Re: 미국 신형 호위함 사업에 신중한 입장인 일본

[위종민]

일본은 호위함 물량이 대부분 미국에서 현지건조되는 데다가, 설계변경 요구, 미국의 부족한 조선 산업기반과 투자 요구, 자국 사업 물량도 충분한 상황이라 신중하게 접근중이라고 하네요. 

왜 일본 방산업계는 미 해군 호위함 계획에서 한발 물러서고 있는가

2026년 9월 10일 발행
요시히로 이나바
기획

미쓰비시중공업이 건조한 모가미급 호위함 12번함 ‘요시이’의 진수. 사진: 미쓰비시중공업

일본 방산업계 관계자들은 막대한 투자 부담과 국내 해군 건조사업에 대한 의무 때문에 미 해군의 잠재적 호위함 사업 참여에 점점 더 신중한 태도를 보이고 있다.

9월 1일 USNI News는 미 해군이 일본, 한국, 튀르키예에서 호위함을 도입하는 방안을 검토하고 있다고 보도했다. 그러나 일본에서는 이 가능성이 그만큼 큰 기대를 불러일으키지는 않고 있다.

해외에서 호위함을 도입할 가능성은 8월 백악관이 발표한 각서에서 비롯됐다. 이 각서는 국가안보 예외조항을 적용해 외국에서 건조된 군함이 미 해군에 취역하는 것을 금지하는 미국 법률상의 제한을 우회함으로써 국방부가 외국 함정 설계를 검토할 수 있도록 길을 열었다. 특히 이 지침은 해외 건조가 일반적으로 미국 내 시설에 직접 투자하거나 미국 조선소 지분을 보유한 조선업체와 연계되도록 규정하고 있어, 심도 깊은 산업적 결합의 기반을 마련하고 있다.

보도에 따르면 검토 대상 후보에는 한국의 충남급 유도미사일 호위함, 튀르키예의 이스탄불급 유도미사일 호위함, 그리고 일본 미쓰비시중공업(MHI)이 건조한 모가미급 다목적 호위함(FFM)이 포함돼 있다.

그러나 기존 모가미급의 능력이 상대적으로 제한적이라는 점을 고려하면, 실제로 검토되고 있는 일본 설계는 배수량이 증가하고 보다 강력한 전투능력을 갖춰 미국의 원양작전에 더 적합한 개량형 FFM, 흔히 뉴 FFM이라고 불리는 함정이다. 이 함정은 이미 호주 해군이 선택한 것과 동일한 형식이다.

일부 관측자들은 일본 FFM이 최종적으로 선정될 수 있다는 기대를 나타내고 있다. 물론 미일동맹은 중요한 요소다. 여기에 호주는 이미 일본 최초의 주요 국제 군함 수출사업에 해당하는 FFM 도입을 결정했다.

개량형 FFM은 기존 모가미급과 달리 원양작전 능력이 향상됐으며 전반적인 전투능력도 강화됐다. 일본 산업계가 납기 준수 측면에서 쌓아온 평판에 대한 어느 정도의 신뢰도 있을 수 있다.

그러나 일본에서는 이러한 기대와 함께 미국에 호위함을 수출하는 데 대한 상당한 우려도 존재한다.

‘핀란드 모델’과 미국 투자 부담

주요 이유 가운데 하나는 미 호위함 도입사업이 이른바 ‘핀란드 모델’을 채택할 것으로 알려졌다는 점이다. 이 방식에서는 처음 두 척을 해외 조선소에서 건조한 뒤, 이후에는 미국 조선시설과 기반시설에 해외 자본을 투자하게 된다.

이 개념은 미 해안경비대의 북극 안보 커터 사업에서 채택된 방식에 따른 것이다. 이 사업에서는 캐나다 설계를 기반으로 핀란드 조선소가 초기 함정을 건조한 뒤 미국 조선소로 건조가 이전된다.

일본 산업계의 관점에서 이 모델은 몇 가지 우려를 낳고 있다.

첫째, 실제로 일본에서 건조되는 것은 처음 두 척, 또는 많아야 비교적 적은 수의 함정에 불과하다. 따라서 일본 조선소가 직접적으로 얻는 경제적 이익은 제한적이다. 미국으로 건조가 이전된 뒤 함정의 사양이 변경될 가능성에 대한 우려도 있다.

그러나 무엇보다 가장 큰 우려는 미국 조선소에 요구될 수 있는 투자 규모다.

미국 투자는 미국 조선업 재건을 주요 정책 목표로 삼은 트럼프 행정부에 필수적인 요소다. 해군의 함정 건조 수요를 충족해야 할 필요성과 함께, 이것이 핀란드 모델을 채택하려는 주된 이유 가운데 하나일 가능성이 높다.

미국 산업기반의 구조적 현실

미국 조선업이 직면한 문제는 단순히 조선소 수가 부족해서 생긴 것이 아니라, 더 광범위한 산업역량이 장기간에 걸쳐 약화된 데서 비롯됐다.

냉전 종식 이후 군함 수요 감소와 상선 조선업 축소로 수많은 조선소가 폐쇄되거나 통합됐다. 그 결과 대형 군함 건조 능력은 이제 비교적 소수의 조선소에 집중돼 있다.

이로 인해 업계의 여유 생산능력이 대부분 사라졌고, 해군이 함대 규모를 확대하려 해도 건조량을 신속하게 늘릴 수 없는 구조적 상황이 형성됐다.

더 심각한 문제는 숙련 노동력 부족이다.

조선업 노동력은 장기적으로 감소해왔으며, 임금, 주거비, 노동환경 등의 문제로 신규 인력을 채용하고 유지하는 것도 점점 어려워지고 있다. 동시에 숙련된 경험자들이 점점 더 많이 은퇴하면서 조선소 내에서 상대적으로 경험이 부족한 인력의 비중이 늘어나고 있다.

이에 따라 생산성과 품질을 유지하는 것이 갈수록 큰 과제가 되고 있다.

조선소 기반시설 자체도 노후화되고 있다. 제한된 부지와 낡은 시설은 모듈식 건조나 자동화 같은 현대적인 생산방식의 도입을 어렵게 만들며, 불안정하고 불확실한 수요 때문에 기업들도 대규모 설비투자에 신중한 태도를 보이고 있다.

공급망도 취약하다. 냉전 이후 많은 부품 제조업체가 군함 조선 분야에서 철수하면서, 다수의 핵심 부품이 단일 공급업체에 의존하게 됐다.

이는 평시의 비용과 납기뿐 아니라 전시에 생산을 신속하게 확대하는 능력에도 중대한 제약이 된다.

또한 일본과 한국 같은 나라의 조선업이 디지털화, 자동화, 로봇공학, 보다 효율적인 생산관리체계를 적극적으로 도입해온 반면, 미국 군함 조선업에서는 이러한 첨단 생산방식의 도입이 더 느리게 진행됐다.

다시 말해 미국 조선업이 직면한 문제는 조선소 통합, 노동력 부족, 노후한 기반시설, 취약한 공급망, 생산기술 현대화 지연이 결합한 구조적 문제다.

이 문제는 미국 싱크탱크 전략국제문제연구소(CSIS)가 2025년 12월 발표한 보고서에서 자세히 다뤄졌다.

따라서 이러한 문제를 해결하려면 미국 조선소에 대한 해외투자, 기존 시설의 현대화와 확장, 첨단 조선기술과 생산방식의 도입이 필요할 가능성이 높다.

JS 모가미(FFM-1)와 JS 구마노(FFM-2). 사진: 일본 해상자위대

미쓰비시중공업의 국내 건조사업 압박

그러나 미쓰비시중공업 입장에서는 이것이 중대한 딜레마를 만든다.

회사가 호위함 경쟁에서 승리할 경우 미국 조선업 재건을 지원하기 위해 상당한 재정 투자와 인적자원을 투입해야 하는 상황을 피하기 어렵다. 이는 회사에 큰 부담이 될 것이다.

두 번째 문제는 미쓰비시중공업이 이미 일본 해상자위대를 위한 지속적인 군함 건조사업을 수행하고 있다는 점이다.

현재 건조 중인 이지스 시스템 탑재함(ASEV)에 이어 회사는 개량형 FFM, 신형 보급함, 그리고 잠재적으로 신형 이지스 탑재 구축함까지 건조해야 한다.

이러한 국내 수요에 더해 미쓰비시중공업은 호주를 위한 FFM의 수출과 건조도 지원해야 한다.

이러한 사업들을 모두 합치면 회사가 미국에 대규모 지원을 제공할 수 있는 여유 역량은 매우 제한적이다.

이처럼 여러 요인이 겹치면서 미국 호위함 사업 참여 가능성을 두고 일본의 관련 업계 관계자들 사이에서는 눈에 띄게 신중하며, 심지어 소극적이라고 할 수 있는 분위기가 형성되고 있다.

일본산 호위함이 미 해군에 취역할 가능성은 더 넓은 미일 방위협력이라는 관점에서는 매우 매력적으로 보일 수 있지만, 산업적 현실은 훨씬 더 복잡하다.

일본 입장에서 문제는 단순히 자국 호위함 설계가 미 해군 경쟁에서 승리할 수 있느냐가 아니다. 일본 산업계가 국내와 호주에서 빠르게 증가하는 함정 건조 수요를 동시에 충족하면서 미국 군함 조선 산업기반의 일부를 재건하는 데 필요한 자본, 노동력, 기술, 관리 자원을 투입할 여력이 있느냐가 문제다.

이러한 계산은 결국 FFM 자체의 기술적 장점보다 훨씬 더 중요한 요소가 될 수 있다.

요시히로 이나바

요시히로 이나바는 일본 시즈오카를 기반으로 활동하는 프리랜서 작가다. 그는 일본의 몇 안 되는 젊은 군사 전문 작가 가운데 한 명이며, 현재 일본의 대학원에서 국제법, 특히 자위권과 무력사용을 공부하고 있다. 일본 육상·해상·항공자위대에 특히 정통하다.

Why Japan’s Industry is Pulling Back from the U.S. Navy Frigate Plan

Why Japan’s Industry is Pulling Back from the U.S. Navy Frigate Plan

• Published on 10/09/2026
• By Yoshihiro Inaba
• In Features

Launch of the 12th Mogami-class frigate 'Yoshii' by MHI. Photo credit: MHI

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Japanese defense industry stakeholders are growing hesitant over a potential U.S. Navy frigate deal, weighed down by heavy investment demands and domestic naval commitments.

On September 1, USNI News reported that the U.S. Navy is considering acquiring frigates from Japan, South Korea, and Türkiye. In Japan, however, the prospect has not generated the same level of enthusiasm.

The possibility of acquiring frigates from overseas stems from a White House memorandum issued in August. The memorandum invoked a national-security exemption to circumvent U.S. statutory restrictions that prohibit foreign-built warships from entering U.S. Navy service, thereby opening the door for the Department of Defense to consider foreign ship designs. Crucially, the directive stipulates that foreign construction is generally tied to shipbuilders that invest directly in U.S. facilities or hold a stake in American shipyards, setting the stage for deep industrial entanglements.

According to reports, the candidates under consideration include South Korea’s Chungnam-class guided-missile frigate, Türkiye’s Istanbul-class guided-missile frigate, and the Mogami-class multipurpose frigate (FFM) built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) in Japan.

However, given the relatively limited capabilities of the existing Mogami class, the Japanese design actually being considered is the upgraded FFM—often referred to as the New FFM—which features increased tonnage and more robust combat capabilities better suited for U.S. blue-water operations. This is the same variant already selected by the Royal Australian Navy.

Among these observers, some have expressed hopes that the Japanese FFM could ultimately be selected. The Japan-U.S. alliance is, of course, an important factor. In addition, Australia has already decided to procure the FFM in what represents Japan’s first major international warship export program.

Unlike the existing Mogami class, the upgraded FFM offers improved capabilities for blue-water operations as well as enhanced overall combat capability. There may also be a degree of confidence in the reputation of Japanese industry for adhering to delivery schedules.

In Japan, however, these expectations are accompanied by significant concerns about exporting the frigate to the United States.

The “Finland Model” and the Burden of U.S. Investment

One major reason is that the U.S. frigate acquisition program is reportedly expected to adopt what has been described as the “Finland model.” Under this approach, the first two hulls would be constructed at a foreign shipyard, after which foreign investment would be directed toward U.S. shipbuilding facilities and infrastructure.

The concept follows the approach adopted for the U.S. Coast Guard’s Arctic Security Cutter program, under which a Finnish shipyard would build the initial hull based on a Canadian design before construction is transferred to a U.S. shipyard.

From the perspective of Japanese industry, this model presents several concerns.

First, only the first two ships—or, at most, a relatively small number of vessels—would actually be constructed in Japan. The direct economic benefits for Japanese shipyards would therefore be limited. There are also concerns about possible changes to the ship’s specifications once construction is transferred to the United States.

Above all, however, the greatest concern is the scale of investment that could be required in U.S. shipyards.

Investment in the United States is an indispensable element for the Trump administration, which has made the revitalization of the U.S. shipbuilding industry a major policy objective. Alongside the need to meet the Navy’s shipbuilding requirements, this is likely one of the principal reasons behind the adoption of the Finland model.

Structural Realities of the U.S. Industrial Base

The challenges facing the U.S. shipbuilding industry are not simply the result of an insufficient number of shipyards, but stem from the long-term erosion of broader industrial capabilities.

Following the end of the Cold War, declining demand for naval vessels and the contraction of the commercial shipbuilding sector led to the closure and consolidation of numerous shipyards. As a result, the ability to construct major naval vessels is now concentrated in a relatively small number of yards.

This has eliminated much of the industry’s excess production capacity, creating a structural situation in which shipbuilding output cannot be rapidly increased even when the Navy seeks to expand the size of the fleet.

An even more serious issue is the shortage of skilled labor.

The shipbuilding workforce has declined over the long term, while recruiting and retaining new workers has become increasingly difficult because of issues such as wages, housing costs, and working conditions. At the same time, experienced skilled workers are retiring in growing numbers, leaving shipyards with a larger proportion of relatively inexperienced personnel.

Maintaining productivity and quality has therefore become an increasingly significant challenge.

Shipyard infrastructure itself is also aging. Constrained sites and outdated facilities make it more difficult to introduce modern production methods such as modular construction and automation, while unstable and uncertain demand has made companies cautious about committing to large-scale capital investment.

The supply chain is also fragile. Following the Cold War, many component manufacturers withdrew from the naval shipbuilding sector, leaving numerous critical components dependent on single-source suppliers.

This creates problems not only for costs and delivery schedules in peacetime, but also represents a major constraint on the ability to rapidly surge production during wartime.

In addition, while shipbuilding industries in countries such as Japan and South Korea have aggressively adopted digitalization, automation, robotics, and more efficient production-management systems, the introduction of such advanced manufacturing methods has progressed more slowly in U.S. naval shipbuilding.

In other words, the problems confronting the U.S. shipbuilding industry are structural in nature, arising from the combined effects of shipyard consolidation, workforce shortages, aging infrastructure, fragile supply chains, and delays in modernizing production technologies.

This issue was examined in detail in a report published in December 2025 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a U.S. think tank.

Addressing these challenges will therefore likely require foreign investment in U.S. shipyards, the modernization and expansion of existing facilities, and the introduction of advanced shipbuilding technologies and production methods.

JS Mogami (FFM-1) and JS Kumano (FFM-2) (Credit: JMSDF)Domestic Pipeline Pressures for Mitsubishi Heavy Industries

For MHI, however, this presents a major dilemma.

If the company were to win the frigate competition, it would inevitably be required to commit substantial financial investment and human resources to support the revitalization of the U.S. shipbuilding industry. This would represent a significant burden for the company.

A second issue is that MHI is already committed to a sustained pipeline of warship construction for the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF).

Following the Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEVs) now under construction, the company will need to build the upgraded FFM, new replenishment ships, and potentially a new class of Aegis-equipped destroyers.

On top of these domestic requirements, MHI will also have to support the export and construction of the FFM for Australia.

Taken together, these commitments leave the company with very limited spare capacity to provide substantial support to the United States.

As a result of these overlapping factors, there is a notably cautious, if not reluctant, mood among relevant stakeholders in Japan regarding the prospect of participating in the U.S. frigate program.

Although the possibility of a Japanese-built frigate entering U.S. Navy service may appear highly attractive from the perspective of broader Japan-U.S. defense cooperation, the industrial realities are considerably more complicated.

For Japan, the question is not simply whether its frigate design can win a U.S. Navy competition. It is whether Japanese industry can afford to commit the capital, workforce, technology, and management resources required to help rebuild part of the U.S. naval shipbuilding industrial base while simultaneously meeting rapidly growing shipbuilding requirements at home and in Australia.

That calculation may ultimately prove far more important than the technical merits of the FFM itself.

Tags

• Japan, New FFM, US Navy

Yoshihiro Inaba

Yoshihiro Inaba is a Freelance Writer based in Shizuoka, Japan. He is one of the few young military writers in Japan and is currently a student studying international law (especially self-defense and use of force) at a Japanese graduate school. He is particularly familiar with Japan's Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces.

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