not then the military would be dictating policy to the civilian leadership. This is why protests that began in defence of Fedorov have rapidly turned to a demand for Syrskyi’s removal, because Ukrainian society can see from Fedorov’s record that the system can be improved.

The tragedy of this process is that it has unfolded just as Ukraine has put Russia under immense pressure tactically and thereby bought the opportunity to further gain the upper hand. It has also paralysed progress in bolstering Ukraine’s defences in the lead up to what is likely to be a harsh winter and a potential Russian mobilisation. For Ukraine’s civil society, having glimpsed the prospect of a successful conclusion of the war, the fear that Ukraine's hopes may be smothered by elite squabbling is an unacceptable outcome. And so once again it is civil society – as in 2014 and 2022 – that must save Ukraine from itself.

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