The Problem of the Criteria in the Quest of the Historical Jesus

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Reformational Theological Studies, vol.1, 2000
(C) 2000 Hyeon Woo Shin

The Problem of the Criteria in the Quest of the Historical Jesus

Hyeon Woo Shin

Free University Amsterdam, The Netherlands

1. To attain the knowledge of the historical Jesus (HJ), we need to establish criteria to distinguish the historical figure of Jesus from the unhistorical ones. To determine whether our criteria are "valid" (i.e., able to distinguish the historical figure of Jesus from unhistorical ones), we have to know whether the criteria really can distinguish the historical figure of Jesus from unhistorical ones. To know this, however, we need the knowledge of the HJ. And so, as R.H. Chisholm says, "we are caught in a circle."⁽¹⁾ The problem is that we do not have certain knowledge of the HJ.⁽²⁾ We can only have probable knowledge.⁽³⁾ Consequently, even if there might be valid criteria, we can never know with certainty whether our criteria for the quest of the HJ are valid or not.

2. However, we can still acquire probable knowledge about valid criteria through arguments which justify the criteria. Coherent arguments which can explain the factual phenomena (of transmission of a tradition) may validate those criteria. This meta-principle depends on "the law of contradiction" (LC) and "the principle of explainability" (PE).⁽⁴⁾ LC denotes the principle that anything cannot be so and not-so, at the same time, to the same viewpoint.⁽⁵⁾ PE is the principle that prefers the theory which best explains a phenomenon. Amico formulated PE that "All other things being equal, criteria and metacriteria with greater explanatory power should be preferred."⁽⁶⁾ PE presupposes LC and the reality of impressions (first-hand data from the reality perceived by senses). An incoherent theory or a theory which does not agree with impressions is considered to fail in explaining the reality.

3. The justification of these basic principles, however, seems problematic.⁽⁷⁾ (1) To justify LC we need "the rule of negation introduction" (If contradiction occurs from the hypothesis A, A is not true) that is also known as reductio ad absurdum,⁽⁸⁾ and to justify "the rule of negation introduction" (NI) we need presuppose LC.⁽⁹⁾ This circularity indicates that without accepting one of these principles without any proofs, we can prove neither LC nor NI, and that if we attempt to prove both of them without any presupposition, we fail to do it because of the circularity. Proving LC with NI, and again proving NI with LC commits a logical fallacy of circular argumentation.⁽¹⁰⁾ (2) We may suppose the possibility that we can find a justification of LC without presupposing any hypotheses. In this case, our proof will need another proof which proves the unproved hypothesis of our proof, and so the line of proofs will regress infinitely. Hence, we will not attain the final justification of LC. (3) We may regard LC as self-evident because it is clear to our consciousness. Its clearness to the human intuition, however, cannot absolutely justify it. Human beings cannot but think in accordance with LC, and they can agree with each other on the basis of this rule. However, the necessity in human thinking or agreement among human beings cannot justify the truth of LC.⁽¹¹⁾ Human beings cannot check whether human intuition correctly reflects reality because they cannot go out of human consciousness to compare human intuition with reality itself.⁽¹²⁾ (4) As for PE, we cannot compare any theory (which explains reality) with reality itself. We can merely compare a theory with our impressions of reality. These impressions are immediate and self-evident, but we cannot prove that they truly reflect reality itself. Human beings cannot but perceive impressions as they are programmed to perceive them, but this necessity cannot justify the truth of the impressions. Further, at times the impressions of the same reality might be different to perceiver by perceiver. Even if human beings can agree with each other on their impressions, even this agreement cannot justify the truth of the impressions because this agreement might depend on the same programme which is installed into the human mind.

4. Nevertheless, even if human beings cannot change this programme, they can use it to acquire information and knowledge which this programme can provide. Thus, within the limitation of this programme, science is possible. Within this limited area, there exists no burden of proof for LC or the realness (the reality-reflecting aspect) of impressions⁽¹³⁾ that is already evident to human intelligence. Therefore, PE, that presupposes LC and the realness of impressions, can function as a sound principle in this area of science.⁽¹⁴⁾

5. Even if we accept LC and PE as maxims without the burden of proof, we still have the burden of argument in order to validate theories on the basis of these principles. Sometimes several incompatible arguments, which altogether can explain the factual phenomena, coexist.⁽¹⁵⁾ Then we meet a problem to distinguish the stronger argument from the weaker one,⁽¹⁶⁾ and cannot but appeal to persuasiveness, which is a subjective standard. This subjectivity can often produce uncertainty in the quest of the HJ.

6. On account of the limitations above, the quest of the HJ is destined to remain in the sphere of probability. There cannot exist any categorical decisions about the HJ, but only hypothetical conclusions, which begin with 'if the criteria are valid,' or 'if our arguments are valid.'

7. Further, even if we have sound criteria, the utilization of the criteria also has a limitation. The criteria themselves do not automatically promise or guarantee convincing conclusions or productive results. Often, one requires human insight and creativity to use these criteria effectively. For example, even if PE is accepted as our criterion for truth, this criterion does not automatically provide truth. The perception of truth through this criterion takes time, and needs effort. Likewise, even if human beings can agree with each other that either A or not-A is true, they cannot make someone accept one or the other as true without convincing evidence. Thus, in many instances they postpone their decisions. In such cases, the criteria cannot positively help the decision. As G. Zuntz stated, "there is no regle de fer, no divining-rod to save the critic from the strain of labour and thought."⁽¹⁷⁾ Moreover, even if valid criteria are adopted, the misuse of the criteria can lead us to what is false rather than to what is true.

8. Nevertheless, these limitations do not annihilate the necessity and significance of the investigation of the criteria for the quest of the HJ. Without criteria, we cannot make any arguments or decisions. Without reliable criteria, we cannot make any reliable decisions. Thus, we cannot but investigate the criteria to make our decisions about authenticity, and to protect the human reason from making a fictitious Jesus. Further, even if we may not attain evidently valid criteria, we can still acquire probably valid criteria. Though probability cannot ensure the truth, we cannot but follow probability rather than possibility in our decision making. Even though the probability of a criterion's validity may not be followed mechanically in every case (one also needs to consider also other criteria), it can be useful for some cases where other things are equal.⁽¹⁸⁾ Moreover, "the cumulative effect"⁽¹⁹⁾ of several probably valid criteria can support a theory with very high probabilities.⁽²⁰⁾ Even though one may not count and compare the numbers of evidence for a decision in every individual incidence because we cannot quantify the probability of the validity of evidence, other things being equal (i.e., if each piece of considered evidence has the same probability, and is independent), a hypothesis supported by more pieces of evidence may be preferred to another hypothesis supported by less pieces of evidence. For these reasons, the quests of the criteria for authenticity are significant as a basis for the quests of the HJ, only if those criteria can reflect reality in terms of probability.

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Table: The Effects of Cumulative Evidence

Cumulation of Evidence	Probability of Truth	Possibility of Falsity
1 piece of evidence	70 %	30 %
2 pieces of evidence	91 %	9 %
3 pieces of evidence	97.3 %	2.7 %
4 pieces of evidence	99.19 %	0.81 %
5 pieces of evidence	99.757 %	0.243 %

9. This table shows that when each piece of evidence is probably valid, a theory supported by two or more pieces of such evidence is very probably true. This table follows the formula R = 1 - (1 - p)ⁿ, R being the probability of the truth of a theory supported by n pieces of (independent) evidence, each of which has a probability of validity p. The present writer has constructed this formula on the basis of the following argumentation: (1) When evidence a and b and g ... support a theory A, if one of these (a or b or g ...) is valid, A is true; (2) Either a or b or g ... is valid, unless all of a and b and g ... are invalid; (3) Thus, (the probability of truth of a theory) = 100 % - (the possibility of invalidity of all a and b and g ...). Therefore, R = 1 - (1 - p)ⁿ.⁽²¹⁾ For example, when the probability of validity of each piece of evidence is 70 %, the invalidity of each piece of evidence has the probability of 30 %. Then the probability that both a and b are invalid reaches 9 % (30 % ? 30 %). Thus, the probability that either a or b is valid achieves 91 %. This formula shows that if the probability of the validity of evidence (p) increases, the probability of the truth of a theory (R) increases, and that if p decreases, R also decreases. It also shows that if the piece of evidence (n) increases, R increases. Consequently, even if we do not know which evidence is absolutely valid, one may suppose that the probability of a theory's truth becomes higher, if the number of evidence for the theory increases.

Notes

1. Cf. R.M. Chisholm, The Problem of the Criterion (Milwaukee 1973) 3: "To know whether things really are as they seem to be, we must have a procedure for distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. But to know whether our procedure is a good procedure, we have to know whether it really succeeds in distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. And we cannot know whether it does really succeed unless we already know which appearances are true and which ones are false. And so we are caught in a circle." (his italics and emphasis)

2. Cf. B. Witherington, The Jesus Quest: The Third Search for the Jew of Nazareth (Downers Grove 1995) 12: "... the most historical-critical method can accomplish is to establish a good probability as to whether or not a certain saying or action reported of Jesus did actually originate with him and whether or not a given interpretation of Jesus has some historical basis." (his italics); E.P. Sanders & M. Davies, Studying the Synoptic Gospels (London 1989) 304: "In historical research there is no means of establishing absolutely what is 'true' and 'false', and we deal instead with probabilities."

3. This probable knowledge may be utilized to distinguish probable criteria from improbable ones. However, the probable knowledge of the HJ is attained by the utilization of the criteria supposed to be probable. Thus, we are caught again in circularity.

4. R.P. Amico regarded LC and PE as "fundamental metaprinciples" (The Problem of the Criterion (Maryland1993) 139). Here PE does not denote a maxim of textual criticism but a basic principle of all scientific endeavours. PE as a text-critical maxim is an application of PE which is a maxim of science in general.

5. For Aristotle's classical definition of LC, see Aristotelis Metaphysica, ed. W. Jaeger (Oxford 1957) 1005b-20: To. ga.r auvto. a[ma u`pa,rcein te kai. mh. u`pa,rcein avdu,naton tw/| auvtw/| kai. kata. to. auvto,. ("The same [property] cannot be extant and non-extant in the same thing at the same time, to the same [view-point].") (the translation is mine) Amico regarded LC as a criterion of criteria: "Metacriteria and criteria should be consistent with the law of noncontradiction and should yield beliefs that are not inconsistent" (Amico, Problem, 139).

6. Amico, Problem, 139.

7. The following logical treatments adopt terms used by R.H. Thomason, Symbolic Logic: An Introduction (London 1970).

8. LC might be deduced as follows on the basis of the rules of inference, such as the rule of "conjunction elimination" (If 'A and B' is true, A or B is true), "the rule of negation introduction." 1. Let us suppose something is so and not-so (hypothesis). 2. Then it is so (from 1, conjunction elimination). 3. It is also not-so (from 1, conjunction elimination). 4. When 1 is supposed, its conclusions (2 and 3) contradict against each other. Thus, 1 is not the case (from 1,2,3, negation introduction). Thus, anything cannot be so and not-so (at the same time, to the same viewpoint).

9. NI can be proved on the basis of LC and inference rules, "modus tolens" (If it is the case that 'if A then B', and B is false, then A is also false) and "implication introduction" (When B can be inferred from a supposed A, 'If A then B' is true). 1. Let us suppose that from a hypothesis A, contradictory conclusions B (something is so) and not-B (something is not-so) can be inferred (hypothesis). 2. But, anything cannot be so and not-so (LC). 3. Thus, the hypothesis A is false (from 1, 2, modus tolens). 4. If contradictory conclusions are inferred from a hypothesis, the hypothesis is false (implication introduction from 1 and 3).

10. Circular argumentation refers to the argumentation which proves a conclusion with a premise, and again the premise with the conclusion. Cf. D.N. Walton, "The Essential Ingredients of the Fallacy of Begging the Question", Fallacies (eds. H.V. Hansen & R.C. Pinto) (Pennsylvania 1995) 229-39.

11. Cf. Amico, Problem, 129: "... the fact that we all share these logical intuitions (if indeed we do) is not what justifies us in accepting them."

12. Even if LC is a sound principle, we cannot refute the opposition, 'both A and not-A might be untrue.' One might insist that this opposition is false according to the law of the excluded middle (Between two contradictory sentences A and not-A, if one is false, the other is true), and that this law is equal to LC. However, they are not the same. They can be regarded as the same, only if the value of a sentence can have just two kinds of values, truth or falsity. In this system, if A is false then not-A is true. But in other systems which have more than two kinds of truth-values (e.g. verity, falsity, being not-false not-true), even if A is false, not-A might be not necessarily true, because it can be neutral. Thus, without a special concept of truth, LC alone cannot refute a sceptical opposition which doubts both thesis and antithesis. The two-valued truth concept seems self-evident to the human mind, but this self-evidence does not verify its absolute legitimacy because it is evident only within the human mind and the human mind cannot examine whether this concept of truth reflects the reality itself or not. We can merely state that in the human mind a sentence has normally two kinds of truth-values.

13. Impressions are perceived as 'real,' even if they do not always reflect reality truly.

14. PE imply interactions between explanations (hypotheses or theories) and impressions (experiences, data from experiments, or statistics). An explanation which fails in explaining impressions may be rejected. An impression which fails to be explained may be rejected. However, a new explanation can be introduced to support the rejected impression, and both the expression‎ and the impression could be accepted. By this endless dialogue between explanation and impression, science approaches the truth.

15. Amico, Problem, 66.

16. Amico. Problem, 30.

17. G. Zuntz, The Text of the Epistles: A Disquisition Upon the Corpus Paulinum (London 1953) 283.

18. Cf. M. Silva, "Internal Evidence in the Text-Critical Use of the LXX", La Septuaginta en la investigacion contemporanea, (ed. N.F. Marcos) (Madrid 1985) 164-66.

19. This term is adopted from G.D. Fee, "A Text Critical Look at the Synoptic Problem", NT 22 (1980) 12-28. 17. For an analysis of this concept, see below.

20. Cf. R.H. Stein, "The "Criteria" for Authenticity", Gospel and Tradition, (ed. R.H. Stein) (Grand Rapids 1991) 185: "It is nevertheless the cumulative evidence of the various criteria that serves to demonstrate a sayings's authenticity."

21. Cf. I.M. Copi, Introduction to Logic, 4^th ed. (New York 1972) 474, 480.