중간선거 승리가 전쟁 종결과 관세전쟁 종료를 뜻하지는 않는다

[위종민]

채텀하우스에 올라온 글입니다. 

각종 행정 권한이 행정부에 집중돼 있고, 법안거부권도 갖고 있어서 11월 3일 중간선거에서 민주당이 상하양원을 장악해도 당장 이란전쟁이 끝나고 관세전쟁이 없던 일이 되는 건 아니라고 설명하네요. 

# 미국 유권자들은 분노하고 있다. 그러나 관세와 전쟁에 관해서는 중간선거가 신속한 변화를 가져오지 못할 것이다

미국 유권자들이 분노하고 있지만, 국내 물가를 끌어올리는 국제정책, 즉 관세와 이란 전쟁에서 즉각적인 변화를 체감할 가능성은 낮다.

전문가 논평

2026년 10월 22일 발행 — 읽는 시간 3분

사진 — 2026년 9월 22일 캘리포니아주 마라톤 페트롤리엄 로스앤젤레스 정유공장 밖에서 미국 국기를 배경으로 주유소의 휘발유 가격이 표시돼 있다. 사진: Patrick T. Fallon / AFP via Getty Images.

헤더 헐버트

채텀하우스 미국·북미 프로그램 준연구위원

미국 중간선거가 다가오면서 미국 유권자들은 분노하고 있다. 경제와 물가, 불안정한 상황에 분노하고 있다. 그리고 자신들이 국내에서 겪는 어려움을 트럼프 행정부의 국제정책과 연결 짓고 있다.

여론은 관세를 높은 물가와 직접 연결하고 있다. 8월 실시된 조사에서는 미국인의 75%가 식료품과 상품을 감당할 수 있는지 걱정하고 있으며, 이러한 걱정을 하는 사람들의 83%는 관세가 해당 상품들의 가격을 인상시켰다고 응답했다. 또한 유권자 네 명 중 세 명에 달하는 사람들이 관세가 자신의 투표에 영향을 미칠 것이라고 말했다.

유권자들은 이란 전쟁에도 분노하고 있으며, 이를 생활비와 직접 연결 짓고 있다. 응답자의 과반수는 트럼프가 중간선거 전에 전쟁을 끝내더라도 그의 정당을 더 호의적으로 평가하지는 않을 것이라고 답했다.

관련 기사: 미국 중간선거가 이례적인 외교정책 선거가 된 이유

중간선거 유권자들이 국제문제에 이처럼 분노했던 마지막 시기는 이라크 전쟁이 악화되던 2006년이었다. 그러나 그 선거 이후 당시 대통령이었던 조지 W. 부시는 이라크에서 오히려 더욱 공격적인 정책을 채택했다. 이른바 2007년의 ‘증파(surge)’였다. 트럼프의 공개 발언을 보면 그 역시 전쟁과 관세 양쪽에서 더욱 공격적으로 나설 가능성이 높다. 이는 부분적으로 그의 정치적 스타일로 설명할 수 있지만, 국제정책에 관한 권한이 행정부에 얼마나 집중돼 있는지도 그 이유다.

민주당은 의회 양원 중 한 곳 또는 양쪽 모두에서 승리할 경우 부패와 법치주의 문제에 대한 조사를 시작하겠다고 밝혔다. 그러나 권한을 되찾으려는 노력은 느리게 진행될 것이며, 그 성과가 유권자들의 지갑에 반영되기까지는 더욱 오랜 시간이 걸릴 것이다.

## 이란에 대한 정책 방향을 바꿀 수 있을까?

이란 전쟁과 관련해 중간선거 이전에 합의를 가로막았던 모든 요인은 11월 3일 이후에도 그대로 남아 있을 것이다. 역내와 미국의 인사들은 중간선거 이후 충돌이 재개될지에 관해 추측하고 있으며, 이란 핵시설에 대한 공격부터 이라크를 거점으로 한 더욱 공격적인 대리전까지 전쟁이 확대될 수 있는 여러 방식을 전망하고 있다. 한편 트럼프는 이 지역에 병력 9,000명을 추가로 파견한다고 발표했다.

일부 의회 의원들은 이미 전쟁을 강제로 끝내기 위해 자신들이 활용할 수 있는 수단을 검토하고 있다. 그중 하나가 1973년 전쟁권한법(War Powers Act)으로, 60일을 초과하는 적대행위에는 의회의 승인이 필요하다고 규정한다. 관련 결의안은 이미 일부 공화당 의원들의 지지를 받아 하원을 세 차례 통과했다. 트럼프는 지금까지 상원에서 이 결의안이 통과되는 것을 막는 데 성공했지만, 가장 최근에는 단 한 표 차이로 저지했다. 다음 의회에서 결의안이 양원을 모두 통과하는 상황을 상상하는 것은 그리 어려운 일이 아니다.

그러나 과거 의회가 이 법률을 활용하려 했을 때 양당 출신 대통령들은 거부권을 행사하거나 이를 무시했다. 트럼프도 2019년 예멘 문제와 2020년 이란 문제에서 그렇게 했다. 법원 역시 입법적 구제수단이 남아 있는 동안에는 관할권이 없다는 이유로, 전쟁권한법의 집행을 요구하며 의원들이 제기한 소송의 심리를 거부해왔다. 공동결의안이 통과되더라도 트럼프에 대한 정치적 압박이 커지는 것 이상의 효과는 없을 것이다.

그렇게 되면 의회에는 또 다른 수단인 예산권이 남는다. 현 의회가 선거 직후 복귀해 이른바 ‘레임덕 회기’를 진행하면, 1월에 새 의회가 출범하기 전에 이란 전쟁 비용을 충당하기 위한 국방부의 추가 예산 요청에 대해 표결하도록 요구받게 될 것이다. 민주당 의원들과 소수의 공화당 의원들은 이미 한 차례 이러한 예산안의 통과를 저지했으며, 이를 둘러싼 활발한 공개 논쟁이 이어질 것이 확실하다. 그러나 의회가 자신들이 반대하는 전쟁의 예산을 중단하겠다고 위협한 것은 이번이 처음이 아니지만, 실제로 그러한 위협을 실행에 옮긴 적은 없다.

그렇지만 때로는 위협과 공개적인 논쟁만으로도 영향을 미칠 수 있다. 현재 구성의 의회조차 트럼프가 이란 전쟁 이전에 요청했던 1조 5,000억 달러 규모의 국방예산을 승인할 가능성은 낮다. 이는 44% 증액된 금액이다. 미군이 값비싼 미사일을 보충하고 세계 다른 지역에서의 억제 공약을 이행하는 데 어려움을 겪으면서, 전쟁을 끝내거나 적어도 비용을 줄이기 위해 전쟁의 규모를 축소하라는 압박이 커질 것이다. 그러나 이러한 변화는 빠르게 이뤄지지 않을 것이며, 미국 소비자들이 투표의 이유로 꼽는 물가를 낮추는 데 도움이 될 만큼 결정적이지도 않을 것이다.

## 관세정책의 강화

관세에 관한 전망은 좀 더 명확해 보인다. 미국 헌법은 관세에 관한 권한을 의회에 부여하고 있다. 트럼프의 관세에 반대하는 의원들이 의회에서 과반수를 확보한다면, 원할 경우 관세를 폐지하고 법률로 관세율을 정하거나 의회의 동의 없이 트럼프 행정부가 관세를 인상하는 것을 명시적으로 금지할 수 있다.

그러나 이는 말처럼 쉽지 않다. 지난 10년 동안 다양한 정당 구성의 의회들은 대통령들이 제안한 자유무역협정과 관세 모두에 반대해왔지만, 초당적 다수가 지지할 수 있는 무역정책을 마련하지는 못했다. 이러한 상황은 앞으로도 계속될 가능성이 높다. 의회 민주당 의원들은 트럼프의 무역협상이 어떤 방식으로 진행됐고 관세 면제가 어떻게 허용됐는지를 둘러싼 부패 의혹에 대해 광범위하게 조사할 계획을 예고했다. 그러나 이상적인 관세 수준이 어느 정도여야 하는지에 대해서는 내부적으로 의견 차이가 크며, 학용품이나 건설자재 같은 특정 부문을 넘어 광범위한 관세 부담 완화를 실현할 만큼 충분한 공화당의 협력을 확보할 수 있을지에 대해서도 회의적이다.

한편 트럼프 행정부는 여론에 따라 관세를 인하하기는커녕 오히려 정책을 더욱 강화하고 있다.

트럼프 행정부는 유럽연합(EU)과 다른 15개 경제권을 대상으로 새로운 무역법 ‘301조’ 조사를 시작했다. 이들이 부당하게 낮은 가격으로 수출하기 위해 구조적으로 과잉생산하고 있다는 주장을 근거로 삼았다. 또한 무역환경이 미국의 국가안보를 해치고 있다는 이른바 ‘232조’상의 주장을 근거로 반도체, 핵심 광물, 민간 항공기 및 부품에 관세를 부과할 가능성도 열어뒀다.

마지막으로 트럼프 행정부는 EU의 탄소국경조정제도(CBAM)가 미국 기업들에 미치는 영향에 관한 의견 제출을 요청했다. 여기에는 ‘부정적인 영향을 시정하기 위해 집행 조치를 취하는 것이 적절한지, 적절하다면 어떤 조치를 취해야 하는지’도 포함된다. 의견 제출 기한은 중간선거 다음 주이며, 이후 공개 청문회나 공식 조사 등 다양한 선택지가 열릴 수 있다. 따라서 트럼프 행정부는 내년에 CBAM 관련 관세의 위협이나 실제 부과를 활용할 수 있게 된다. 이는 협상 수단이 될 수도 있고, 현재 시행 중인 조치 일부가 법원에서 무효화될 경우 다음 단계의 관세 부과 수단이 될 수도 있다.

중간선거 결과로 인해 트럼프가 인기가 없는 정책을 바꾸라는 압박을 받을 가능성이 높은 가운데, 유권자들의 명백한 분노 역시 새 의회가 최근 몇 년보다 더 적극적으로 예산과 관세에 관한 자신의 권한을 행사하도록 압박할 것이다. 그렇지 않다면 유권자들은 자신들의 투표가 아무것에도 연결되지 않은 레버를 밀어 올린 것과 같았다고 느낄 가능성이 높다. 그리고 이는 좌절감을 더욱 키워 2028년 대통령선거에서 예상 밖의 결과가 나타날 가능성을 높일 것이다.

US voters are angry. But on tariffs and war, the midterms won’t bring quick change | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank

US voters are angry. But on tariffs and war, the midterms won’t bring quick change

US voters are angry. But on tariffs and war, the midterms won’t bring quick change

Despite their anger, American voters are unlikely to see much immediate change to the international policies that are driving up costs at home: tariffs and the Iran war.

Expert comment

Published 22 October 2026 —3 minute READ

Image — Gas prices are displayed at a gas station across from a US flag outside the Marathon Petroleum Corp. Los Angeles Refinery in California on 22 September 2026. Photo by Patrick T. Fallon / AFP via Getty Images.

Heather Hurlburt

Associate Fellow, US & North America Programme, Chatham House

As the US midterms approach, American voters are angry. They are angry about the economy, about prices and about insecurity. And they have connected their plight at home with the Trump administration’s international policies.

Public opinion directly connects tariffs to high prices.  An August survey found that 75 per cent of Americans worry about being able to afford groceries and goods, while 83 per cent of those worried say tariffs have increased the prices of those goods. And as many as three in four voters say tariffs will influence their vote.

Voters are also angry about the Iran war, which they directly connect to the cost of living. Majorities say that even if Trump ended the war before the midterms, they would not view his party more favourably.

Related work

Why the US midterms are a rare foreign policy election

The last time midterm voters were this angry about international issues was in 2006, as the Iraq war turned sour. But after that election, then-president George W Bush adopted even more aggressive policies in Iraq, the so-called ‘surge’ of 2007. Trump’s public statements suggest that he, too, is likely to be more aggressive on both war and tariffs. His political style explains some of this, but so does the extent to which the executive branch holds power over international policies. 

Democrats have said if they win one or both houses of Congress they will initiate investigations into corruption and the rule of law. But efforts to claw back power will be slow – and even slower to yield results in voters’ wallets.

Changing course on Iran?

On the war with Iran, all the factors that have prevented a deal before the midterm elections will still be in place after 3 November. Voices from the region and the US alike are speculating whether there will be renewed conflict after the midterms and forecasting different ways in which the war could be expanded, from an assault on Iran’s nuclear facilities to a more aggressive proxy war waged from Iraq. Meanwhile, Trump has announced that 9,000 additional troops are being sent to the region.

Some members of Congress are already looking at the tools they have to force an end to the war. One such tool is the War Powers Act of 1973, which requires congressional approval for any hostilities lasting longer than 60 days. Such a resolution has already passed the House of Representatives three times, with the support of a few Republicans. Trump has thus far managed to prevent it from being passed by the Senate, most recently only by one vote. It is not much of a stretch to imagine the resolution passing both houses in the next Congress. 

However, previous congressional attempts to use it have been vetoed and ignored by presidents of both parties – including Trump in 2019 (Yemen) and again in 2020 (Iran). Courts have also declined hearing cases brought by members of Congress seeking to enforce the Act, saying they lacked jurisdiction while legislative remedies were available. Passage of a joint resolution will up the political pressure on Trump but nothing more.  

That leaves Congress with its other tool – the power of the purse. When the current Congress returns shortly after the elections for a so-called ‘lame duck’ session before the newly elected Congress is seated in January, it will be asked to vote on the Pentagon’s request for extra money to fund the Iran war. Democrats and a few Republicans have already blocked such funding from being passed once, and a lively public battle is sure to follow. However, while this would not be the first time a Congress has threatened to cut off funding for wars it disapproves of, it has never actually followed through on such threats. 

Sometimes though, the threat and public debate can be enough to have an impact. Congress – even in its current configuration – is unlikely to approve the $1.5 trillion military budget Trump requested before the war with Iran, a 44 per cent increase. As the US military struggles to replace expensive missiles and meet its deterrence commitments elsewhere in the world, pressure will grow to end the war – or at least to dial it back to reduce costs. But that won’t be quick and it won’t be decisive enough to help lower prices, which is what American consumers say they are voting for. 

Doubling down on tariffs

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On tariffs, the prospects appear more straightforward. The US Constitution reserves tariff power to Congress. Congressional majorities opposing the Trump tariffs could, if they wished, repeal them and set tariff levels in law, or explicitly bar the Trump administration from raising tariffs without congressional consent. 

But that is easier said than done. For the last decade, congresses of various partisan compositions have opposed both free trade agreements and tariffs proposed by presidents but have been unable to find trade policy that cross-partisan majorities can support. This is likely to continue. Congressional Democrats have previewed plans for ambitious investigations of corruption allegations in how Trump’s trade deals were negotiated, and how exemptions to tariffs are granted. But they disagree deeply about what ideal tariff levels should be and are sceptical of gaining enough Republican cooperation for broader tariff relief beyond specific sectors, such as school supplies or construction materials.

Meanwhile, far from bending to popular opinion and reducing tariffs, the Trump administration is doubling down. 

It has initiated another round of ‘section 301’ investigations into the EU and 15 other economies, alleging that they systematically overproduce in order to export at unfairly low prices. It has also left the door open to tariff action on semiconductors, critical minerals and commercial aircraft (and parts) under so-called ‘section 232’ allegations that trade conditions are harming US national security. 

Finally, it has launched a request for comment on how the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) impacts US businesses, including ‘whether and what enforcement action may be appropriate to remedy any negative effects’. Those comments are due the week after the midterms and open up a range of options, including a public hearing or a formal investigation. The Trump administration will therefore be able to use the threat or reality of CBAM tariffs next year; either as a negotiating tool or as a next round of tariffs should any of the current measures be overturned in court.

With the midterm results likely to put Trump under pressure to change unpopular policies, explicit voter anger will also put pressure on a new Congress to be more aggressive than in recent years, to use the power it does have over budgets and tariffs. Absent that, voters are likely to find that their vote was like pushing a lever that is not connected to anything. And that is likely to increase frustration even more – upping the chances for surprising results in the 2028 presidential election.