호르무즈 해협 재개방 합의는 어떻게 이뤄져야 하는가?

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When Computers Went To Sea | 호르무즈 해협을 어떻게 열어야 하나? - Daum 카페

호르무즈 해협을 어떻게 열어야 하나?

When Computers Went To Sea | 호르무즈 해협을 개방하기 위한 미국의 재정적 노력이 실패한 이유 - Daum 카페

호르무즈 해협을 개방하기 위한 미국의 재정적 노력이 실패한 이유

When Computers Went To Sea | 미국의 호르무즈 봉쇄; 누가 우위에 서 있는가? - Daum 카페

미국의 호르무즈 봉쇄; 누가 우위에 서 있는가?

When Computers Went To Sea | 호르무즈 해협을 지나는 석유 수출량의 변화 - Daum 카페

호르무즈 해협을 지나는 석유 수출량의 변화

When Computers Went To Sea | 유조선 보험료를 40배 올려 호르무즈 해협을 사실상 막다 - Daum 카페

유조선 보험료를 40배 올려 호르무즈 해협을 사실상 막다

채텀하우스의 기사입니다. 

항해의 자유 회복에 초점을 둔 기술적으로 정밀하며 상호적이고 검증가능한 절차가 필요하고,MOU나 두루뭉술한 대타협 따위로는 해결하기 어려울 것이라고 하는데 과연 가능할지... 11월 3일 이후에야 가능하겠죠. 

호르무즈 함정에서 벗어나기: 해협 재개방 합의는 어떤 모습이어야 하나

어떤 합의든 유지되도록 하려면 구체적이고, 상호적이며, 검증 가능한 절차가 필수적이다.

전문가 논평

2026년 9월 30일 발행 — 읽는 시간 3분

2026년 9월 12일 전략적 항구도시 반다르아바스의 호르무즈 해협 해안가에서 일상이 이어지고 있다. 사진: Fatemeh Bahrami/Anadolu via Getty Images

니티아 라브

국제안보 프로그램 아카데미 연구원

미국과 이란 간 전쟁은 확전과 외교 사이의 불확실한 국면에 들어섰다. 유엔총회에서 이란은 여러 조건이 충족될 경우 호르무즈 해협을 재개방하고 핵협상을 재개하겠다는 제안을 내놨다. 도널드 트럼프 대통령은 이를 거부한 것으로 보인다.

이후 보도들은 대통령이 이란에 대한 새로운 공격을 검토하고 있다고 전했다. 한편 이란의 지원을 받는 후티의 선박 공격으로 분쟁은 홍해까지 확대됐다.

워싱턴과 테헤란 사이의 이견 범위와 장기간 이어진 해협 폐쇄가 세계에 미치는 영향을 고려하면, 어떤 합의든 호르무즈 상황을 되돌리는 것에서 시작해야 할 가능성이 크다. 그것이 가능할까?

가능하다. 그러나 성공적인 호르무즈 합의에는 무엇보다 항행의 자유 회복에 초점을 둔 기술적으로 정밀하고 상호적이며 검증 가능한 절차가 필요하다. 또 하나의 모호한 양해각서(MOU)나 더 광범위한 대타협의 일부로는 효과적으로 해결되기 어려울 것이다.

해협의 현재 상황

테헤란은 선박들에게 이란 영해를 통과하도록 요구하고 통행료를 부과하며 자국 정책을 위반했다고 주장하는 선박을 공격하는 방식으로 선언한 호르무즈 해협 ‘폐쇄’를 집행해왔다. 그 결과 걸프 지역 전역에서 해상 사건 85건과 선원 사망 24명이 보고됐다.

미국은 이란과 연계된 모든 선박에 봉쇄를 가하는 방식으로 대응했다. 9월 28일 기준 미군은 상선 122척의 항로를 변경시켰고 3척을 무력화했으며 2척에 승선했다. 미군은 해협 남쪽을 따라 자체 항로도 개설했다. 그 결과 불안정한 대치와 반복되는 충돌이 이어지고 있다. 한편 수백 척의 선박이 걸프에 발이 묶여 있다.

해운 데이터에 따르면 월요일 해협을 통과한 선박은 16척에 불과했다. 전쟁 발발 전 하루 약 138척과 비교된다. 북쪽의 이란 항로를 이용하는 교통 대부분은 이란, 러시아, 중국 연계 선박이 차지해왔다. 중국은 이란 수출 원유의 90% 이상을 구매한다. 남쪽 항로에서 미국의 지원을 받는 통과 선박 가운데 상당수는 UAE 국적선이다.

지속 가능한 합의에는 항로와 좌표, 통항 자격 선박, 통신 절차 등을 구체적으로 명시하는 운용절차가 필요하다.

8월 이란과 오만은 해협의 해상교통을 공동 관리하는 합의에 접근했다. 오만 외무부는 제안된 틀이 임시 항행 회랑을 설치하고, 공동 기뢰 제거 사업을 만들며, 궁극적으로 정보공유를 위한 장치를 제공하게 될 것이라고 밝혔다.

오만, 이란, 걸프협력회의(GCC) 지도자들은 합의를 마무리하기 위해 무스카트에서 만날 예정이었다. 그러나 미국의 압박과 홍해에서의 긴장 고조로 회의는 9월 연기됐다.

이 구상은 호르무즈 재개방을 위해 반드시 미국과 이란이 다른 모든 분쟁부터 먼저 해결해야 하는 것은 아니라는 점을 보여준다. 다만 양측은 상업 항행을 위한 실행 가능한 체계를 구축해야 한다.

이를 위해서는 억제와 처벌을 분리하는 긴장완화 경로가 필요하다. 양측 모두 적대행위로 인식되는 행동에 대응해 과도한 ‘처벌’을 가하려는 시도를 중단해야 한다. 그러한 행동은 상대방이 다시 확전하도록 유인할 뿐이다.

합의를 기술적으로 신뢰할 수 있게 만들어야 한다

6월 체결된 양해각서는 외교적 출구를 만들기 위한 첫 시도였다. 그러나 모호함이 곳곳에 존재했다. 휴전은 유지되지 않았고, MOU가 설정한 60일의 기간 안에 더 광범위한 합의도 이뤄지지 않았다.

MOU 실패의 핵심에는 호르무즈와 관련한 기술적 세부사항 부족이 있었다. 효과적인 해협 합의는 단순히 상선 통항이 즉시 재개된다고 선언하는 데 그칠 수 없다. 어떤 선박이 어떤 항로를 통과할 수 있는지, 선박이 합의된 항로를 이탈하면 어떻게 되는지를 정의해야 한다. 누가 항행정보를 제공하고 상업 운항자들과 소통할지도 명시해야 한다. 또한 이란, 오만, 미국, 국제 해양당국이 어떤 방식으로 상호작용할지도 구체화해야 한다.

MOU는 이러한 문제 중 일부를 예상하고 있었다. 그러나 지속 가능한 합의라면 항로와 좌표, 통항 자격 선박, 통신 절차, 항행 및 검사 규칙, 통보 의무 등을 명시하는 운용절차를 만들어야 한다.

무엇보다 어떤 합의든 상업활동과 군사활동을 구분해야 한다. 상선에는 보호된 상업 항행체제의 일부로 예측 가능한 규칙이 필요하다. 이러한 체제는 미국이나 이란이 호르무즈를 넘어 상대방의 더 광범위한 주장을 인정하도록 요구해서는 안 된다.

긴장완화는 상호적이고 점진적이며 검증 가능해야 한다

호르무즈 해협 재개방은 하나의 과정으로 취급해야 한다. 트럼프 대통령이 강하게 비판해온 오바마 행정부의 2015년 이란 핵합의도 여러 해에 걸친 과정이었다. 양측 전문가 실무그룹은 기술적 합의를 정치적 과정에 반영함으로써 합의가 정치적으로 가능할 뿐 아니라 기술적으로도 실행 가능하도록 했다. 호르무즈 절차는 그렇게 복잡하거나 길 필요는 없다. 그러나 기술적 전문성은 필요하다.

호르무즈 해협 재개방 초기 노력은 해양환경을 안정시키는 데 집중해야 한다. 이란과 미국 모두 해협에서의 적대행위를 점진적이고 상호적으로 중단하기로 약속해야 한다.

예를 들어 이란은 상선에 대한 방해를 줄이고 합의된 통신절차를 구축할 수 있다. 이에 대응해 미국과 파트너들은 일부 봉쇄작전을 축소하고, 이란이 행동 기준에 도달하는 것과 연계해 제한적인 제재 완화를 제공할 수 있다.

기뢰 제거와 항행에 관한 합의도 필요하다. 기술팀은 공동으로 합의한 안전절차에 따라 기뢰 제거작업을 수행하고, 제거된 구역과 아직 제거되지 않은 구역의 위치를 상업 운항자들에게 알려야 한다.

당사자들은 공동 사고보고 체계를 구축하고, 당국이 항로의 안전을 인증할 때까지 선박들이 임시 항로를 따르도록 해야 한다.

독립적인 해양기구들은 정치적 합의 자체에 책임을 지지 않으면서도 기뢰 제거가 완료된 구역의 상태를 검증하는 데 도움을 줄 수 있다.

해상에서 반복적이고 예측 가능한 행동은 미국, 이란, 기타 지역 행위자들 사이에 신뢰를 구축할 수 있다. 성공의 핵심은 순서와 검증이다. 어떤 양보도 전적으로 신뢰에 의존하거나 MOU에 담겼던 식의 포괄적인 약속에 기대서는 안 된다.

다자 집행 및 감시 장치를 포함해야 한다

다자적 관여는 지속 가능한 합의를 만드는 데 중요한 역할을 할 수 있다. 분쟁 전반에 걸쳐 오만, 카타르, 파키스탄은 핵심 중재 역할을 해왔다. 걸프 국가들 역시 상업 해운을 복구하기 위한 합의를 모색해왔다. 영국과 프랑스도 해협을 통한 항행을 복원하는 데 도움을 주기 위해 다국적 연합을 조직했다.

이러한 국가들은 합의 준수를 감시하고 안심을 제공함으로써 재개방 이행을 도울 수 있다. 보강 역할을 하는 국가들의 존재는 미국과 이란이 정치적 합의를 훼손하는 것보다 실행하는 편이 더 쉬운 환경을 만들 수도 있다.

감시체계에는 오만과 다른 걸프 국가 대표, 국제 해양당국, 중립적인 기술 전문가들이 포함될 수 있다. 이들의 권한은 좁고 운용 중심이어야 한다. 예를 들어 합의된 항로를 감시하고, 사건을 문서화하며, 위반사항을 보고하는 정도다.

대타협이 아니라 이행이 중요하다

어떤 합의에서 아마 가장 중요한 요소는 양측 모두 결과를 자국의 이익을 보호한 것으로 설명할 수 있게 하는 것이다. 즉 각자의 양보를 상대방의 행동과 조건부로 연계하는 방식이다. 그래야 양국 모두에게 협력이 정치적으로 덜 위험해진다.

따라서 호르무즈 함정에서 빠져나오는 길은 양측 모두에게 싸움을 멈출 수 있는 실용적이고 검증 가능하며 정치적으로 감당 가능한 방식을 제공하는 신중하게 설계된 합의여야 한다.

6월 MOU는 미·이란 합의의 기본 요소를 구상할 수 있음을 보여줬다. 그러나 그것의 붕괴는 견고한 이행장치와 권한이 없는 정치적 약속은 유지되기 어렵다는 점을 보여줬다. 다음 합의는 이 경험에서 배워야 한다.

미국과 이스라엘의 다가오는 선거는 해협 재개방 진전에 방해가 될 수 있다. 이란의 통행료 부과 같은 일부 문제는 여전히 상당한 정치적 장애물로 남을 수 있다. 그러나 당사자들이 해협의 교통을 관리할 지속 가능한 장치를 구축하기 전까지 재충돌 위험은 계속 남아 있을 것이다.

Escaping the Hormuz trap: What should an agreement to reopen the Strait look like? | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank

Escaping the Hormuz trap: What should an agreement to reopen the Strait look like?

Escaping the Hormuz trap: What should an agreement to reopen the Strait look like?

A detailed, reciprocal, and verifiable process is essential to ensure that any agreement holds.

Expert comment

Published 30 September 2026 —3 minute READ

Image — Daily life continues on the waterfront in the strategic port city of Bandar Abbas on the Strait of Hormuz on 12 September 2026. (Photo by Fatemeh Bahrami/Anadolu via Getty Images)

Nitya Labh

Academy Associate, International Security Programme

The war between the United States and Iran has entered an uncertain phase between escalation and diplomacy. At the UN General Assembly, Iran offered a proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and resume nuclear talks – if various conditions were met. That has apparently been rejected by President Donald Trump.

Subsequent reports claimed the president was considering new strikes on Iran. Meanwhile, attacks on ships from the Iran-backed Houthis have extended the conflict into the Red Sea. 

Given the scope of disagreement between Washington and Tehran, and the global impact of the Strait’s prolonged closure, any settlement will likely need to begin with an unwinding of the Hormuz situation. Can that be achieved?

It is possible. But a successful agreement on Hormuz requires above all a technically precise, reciprocal, and verifiable process that focuses on restoring freedom of navigation. It is unlikely to be effectively addressed through another vague Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), or as part of a wider grand bargain.

Status of the Strait

Tehran has enforced its declared ‘closure’ of the Strait of Hormuz by demanding that ships transit through Iranian waters, charging tolls, and striking vessels it claims have violated its policies. This has resulted in 85 maritime incidents and 24 seafarer deaths reported across the Gulf region.

The US has responded by imposing a blockade on all ships linked to Iran. As of 28 September, US forces have redirected 122 commercial vessels, disabled three, and boarded two. US forces have also created their own route along the southern side of the Strait. The result is an unstable standoff and recurrent clashes. Meanwhile, hundreds of ships remain stranded in the Gulf.

Shipping data shows only 16 vessels crossed the Strait on Monday. That compares to about 138 per day before the start of the war. Most of this traffic along the northern (Iranian) route has been dominated by Iranian, Russian and Chinese-linked vessels. (China purchases over 90 per cent of Iranian exported oil). A large share of US-assisted transits along the southern route are from UAE-flagged vessels.

A durable arrangement will need to create an operating procedure that specifies routes and coordinates, vessel eligibility, communications protocols…and more.

In August, Iran and Oman moved toward an arrangement for jointly managing maritime traffic in the Strait. Oman’s foreign ministry said the proposed framework would establish a temporary navigational corridor, create a joint project to clear mines, and eventually provide arrangements for information-sharing.

Leaders from Oman, Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were expected to meet in Muscat to finalize the agreement. But the meeting was postponed in September following US pressure and escalations in the Red Sea. 

The initiative demonstrates that reopening Hormuz does not necessarily require the US and Iran to resolve all their other disputes first. It does, however, require the parties to establish a workable system for commercial navigation. 

For that to happen there will need to be a path toward de-escalation that separates deterrence from punishment. Each side will have to stop trying to inflict excessive ‘punishment’ in response to perceived hostile acts, which merely incentivizes the other to escalate again. 

Make the agreement technically credible

The MOU agreed in June was a first attempt at a diplomatic off-ramp. However, it was riddled with ambiguity. The ceasefire did not hold, and no wider settlement was agreed in the 60-day timeline the MOU set. 

Crucial to the MOU’s failure was the lack of technical detail regarding Hormuz. An effective Strait agreement cannot simply say that traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start. It must define which vessels can transit along which routes and what happens if a vessel deviates from its agreed route. It must state who will provide navigational information and communicate with commercial operators. And it must specify how Iranian, Omani, American, and international maritime authorities will interact.

The MOU anticipated some of these issues. But a durable arrangement will need to create an operating procedure that specifies routes and coordinates, vessel eligibility, communications protocols, rules for navigation and inspection, notification requirements and more.

Most importantly, any agreement must distinguish between commercial and military activity. Commercial vessels need predictable rules as part of a protected commercial-navigation regime – one that does not require the US or Iran to recognize the other’s broader claims beyond Hormuz.

De-escalation must be reciprocal, gradual, and verifiable

The reopening of the Strait should be treated as a process. The Obama administration’s 2015 Iran nuclear deal, much disparaged by President Trump, was a multi-year process. Expert working groups on both sides fed technical agreements into the political process, ensuring the deal was technically achievable as well as politically viable. A process for Hormuz need not be as complex or drawn out. But it will require technical expertise. 

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Initial efforts at reopening the Strait of Hormuz should focus on stabilizing the maritime environment. Both Iran and the US would need to commit to a progressive and reciprocal pause in hostilities in the Strait. 

For example, Iran could reduce interference with commercial shipping and establish agreed communication procedures. In response, the US and its partners might reduce some blockade operations and provide limited sanctions relief tied to Iran reaching behavioural benchmarks.

Agreement on mine clearance and navigation will also be needed. Technical teams must conduct mine-clearance under a jointly agreed safety protocol, with the locations of cleared and un-cleared areas communicated to commercial operators. 

The parties should establish a common incident-reporting mechanism and require vessels to follow temporary traffic lanes until authorities certify lanes as safe.

Independent maritime organizations could help verify the status of cleared areas without becoming responsible for the political settlement itself.

Repeated, predictable action at sea could build trust between the US, Iran, and other regional actors. The key to success is sequencing and verification. No concession can depend entirely on trust or the kind of broad commitments made in the MOU.

Include multilateral enforcement and monitoring mechanisms

Multilateral engagement could play an important role in creating a lasting deal. Over the course of the conflict, Oman, Qatar and Pakistan have played central mediating roles. And Gulf states have sought arrangements to restore commercial shipping. The UK and France have also organized a multinational coalition to help restore shipping through the Strait. 

Such countries can help implement a reopening by monitoring compliance with an agreement and providing reassurance. The presence of reinforcing powers can also create an ecosystem in which a political agreement is easier for the US and Iran to implement than undermine.

A monitoring mechanism could include representatives from Oman and other Gulf states, international maritime authorities, and neutral technical experts. Its mandate should be narrow and operational. For example, to monitor agreed routes, document incidents and report violations. 

Implementation, not a Grand Bargain

Perhaps the most important element to any agreement is that it allows both sides to describe the outcome as protecting their interests – making each concession conditional on the other side’s behaviour. That makes cooperation less politically risky for both countries.

The way out of the Hormuz trap must therefore be a carefully constructed bargain in which both sides are given a practical, verifiable, and politically survivable way to stop fighting.

The June MOU demonstrated that the basic elements of a US–Iran agreement are conceivable. Its collapse illustrated that political commitments without robust implementation mechanisms and authorities are unlikely to hold. The next agreement must learn from that experience.

Approaching elections in the US and Israel may interfere with progress on reopening the Strait. Some issues, such as Iran’s charging of tolls, could remain a significant political obstacle. But, until the parties establish a durable mechanism for managing traffic in the Strait, the risk of renewed confrontation will remain.