외국세력 간 경쟁이 소말리아의 정치적 위기를 심화시키고 있다

[위종민]

When Computers Went To Sea | 소말리아와 터키 간의 방위협정 - Daum 카페

소말리아와 터키 간의 방위협정

When Computers Went To Sea | 이집트, 에티오피아와의 갈등으로 소말리아와 연계를 강화 - Daum 카페

이집트, 에티오피아와의 갈등으로 소말리아와 연계를 강화

When Computers Went To Sea | 소말리아, 터키에서 T129 ATAK 공격헬기 도입 예정 - Daum 카페

소말리아, 터키에서 T129 ATAK 공격헬기 도입 예정

When Computers Went To Sea | UAE, 소말리아 푼틀란드에 레이다시스템 배치 - Daum 카페

UAE, 소말리아 푼틀란드에 레이다시스템 배치

When Computers Went To Sea | 다시 준동하고 있는 소말리아 해적들 - Daum 카페

다시 준동하고 있는 소말리아 해적들

When Computers Went To Sea | Re: 시리아에서 소말릴란드까지; 터키-이스라엘의 경쟁 - Daum 카페

Re: 시리아에서 소말릴란드까지; 터키-이스라엘의 경쟁

When Computers Went To Sea | 터키와 소말리아의 협력, 그리고 홍해를 둘러싼 각축전 - Daum 카페

터키와 소말리아의 협력, 그리고 홍해를 둘러싼 각축전

재임중인 대통령의 임기연장 법안이 통과돼 소말리아 남서부, 중부, 북부의 푼틀란드와 도서지역의 알 샤바브 등 각 세력의 정쟁이 격화되고 있는데, 거기에 터키(소말리아 정부), UAE (소말릴란드, 푼틀란드, 주발란드 등 소말리아 정부와 대립하는 세력) 등의 외세가 개입해 정쟁을 격화시킬 수 있다고 합니다. 주요 세력간 분쟁이 격화되면 알 샤바브나 ISIS같은 테러조직 진압작전이 약화돼 문제가 더 악화된다고.. 

# 외국 세력 간 경쟁, 소말리아의 정치적 위기를 장기전으로 악화시킬 위험

소말리아의 국내 불안정이 격화된 역내 경쟁으로 더욱 심화하면서, 아프리카의 뿔 지역 다른 곳에서 나타난 것처럼 분쟁이 더욱 고착화할 수 있는 상황이 조성되고 있다.

전문가 논평

2026년 10월 16일 발행 | 읽는 시간 3분

2026년 6월 4일 모가디슈 하울 와다그 지구에서 포격이 발생했다는 보도가 나온 뒤 소말리아 정부군이 거리를 순찰하고 있다. (AFP via Getty Images)

아웨이스 아흐메드

스타브로스 니아르코스 재단 객원연구원, 아프리카 프로그램

소말리아는 하산 셰이크 모하무드 대통령의 임기가 당초 만료될 예정이었던 2026년 5월부터 정치적 위기에 휩싸여 있다. 의회는 지난 3월 대통령 임기를 5년으로 연장하는 헌법 개정안을 통과시켜 하산 셰이크 대통령이 2027년 5월까지 재임할 수 있도록 했다.

이에 소말리아 야권 연합이 반발했다. 이 연합에는 북부 푼틀란드와 남부 주발란드 연방 구성주의 지도부, 남서부주 전 대통령 압디아지즈 라프타가렌을 비롯한 정치인들이 참여하고 있다. 이번 주 야권은 선거관리위원회가 2027년 4월과 5월에 각각 의회선거와 대통령선거를 실시하겠다고 일방적으로 발표한 것도 거부했다.

정치적 위기는 모가디슈와 남서부주의 바이도아에서 격렬한 충돌을 촉발했다. 최근 바이도아 일대에서 정부군과 라프타가렌에게 충성하는 야권 연계 전투원들 사이에 벌어진 교전에는 수천 명의 전투원이 참가하고 드론과 전투기가 사용된 것으로 전해졌다.

연방정부와 이에 협력하는 남서부주, 히르샤벨레주, 갈무두그주 정부는 소말리아 남부와 중부의 주요 도시 대부분을 통제하고 있다. 반면 최남단의 주발란드는 모가디슈와 대립하고 있다. 알카에다와 연계된 조직인 알샤바브는 이 도시들을 둘러싼 농촌지역 대부분을 장악하고 있다. 한편 푼틀란드와 독립을 선언한 소말릴란드 공화국의 행정부는 북부의 상당 부분을 통치하고 있으며, 그 사이에는 새로 설립된 친연방정부 성향의 북동부주가 끼어 있다.

## 역내 긴장 속에서 더욱 커진 이해관계

헌법을 둘러싼 분쟁이 무력충돌로 이어진 것은 소말리아에서 처음이 아니다. 2021년에도 비슷한 충돌이 발생했다. 그러나 이번에는 연방체제 내부의 권력균형이 걸려 있기 때문에 이해관계가 더욱 중대하다. 야권은 하산 셰이크 대통령이 이끄는 현 연방정부가 각 주의 권한을 희생시키면서 모가디슈에 권력을 집중하려 한다고 비난한다.

관련 글: 티그라이에 전쟁이 다시 찾아왔다. 이번에는 에티오피아 내부에 머물지 않을 수도 있다.

소말리아의 분쟁은 외국 세력들 사이의 경쟁이 심화하고 복잡한 동맹관계가 형성되면서, 갈수록 그러한 경쟁의 중심지가 되고 있는 지역에서 벌어지고 있다. 크게 두 개의 유동적인 진영이 형성됐다. 이집트, 사우디아라비아, 튀르키예는 역내에서 수단군 및 에리트레아와 대체로 같은 편에 서 있는 것으로 여겨지는 반면, 아랍에미리트(UAE)와 이스라엘은 에티오피아와 대체로 같은 편에 서 있는 것으로 평가된다.

현재 소말리아의 정치적 위기에서 가장 중요한 외부 행위자는 튀르키예와 UAE다. 튀르키예는 연방정부를 지원하는 것으로 여겨지는 반면, UAE는 야권에 속한 주정부들과 관계를 맺고 있다.

이러한 역학관계는 새로운 동맹 형성을 촉진하는 동시에 분열을 심화하고 있다. 기존의 국내 정세가 불안정하다는 점을 고려하면, 여러 위험이 중첩되면서 새로운 분쟁이 고착화할 심각한 가능성이 있다.

## 튀르키예와 UAE

튀르키예는 10년 넘게 소말리아에 관여해왔으며, 주로 모가디슈의 연방정부를 통해 활동했지만 관여 경로가 거기에만 국한된 것은 아니다. 초기에는 인도주의 및 개발사업에 집중했다. 또한 2017년부터 소말리아군을 위한 군사훈련시설을 운영해왔다.

튀르키예는 2024년 이후 모가디슈와 여러 전략협정을 체결하면서 하산 셰이크 행정부와 더욱 가까워졌다. 이 때문에 일부 야권 인사들은 현재 대통령 임기 연장을 둘러싼 분쟁에서 튀르키예의 중립성에 의문을 제기했다. 튀르키예는 정치적 개입 의혹을 부인했으며, 자국의 입장은 소말리아 연방정부 기관들을 지지한다는 기존 정책과 일치한다고 밝혔다.

그러나 최근 튀르키예 전투기들이 바이도아 인근 교전에 관여한 것으로 전해졌다. 앙카라는 이를 확인하지 않았지만, 사실이라면 무장한 정치적 반대세력에 대한 주목할 만한 직접 개입에 해당한다.

현재 소말리아의 정치적 위기에서 가장 중요한 외부 행위자는 튀르키예와 UAE다.

UAE는 현 연방정부 및 소말리아의 일부 연방 구성주와 다층적인 관계를 구축했다. 그러나 2026년 1월 소말리아 연방정부는 UAE가 소말리아의 국가주권을 훼손하고 있다고 비난하면서 양국 간 모든 국방·안보 협력협정을 무효화했다.

이 조치는 예멘에서 사우디아라비아와 UAE 사이의 균열이 발생한 시기와 맞물렸다. 협정들을 무효화하기 며칠 전, 소말리아는 예멘의 사우디 주도 연합군이 아부다비가 예멘 분리주의 지도자를 베르베라와 모가디슈를 경유해 UAE로 탈출시키는 데 관여했다고 비난한 뒤 조사에 착수했다. 이후 소말리아는 튀르키예와 이집트의 외교적 지원을 받아 사우디아라비아 및 카타르와 국방협정을 체결했다.

UAE는 소말릴란드, 푼틀란드, 주발란드와 직접적인 관계를 유지해왔으며, UAE 기업들은 항만 운영에서 상당한 이해관계를 보유하고 있다. 이들 지역정부는 모두 모가디슈가 협정들을 취소한 조치를 거부했다.

따라서 각 지역 지도부에 대한 영향력을 유지하는 것은 UAE의 광범위한 아프리카의 뿔 지역 전략에서 매우 중요하다. 그러나 모가디슈에 반대하는 연방 구성주들과 UAE의 관계는 긴장을 더욱 고조시키는 데 기여하고 있다.

## 국내적 요인

현지 행위자들도 자국 내 이해관계와 정당성을 강화하기 위해 외부의 지원을 점점 더 적극적으로 모색하고 있다. 연방정부와 야권 모두 지원을 끌어내기 위해 자신들의 국내 영향력이 외부 행위자들의 이익과 부합한다는 점을 보여주려 노력하고 있다.

외국 세력에 지원을 호소하는 데는 여러 요인이 작용한다. 그중 핵심은 소말리아 정치세력들 사이의 깊은 정치적 분열과 이러한 분열을 실질적으로 해결하려는 노력이 지속적으로 실패해왔다는 점이다. 따라서 서로 경쟁하는 국내 엘리트들은 현지 정치적 경쟁세력에 맞서 균형을 확보하기 위해 항만 투자, 경제협력, 수송회랑, 군사기지 등 외부 세력에 전략적 유인을 제공하려 하고 있다.

연방체제 내부의 권력균형이 걸려 있다.

연방정부가 추진한 논란의 헌법 및 선거제도 개혁은 이러한 분열을 더욱 고착화했다. 일부 연방 구성주와 소말릴란드는 튀르키예가 군사적 지원과 투자를 제공하고 있다는 보도 속에서 모가디슈가 권력을 집중하는 데 위협을 느끼고 있다.

변화하는 역내 지정학적 역학관계는 소말리아 국내 행위자들이 활용할 수 있는 협상력도 높이고 있다. 예멘에서 후티 반군이 진격하면서 아덴만과 홍해를 연결하는 바브엘만데브 해협의 중요성이 다시 한번 부각됐고, 소말리아의 전략적 입지도 더욱 중요해졌다. 후티 반군은 소말리아의 알샤바브와 관계를 확대하고 있는 것으로 전해졌다.

## 전쟁 심화의 위험

소말리아는 30년 넘게 무력분쟁에 휩싸여 있었다. 씨족이든 특정 행정부든 지역정부든, 어느 한 세력도 다른 세력들을 압도하고 국가 전체를 통치할 수 없었다.

그러나 현재 정치적 반대세력들 사이에서 무력충돌이 격화하고 더욱 정교한 무기가 동원되는 상황은 새로운 국면이 시작되고 있음을 보여준다. 현지 행위자들은 증가하는 위협에 맞서 균형을 확보하기 위해 외부의 지원과 새로운 동맹을 점점 더 적극적으로 모색하고 있다.

예를 들어 라프타가렌의 옛 남서부주 행정부에서 장관을 지낸 한 인사는 최근 바이도아 분쟁에서 자신들의 병력이 드론을 사용했다고 밝혔으며, 어떤 외부 세력이든 드론을 제공한다면 받아들이겠다고 말했다. 북부에서는 연방정부가 2025년 북동부주를 설립한 데 대응해 푼틀란드와 소말릴란드가 동맹을 형성했다. 이러한 역학관계는 외국 세력의 지원에 힘입어 분쟁이 더욱 확대될 위험을 낳고 있다.

변화하는 안보 환경에 관해 더 알고 싶으십니까?

안보·국방 콘퍼런스에서 전문가 및 정책결정자들과 함께 오늘날 가장 시급한 위협에 관한 솔직한 분석을 들어보십시오.

더욱이 이러한 무력분쟁은 알샤바브와 소말리아 ISIS처럼 소말리아에서 활동하는 테러조직들에도 기회를 제공한다. 정치적 위기 기간에는 이들 조직을 대상으로 한 안보작전이 상당히 축소되는 경우가 많으며, 이는 이들이 세력을 회복하고 재편할 수 있게 한다. 연방정부와 야권 세력 사이의 무력분쟁 심화는 이들 조직이 다층적인 분쟁 속에서 영향력을 확대할 기회를 제공한다.

이처럼 더 광범위한 이해관계가 걸려 있는 만큼, 연방정부 및 연방 구성주들과 관계를 맺고 있는 모든 외부 당사자는 소말리아 정치세력들 사이의 긴장을 완화할 방안을 모색하는 것이 자신들의 이익에도 부합한다. 또한 이러한 분쟁이 아프리카의 뿔 지역과 홍해의 광범위한 역학관계와 맞물려 있다는 점을 고려하면, 아프리카연합(AU)과 정부간개발기구(IGAD) 같은 역내 기구들을 통해 긴장 완화 노력을 조율하는 것도 매우 중요하다.

단기적으로는 선거가 실시될 때까지 현실적인 일정을 마련하면서 헌법 개정, 선거 문제, 과도기 통치체제에 관한 포괄적인 정치적 합의로 이어질 수 있는 대화를 촉진해야 한다. 이러한 합의가 없다면 더욱 광범위하고 장기적인 분쟁이 발생할 위험은 계속 높아질 것이다.

Foreign rivalries risk turning Somalia’s political crisis into a protracted war | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank

Foreign rivalries risk turning Somalia’s political crisis into a protracted war

Foreign rivalries risk turning Somalia’s political crisis into a protracted war

Somalia’s domestic instability is being compounded by sharpened regional rivalries, paving the way for a more entrenched conflict as seen elsewhere in the Horn of Africa.

Expert comment

Published 16 October 2026 —3 minute READ

Image — Somali government forces patrol a street following reported shelling in the Howl Wadaag district of Mogadishu on 4 June 4, 2026. Photo by AFP via Getty Images.

Aweis Ahmed

Stavros Niarchos Foundation Visiting Fellow, Africa Programme

Somalia has been embroiled in a political crisis since May 2026, when the term of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was originally due to expire. Parliament passed constitutional amendments in March that extended presidential terms to five years, keeping President Hassan Sheikh in office until May 2027. 

This was disputed by Somalia’s opposition alliance, a coalition of political figures including the leadership of the federal member states of Puntland in the north and Jubaland in the south, as well as the former president of South West State, Abdiaziz Laftagareen. This week, the opposition also rejected the electoral commission’s unilateral announcement that parliamentary and presidential polls would take place in April and May 2027.

The political crisis has sparked fierce clashes in Mogadishu and the city of Baidoa in South West State. The recent fighting around Baidoa, between government forces and opposition-allied fighters loyal to Laftagreen, reportedly involved thousands of fighters and the use of drones and fighter jets. 

The federal government, along with its allied federal member state administrations – South West, Hirshabelle, and Galmudug – controls most major cities in southern and central Somalia, while Jubaland, in the far south, is at odds with Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda-affiliated organization, controls much of the surrounding countryside. Meanwhile, the administrations of Puntland and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland govern much of the north, with the newly created and federal government-aligned North East State squeezed in-between. 

High stakes amid regional tensions

This is not Somalia’s first experience of constitutional disputes leading to armed clashes, with similar conflict occurring in 2021. But the stakes are higher this time, as the balance of power within the federal system is at stake. The opposition accuses the current federal government under President Hassan Sheikh of seeking to consolidate power in Mogadishu at the expense of the states.

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The conflict in Somalia is also taking place in a region that has increasingly become the focus of escalating rivalries between foreign powers in a complex web of alliances. Two broad, fluid blocs have taken shape: Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are seen as broadly aligned with Sudan’s Armed Forces and Eritrea in the region, while the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel are seen as broadly aligned with Ethiopia. 

In Somalia’s current political crisis, Turkey and the UAE are the two most important external actors. Turkey is seen as backing the federal government, while the UAE has relations with the opposition state administrations. 

These dynamics are helping to both incentivize new alliances and deepen divisions. Given the existing domestic volatility, there is a serious compound risk of newly entrenched conflict. 

Turkey and the UAE

Turkey has been engaged in Somalia for over a decade, primarily but not exclusively through the federal government in Mogadishu. Its initial involvement concentrated on humanitarian and development initiatives. It has also run a military training camp for the Somali armed forces since 2017.

Turkey has drawn closer to the Hassan Sheikh administration since 2024 after signing several strategic agreements with Mogadishu. This prompted some opposition figures to question Turkey’s neutrality in the context of the current conflict over the presidential term extension. Turkey has rejected accusations of political interference and says its position is consistent with its support for Somalia’s federal government institutions. 

However, more recently, Turkish fighter jets were reportedly involved in the fighting near Baidoa. This has not been confirmed by Ankara, but would constitute a notable direct intervention against armed political opposition. 

In Somalia’s current political crisis, Turkey and the UAE are the two most important external actors.

The UAE established multi-layered ties with the current federal government and some of the country’s federal member states. However, in January 2026, Somalia’s federal government annulled all its defence and security cooperation agreements with the UAE, accusing it of undermining Somalia’s national sovereignty. 

This move coincided with the Saudi-Emirati rift in Yemen. Days before annulling the agreements, Somalia launched an investigation after the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen accused Abu Dhabi of facilitating the evacuation of a Yemeni separatist leader to the UAE via Berbera and Mogadishu. Somalia then signed defence agreements with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, with diplomatic support from Turkey and Egypt.

The UAE has maintained direct relations with Somaliland, Puntland and Jubaland, with Emirati firms maintaining significant interests in port operations. All of these regional administrations had rejected the cancellation of the agreements by Mogadishu. 

Retaining influence with the leadership in each territory is therefore critical to the UAE’s wider strategy in the Horn of Africa. But its relations with the federal states opposed to Mogadishu are contributing to further inflaming tensions.  

Domestic drivers 

Local actors are also increasingly looking outwards for foreign backing to shore up their domestic interests and legitimacy. To attract support, both the federal government and the opposition are making efforts to show that their domestic influence aligns with the interests of external actors. 

This appeal to foreign players is driven by multiple factors. Key among them is the profound political division among Somali political actors, and the persistent failure to genuinely address these divisions. To counterbalance their local political rivals, competing domestic elites are therefore seeking to offer strategic incentives to external powers such as port investments, economic partnerships, transport corridors and military bases.

The balance of power within the federal system is at stake.

The federal government’s controversial constitutional and electoral reforms have solidified these divisions. Some federal member states and Somaliland feel threatened by Mogadishu’s consolidation of power, backed by Turkey’s reported military support and investments. 

Shifting regional geopolitical dynamics are also increasing the leverage available to domestic actors in Somalia. The Houthis’ advance in Yemen has once again exposed the importance of the Bab al-Mandab Strait connecting the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, reinforcing Somalia’s strategic location. The Houthis reportedly have growing relations with al-Shabaab in Somalia.  

The risks of deepening war

Somalia has been embroiled in armed conflicts for over three decades. No single entity – whether a clan, a specific administration or a regional government – has been able to dominate the rest and rule the entire country. 

However, the escalation of current armed clashes between political opponents, and the involvement of more sophisticated weaponry, points to a new chapter. Local actors are increasingly seeking external support and new alliances as a counterbalance to rising threats. 

For example, a minister from Laftagareen’s former South West State administration recently stated that their forces used drones in the latest Baidoa conflict and said they would accept drones from any external power. In the north, Puntland and Somaliland formed an alliance in response to the federal government establishing North East State in 2025. These dynamics risk a widening conflict fuelled by the support of foreign powers. 

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Furthermore, these armed conflicts provide an opportunity for terrorist organizations active in Somalia, such as al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia. During political crises, security operations against these groups often decline considerably, allowing them to recover and regroup. The deepening armed conflicts between the federal government and opposition groups offers these organizations an opportunity to expand their influence within a multi-layered conflict.   

Given these broader stakes, it is in the interests of all external parties who have relations with the federal government and member states to pursue options for de-escalation between Somali political actors. Considering their intersection with wider regional dynamics in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea, it is also vital that de-escalation efforts are triangulated through regional institutions such as the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). 

In the short term, there is a need to facilitate dialogue that can pave the way for an inclusive political agreement on constitutional amendments, electoral issues and interim governance arrangements, with a realistic timetable until elections can be held. Without such an agreement, the risk of a wider protracted conflict will continue to rise.