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In a rare moment of political unity, the Association of South-east Asian Nations (Asean) unhesitatingly urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) to “comply fully with United Nations Security Council resolutions”. At the 50th Asean Foreign Ministers Meeting in Manila that ended on Aug 5, the grouping also asked Pyongyang to commit to “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner”.
Many have touted this as a sign that the 50-year-old regional organisation has finally come of age as it wades into the high-stakes game of international security.
In retrospect, this is not the first time Asean has spoken out against North Korea’s efforts to develop and acquire nuclear weapons, a principled stance consistent with its South-east Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone declaration adopted in 1971.
However, some have accused Asean of having a track record of “all talk, no action”.
As Asean commemorates its golden jubilee, it would need to rectify its credibility deficit by backing up strong words with equally appropriate actions.
In the case of the Korean nuclear issue, the grouping could collectively take tangible actions to cut off North Korea’s business interests in the region and support other measures approved by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2371. A failure to follow up on this or any of its firm rhetoric would render any Asean declaration weak and toothless.
In fact, Asean’s privileged position as the convenor of East Asian cooperation can no longer be taken for granted.
For decades now, Asean has been the leader and innovator in designing and leading pan-Asian collaborative frameworks such as the Asean Regional Forum (since 1994), the East Asian Summit (since 2005), and the Asean Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (since 2010).
These fora have exemplified Asean’s long-standing desire to work with major and middle powers outside the region for the security and stability of the region, but the regional organisation now faces an uphill task to accommodate the whims and wishes of these same powers.
In the face of such pressure, Asean must realise that the idea of “centrality” must mean more than merely being in the “centre of the action” or acting as organiser and chauffeur.
Asean can hold on to its vaunted centrality only if it continues to have the trust of the major powers as an honest and impartial interlocutor.
At the same time, if Asean allows the interests of the major powers to solely dominate and overpower these fora’s agendas, these Asean-led processes would face the real threat of obsolescence, to the detriment of the region. Moving forward, it may not be enough for Asean to be impartial. Impartiality often means neutrality, and that would advertently lead to “silence”.
Asean is hard-pressed to balance between the imperative of impartiality and being a relevant regional entity guided by long-standing principles.
In other words, there is no point for Asean to be “at the centre” if centrality serves only to perpetuate the interests of the major powers at the expense of Asean’s.
All 10 member states must be willing to let Asean speak with a clarion voice that may at times contradict some of the major powers. Asean should act and speak on an even keel with all of its dialogue partners.
Asean serves two important purposes for its members. First, it is bound by the belief that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
As a grouping of mostly small states, the voices of 10 countries are more audible and louder than speaking individually — something Asean has more often than not succeeded in facilitating over the past 50 years.
Second, Asean allows member states to register their stance in a collective setting for situations that might not allow them to do so in individual capacities.
Asean is the best strategic mouthpiece available for individual states to speak out under the protective and safe umbrella of collective action.
However, as commendable as Asean’s decision to take a firm stand on a security issue outside South-east Asia may be, it should seek to avoid double standards particularly when it comes to intra-Asean security issues. The Rohingya crisis, human trafficking and the growth of radical Muslim fundamentalism are just some of the lingering security issues closer to home in which Asean should take the lead in addressing.
Although Asean centrality has almost always referred to Asean’s position relative to the “outside”, Asean should work hard to address the issue of “internal centrality”.
There is no point in Asean gaining traction outside South-east Asia when the grouping in effectively invisible within the region.
Asean has to address the critical issue of making itself matter to South-east Asians, and let Asean’s citizens understand and own the concept of “community”.
Moving forward, the disconnect between Asean and South-east Asians is one of the major challenges for Asean. Without support and stakeholdership from the people, the hard choices to make community-building work would be difficult, especially if leaders fall into the temptation of relapsing into nationalistic stances. This would require having the political courage to perhaps even selectively set aside Asean’s “most cherished” principle of domestic non-interference for the sake of the common good.
If Asean is to be a community in the fullest and truest sense of the word, it has to be able to equate domestic security with regional security, and take collective action whenever necessary.
Outlining firm and principled stances towards external developments are all well and good, but cooperating on common security threats in tangible ways would make Asean even more relevant to the public.
Let that be our shared vision for Asean as it trudges on towards the next 50 years, and the next 50.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS:
Dr Tang Siew Mun and Mr Jason Salim is respectively Head and Research Officer at Asean Studies Centre, Iseas-Yusof Ishak Institute. This is part of a series of commentaries TODAY is running to mark Asean’s 50th anniversary.