이란, 요르단의 공군기지를 공격해 A-10과 F-15 손상

[위종민]

9월 8일(미 동부시간 기준) 이란이 요르단의 무와파크 살티 공군기지를 탄도미사일로 공격해 A-10 1기가 날개에 심각한 손상을, F-15E 8대도 경미한 손상을 입었다고 하네요. 

중국의 상업위성이 공격 직후 촬영한 사진도 공개됐습니다. 이란이 중국에 BDA를 위탁하나 보네요. 

미 공군 A-10 선더볼트 II 공격기가 2026년 8월 30일 미 중부사령부 작전책임지역을 비행하고 있다. 미 공군 사진, 티파니 A. 에머리 기술하사

이란, 요르단 공군기지 미사일 공격으로 미군 A-10과 F-15 손상

2026년 9월 9일 | 크리스 고든

이란의 탄도미사일 공격으로 요르단의 핵심 미군 공군기지에 있던 여러 대의 미군 전투기가 손상됐다고 사안에 정통한 관계자들이 Air & Space Forces Magazine에 확인했다.

미 동부시간 기준 9월 8일 이란이 요르단 무와파크 살티 공군기지를 공격한 뒤 A-10 선더볼트 II 공격기 1대가 날개에 심각한 손상을 입었고, F-15E 스트라이크 이글 전투기 약 8대도 경미한 손상을 입었지만 운용 가능한 상태인 것으로 평가됐다.

미군 항공기 피해는 CBS 뉴스가 처음 보도했다.

미 중부사령부 대변인은 논평 요청에 즉시 응답하지 않았다.

MSAB로 알려진 이 기지에 대한 공격은 미국이 9월 8일 이란 유조선 5척을 타격한 뒤 발생했으며, 이란은 이에 대한 보복으로 해당 시설에 수십 발의 탄도미사일을 발사했다. 미국과 요르단군은 이란 미사일을 향해 수십 발의 요격미사일을 발사했다. 미국 당국자들은 미군 사망자는 없었다고 밝혔다. 그러나 이란은 미국의 군수자산에 피해를 줄 수 있었다. 공격 후 몇 시간 안에 이란 이슬람혁명수비대는 기지의 미군 항공기를 손상시켰다고 주장했다.

미군은 이 기지에서 수십 대의 군용기를 운용하고 있으며, 이곳은 이란을 상대로 한 작전의 핵심 공군력 거점 역할을 한다. 테헤란은 지난 2월 분쟁이 시작된 이후 요르단 아즈라크 인근에 있는 이 시설을 여러 차례 공격했다. 지난 7월에는 이 기지에 대한 미사일 공격으로 미 육군 병사 3명이 사망했다.

중국 위성영상, 요르단 미군기지에 대한 치명적인 이란 공격과 연계된 것으로 알려져

이란이 무와파크 살티 공군기지를 치명적으로 공격하기 전후에 중국 측으로부터 확보한 것으로 알려진 고해상도 영상은 상업용 우주정보, 정밀미사일전, 미중 경쟁이 새롭게 교차하는 지점을 드러내고 있다.

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작성자: admin
2026년 9월 13일

이란의 미사일 발사

(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — 이란이 7월 17일 무와파크 살티 공군기지를 치명적으로 탄도미사일로 공격하기 전후에 중국의 고해상도 위성영상을 확보한 것으로 알려지면서, 상업용 우주감시 능력이 배치된 미군을 상대하는 결정적인 표적획득 수단으로 변모했을 가능성이 제기되고 있다.

익명을 요구한 미국 당국자들은 이번 영상 관련 정황을 중국계 주체에서 비롯된 지원이 전장에서 치명적인 결과를 초래했다는 가장 명확한 증거라고 설명했다. 그러나 워싱턴은 관련 공급자를 특정하지 않았으며, 영상 이전 경로를 입증하는 과학수사 증거도 공개하지 않았다.

이 공격으로 타일러 제임스 피한 중위, 이사벨라 곤잘레스 이병, 앤젤 S. 램퍼새드 병장이 사망했다. 이로 인해 이번 공격은 단순히 대량의 미사일을 발사했지만 실패한 또 하나의 이란 공격이 아니라, 미국의 다층 방공망을 뚫은 전략적으로 중대한 사건이 됐다.

암만에서 동쪽으로 약 80~100km 떨어진 아즈라크 인근에 있는 무와파크 살티 기지는 미국의 전투기, 정보자산, 방공전력을 지원한다. 따라서 이란 입장에서는 이 기지를 마비시킬 경우 역내 출격 능력과 방공범위를 약화시킬 수 있는 집중된 표적이 된다.

이란은 약 24시간 안에 세 차례 공격을 실시하면서 탄도미사일과 일회용 공격 드론을 함께 사용했다. 이는 요르단 기지 주변의 센서, 요격체계, 지휘망, 인원 보호절차에 과부하를 주기 위한 다방향 돌파 문제를 만들어내려는 것이었다.

요르단 무와파크 살티 공군기지의 위성사진

마코 루비오 국무장관은 미국과 파트너 전력이 접근하는 거의 모든 미사일을 요격했지만 “한 발이 빠져나갔다”고 인정했다. 이는 전반적으로 높은 요격률을 기록하더라도 단 한 발의 성공적인 돌파가 인명피해를 발생시킬 수 있음을 보여준다.

보도된 중국 위성영상은 이란이 항공기 주기 위치, 격납고, 컨테이너형 숙소, 지원 기반시설을 구별할 수 있게 해줬을 것이며, 위성수집에서 표적 선정, 공격계획, 공격 후 전투피해평가로 이어지는 정보주기를 단축시켰을 가능성이 있다.

그러나 미국 당국자들은 중국 정부가 영상 이전을 지시했다고 비난하지는 않았다. 따라서 이번 사건이 국가 주도의 지원이었는지, 상업적으로 공급된 지리공간정보였는지, 제3자를 통한 구매였는지, 또는 중국 위성기업의 독립적인 활동이었는지는 여전히 밝혀지지 않았다.

중국은 자국 기업이 이란의 표적획득에 관여했다는 의혹을 부인했다. 중국대사관 대변인 류창은 익명의 비판자들이 “악의적으로 다른 국가들을 연계하고 비방하고 있다”고 주장하며, 중국과 이란의 협력은 국제법에 부합한다고 밝혔다.

이번 논쟁은 이중용도 상업위성 군집이 민간 관측과 군사정보 사이의 전통적인 경계를 어떻게 약화시키고 있는지를 보여준다. 이로 인해 지역 강국들은 정교한 자체 정찰위성을 운용하거나 공식적인 국가 지원을 받지 않고도 표적획득에 사용할 수 있는 수준의 데이터를 확보할 수 있게 됐다.

미국의 군사기획자들에게 이번 치명적인 공격은 확대되고 있는 전력보호 문제를 드러낸다. 강화 항공기 격납고, 분산된 숙소, 기동식 방공체계, 기만조치는 이제 미사일, 드론, 전자감시뿐 아니라 지속적인 궤도 감시에도 대응해야 한다.

워싱턴과 베이징에게도 이번 의혹은 9월 24일로 예정된 정상회담을 앞두고 불안정한 군사정보 갈등을 제기한다. 전략적 안정화를 위한 시도와 중국의 상업적 우주능력이 이란이 미군을 살해하는 데 도움을 줬다는 증거가 충돌할 수 있기 때문이다.

위성정보가 이란의 공격을 어떻게 형성했을 수 있는가

공격 이전에 제공된 것으로 알려진 영상은 정기적으로 인원이 머무는 숙소 건물, 항공기 운용구역, 방어 진지, 군수집결지를 식별함으로써 표적 개발을 지원했을 수 있다. 이러한 시설의 파괴는 작전적·정치적으로 불균형하게 큰 결과를 초래할 수 있다.

이전 공격 이후 촬영된 영상은 어떤 미사일이 방공망을 돌파했는지, 어떤 시설이 여전히 작동하고 있는지, 미국이 살아남은 자산을 어디로 이동시켰는지를 보여줄 수 있었다. 이는 이란의 기획자들이 효과가 없었던 기존 표적을 반복 공격하는 대신 후속 조준점을 수정할 수 있도록 해줬을 것이다.

이러한 정보상의 이점을 얻기 위해 반드시 지속적인 실시간 감시가 필요한 것은 아니다. 고정시설은 관측 가능한 일상적 패턴을 보이며, 반복적인 위성 통과를 통해 건설 활동, 방어전력 배치, 주기된 항공기, 분산·증원·긴급복구를 나타내는 변화 등을 기록할 수 있기 때문이다.

세 번째이자 치명적인 미사일은 인원들이 잠든 상태에서 컨테이너형 숙소를 타격한 것으로 알려졌다. 이는 정밀한 표적획득, 작전적 숙지 또는 우연한 일치를 의미할 수 있지만, 현재 공개된 정보로는 위성영상이 선택된 탄착지점에 정확히 어떤 영향을 미쳤는지 확인할 수 없다.

첫 번째 공격에서는 파편이 기지 체육관으로 날아들었고 경보가 발령되면서 대부분의 인원이 벙커로 이동했다. 두 번째 미사일은 비어 있는 항공기 격납고를 타격했으며, 이후 치명적인 공격은 보호경보와 대피시설 접근절차의 취약성을 드러냈다.

이러한 타격들은 탄도미사일 공격이 기지를 상호 연결된 하나의 체계로 보고 공격할 수 있음을 보여준다. 대부분의 접근 무기가 성공적으로 탐지·요격되더라도 항공기, 숙소, 정비능력, 방어태세 모두가 위협받을 수 있다.

해상도가 약 0.5m에 이르는 것으로 알려진 고해상도 영상은 항공기 크기의 물체와 주요 기반시설을 식별할 수 있으며, 약 5m 해상도의 이란 누르 위성과 비교하면 정보능력이 크게 향상된다. 또한 미사일 공격 이후 보다 신뢰할 수 있는 전투피해평가도 가능하게 한다.

작전적 중요성은 센서에서 사수까지 이어지는 절차가 단축된다는 데 있다. 외부 영상은 불확실성을 줄이고, 제한된 장거리 무기를 절약하며, 이미 파괴됐거나 버려진 시설 대신 살아남은 시설을 후속 일제사격의 표적으로 지정할 수 있게 한다.

이란은 서로 다른 날짜의 지리공간정보를 비교해 방어태세 변화와 어떤 작전구역이 우선적으로 복구됐는지를 파악할 수도 있다. 다만 이러한 분석 역시 정확한 판독, 적시성 있는 전달, 신뢰할 수 있는 타격조정에 의존한다.

따라서 핵심 쟁점은 위성이 개별 미사일 한 발을 직접 유도했느냐가 아니라, 상업 정찰정보가 이란의 작전 수준 의사결정을 충분히 개선해 반복적인 공격을 더 선별적이고 경제적이며 작전적으로 파괴적인 형태로 만들었느냐는 것이다.

요르단의 미군기지

TEE-01B와 확대되는 이란의 우주기반 표적획득 능력

이란 혁명수비대 항공우주군은 2024년 말 중국의 지구관측위성 TEE-01B를 이른바 ‘궤도상 인도’ 방식으로 획득한 것으로 알려졌다. 이는 발사 이후 위성 통제권을 이전하는 방식으로, 전통적인 군사위성 수출에서 나타나는 외형적 특성을 피할 수 있다.

약 3,700만 달러 규모로 알려진 이 계약은 동등한 정찰 프로그램을 국내에서 독자 개발할 때 필요한 비용과 기반시설, 기술적 위험을 고려하면 비교적 저렴한 비용으로 주권적 정보·감시·정찰 능력을 확보할 수 있는 경로가 된다.

유출된 것으로 알려진 이란의 임무지시 기록과 영상, 궤도 분석에 따르면 TEE-01B는 2026년 3월 이란의 군사작전 전후에 프린스 술탄 공군기지, 무와파크 살티, 바레인, 아르빌 주변의 미국 및 동맹국 시설을 관측한 것으로 나타났다.

이 위성은 Earth Eye와 연계된 것으로 알려졌으며 일부 보도는 위성 버스가 Chang Guang과 관련 있다고 전했다. 그러나 기업 관련 정보가 서로 충돌하고 공개된 계약문서도 없기 때문에 기술적·조직적 책임을 특정할 때는 신중할 필요가 있다.

이란은 베이징 소재 Emposat이 운영하는 상업용 지상국을 이용할 수 있었던 것으로 알려졌다. 이는 보다 광범위한 지리적 네트워크를 통해 위성 임무지시와 데이터 하향전송을 지원할 수 있었지만, 해당 회사는 군사조직이 자사 서비스를 사용하고 있다는 사실을 몰랐다고 부인했다.

사실이라면 이러한 구조는 이란에 단일 궤도 센서 이상의 능력을 제공한다. 전 세계에 분산된 지상 기반시설을 활용하면 지휘 대응성을 높이고 데이터 전달 지연을 줄이며 중동 전역의 지리적으로 분산된 작전에서 접근성을 강화할 수 있기 때문이다.

TEE-01B는 3월 13일부터 15일까지 프린스 술탄 공군기지 상공을 관측하도록 임무가 부여된 것으로 알려졌다. 이 기간에는 3월 14일 이란의 공격으로 미국 공중급유기 5대가 손상된 것으로 알려진 사건도 포함되며, 이는 공중급유기가 고가치 작전표적임을 보여준다.

공중급유기를 공격하는 것은 전투공군력을 유지하는 군수구조 자체를 공격하는 것이다. 급유기를 파괴하거나 분산시키면 전투기의 체공시간을 줄이고 장거리 타격 선택지를 제한하며, 더 적고 더 멀리 떨어진 작전기지에 대한 의존도를 높일 수 있기 때문이다.

그럼에도 위성 궤도가 특정 시점에 해당 지역을 통과했다는 사실만으로 특정 영상이 특정 공격을 지시했다고 입증할 수는 없다. 날씨, 재방문 주기, 위장, 분석 오류, 전송 지연 등은 비교적 고해상도인 상업위성 영상조차 군사적 활용가치를 떨어뜨릴 수 있다.

따라서 전략적 변화는 여러 요소의 결합에서 발생한다. 이란의 미사일과 드론, 외부 위성영상, 상업용 지상국, 공격 후 분석이 결합되면 각각의 구성요소를 따로 봤을 때보다 훨씬 강력한 정찰-타격 복합체를 만들어낼 수 있다.

무와파크 살티, 집중된 미군전력의 취약성 드러내

무와파크 살티는 F-15, F-16, F-35, A-10, MQ-9 리퍼와 방공체계를 수용하거나 지원하며, 중요한 전투거점인 동시에 작전적으로 중요한 표적들이 집중된 매력적인 공격목표이기도 하다.

미국이 이 기지를 보다 영구적인 시설로 확장하면서 역내 전력투사 능력은 강화됐지만, 동시에 격납고, 숙소, 정비구역, 연료 기반시설, 통신노드, 항공기 지원구역 등 눈에 띄는 군수 흔적도 확대됐다.

이란의 반복적인 표적공격은 단 한 차례의 극적인 타격으로 기지를 완전히 무력화하는 것에만 의존하기보다, 누적적인 혼란을 일으키고 항공기 분산을 강요하며 요격미사일 비축량을 소모시키려는 작전전략을 보여준다.

7월 9일 약 8~10발의 미사일을 사용한 앞선 일제사격은 대부분 요격돼 사망자가 발생하지 않았지만, 7월 17일 공격은 반복적인 일제사격이 결국 방어망의 틈이나 절차적 취약성, 또는 단순한 확률을 이용할 수 있음을 보여줬다.

이러한 비용 교환구조는 상대적으로 제한된 수의 미사일이나 드론이 방어 측에 여러 발의 고성능 요격미사일 발사, 지속적인 레이더 감시, 반복적인 인원 대피를 강요할 수 있을 때 지속적으로 공격하는 쪽에 유리하다. 실제 물리적 피해가 제한되더라도 마찬가지다.

치명적인 공격은 전력보호가 항공기 방어에만 국한되지 않는다는 점도 보여준다. 숙소 구역, 체육관, 조립식 건물 등은 그 안에 집중된 인원이 공중작전과 방공임무를 유지하는 데 필요할 경우 군사적으로 중요한 표적이 될 수 있다.

항공기와 인원을 분산하면 취약성을 줄일 수 있지만, 동시에 방어구역이 넓어지고 수송 요구가 증가하며 정비가 복잡해지고 추가적인 통신 의존성이 발생한다. 즉 표적 집중에서 발생하는 위험이 군수·지휘 복잡성의 위험으로 전환된다.

대피시설과 숙소를 강화하면 생존성을 높일 수 있지만 건설비가 많이 들고 지리적으로 눈에 띄며, 지속적인 상업위성 관측을 통해 표적좌표가 갱신될 수 있는 점점 더 정밀한 무기에 취약할 수 있다.

따라서 기만, 위장, 신속한 이동은 미사일 방어를 보완하는 필수 요소가 된다. 적이 고정된 역내 시설을 상대로 반복적인 일제사격, 표적 수정, 외부정보를 결합하는 상황에서는 요격체계만으로 보호를 보장할 수 없기 때문이다.

따라서 무와파크 살티는 미국의 전력태세 전반에 더 광범위한 경고를 제공한다. 자유로운 작전환경에서 효율성을 극대화하도록 설계된 기지는 적이 장거리 정밀무기와 저가 드론, 준상업적 지리공간정보 접근능력을 갖춘 상황에서는 오히려 부담이 될 수 있다.

제재, 상업 우주정보를 둘러싼 더 광범위한 경쟁 드러내

워싱턴은 5월 8일 MizarVision, Earth Eye, Chang Guang에 제재를 부과하면서 이 중국 기업들이 2026년 분쟁 중 미국과 동맹국의 군사활동을 이란이 관측하도록 지원하는 영상을 수집·공개하거나 제공했다고 주장했다.

MizarVision은 상업적으로 획득한 영상과 인공지능을 이용해 항공기와 항공모함을 포함한 군사적 특징을 식별했다는 비난을 받았다. 이는 자동화된 분석기술이 광범위하게 이용 가능한 사진을 산업적 속도로 작전적 가치가 있는 정보로 변환할 수 있음을 보여준다.

Earth Eye는 이란에 위성영상을 직접 제공했다는 의혹을 받았고, Chang Guang은 이란의 요구에 따라 미국 및 동맹국 시설을 촬영한 것으로 알려졌다. 그러나 중국은 이러한 주장을 부인하며 이를 입증할 증거를 요구했다.

Chang Guang은 이전에도 미국의 제재를 받은 바 있으며, 자사 위성영상이 홍해에서 미국 자산에 대한 후티의 작전을 지원했다는 의혹도 받았다. 과거 보도에서는 이 회사의 위성영상 상품이 러시아 바그너그룹과 연계됐다는 주장도 제기됐다.

이러한 의혹은 상업 우주기업들이 직접 무기를 발사하지 않고도 여러 전구에서 간접적인 참가자가 될 수 있음을 보여준다. 이들의 영상은 멀리 떨어진 군사고객에게 표적 발견, 항로 분석, 전투피해평가, 작전선전 등에 사용될 수 있기 때문이다.

미국의 위성영상 제공업체들은 워싱턴의 요청 이후 중동 분쟁지역에 대한 영상 공개를 제한한 것으로 알려졌지만, 이러한 제한만으로는 외국 위성군집과 중개업체, 분석회사, 전 세계에 분산된 지상국으로 구성된 국제시장을 통제할 수 없다.

따라서 일방적인 통제는 수요를 미국의 관할권 밖에서 활동하는 업체들로 이동시킬 수 있으며, 이는 반도체, 드론 부품, 기타 전략적으로 민감한 이중용도 기술에서 나타나는 수출통제 우회와 비슷한 정보차단 문제를 만들어낸다.

상업용 영상은 책임소재 규명도 복잡하게 만든다. 군사고객이 중개업체를 통해 데이터를 구매하거나 공개된 영상을 이용하거나 여러 공급자의 자료를 결합할 수 있기 때문에 특정 정부가 특정 군사작전을 의도적으로 지원했는지 판단하기 어려워진다.

제재는 금융, 상업협력, 시장 접근을 제한할 수 있지만 억제 효과는 제재 대상 기업이 서방 시장 접근을 계약, 정치적 보호, 대체 기술 생태계에서 증가하는 수요보다 더 중요하게 평가하느냐에 달려 있다.

따라서 경쟁은 정찰위성 자체의 소유를 넘어 지리공간정보 공급망 전체의 통제 문제로 확대되고 있다. 여기에는 임무 요청, 궤도상 수집, 지상국 접근, 인공지능 분석, 유통경로, 최종사용자 확인 등이 모두 포함된다.

트럼프-시진핑 정상회담, 치명적인 정보 갈등에 직면

위성영상 관련 의혹은 도널드 트럼프 대통령과 시진핑 중국 국가주석이 9월 24일 백악관에서 만나기로 한 시점보다 2주도 채 남지 않은 상황에서 제기됐다. 이에 따라 전장정보 문제가 정상급 양국관계 안정화 노력에 복잡한 변수가 될 가능성이 있다.

워싱턴과 베이징은 무역, 대만, 인공지능, 희토류, 펜타닐, 역내 안보에 관한 전략대화를 추진하는 동시에 중국의 상업기술이 미국군을 상대로 한 이란의 작전능력을 실질적으로 강화했다는 의혹과 마주하고 있다.

트럼프는 앞서 시진핑이 전쟁 종식과 호르무즈해협 재개방을 지원하겠다고 제안했으며, 중국이 이란에 군사장비를 제공하지 않을 것이라고도 주장했다. 중국 당국은 이와 동일한 표현으로 이를 공개 확인하지는 않았다.

위성영상은 이러한 보장 범위 안에서 모호한 범주에 속한다. 상업적으로 구매할 수 있고 기술적으로 이중용도이며 비운동성 수단이지만, 표적 개발에 이용될 경우 전통적인 군사장비만큼 치명적인 결과를 낳을 수 있기 때문이다.

미국 당국은 중국 측에 여러 차례 우려를 제기한 것으로 알려졌지만, 베이징 지도부가 영상 이전을 지시했다고 비난하는 것은 피했다. 이는 외교적 여지를 유지하면서 미국이 이란의 작전을 가능하게 했다고 판단하는 기업들에 대한 압박을 지속하기 위한 것이었다.

이러한 구분은 즉각적인 긴장 고조를 제한할 수 있지만 동시에 정책적 딜레마를 드러낸다. 중국은 정부 차원의 책임을 부인할 수 있지만 중국 관할권 내 상업기업들이 미국의 군사기획자들이 일반적인 민간 서비스가 아니라 작전정보로 간주하는 능력을 계속 제공할 수 있기 때문이다.

베이징은 이란과의 협력이 합법적이라고 주장하고 중국을 전쟁에 연루시키려는 시도를 거부하고 있으며, 무와파크 살티 공격과 연관된 표적획득 수준의 영상을 중국 기업들이 공급했다고 공개적으로 인정하지 않았다.

한편 워싱턴도 해당 영상의 정체, 공급업체, 임무 요청, 전달방식, 해당 데이터를 7월 17일 공격의 작전 표적결정에 활용한 이란 부대를 특정하는 공개적인 과학수사 증거를 제시하지 않았다.

이러한 증거의 공백 때문에 양측의 주장 모두에 동일한 수준의 회의적 검토가 필요하다. 미국 당국이 공개할 수 없는 기밀정보를 보유하고 있을 수도 있지만, 중국의 부인 역시 중국 관할 기업들이 군사적으로 유용한 데이터를 제공하지 않았음을 독립적으로 입증하지는 못한다.

궁극적으로 무와파크 살티 사건은 미래의 강대국 경쟁이 상업위성군집, 부인 가능한 데이터 이전, 파트너를 통한 표적획득을 통해 점점 더 전개될 것임을 보여준다. 이는 중립성의 경계를 흐리는 동시에 군수시설의 흔적과 고정된 전력태세를 점점 더 보호하기 어렵게 만들고 있다.

Iran Damages US A-10, F-15s with Missile Attack on Air Base in Jordan

A U.S. Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft flies in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility Aug. 30, 2026. U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Tiffany A. Emery

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Iran Damages US A-10, F-15s with Missile Attack on Air Base in Jordan

Sept. 9, 2026 | By Chris Gordon

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An Iranian ballistic missile attack on a key U.S. air base in Jordan damaged multiple U.S. warplanes, people familiar with the matter confirmed to Air & Space Forces Magazine.

One A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft suffered a severely damaged wing and about eight F-15E Strike Eagle fighters were lightly damaged but are considered serviceable after Iran attacked Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan on Sept. 8 Eastern Time.

The damage to U.S. aircraft was first reported by CBS News.

A spokesman for U.S. Central Command did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The attack on the base, known as MSAB, came after the U.S. struck five Iranian tankers Sept. 8, and Iran retaliated by lobbing scores of ballistic missiles at the installation. U.S. and Jordanian forces launched dozens of interceptors at the Iranian missiles. U.S. officials said no American personnel were killed. But Iran was able to harm American materiel. In the hours after the attack, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed it damaged U.S. aircraft at the base.

The U.S. has dozens of warplanes operating from the base, which acts as a key airpower hub for operations against Iran. Tehran has targeted the facility, near the Jordanian town of Azraq, numerous times since the conflict began in February. Three Army Soldiers were killed in a missile attack on the base in July.

Chinese Satellite Imagery Linked to Deadly Iran Strike on US Base in Jordan - Defence Security Asia

Chinese Satellite Imagery Linked to Deadly Iran Strike on US Base in JordanHigh-resolution imagery allegedly obtained from Chinese entities before and after Iran’s deadly attack on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base exposes a new intersection between commercial space intelligence, precision missile warfare and US-China rivalry.

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By admin On Sep 13, 2026

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(DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA) — Iran reportedly obtained high-resolution Chinese satellite imagery before and after its deadly July 17 ballistic-missile strike on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, potentially transforming commercial space surveillance into a decisive targeting instrument against deployed United States forces.

Unnamed American officials described the imagery connection as the clearest evidence that support originating from Chinese entities produced lethal battlefield consequences, although Washington has neither identified the suppliers involved nor publicly released forensic evidence establishing the transfer chain.

The attack killed First Lieutenant Tyler James Feehan, Private Isabella Gonzales and Sergeant Angel S. Rampersad, making the strike a strategically consequential breach of layered United States air defences rather than another unsuccessful Iranian demonstration of missile volume.

Muwaffaq Salti, located near Azraq approximately 80–100 kilometres east of Amman, supports American combat aircraft, intelligence platforms and air-defence forces, giving Iran a concentrated target whose disruption could weaken regional sortie generation and defensive coverage.

Iran employed ballistic missiles and one-way attack drones during three strikes conducted within approximately 24 hours, creating a multidirectional penetration problem intended to overload sensors, interceptors, command networks and personnel-protection procedures surrounding the Jordanian installation.

Satellite image of Muwaffaq Al Salti air base in Jordan

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said United States and partner forces intercepted almost every incoming missile but acknowledged that “one leaked through,” illustrating how a single successful penetration can impose casualties despite an otherwise high defensive interception rate.

The reported Chinese imagery would have enabled Iran to distinguish aircraft parking positions, hangars, containerized housing units and support infrastructure, shortening the intelligence cycle between satellite collection, target selection, strike planning and post-attack battle-damage assessment.

However, American officials did not accuse China’s government of ordering the imagery transfer, leaving unresolved whether the episode represented state-directed assistance, commercially supplied geospatial intelligence, third-party acquisition or independent activity by Chinese satellite companies.

Beijing rejected allegations linking Chinese enterprises to Iranian targeting, while Chinese Embassy spokesperson Liu Chang accused unnamed critics of “maliciously linking and smearing other countries” and maintained that China’s cooperation with Iran complied with international law.

The dispute demonstrates how dual-use commercial satellite constellations are eroding traditional distinctions between civilian observation and military intelligence, allowing regional powers to acquire targeting-quality data without operating sophisticated indigenous reconnaissance satellites or receiving acknowledged state assistance.

For United States planners, the deadly strike exposes a widening force-protection problem because hardened aircraft shelters, dispersed accommodation, mobile air defences and deception measures must now counter persistent orbital observation alongside missiles, drones and electronic surveillance.

For Washington and Beijing, the allegation also introduces a volatile military-intelligence dispute before their planned September 24 summit, where strategic stabilization could collide with evidence that commercially available Chinese space capabilities allegedly helped Iran kill American soldiers.

(CLICK HERE): [VIDEO] Iran Draws First American Blood in Jordan: Ballistic Missiles Kill 2 US Troops, One Missing as Middle East War EscalatesHow Satellite Intelligence Could Have Shaped the Iranian Strike

The reported provision of imagery before the attack could have supported target development by identifying regularly occupied accommodation blocks, aircraft operating areas, defensive positions and logistical concentrations whose destruction would generate disproportionate operational and political consequences.

Imagery collected after earlier attacks could then have revealed which missiles penetrated, which structures remained functional and where United States forces relocated surviving assets, enabling Iranian planners to refine subsequent aimpoints instead of repeating ineffective targeting patterns.

This intelligence advantage would not require continuous real-time surveillance because fixed installations exhibit observable routines, while repeated satellite passes can document construction, defensive deployments, parked aircraft and changes indicating dispersal, reinforcement or emergency repair activity.

The third and fatal missile reportedly struck containerized housing units while personnel were sleeping, suggesting either accurate targeting, operational familiarity or chance convergence, although the available information cannot establish precisely how satellite imagery influenced the selected impact point.

A first strike sent debris into the base gym and triggered warnings that moved most personnel toward bunkers, while a second missile struck an empty aircraft hangar before the deadly impact exposed vulnerabilities within protective-alert and shelter-access arrangements.

Together, these impacts demonstrate how ballistic-missile attacks can target an installation as an interconnected system, threatening aircraft, accommodation, maintenance capacity and defensive readiness even when most incoming weapons are successfully detected and intercepted.

High-resolution imagery reportedly approaching 0.5-metre resolution could distinguish aircraft-sized objects and major infrastructure, representing a substantial intelligence improvement over Iran’s approximately five-metre-resolution Noor satellites and enabling more credible battle-damage assessments after missile attacks.

The operational significance lies in compression of the sensor-to-shooter sequence, because external imagery can reduce uncertainty, conserve limited long-range weapons and direct successive salvos toward surviving facilities rather than already destroyed or abandoned structures.

Iran could also use geospatial intelligence to compare imagery across different dates, identify defensive adaptation and estimate which operational sectors received priority repairs, although such analysis would still depend upon accurate interpretation, timely delivery and reliable strike coordination.

Consequently, the central issue is not whether a satellite directly guided an individual missile, but whether commercial reconnaissance improved Iran’s campaign-level decisions sufficiently to make repeated attacks more selective, economical and operationally disruptive.

U.S base in JordanTEE-01B and Iran’s Expanding Space-Based Targeting Capacity

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force reportedly acquired the Chinese Earth-observation satellite TEE-01B in late 2024 through an “in-orbit delivery,” transferring control after launch and avoiding the profile associated with a conventional military satellite export.

The reported agreement, valued at approximately $37 million, would represent a comparatively inexpensive pathway toward sovereign intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capacity when measured against the cost, infrastructure and technological risk of developing an equivalent reconnaissance programme domestically.

Leaked Iranian tasking records, imagery and orbital assessments reportedly indicated that TEE-01B observed United States and allied facilities around Prince Sultan Air Base, Muwaffaq Salti, Bahrain and Erbil before or after Iranian military operations in March 2026.

The satellite was reportedly connected to Earth Eye, while some accounts associated its bus with Chang Guang, but conflicting corporate details and the absence of publicly released contractual documentation require caution when assigning technical or organizational responsibility.

Iran allegedly obtained access to commercial ground stations operated by Beijing-based Emposat, which could have supported satellite tasking and data downlink across a wider geographic network, although the company denied knowing that military organizations were using its services.

If accurate, this architecture would provide Iran with more than a single orbital sensor because globally distributed ground infrastructure could improve command responsiveness, reduce data-delivery delays and strengthen access during geographically dispersed operations across the Middle East.

TEE-01B was reportedly tasked over Prince Sultan Air Base between March 13 and 15, encompassing an Iranian strike that allegedly damaged five United States refuelling aircraft on March 14 and highlighting aerial tankers as high-value operational targets.

Targeting refuelling aircraft would attack the logistics architecture sustaining combat airpower, because destroying or dispersing tankers can reduce fighter endurance, constrain long-range strike options and increase dependence upon fewer, more distant operating locations.

Nevertheless, orbital coincidence does not independently prove that particular imagery directed a particular attack, while weather, revisit timing, camouflage, analytical errors and transmission delays can reduce the military utility of even comparatively high-resolution commercial satellite products.

The strategic transformation therefore arises from aggregation: Iranian missiles, drones, external imagery, commercial ground stations and post-strike analysis can combine into a reconnaissance-strike complex more capable than any individual component would suggest in isolation.

Muwaffaq Salti Exposes the Vulnerability of Concentrated US Forces

Muwaffaq Salti hosts or supports F-15s, F-16s, F-35s, A-10s and MQ-9 Reapers alongside air-defence systems, making the installation a critical combat hub whose value also creates an attractive concentration of operationally significant targets.

United States investment in expanding the base toward a more permanent facility strengthened regional force projection but simultaneously increased its visible logistics footprint, including hangars, housing, maintenance zones, fuel infrastructure, communications nodes and aircraft-support areas.

Iran’s repeated targeting indicates an operational strategy aimed at imposing cumulative disruption, forcing aircraft dispersal and consuming interceptor inventories rather than relying exclusively upon a single spectacular strike to neutralize the installation completely.

An earlier July 9 barrage involving approximately eight to ten missiles was largely intercepted without fatalities, yet the July 17 attack demonstrated that repeated salvos can eventually exploit defensive gaps, procedural weaknesses or simple statistical probability.

This cost-exchange dynamic favours persistent attackers whenever comparatively limited missiles or drones compel defenders to launch multiple sophisticated interceptors, maintain continuous radar coverage and repeatedly shelter personnel, even when physical damage remains contained.

The fatal strike also underscores that force protection extends beyond defending aircraft because accommodation zones, gyms and prefabricated structures can become militarily consequential targets when concentrated personnel sustain air operations and air-defence missions.

Dispersing aircraft and personnel could reduce vulnerability, but distribution would enlarge security perimeters, increase transportation requirements, complicate maintenance and create additional communications dependencies, transferring risk from target concentration into logistics and command complexity.

Hardening shelters and accommodation would improve survivability, although construction is expensive, geographically visible and potentially vulnerable to increasingly accurate weapons whose target coordinates can be updated through persistent commercial satellite observation.

Deception, camouflage and rapid relocation consequently become essential complements to missile defence, because interceptors alone cannot guarantee protection when adversaries combine repeated salvos, target refinement and external intelligence against fixed regional installations.

Muwaffaq Salti therefore represents a wider warning for American force posture: bases optimized for efficiency during permissive operations may become liabilities when adversaries possess long-range precision weapons, affordable drones and near-commercial access to geospatial intelligence.

Sanctions Reveal a Wider Contest Over Commercial Space Intelligence

Washington sanctioned MizarVision, Earth Eye and Chang Guang on May 8, alleging that Chinese companies collected, published or supplied imagery supporting Iranian observation of United States and allied military activity during the 2026 conflict.

MizarVision was accused of using commercially acquired imagery and artificial intelligence to identify military signatures including aircraft and aircraft carriers, demonstrating how automated analytics can convert widely available pictures into operationally relevant intelligence at industrial speed.

Earth Eye was accused of providing satellite imagery directly to Iran, while Chang Guang allegedly collected images of American and allied facilities in response to Iranian requirements, although China rejected those accusations and demanded substantiating evidence.

Chang Guang had previously faced United States sanctions and allegations that its imagery supported Houthi operations against American assets in the Red Sea, while earlier reporting also connected its satellite products to Russia’s Wagner Group.

These allegations suggest that commercial space companies can become indirect participants across multiple theatres without launching weapons, because their imagery may support target discovery, route analysis, battle-damage assessment and operational propaganda for distant military customers.

American imagery providers reportedly restricted publication of Middle Eastern conflict-zone coverage following Washington’s requests, but comparable restrictions cannot suppress an international marketplace containing foreign constellations, brokers, analytical firms and globally distributed ground stations.

Unilateral controls may consequently displace demand toward providers operating beyond United States jurisdiction, producing an intelligence-denial problem similar to export-control leakage across semiconductors, drone components and other strategically sensitive dual-use technologies.

Commercial imagery also complicates attribution because a military customer might purchase data through intermediaries, exploit openly published pictures or combine products from several suppliers, obscuring whether any government knowingly enabled a particular military operation.

Sanctions can restrict finance, commercial partnerships and market access, yet their deterrent effect depends upon whether targeted companies value Western exposure more than contracts, political protection and growing demand within alternative technological ecosystems.

The contest is therefore expanding from ownership of reconnaissance satellites toward governance of the entire geospatial supply chain, encompassing tasking requests, orbital collection, ground-station access, artificial-intelligence analysis, distribution channels and end-user verification.

(CLICK HERE): China’s Jilin-1 Spy Satellite Network Is Watching the U.S.–Iran War in Real Time — Beijing Quietly Harvests American Warfighting Data for Future Indo-Pacific ConflictTrump–Xi Summit Faces a Lethal Intelligence Dispute

The imagery allegation emerged less than two weeks before President Donald Trump’s planned September 24 White House meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, raising the prospect that battlefield intelligence could complicate leader-level efforts to stabilize bilateral relations.

Washington and Beijing are simultaneously pursuing strategic dialogue over trade, Taiwan, artificial intelligence, rare earths, fentanyl and regional security while confronting accusations that Chinese commercial technology materially strengthened Iran’s campaign against American forces.

Trump previously said Xi offered assistance in ending the war and reopening the Strait of Hormuz, while also asserting that China would not provide Iran with military equipment, a characterization Chinese officials did not publicly confirm‎ identically.

Satellite imagery occupies an ambiguous category within that assurance because it is commercially obtainable, technically dual-use and non-kinetic, yet its employment for target development can produce consequences as lethal as conventional military hardware.

United States officials reportedly raised concerns repeatedly with Chinese counterparts but avoided accusing Beijing’s leadership of directing the transfers, preserving diplomatic space while maintaining pressure upon companies Washington considered responsible for enabling Iranian operations.

That distinction may limit immediate escalation, but it also exposes a policy dilemma because China can deny governmental responsibility while commercial entities continue supplying capabilities that American planners regard as operational intelligence rather than ordinary civilian services.

Beijing maintains that its cooperation with Iran is lawful, rejects attempts to implicate China in the war and has not publicly admitted that Chinese companies supplied targeting-quality imagery associated with the Muwaffaq Salti attack.

Washington, meanwhile, has not presented public forensic proof identifying the imagery, supplier, tasking request, delivery mechanism or Iranian unit that allegedly transformed the data into operational targeting decisions for the July 17 strike.

This evidentiary gap requires equal scepticism toward both narratives: American officials may possess classified intelligence they cannot disclose, while Chinese denials do not independently establish that companies under Beijing’s jurisdiction avoided supplying militarily useful data.

Ultimately, the Muwaffaq Salti episode signals that future great-power competition will increasingly unfold through commercial constellations, deniable data transfers and partner-enabled targeting, blurring neutrality while making logistics footprints and fixed force posture progressively harder to protect.

Chinese Satellite Imagery Linked to Deadly Iran Strike on US Base in Jordan - Defence Security Asia

[백선호]

쉘터 3개, 활주로 1개가 맞았다고 하네요.

https://www.osint613.com/post/impact-points-seen-at-muwaffaq-salti-22645

[위종민]

꽤 여러 발을 날린 것 같은데, 미국도 언제까지 패트리어트 소모를 감당할 수 있을지 모르겠네요.

[백선호]

이란 전쟁이 탄도 미사일과 자폭 무인기의 공격을 받으면서도 살아남아 싸우는 방법을 확립하는 예방 주사가 되길 바래야죠...