중국은 남중국해 영유권 주장을 넘어 통치하기를 원하고 있음

[위종민]

중국은 9월 24일 제2 토마스 환초에 대한 필리핀의 보급작전이 "사전에 중국의 승인을 받지 않았기 때문에" 불법이었으며, 따라서 중국의 행동은 적절했다고 주장했네요. 영유권 주장을 넘어 남중국해 이용을 통제하거나, (국제기구에 의한 중재 따위는 신경쓰지 않고) 영유권 주장과 별개로 통제권을 확보하기를 추구하는 것 같습니다. 

# 중국은 남중국해에 대한 영유권을 주장하는 데 그치지 않는다. 남중국해를 통치하는 방법을 익히고 있다

찰스 피어슨 박사

2026년 10월 9일

읽는 시간 7분

2025년 10월 12일 중국 해경 함정이 필리핀이 점유한 티투섬 인근에서 필리핀 선박 BRP 다투 파그부아야호를 향해 물대포를 발사하고 있다. 티투섬은 현지에서 파그아사섬으로 불린다.

중국 정부는 필리핀의 세컨드 토머스 암초 보급작전이 중국의 승인을 받지 않았기 때문에 불법이었다고 주장한다. 중국은 이 해역을 자국이 관리하는 공간으로 취급하는 방향으로 전환했다.

9월 24일 발생한 사건에서 중국 해경 순찰함들은 필리핀의 배타적경제수역(EEZ) 안에 있는 세컨드 토머스 암초로 향하던 보급작전 참가 필리핀 선박들을 가로막았다. 차단은 목적지인 BRP 시에라 마드레호에서 60해리 떨어진 지점에서 이뤄졌다. 시에라 마드레호는 필리핀이 영유권을 주장하고 주둔지로 활용하기 위해 1999년 의도적으로 좌초시킨 함정이다. 필리핀 해경은 이번 차단 과정에서 벌어진 기동이 “필리핀 인력들을 위험에 빠뜨렸다”고 밝혔다. 중국 해경 함정들은 이제 악명 높아진 해상민병대의 지원을 받아 암초 주변에 밀집했으며, 인근에는 군함 세 척이 대기하고 있었다. 이후 이 사건에 뒤이어 군사훈련이 실시됐다. 이번 사건은 일관되게 반복되는 행동 양상의 일부다. 최근 유포된 영상에는 9월 18일 중국 해경 함정이 이 해역에서 필리핀 어업 관련 선박을 들이받는 장면이 담겨 있으며, 이는 중국이 사용하는 공격적인 전술을 다시 한번 보여준다.

많은 논평은 이러한 사건들을 중국의 또 다른 공격행위로 규정하고, 중국과 미국의 조약 동맹국 사이에서 더 큰 충돌이 발생할 가능성이 있다고 지적했다. 그러나 훨씬 더 중요한 사실을 드러내는 것은 중국 관영 글로벌타임스가 익명의 소식통을 인용해 제시한 주장이다. 이 소식통은 필리핀의 보급작전이 “사전에 중국의 승인을 받지 않았기” 때문에 불법이었으며, 따라서 중국이 적절하게 행동했다고 주장했다. 마찬가지로 중국신문망은 중국 해경 대변인 장뤼의 발언을 인용해 “필리핀이 약속을 어겼다”고 전했다. 마닐라는 양측이 2024년에 체결한 잠정 합의에 사전 승인이 필요하다는 규정이 포함돼 있다는 주장을 지속적으로 부인해왔다.

어업 금지조치는 해당 해역의 소유권을 결정하지는 않지만, 누가 그곳에서 어업을 할 수 있는지는 규정한다. 이러한 조치들은 모두 일종의 회색지대에 존재한다. 중대한 수준의 대립을 촉발할 문턱에는 이르지 않으면서도, 중국 선박들은 자신들이 권한을 행사한다는 인식을 확산시키고 있다.

중국이 사용하는 언어는 영유권 주장을 확립하려는 측의 언어라기보다 영토를 관리하는 당국이 사용하는 언어와 정확히 일치한다. 세컨드 토머스 암초에서 발생한 이번 사건은 남중국해의 장기적인 통치권을 둘러싸고 서서히 진행되는 경쟁의 일부다.

## 점유가 아니라 허가

중국의 입장은 남중국해 대부분에 대한 관할권을 공식 지도상에 표시하는 데 사용하는 구단선에 기반을 두고 있다. 이러한 지도상의 선은 유용한 수단이지만, 관찰자들은 중국의 허가체제를 확립해온 점진적이고 기술적인 접근방식도 고려해야 한다.

스카버러 암초는 이러한 전략이 실제로 실행되는 사례를 보여준다. 2024년 11월 중국은 이 암초 주변에 직선기선을 선포했다. 직선기선은 영해, 접속수역, 배타적경제수역 등 해양구역을 측정하는 기준이 되는 선이다. 또한 2025년 9월에는 스카버러 암초에 국가급 자연보호구역을 지정한다고 발표했으며, 2026년 8월에는 “사전 승인 없이” 어업을 하는 행위를 금지하는 내용을 포함한 관리규정을 발표했다. 이에 따라 법률에 의해 허가받은 개인이나 단체를 제외하고는 누구도 해당 해역에 진입할 수 없으며, 중국 해경의 순찰을 통해 이러한 규정이 집행된다.

중국은 동일한 논리를 남중국해의 더 넓은 지역으로 확대했다. 매년 여름 5월부터 8월 중순까지 실시되는 금어기를 통해 남중국해 전체의 약 절반에 해당하는 해역에 대한 접근을 제한한다. 이러한 해역의 상당 부분은 국제적으로 인정되는 베트남과 필리핀의 배타적경제수역과 겹친다. 중국은 이 해역에 싼사시까지 설치해 파라셀군도와 스프래틀리군도를 중국의 행정구역으로 관리하고 있다. 2021년 제정된 해경법은 또한 “중국 관할 해역”에서 무기 사용을 허용하지만, 해당 해역의 경계가 어디까지인지 명확하게 규정하지 않았다. 2024년 추가로 제정된 해경 규정은 중국 해경이 이 해역에 불법으로 진입한 것으로 의심되는 외국인을 최대 60일 동안 구금할 수 있도록 했다.

RUSI의 분석과 연구가 마음에 드십니까? 구글 검색에서 먼저 표시되도록 설정하세요.

구글 검색 결과에 RUSI의 콘텐츠가 더 많이 표시되도록 도와주십시오. RUSI를 구글의 선호 출처로 추가하면 RUSI의 분석이 검색 결과에서 더욱 눈에 띄게 표시됩니다.

구글에서 선호 출처로 추가하기

이러한 조치들은 중국이 정확히 무엇을 소유하고 있는지에 대해서는 불분명하지만, 허가가 필요하다는 점과 중국의 국내 규정을 위반하는 개인이나 단체가 어떤 결과를 맞게 되는지에 대해서는 매우 명확하다. 어업 금지조치는 해당 해역의 소유권을 결정하지는 않지만, 누가 그곳에서 어업을 할 수 있는지는 규정한다. 이러한 조치들은 모두 일종의 회색지대에 존재한다. 중대한 수준의 대립을 촉발할 문턱에는 이르지 않으면서도, 중국 선박들은 자신들이 권한을 행사한다는 인식을 확산시키고 있다.

그 효과는 누적된다. 어선들이 금지명령을 따르기 시작하면서 중국의 허가체제에 정당성을 부여한다. 보급작전에 참가하는 선박의 승무원들은 자신들의 항로와 목적지가 중국의 관리 아래 있는 것처럼 보이는 공간에 존재한다는 사실을 체득하게 된다. 시간이 흐르면서 이러한 관행은 남중국해 연안국 정부들의 지속적인 항의에도 불구하고 관할권과 비슷한 것으로 변해간다. 나는 최근 《퍼시픽 리뷰》에 발표한 논문에서 이를 ‘구역화 전략(zonation strategy)’이라고 불렀다. 이는 합법적이거나 준법적인 해양구역을 해상에서 국가 통제를 행사하는 수단으로 활용하는 것을 뜻한다.

## 법정에서 승리하는 것만으로 충분하지 않았던 이유

2016년 필리핀 대 중국 사건에서 내려진 중재판정은 중국 정부의 입장에 대한 가장 명확한 법적 반박으로 남아 있다. 중재재판소는 구단선 내부에 대한 중국의 역사적 권리 주장이 유엔해양법협약(UNCLOS)을 포함한 국제법상 근거가 없다고 판단했다. 실제로 중재재판소는 중국이 점유한 스프래틀리군도의 어떠한 해양지형도 자체적인 배타적경제수역을 가질 수 없으며, 세컨드 토머스 암초는 필리핀의 배타적경제수역 안에 있다고 밝혔다. 이 판정의 법적 영향은 상당했으며, 마닐라가 중국의 행정적 확장에 이의를 제기할 수 있는 근거를 제공했다.

그러나 실제 상황에서는 거의 달라진 것이 없었다. 중국은 이후 미스치프 암초, 수비 암초, 파이어리크로스 암초 등을 포함한 인공섬들에 기지, 항만, 활주로와 같은 군사시설을 건설했다. 한편 ‘제2의 해군’이라고 불리는 중국 해경은 규모가 커지고 순찰활동도 확대됐다. 중재판정이 중국이 법적으로 어떤 권리를 갖는지를 다뤘다면, 중국 정부는 다른 행위자들에게 어떤 행동을 하도록 강제할 수 있는지를 기반으로 통치권을 행사해왔다. 중국의 반복적인 행동이 다른 행위자들에게 중국의 허가를 받아야 하는 것처럼 행동하도록 학습시킬 수 있다면, 중국은 주권에 관한 법적 논쟁에서 승리할 필요가 없다.

국제안보 뉴스레터 구독

국제안보연구그룹의 최신 간행물과 행사 소식을 받아보십시오.

구독하기

서방의 대응에도 동일한 한계가 존재한다. 미국의 항행의 자유 작전은 분쟁 해역에 진입하고 통과함으로써 중국의 행동에 대한 반대 의사를 표현한다. 이러한 간헐적인 행동은 명확한 법적 입장을 드러내지만, 어업 금지조치와 자연보호구역, 해경 순찰이 일상적으로 존재하는 상황에서 자유로운 바다가 영구적으로 유지되는 현실을 만들어내지는 못한다. 호주에 원자력 추진 잠수함을 제공할 계획을 포함한 오커스(AUKUS) 역시 중국의 관할권 행사에 맞서는 억제 중심의 대응방식에 속하지만, 필리핀 보급선의 항로 변경과 같은 일상적인 작은 행동들을 막지는 못한다.

## 허가 절차에 응하지 않기

중국의 우위는 일상적인 관행을 기반으로 구축되기 때문에, 이에 대한 대응도 비슷한 수단을 통해 이뤄져야 한다. 이는 마닐라와 협력국들에 네 가지 핵심적인 시사점을 제시한다.

첫째, 필리핀은 중국이 도입한 허가체제에 공개적으로든 실제 행동에서든 양보해서는 안 된다. 마닐라는 2024년 중국과 체결한 잠정 합의가 노골적인 대립을 방지하는 데 기여했다고 평가한다. 그러나 필리핀의 배타적경제수역 안에 있는 세컨드 토머스 암초의 필리핀 전초기지에 보급품을 전달하려면 중국 정부의 허가가 필요하다는 사실을 받아들이는 순간, 관할권을 둘러싼 논쟁은 사실상 총 한 발 쏘지 않고 패배한 것이 된다. 허가가 필요하지 않다는 마닐라의 입장을 계속 고수하는 것이 필리핀이 보유한 전략적으로 가장 중요한 수단이다.

둘째, 중국의 행동이 강압적이라는 사실을 드러내는 것은 중국의 통치권 행사를 약화시킨다. 중국의 성공은 그러한 행동들이 일상적인 행정활동처럼 보이는 데서 나오기 때문이다. 2023년부터 마닐라는 중국의 강압적인 행동을 공개적으로 부각하려는 ‘적극적 투명성(assertive transparency)’ 정책을 활용해왔다. 이를 통해 중국의 법 집행 행위는 중국의 통치권 행사가 분쟁 대상이라는 사실을 보여주는 공개 기록의 일부가 되며, 중국 정부가 자신의 통치권이 받아들여졌다고 주장하는 것을 차단한다.

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셋째, 중국의 통치권 행사를 집단적으로 인정하지 않는 입장을 유지해야 한다. 필리핀이 이러한 분쟁에서 고립돼서는 안 된다. 중국 정부가 이를 양국 간 분쟁으로 규정하기 쉬워질 수 있기 때문이다. 필리핀은 2024년 해양구역법을 통해 유엔해양법협약에 따른 자국의 해양권리를 명시했다. 따라서 영국과 유럽연합(EU) 같은 협력국들은 일반적인 지지 성명을 발표하는 데 그치지 않고 중국 정부가 취한 각각의 조치를 구체적으로 지목해 명시적으로 거부할 수 있다. 또한 자국 선박과 상업적 사업자들이 중국의 허가를 신청하는 일이 없도록 해야 한다.

마지막으로, 필리핀 해경과 해양영역인식체계의 역량을 강화하는 것이 필수적이다. 중국 정부의 허가체제는 이를 집행할 수 있는 동안에만 유지된다. 마닐라가 자국의 배타적경제수역에서 어떤 일이 벌어지고 있는지 파악할 수 있는 능력을 강화하면 대응능력도 더욱 향상될 것이다.

9월 24일 사건은 수많은 사건 가운데 하나이며, 마지막 사건도 아닐 것이다. 이러한 대립이 늘어나면서 추가적인 긴장 고조가 발생할 위험이 있지만, 더 큰 위험은 중국 정부의 권한이 조용히 잠식하듯 확대되는 데 있다. 남중국해의 행위자들이 세컨드 토머스 암초에 보급품을 전달하려면 중국 정부의 승인이 필요하다는 생각을 따르게 된다면, 중국은 단순한 대립에서 승리하는 것보다 더 중요한 것을 얻은 셈이 된다. 바로 누가 바다를 이용할 수 있는지를 결정하는 권한이다.

© Charles Pearson, 2026. 저자의 허가를 받아 RUSI에서 발행.

이 논평에 표현된 견해는 저자 개인의 견해이며, RUSI 또는 다른 기관의 입장을 대변하지 않는다.

이용조건은 웹사이트 이용약관을 참조하기 바란다.

RUSI에 기고하고 싶은 논평 아이디어가 있다면 [commentaries@rusi.org](mailto:commentaries@rusi.org)로 간단한 기획안을 보내주시기 바란다. 연구 관심 분야에 부합할 경우 회신할 예정이다. 기고자를 위한 전체 지침도 확인할 수 있다.

China is Not Just Claiming the South China Sea. It is Learning to Govern It | Royal United Services Institute

China is Not Just Claiming the South China Sea. It is Learning to Govern It

China is Not Just Claiming the South China Sea. It is Learning to Govern It

Dr Charles Pearson

9 October 20267 Minute Read

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Beijing claims a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal was illegal, lacking approval from Beijing, China has shifted to treating this as space it administers.

The 24 September incident saw China Coast Guard patrol ships intercept Philippine vessels involved in a resupply run, destined for Second Thomas Shoal, situated within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The interception occurred 60 nautical miles from its destination of BRP Sierra Madre, the ship which Manila grounded on purpose in 1999 to assert its claim and act as a garrison. The Philippine Coast Guard commented that the manoeuvres involved in this interception ‘put Filipino personnel at risk’. China Coast Guard vessels, supported by its now infamous maritime militia, crowded the shoal, while three warships lurked nearby. The incident was subsequently followed by a military exercise. This incident is part of a consistent pattern, with the recently circulated footage of a Chinese cutter ramming a Philippine fisheries vessel in these waters on 18 September further demonstrating the aggressive tactics in play.

Much of the commentary has framed these incidents as further acts of aggression, and suggested that a more major clash between China and a US treaty ally could be on the horizon. Much more revealing, however, is a claim in China’s state-run Global Times, citing an unnamed source, stating that it acted appropriately, as the Philippine resupply mission was illegal, since it ‘had not received prior Chinese approval’. Similarly, China News attributed a comment to Jiang Lue, spokesperson of the China Coast Guard, that ‘the Philippines broke its commitments’. Manila has continually issued denials that a provisional agreement made between the two sides in 2024 mandates any prior approvals.

Fishing bans do not determine ownership over the water but still dictate who can fish. Each of these measures exists in a grey zone of sorts, whereby the threshold for significant contestation has not been met, while Chinese vessels project a vision of authority

The language used by China is exactly the sort used by an administering authority over territory, rather than the sort used to establish a claim. This incident at Second Thomas Shoal is part of a slower contest over long-term governance in the South China Sea.

Permission, Not Possession

China’s stance rests on the nine-dash line, which China uses in an official cartographic manner to state its jurisdiction over the majority of the South China Sea. This cartographic line is useful, but observers must also consider the modest, technical approach that has established China’s permission regime.

Scarborough Shoal provides one example of this strategy in motion. In November 2024, straight baselines were declared around it. These are the lines from which maritime zones are measured, including territorial waters, contiguous zones, EEZs, etc. Furthermore, in September 2025, a national nature reserve was announced for Scarborough Shoal, while management rules including the prohibition of fishing ‘without prior approval’ were issued in August 2026. As such, no individual or organisation except those permitted by law would be allowed entry to these waters, as enforced by patrols from the China Coast Guard.

The same logic has been extended by China into the wider South China Sea, as every summer, a fishing moratorium prevents access to around half of the entire sea, running from May to mid-August. Much of this space overlaps with the internationally recognised EEZs of Vietnam and the Philippines. China has even established Sansha City in this space, which administers the Paracel and Spratly Islands as Chinese districts. The 2021 Coast Guard Law also authorises the use of weapons in ‘maritime areas under Chinese jurisdiction’, without a clear definition of where those waters end. A further Coast Guard Regulation in 2024 permitted them to detain non-Chinese nationals suspected of illegally entering these waters for up to 60 days.

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These measures are unclear on what exactly China owns, but are very clear on the necessity for permissions and consequences for any person or organisation that may break China’s domestic rules. Fishing bans do not determine ownership over the water but still dictate who can fish. Each of these measures exists in a grey zone of sorts, whereby the threshold for significant contestation has not been met, while Chinese vessels project a vision of authority.

The effect is cumulative. Fishing vessels begin to adhere to prohibition orders, lending legitimacy to China’s permission regime. Crews on resupply missions learn that their route and destination exist in a space of China’s apparent administration. Over time, these habits turn into something resembling jurisdiction, despite continuing protest from littoral state governments around the South China Sea. In a recent article in The Pacific Review, I call this zonation strategy, referring to the use of maritime zones, both legal and quasi-legal, as tools of state control at sea.

Why Winning in Court Has Not been Enough

A 2016 arbitral award in the Philippines v China case remains the clearest legal rebuttal of Beijing’s stance. This tribunal found that China’s historic rights claims within the nine-dash line were unfounded in international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Indeed, it stated that no maritime feature occupied by China in the Spratly Islands should host its own EEZ, while Second Thomas Shoal exists within the Philippines’ EEZ. The legal consequences of this award have been substantial, providing Manila with a basis to challenge Beijing’s administrative expansion.

However, it changed little in practice. China has since established military installations such as bases, ports and airstrips on artificial islands, including Mischief, Subi and Fiery Cross Reefs. Meanwhile, the China Coast Guard, referred to as its ‘second navy’, has grown, and expanded its patrols. While the award concerned what China was legally entitled to, Beijing has practised governance based on what others can be made to do. China does not need to win a legal argument over sovereignty if its routines can train other actors to behave as though they must seek its permission.

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The West’s response suffers the same shortfall. US Freedom of Navigation Operations express their disapproval of China’s actions by sailing into and through the contested waters. These occasional displays make a sharp legal point, but fail to administer a permanent free-seas reality when fishing bans, the nature reserve and coast guard patrols are daily realities. AUKUS, which has plans to give Australia nuclear-powered submarines, equally plays into the deterrence model of contestation to China’s jurisdictional activities, but fails to prevent the everyday small actions, including the rerouting of a Philippine resupply boat.

Refusing the Paperwork

Since China’s advantage is built upon everyday practice, it must be contested through similar means, placing four key implications on Manila and its partners.

First, the Philippines must not concede on the permission regime China has instated, publicly or in practice. Manila credits the provisional arrangement it made with China in 2024 with preventing outright confrontation, but as soon as a resupply mission to the Philippine outpost at Second Thomas Shoal, inside its EEZ, is accepted as requiring Beijing’s permission, the argument over jurisdiction has essentially been lost without shots fired. Continuing Manila’s insistence that no permission is required is the most strategically important tool it possesses.

Second, exposing China’s actions as coercive undermines its administration, as its success comes from actions looking routine. Since 2023, Manila has used a practice of ‘assertive transparency’, which attempts to highlight China’s coercive manoeuvres in the public domain. As such, enforcement acts become part of the public record that this administration is disputed, blocking Beijing from claiming acceptance.

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Third, collective non-recognition of China’s administration must hold. The Philippines must not become isolated in these disputes, as they can quickly become framed by Beijing as bilateral quarrels. Manila’s 2024 Maritime Zones Act laid out its maritime entitlements under UNCLOS. Partners such as the UK and EU can therefore go further than general statements of support and explicitly reject each of Beijing’s measures by name, ensuring that their own vessels and commercial operators never apply for Chinese permits.

Finally, capacity building for the Philippine Coast Guard and its maritime domain awareness systems is essential. Beijing’s permission regime only lasts as long as it is enforced. Increased capacity for Manila to see what is happening in its EEZ will improve its response further.

The incident of 24 September is one of many, and will not be the last. There is a risk that further escalation could occur as these confrontations proliferate, but the greater danger is the quiet encroachment of Beijing’s authority. If actors in the South China Sea become adherent to the idea that resupplying Second Thomas Shoal necessitates Beijing’s approval, China will have won something more important than a simple confrontation. It will have won the authority over who may use the sea.

© Charles Pearson, 2026, published by RUSI with permission of the author.

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[백선호]

서해에서도 이런 짓을 할 수 있는데 우리도 절대 공개적으로든 실제 행동에서든 양보해서는 안되겠네요.

[위종민]

사실 굳이 영유권을 획득할 필요 없이 사실상 주인 행세만 하면 되는 거니까요.

실제 행동은 물론, 공개적으로 통치하겠다는 시도를 부인하고 국제협력을 이끌어내야 될 텐데, 우리가 잘 할 수 있을지는 솔직히 잘 모르겠습니다 ㅜㅜ