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What the Intel Leaks Are Telling Us About North Korea’s Nukes
정보기관들이 누설한 것이 북한의 핵무기에 대해 우리에게 말해주는 것.
Kim Jong Un’s nuclear weapons and missile programs have passed the point of no return. That makes Trump’s threats of preventative war a fantasy.
북한의 핵무기와 미사일 프로그램은 돌아올 수 없는 지점을 지났다. 이것은 트럼프의 예방전쟁 위협을 공상으로 만든다.
By ANKIT PANDA
August 16, 2017
In recent weeks, a deluge of leaks has sprung out from the U.S. intelligence community concerning North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs. Taken together, the leaks portray Kim Jong Un’s regime as nearing mastery of a nuclear-tipped missile that could hit American soil.
북한의 탄도미사일과 핵 프로그램에 대한 미국의 정보기관들에서 누출 홍수를 종합해보면,
미 본토를 타격할 수 있는 핵탄두 장착 미사일을 거의 습득한 북한의 모습을 그려준다.
Three separate and critical intelligence assessments have emerged in recent weeks that merit attention. First, the U.S. intelligence community, in consensus, now assesses that North Korea is fully capable of developing compact missile-mountable nuclear weapons. Second, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Geospational Intelligence Agency assess that North Korea has a fissile material stockpile sufficient for 60 bombs today and is producing additional fissile material at a rate of 12 bombs per year.
Finally, the third assessment, which I first reported last week, is that the Central Intelligence Agency assesses North Korea’s intercontinental-range ballistic missile re-entry vehicle technology to likely be sufficient for the delivery of a nuclear device to the United States—meaning it could probably survive re-entry on a normal trajectory and successful detonate that compact nuclear warhead over an American city.
미국 정보기관들은 첫째, 북한이 미사일에 장착가능한 소형화된 핵탄두를 개발할 능력이 있고, 둘째,
60개의 핵무기를 만들 핵물질을 보유하고 있으며, 12개의 핵무기를 만들 수 있는 핵물질을 해마다 생산하고 있으며, 세째, 북한의 대륙간탄도미사일 재진입기술은 핵탄두를 미 본토까지 운반하기에 충분한 것 같다고 평가하고 있다.
The sudden breakout of leaks as President Donald Trump blusters dangerously about meeting Kim’s threats with “fire and fury” has led well-intentioned observers to see echoes of the run-up to the Iraq war. MSNBC host Rachel Maddow, for instance, has suggested that these leaks are aimed at supporting military action—as bogus stories about aluminum tubes and mobile weapons labs were back in 2002.
This is precisely the wrong conclusion.
MSNBC 진행자 라첼 매도우는 이러한 정보의 누출은 군사행동에 대한 지지를 목표로 한 것이라 말해왔다. 하지만 이것은 정확히 잘못된 결론이다.
Instead of paving the path to war, the public release of these intelligence assessments—two of which remain without known consensus within the intelligence community—are likely aimed at injecting caution into the debate over what to do about North Korea.
전쟁으로 가는 길을 닦기위한 것인 대신에, 이들 정보기관들의 평가들을 공개적으로 발표한 것은, 북한에 대해서 어떻게 할 것인지에 대한 (중구난방식의)논쟁에 경고를 하는 것을 목표로 하고 있는 것 같다.
They should cause Americans to understand the value of establishing a stable deterrent relationship with North Korea as we enter an era where its ICBMs are perhaps months from seeing operational deployment. In other words: The time to start a war with North Korea is not after various parts of the U.S. intelligence community assess that it could likely lob a nuclear weapon at U.S. cities today. The window is gone—certainly for a preventative war. Pre-emptive war also raises the uneasy prospect of betting that the United States would be able to detect and destroy all of North Korea’s road-mobile ICBMs, not leaving even a single launcher capable of retaliating with a devastating nuclear strike.
분명히 예방전쟁의 창은 닫혔다. 선제타격 역시 불편한 전망을 불러일으킨다.
Making the case for a preventative war with North Korea would today defy reality. Kim already has the capability that any such strikes would seek to deny. And it is not clear that a preventative war in the general sense—the notion that, if war is inevitable, it is better for the United States to fight today, not tomorrow—is at all better for the United States, whose relative power will continue to far outstrip North Korea’s. While hawkish officials in the U.S. and South Korea alike may continue to shift the goalposts on prevention by noting that North Korea may not have “completely gained” capabilities like re-entry vehicles—and therefore there’s still time to strike—betting that North Korea can’t hit a U.S. city in a moment of existential crisis doesn’t seem like a bet worth making.
북한과의 예방전쟁을 주장하는 것은 오늘날 현실을 거역하는 것이다.
Kim’s fancy new missiles
In July 2017, for the first time, North Korea launched a ballistic missile capable of reaching the continental United States. The Hwasong-14, an ICBM known as the KN20 by the U.S. intelligence community, flew not once, but twice last month. In both tests, North Korea satisfactorily demonstrated that its new two-stage, liquid-fueled ICBM could comfortably surpass the 5,500 kilometer range requirement that the United States and the Soviet Union once agreed would serve as the threshold for an “intercontinental” range missile.
With its second test, which demonstrated operational launch procedures, North Korea left little doubt that it would be able to throw a reasonably compact nuclear weapon—the sort it showed off next to Kim in a February 2016 photograph—from launch sites across North Korea to targets in the continental United States. From Pyongyang’s perspective, the message of that test should have been clear: The era of the North Korean ICBM is here; prevention is out and pre-emption is unacceptably risky.
평양의 시각에서, 화성14형 2차 테스트의 메세지는 분명했을 것이다: 즉 북한의 ICBM시대가 도래했고, 예방전쟁은 끝났으며, 선제타격은 용납할 수 없게 위험하다는 것.
While the ICBM tests generated the most headlines so far in 2017, they’re far from the full story. This year alone, North Korea has introduced an entirely new suite of impressive ballistic missiles. In February, it showed the world the Pugkuksong-2 (KN15), a road-mobile, solid-fueled, medium-range ballistic missile based on a tracked transporter-erector-launcher. In April and May, North Korea tested the Hwasong-12 (KN17), a new, liquid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile that succeeds the Musudan, an older missile that ran into repeated hitches in testing in 2016, as Pyongyang’s primary strike platform for U.S. military assets on Guam. Additionally in May, North Korea introduced a variant of the SCUD-C short-range ballistic missile with control surfaces, allowing it to maneuver in re-entry; Pyongyang claimed the missile introduced an exceptional level of precision to its short-range ballistic missile arsenal.
Combine these observed developments with the latest bout of intelligence assessment leaks and the conclusion is obvious: Despite the exhortations of Trump administration officials, there is no war with North Korea today that does not immediately turn into a nuclear war. North Korea’s nuclear strategy is premised on initiating a first-use against U.S. military targets within the Northeast Asian and Pacific theaters should it detect even a whiff of a pre-emptive attack or decapitation strike against the regime underway to defeat such an attempt, and to use its ICBM arsenal to deter subsequent American nuclear retaliation.
The stages of North Korean grief
북한에 대한 비탄의 단계.
If there is a lesson from the lead-up to the Iraq invasion that should inform the policy discussion on North Korea today, it’s that serving officials are mighty effective at working with “alternative facts,” to use the parlance of our times.
An exceptionally concerning example of this came over the weekend, when none other than Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, Trump’s scholar-soldier national security adviser, appeared to argue earnestly that Kim was irrational and, as a result, undeterrable. McMaster asked how “classical deterrence theory” would apply to “a regime like the regime in North Korea”—questions that were once asked of China and the Soviet Union, similarly brutal communist states on the verge of nuclear breakout. Mao and the Soviets killed vastly more of their own people than Kim or his forebears have, but deterrence worked just fine in those cases. Like those men, Kim’s overarching goal is self-preservation, not war.
If McMaster truly believed that an adversary like North Korea, which is capable of inflicting unacceptable damage against the U.S. homeland today, is undeterrable from doing so, nuclear strategy doctrine argues for striking immediately and ruthlessly, to disarm the Kim regime at all costs. That McMaster has yet to recommend such a course of action suggests that his belief in Kim’s undeterrability is either dishonest or insincere, or that he has failed to grasp the severity of what an irrational Kim would mean for U.S. national security.
There, of course, is a third option: The prospect of being fully deterred by North Korea—the country once described by Richard Nixon as a “fourth-rate … pipsqueak” power—is such a source of cognitive dissonance that McMaster’s unwillingness to concede Kim his rationality is a coping mechanism. As with the stages of grief, the first stage of a superpower accepting deterrence may be denial.
북한에 의해 완전히 억지될(deterred) 전망-그것도 한때 닉슨에 의해 볼품없는 국가로 묘사되었던 국가에 의해-은 엄청난 인지부조화의 원인이어서 맥매스터가 북한 김정은위원장이 이성적임을 인정하지 않으려는 것은 심리적 대응기제이다.
Moving toward acceptance
수용의 단계로 옮겨가기
Fortunately, we don’t need to speculate about whether deterrence can work with North Korea. It has been working for decades. Deterrence is what has prevented the outbreak of full-on war on the Korean Peninsula since 1953, despite numerous North Korean provocations in recent years, such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island and the sinking of a South Korean ship in 2010. Pyongyang has been able to prevent an invasion with its artillery, short-range rockets, and especially its biological and chemical weapons. As military analysts invariably note, North Korea could turn Seoul, a city of 25 million people, into a smoldering wreck in a matter of minutes—no nukes required.
This, of course, raises the question of why successive Kims in Pyongyang have felt the need to have nuclear weapons at all, let alone the ability to hit the United States with them. The answer lies in the fates of leaders like Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Muammar Qadhafi, who had scuttled their nuclear programs only to be forcibly removed by American military might. As an editorial in the country’s state-run Rodong Sinmun observed on August 13, the fundamental lesson of the nuclear age for small and insecure countries like North Korea is that “nuclear possessors did not suffer military aggression.”
For Pyongyang, as long as the United States maintains its forward-deployed military presence in Northeast Asia, extensive sanctions regime and extended deterrence commitments to South Korea and Japan—what it calls the “hostile policy”—its nuclear ICBMs offer its best hope of self-preservation. There is scant evidence to suggest that Kim would attempt nuclear first-use with his ICBMs given the United States’ massive nuclear superiority, ensuring that such a move would all but assure the regime’s end.
핵선제사용은 단지 정권의 종말을 확실하게할 뿐이라 점을 보장하는 미국의 대규모 핵 우위를 생각한다면, 북한 김정은위원장이 ICBM으로 핵을 먼저 사용할 것이라 시사하는 증거는 거의 없다.
While deterrence is old news, the threat of North Korea being able to inflict unacceptable damage to American cities is not, and this explains the U.S. national security establishment’s collective freakout. Americans got used to “mutual assured destruction” during the Cold War, squaring off against comparably sized nuclear-armed dictatorships. It feels strange to be matched against a “pipsqueak” country whose GDP is estimated in the range of $20 billion to $30 billion. Depending on how one runs the numbers, that’s roughly on the order of what the United States is looking to spend on two of its next-generation Ford-class aircraft carriers. Being deterred by a poor, backward and brutal regime like this is a humiliating place to be for a country that still views itself as the unchallenged global superpower.
그간의 억제는 오래된 뉴스이지만, 미국의 도시들에 받아들일 수 없는 피해를 줄 수 있는 북한의 위협은 새로운 것이어서 미국의 국가안보기관들의 집단적 현실도피를 설명해준다.
"북한같은 가난하고 후진적인 나라"에 의해 억지된다(deterred)는 것은, 여전히 자신을 도전받지않는 글로벌 슈퍼파워라 생각하는 나라에게는 굴욕이다.
Perhaps in time the United States will learn to stop worrying and, if not love, at least tolerate a stable deterrent relationship with a North Korea bristling with nuclear-tipped ICBMs. The only other option is teetering on the brink of “fire and fury” every week. And that’s just no way to live 70-plus years into the nuclear age.
아마 조만간 미국은 걱정하기를 그만두는 것을 배우게될 것이다. 그리고 좋아하지는 않더라도 적어도
핵탄두를 장착한 ICBM을 가진 고슴도치 북한과 안정적인 억지 관계(deterrent relationship)를 용인할 것이다. (주/ 중국, 러시아와의 관계처럼)
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Ankit Panda is a New York-based analyst and senior editor at The Diplomat, where he writes on international security in the Asia-Pacific region. He has reported extensively on North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs. He tweets at @nktpnd.
안킷 판다는 디플로매트지에 글을 쓰고 있는 이름있는 분석가입니다.
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첫댓글 이번 북의 화성12형미사일로 괌에 대한 위력시위사격검토는
바꾸어 말하면 화성14형으로 미국본토에 대한 직접사격도 가능하다는 것을 발표한것입니다
졷문가들이 아니고 냉철한 판단과 논리정연한 군사전략가라면 북에서 보여준 그동안의 자료나 축적된 모든 정보들에 의하여 종합하여 볼때
북미간의 전면전에서 누가 우선 먼저 우위를 점하고 상대방에게 회생불가능한 타격을 주게 될것이라는 것을 잘 알고 있을겁니다
미국의 전략자산인 전략폭격기 항공모함 핵잠수함 한반도 가까이 올 시간에 괌 워싱턴 뉴욕 불바다가 됩니다
사일로형 미니트맨 3 40분동안에 몇발이나 날릴까요
북은 이동형발사대로 연속발사가 가능합니다
아마 항공모함은 깊숙한 곳에 숨어 있어야 할지도요. 미사일 한방에 증발할 수도 있겄지요.
무릇 모든 전쟁은 공격과 방어를 동반합니다
공격에서 시간은 생명이고 곧 승리의 열쇠입니다
방어도 상대의 타격에서 생명과 자산을 지키고 다음의 대응타격을 위해 필수적으로 필요합니다
미국이 사일로발사대에서 한방씩 쏘아올릴 때에 북은 동시다발식으로 연속타격으로 공격합니다
평양이 공격받으면 평양시민들은 지하철에만 들어가도 인명피해를 최소화할수 있지만
천만명의 뉴욕시민이나 워싱턴시민들은 엄청난 피해를 받게 됩니다
워싱턴 뉴욕이 공격받으면 전략폭격기 항모 잠수함은 행차후 나발부는 격으로 아무런 의미도 없습니다
워싱턴과 뉴욕에 몇발씩만 들어가면 상황은 그것으로 끝나고 맙니다
전쟁이 벌어지면 미국이 남쪽에도 핵탄을 날리지 않을까요? 왠지 그럴 것 같은 감이 듭니다.
@한겨레 일부러 날리지는 않는다 하더라도 오차에 의한 오폭 가능성은 언제나 있겠지요. 더군다나 허둥대다 보면....
@Freudo 충분한 개연성도 있습니다. 자작극도 필요하겄지요. 한국민의 여론도 속일 필요가 있을 겁니다. 아울러 한국의 참전도 독려 및 유도하기가 쉽겄지요. 그러나 이런것도 물건너 갔을 겁니다.
@한겨레 6,25전쟁때 을 생각 하면 되겠네요
어떻게 남한이 피해을 입었는가는
미국 러시아 중국... 파키스탄까지 가지고 있는 핵탄두는 전쟁억지력의 힘이지만
북한이 가진 핵탄두는 제국주의 침략자들을 물리치는 수단으로서의 힘입니다!
무식한 힘으로 전쟁을 즐기며 약소국을 침략 강탈해가는 날강도같은 서세 침략자들과
홍익인간 광명이세로 뭉친 동방의 한민족은 그 뿌리와 근원의 차원이 다르기에
양키는 조선에 무릅꿇을 수 밖에 없습니다.
한반도 통일과 인류평화가 눈 앞에 훤하네요~~
"북한에 의해
완전히 억지될(deterred) 전망
-그것도 한때 닉슨에 의해 볼품없는
국가로 묘사되었던 국가에 의해-
은
엄청난 인지부조화의 원인이어서
맥매스터가
북한 김정은위원장이
이성적임을 인정하지 않으려는 것은
심리적 대응기제이다."
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"엄청난 인지부조화"..
비단 맥매스터뿐 아니라..
그동안 서세 우월적 반공 교육에 세뇌된..
대부분의 세계인들이 동일하게 느낄겁니다.
한국 국민들도 마찮가지 구요.
때문에..
이후 북한의 대미압박 성과는..
절대로 물밑에서 거래되지는 않을것 같네요.
세계 자주화를 위해서 가장 중요한게 바로..
인지의 정상화. 사대의식을 떨처내는 거라서..
미국의 채면따윈 안봐줄 듯.^^.
"핵선제사용은 단지 정권의 종말을
확실하게할 뿐이라는 점을 보장하는
미국의 대규모 핵 우위를 생각한다면,
북한 김정은위원장이
ICBM으로 핵을 먼저 사용할 것이라
시사하는 증거는 거의 없다."
===========
지상 최고의 전략가 들은..
지상 최고의 병법..
"싸우지 않고 이기는 방법"을
잘 알고 있을 것이다.
미국 양퀴쉐이들을 상대로.. ㅎㅎ
미제 필망...^^.
전쟁은 나쁜것입니다. 근데 더 나쁜건 전쟁에서 패하는 것입니다.
전쟁에선 2등이 필요없습니다. 북한이 완승하기를 간절히 바라봅니다.
위대한(밥만 많아 처먹는 위가 큰) 미국은 전쟁 안하고 패할줄 안다
몸집이 큰 공룡은 움직임만 제한해도...
쉽게 굻어 죽는 다는...
힘들게 목을 치려하지 않고...
다리만 부러뜨려도.....살 수가 없다는...
그것을 알기에 북의 전략이 신묘하다는...
딱 한발이면....된다는...
^^
서로가 공격하기 어렵게 된 것 같군요.
좋은 방향으로 나아가기를 바라는 마음 뿐입니다.
억지될(deterred) 전망
김용운박사의 <역사의 역습>과 같은 맥락이군요. 공감합니다.