전투기 비싼 전투기가 과연 필요한가? 에 대해 의문을 던지는 외국 잡지글

[폴라리스(최현호)]

Flight Journal 10월호중 The Perfect fighter   - Does it exist, do we need it, can we afford it? 라는 글을 OCR로 긁어봤습니다.

꽤 긴글이니 첨부한 PDF를 받아서 천천히 읽어보시는 것도 좋을 것 같내요.

The Perfect fighter

Does it exist, do we need it, can we afford it?

Unprecedented cost blowouts, schedule delays, and serious questions about performance and capabilities
in the F-35 Joint Strike fighter program have produced some very intensive public argument in recent
times about the merits of stealth and other advanced fighter technologies. While most of the problems
in the JSF program are specific to that aircraft alone, the public debate has been much less
discriminating, with a defacto alliance formed between long established ideological opponents of
stealth, and vendors of non-stealthy aircraft. This debate has been further muddied by JSF advocates
more than often overstating the merits of their design. A number of interesting arguments have emerged
in  this debate. These include:

* Are we paying too much for too little an increase in operational advantage?
* Are any of these super—advanced designs even necessary in today's world?
* Are we likely to see traditional air combat in the future?
* What. if any nations, might the Western alliance confront which would justify the deployment of
  advanced fighter designs?

Give these questions, would it not make more sense to produce and deploy large numbers of less expensive
aircraft such as advanced P-15 and Flanker derivatives?

Distfiling these questions and supporting arguments down really yields one underpinning and fundamental
question which is, “Do we really need stealth?" and in turn, “If yes, then how many stealth fighters
do we really need, and why?"

Inevitably, in a period of rampant government debt induced budget cutting across the OECD nations, the
argument is centred in two related questions, which are “What is the best value?” and “Is there a need?”
The first argument is fundamentally predicated on the second argument, as return on investment is dependent
on the usefulness of the investment in the first place.

Do we really need stealth to defeat air defenses?

The argument as to whether stealth is needed was a “non-argument" two decades ago—the prospect of NATO
nations losing hundreds or thousands of combat aircraft in a fight-to-the-death late Cold War confrontation
with the Soviet Bloc was convincing to almost any observer.

Two decades of police action conflicts and counter-insurgency campaigns against rural insurgents armed
with homemade bombs and AKMS have largely changed public and media perceptions of modern wars. In the 1991
Desert Storm campaign, the massive and dense Iraqi Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) collapsed in days,
in 1996 the Yugoslav IADS in Bosnia offered little resistance, and in the 1999 Operation Allied Force
the same IADS proved no less ineffective. Iraq's air defences collapsed in hours in the 2003 Iraqi Freedom
campaign, and Libya's IADS performed no better in the 2011 Odyssey Dawn campaign. While the F-117A was
used heavily in 1991 and 1999, and the B—2A modestly in 1999, 2003 and 201 1, most of the bombs dropped
were delivered by conventional aircraft.

If IADS are indeed so susceptible to conventional air attacks, then the inference many have drawn is that
stealth aircraft are not of high value in combat.

The problem with this argument is that IADS are not all the same. All of the IADS that were defeated since
1991 shared one fundamental but critical feature. Every single one was built up using legacy export grade
Soviet-era systems, most of which were completely compromised with the fall of the Warsaw Pact and further
so when NATO absorbed most of the Warsaw Pact nations. There is very little technical detail in the Soviet
radars and missile systems of that era which is not public knowledge at this time, allowing the development
of very effective electronic counter-measures and tactics.

Age aside, legacy Soviet IADS were analogue, very manpower and training intensive to operate, while also
being highly maintenance intensive. Most of these systems were designed around static operation, rather
than mobile operations, making them easy to locate and attack.

Is there a missed lesson from the air campaigns of the last two decades?

The answer is yes, and actually two lessons have been abjectly ignored in most Western nations.

The first lesson is that even a geriatric Soviet IADS, totally electronically compromised, can survive a
concerted and sustained air attack over a period of many weeks, if competently operated by smart and
well-trained personnel. The latter is what distinguished the Serbian IADS from all others since 1991. No
less than 743 AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missile rounds, were launched by NATO EA—6B Prowlers, F—16CJ
Weasels and Tornado ECRs. While around 70 percent of Serbia's static missile batteries were destroyed, only
14 percent of Serbia’s mobile 9M9 Kvadrat / SA-6 Gainful SAM systems were killed. Movement, concealment,
decoys and deception worked very effectively, as a result of which nearly 40 percent of NATO’s fighter
force deployed were HARM shooters dedicated to IADS defeat.

This lesson was well understood in the East. Since 1999, Russian and Chinese manufacturers of IADS components
have invested heavily in improving mobility, and providing missile batteries with active and electronic defences.
Contemporary Russian and Chinese digital IADS radars and missile batteries are now built around a five minute
”shoot—and—scoot” model, equipped with jamming equipment and decoys, and typically covered by short range
missile and gun systems built to shoot down HARM missiles and smart bombs. Low Probability of Intercept (LPI)
radar technology is also now emerging outside the West, making radar emissions very difficult to detect. If the
1960s and 1970s Soviet IADS in Serbia were hard to kill, modern Russian and Chinese IADS are extremely hard to
kill.

Current Western thinking on IADS defeat remains mired in the ”silver bullet” model, whereby top tier stealth
aircraft like the F—22A and B-2A are intended to ”carve corridors” through a hostile IADS for non-stealthy
conventional aircraft to operate in. This model will continue to work against legacy Soviet-era IADS, of which
very few remain, but will be ineffective against a contemporary Russian or Chinese—supplied IADS.

There is no room for argument in this matter, despite what Western manufacturers might claim. Russia and China
have adapted their IADS technology to defeat the "silver bullet” model. In 1999, no less than 389 HARMs were
fired to kill three SA—6B Gainful SAM systems—an average of 129.6 HARMs per killed target. The number would
be very much higher for an advanced S-3OOPMU2 Favorit, S-400 Triumf or HQ-9/FD—2000 battery.

Modern IADS may thus survive concerted air attacks for months or longer, and tactically the only viable option
is to bypass them, using stealth aircraft. This is what the U.S. DOD now describes as an Anti-Access/Area
Denial (A2/AD) environment and is the pattern for the future. In a modern A2/AD environment, legacy non-
stealthy fighters are no longer viable, period, and the ”silver bullet” model is no longer effective.

Let us, however, for the sake of argument, consider how well a fleet of unstealthy, but otherwise "modern”
legacy fighters like the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler, F—1 5 Silent Eagle, Eurofighter Typhoon,
Dassault Rafale and Su—35S “Super Flanker” perform against a contemporary Russian IADS. The outcome would
be what eminent U.S. air warfare strategist Richard Hallion termed a ”slow war of attrition”, which was the
pattern of World War 11, Korea and later Vietnam. Heavy losses in aircraft and aircrew, heavy expenditure of
munitions, and slow if any effect.

Do we really need stealth in fighter vs. fighter combat?

The case against legacy unstealthy fighters in a modern A2/AD IADS environment is not open to informed
dispute—although uninformed dispute will no doubt continue until a real air war proves this to even the most
ideologically committed. The debate about the usefulness of stealth against IADS has been paralleled by
equally intensive public argument about the utility of stealth and supersonic cruise in air combat between
fighters. Much of this debate reflects the reality that there has been very little ”fighter vs. fighter”
combat since the 1972 air battles over North Vietnam, and 1982 Israeli-Syrian conflict, as a result
of which often dubious arguments have been difficult to refute by obvious counterexamples.

The principal fault line in the debate over aerialcombat is the dividing line between Beyond Visual Range
(BVR or long range) and Within Visual Range (WV R or short range) missile combat. This is much the same
argument seen in 1960, won politically by the BVR camp, and proven to be the wrong argument in the skies
of North Vietnam in 1965.

The public debate, played out in media briefings, legislative committee hearings, magazine and broadsheet
editorials, blogs, and even YouTube postings, is split across several camps,mostly aligned around specific
aircraft types, and intended to change public and media views of firstly the relative importance of BVR VS.
WVR combat, and secondly, how to prevail in either, but seldom both. Mostly players in this debate aim to
sow confusion, to argue to merits of aircraft with serious deficiencies in BVR, WVR or both regimes of combat.

This debate inevitably raises two basic questions: ”Why BVR?” and ”Is it possible to play a pure BVR or
pure WVR game?”

To answer the first question, why most air forces want a BVR capability is no different to why most armies
centuries ago wanted crossbows, then longbows and later muskets and artillery piece - thin out the enemy
before they close to engage in close combat, and disrupt the enemy's entry into close combat. If the
enemy breaks off close combat, shoot him in the back before he can get away.

The second question is no less interesting. Virtually all “fighter on fighter” engagements historically
have involved one of two fundamental engagement geometries:

Case A. The first is the ”defensiVe barrier” where the fighters are placed in between some valuable
(air/sea/land) asset and approaching enemy aircraft.

Case B. The second is the "offensive sweep”where players roam contested airspace, and then pick and
choose something to kill.

Statistically, nearly all ”fighter on fighter” engagements can be sorted into these two bins. The
historical ”loss exchange rate” statistics for Cases A and B are also interesting. In case A where
close combat is nearly always entered, aircraft agility, performance and pilot ability dominate, but
"loss exchange rates” typically sit between 1:1 and 2.521. This is effect of Lanchester’s Square
Law for attrition combat.

Case B is the Richthoven/Hartmann/Zemke model, where most kills were effected by ambush. In a sense,
such fighter pilots operate like snipers or sharpshooters in land warfare, and avoid close combat.

The BVR game works best in Case B scenarios as the attacker can set up the optimal geometry for the
BVR missile shot, surprise his opponent and hopefully effect the engagement without being engaged
in turn. BVR is also valuable in Case

A scenarios as both sides can thin out the opposing ranks of hostiles—but the reality is that what
hostiles get past the initial BVR missile barrages

will close in and engage in WVR combat.

Basic air combat engagement geometries show that the WVR versus BVR argument is essentially nonsense,
since a contemporary fighter will have to do better than its opponent in both regimes of combat to
be successful.

Design optimization for WVR combat is well understood, and for the last 40 years based on Boyd’s
"energy maneuverability” theory, in which raw acceleration, turn, and climb performance are paramount.

The game is always to get the first firing opportunity with missile or gun, and have the ability to
disengage and retreat beyond the opponent's missile engagement envelope when appropriate.

Design optimization for BVR combat is well understood by some, but less well understood by others, and
is in many respects more difficult than WVR optimization. This is for good reasons.

The first is that detecting, tracking and engaging distant targets relies critically on carrying long range
sensors, which can be degraded or defeated by jamming, stealth or both. Such sensors are expensive,
complicated, often unreliable, and add weight and volume penalties to a design. In the long—range sensor
game, size matters, and bigger is always better, a consequence of physics.

Stealth is very important in BVR combat since it delays the opponent’s first firing opportunity and permits
early disengagements — deficiencies in radar or infrared stealth will always be exploited.

The importance of high aerodynamic performance in BVR combat, especially persistent supersonic cruise,
appears least well understood in the West. It provides more kinetic energy to BVR missiles at launch,
improving range, but also allows a fighter under attack to more easily escape from an opponent's missile
engagement envelope, no differently than in WVR combat. The latter underscores what Australian analyst
Peter Goon terms the “BVR paradox”— the reality that modern BVR combat imposes higher performance demands on
fighters than WVR combat does.

In summary, unless opposing fighters are Soviet-era relics, high aerodynamic performance, high stealth
performance, powerful sensors and big missile payloads are essential to prevail in fighter combat—qualities
shared only by the F-22A, T-50 PAK-FA and J-20, but not the F-35 JSF, and all of which fit RAND analyst Ben
Lambeth’s 1990s label of "biggest gorilla in the sky.”

Who will be future opponents?

Technological and tactical evolution of IADS and fighter vs. fighter combat has clearly created an environment
where unstealthy and low aerodynamic performance conventional aircraft are no longer viable, if the
intent is to overwhelm a modern opponent quickly and decisively, and bring the conflict to a rapid and favorable
conclusion.

This raises the vexed question of future opponents. The post-Cold War world is multipolar, rather than
bipolar, and economically globalized.

A popular View at this time is that the West will never end up in a major conventional conflict with Russia
or China; therefore, air power can be dedicated to minor police actions and counterinsurgency effort,
as observed since 1991. The opponents to be defeated will have either no IADS or modern fighters, or will
operate Soviet-era relics. Therefore, it follows that large numbers of advanced high-performance stealth
fighters like the F-22 are not needed, and force structures can be filled with "more affordable” aircraft
like the F/A-18E/F, F-15 derivatives, or Eurocanard derivatives.

As appealing as this strategic viewpoint might be, especially to advocates of legacy combat aircraft designs,
or underperforming new designs like the P-35 and F/A-18E/ F, there is no sound evidence to suggest the world
will become that way.

Globalisation has produced one wholly unexpected side effect since 1991, which is almost unrestricted global
proliferation of advanced military high technology, mostly from post—Soviet Russia, but increasingly from
China. Russia's T-50 PAK-FA stealth fighter was intended from the outset for export, to replace the many
hundreds of Flankers operated by former Soviet and more recent Russian clients. The advanced S-300PMU2 Favorit /
SA—20B Gargoyle SAM system is available globally, and the newer S-400 / SA-Z1 Growler has also been cleared
for export, as are Nebo series counter-stealth radars. China has been marketing the FD-2000 / FT-2000 /
HQ—9 SAM system, based on the S-30OPMU1 / SA-20A, as well as radar systems, airborne early warning aircraft,
VHF band radars, smart bombs and both BVR and WVR missiles. Any nation with the money can procure any modern
equipment it can afford, from Russia, China or both, with few or no political strings attached. Most such
nations have poor relationships with the United States and its allies, and many are likely future candidates
for “police actions”.

Iran and North Korea were both recipients of such exports until placed under UN embargoes. This is also the
reason why "A2/AD” has become the recent buzzword of choice in the Washington defense debate. Nations
that may have been easily overwhelmed by legacy Western combat aircraft will no longer be.

This is aside from the reality that the United States and its allies must have a credible nonnuclear deterrent
capability to discourage China, and to a lesser extent Russia, from using their modern military power to
coerce weaker neighbors. In terms of how they treat smaller neighboring states, neither nation could be
described as "model citizens,” and China in particular has long-running and bitter territorial disputes
with India, Japan and the ASEAN nations, the latter over the resource-rich South China Sea.

In conclusion, the notion that new build legacy jets or underperforming specialised strike fighter designs
like the F/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF can substitute for top-end fighters like the F-22A, or its Russian and Chinese
analogues, makes no sense in a modern fluid strategic environment, where Russian and Chinese high-technology
weapons are available to any nation with the funds and inclination to procure them. -end-

페이지_ Flight Journal-2012-10.pdf

[Zenos(강준구)]

간단히 정리하면 IADS("통합 방공망"이라고 번역하면 될까요?)라고 표현되는 방공망의 발전으로 인해 고가의 비스텔스 기체들과 특화된 스텔스기(F-35 지칭)는 효용성이 많이 떨어져서 최상급 스텔스기(F-22)를 대체할 수 없을 것이다..라고 주장하고 있는 글 같습니다. (대충 읽어서요.^^)

그 근거로, 2차대전부터 베트남전까지 지속되어온, 고비용/저효율 항공기 무기체계를 근거로 들었는데... 되돌아 보면, 고비용/저효율이었지만, 그 세번의 전쟁 모두 미국의 어마어마한 항공 무기 체계(폭격기/공격기/전투기)가 전쟁의 승패를 가르는 가장 큰 요인이었지 않았나요?

[Zenos(강준구)]

이 글은 미공군을 향한 랩터 지지자의 글이라고 보여집니다. 물론 주장이 틀렸다는 얘기는 아니구요. 다만, 미국을 제외한 다른 어떤 국가에도 적용하기 힘든 논리가 있다... 정도가 제 의견입니다. 최첨단 3억불짜리 랩터로 전투기 숫자를 다 채울 수 있는 나라는 아무래도 미국 밖에 없지요.-_-;

[폴라리스(최현호)]

Zenos님 의견이 맞다고 봅니다. 모든 국가에 들어맞는 답이란 없죠....아..하나 있겠네요....돈벌어~ 하지만 IADS에 대한 한국의 고민과 돌파능력에 대한 고찰은 하고 있는가가? 라는 의문이 들기에 한번쯤 읽어볼만 하단 생각이 들어서요. 늘상 들리는게...F-35 필요없다. 뭐 면 된다...등등 기체에 몰입된 말들만 들리니 (여기 말구요 ^^)....왜 어떤 근거에서 생각해봐야하는지에 대한 일종의 단서라고 할까요? 그런 생각이 들더라구요.

[Zenos(강준구)]

예, 폴라리스님 말씀 지당하십니다. 공군(물론 삼군/혹은 4군 전부)이라는 것 자체를 체계화하여 그 하나의 체계가 전략이 되고, 각각의 무기 체계들이 전술적인 자산으로, 체계 내에서 가장 효율성 있게 선택되어져야하는 것이 이상적이라고 생각됩니다. 사실, 한반도 뿐 아니라, 동아시아의 가까운 미래(2050년 정도)에는 사실상 대규모 충돌이 일어나기 어렵다고 보기 때문에, 무리하게 비싸고도 비싼 F-35나 다른 고성능 비스텔스 전투기를 대량으로 도입하기 보다, 이런 전투기들에 대해 대단히 위협적인 세계 최고급의 방공 체계를 구축하는 것이 나을지도 모르겠다는 생각이 자주듭니다.

[Zenos(강준구)]

우리도 있다..정도로 과시할 수 있는 최소한 수량의 F-35만을 보유하면 되지 않을까 합니다. 전술기 숫자에 목을 맬 이유가 없다고 생각합니다. 제 아무리 중국이 대단해 보이는 스텔스 전투기와 재래식 전투기를 보유한다 하더라도, 기술/성능적으로 F-35는 물로이고, AESA를 달 F-15K 보다 뛰어난 전투기를 보유할 시점은 아직 멀었고, 최신화된 방공망(S-400/S-500)급을 돌파할 수 있는 항공무기를 보유할 가능성은 그 보다 더 떨어져보이기 때문입니다. 무엇보다 중국을 상대로 전투기로 상황에 대처할만큼 우리가 강하지도 않구요.

[백선호]

"Can we afford it?"에 대해서는 별 얘기가 없네요...

[백선호]

전략폭격기는 너무 비싸져서 2차대전 이후 미국, 소련, 영국, 프랑스 정도만 개발해 가질 수 있다가 80년대에는 미국과 소련만 갖고, 지금은 미국도 갖기 힘든 무기가 되었고, 전략폭격기의 자리는 미사일이 차지한 셈입니다. 전투기가 비싸지는 추세가 계속되면 어떻게 될까요?

[Zenos(강준구)]

점점 더 스마트한 무인기가 보편화 되면, 제공권의 개념이 약해지지 않을까 조심스레 예상해봅니다. 초음속 무인기에 SDB 정도를 8발 정도 달고 다니는 스텔스 소형/고속의 무인기가 F-35의 1/10 가격으로 된다면 돈이 많은 나라를 제외하곤 제공기 세력을 유지하기 보다, 보다 공격적인 소형/고속 무인기를 더 많이 배치하게 되지 않을까요?

[백선호]

경기를 살려 보겠다고 달러를 마구 찍어내 달러 값이 떨어지니 앞으로 대당 1억 달러의 전투기는 2008년 경제 위기 이전의 달러 가치로 보면 비싸지 않아 별로 부담이 되지 않는 가격일수도 있을 것 같습니다.

대공황이 막 시작된 1930년의 복엽 전투기 Bulldog는 4200 파운드고 2차대전이 터진 1939년의 단엽 전투기 Spitfire는 8000 파운드여서 거의 2배 비싸게 보이지만 사실은 그 사이 영국이 금본위제 포기하고 파운드 가치가 떨어져 1930년 파운드 가치 기준으로는 4600 파운드입니다.