Is North Korea Really on the Brink of Another Mass Famine?

[정일영]

[The Korean Odyssey]

*North Korea's food production was widely expected to decline significantly in 2022 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and flood damage. @iStock

Il Young Jeong

Research Professor_Institute of Social Sciences_Sogang University

Since the beginning of this year, there has been no short supply of reports about starvation due to food shortages in North Korea. While the starvation is the result of declines in agricultural production, the matter has become a hot topic as “the worst food shortages since the Arduous March (mass famine of the 90s).”

The closed-off nature of information about North Korea has created a news environment that encourages provocative stories and relies heavily on undisclosed sources. This informational environment has only continued to snowball without redress. There are also cases in which "claims" made without concrete evidence are picked up by foreign outlets, gain credibility by association, and are brought back into Korea and reported as "global news."

This article takes a critical look at the recent spate of reports on starvation in North Korea and delves into the issue of unverified "claims" being repeated and reshaped into “facts.”

What is the true extent of North Korea's food crisis?

It is nearly impossible to accurately gauge the food situation in North Korea. This is due to the fact North Korea does not announce information related to it food situation on its own, and even if it did, we would not be able to believe the country’s own reports. There is a reason that discussions about the North Korean economy often feature the wry admission, "even Kim Jong Un himself probably doesn't know."

However, looking at the data we do have, North Korea produced 4.51 million tons of food in 2022 according to South Korea's Rural Development Administration (RDA) in December 2022. This figure represents a decrease 180,000 tons (3.8%) from 4.69 million tons produced in 2021. However, output for 2022 was still up 4.39 million tons compared to 2020. The Rural Development Administration’s annual estimates are based on comprehensive analysis of a variety of inputs, including weather conditions in each region of the country, pest damage, fertilizer supply and demand, crop data from domestic and foreign research institutes, and satellite image information.

North Korea's food production was widely expected to decline significantly in 2022 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and flood damage. Some even predicted a sharp drop of up to 3 million tons compared to 2021. However, according to RDA’s estimates, experts concluded that - despite the circumstances - North Korea’s agricultural sector did better than expected, even increasing output compared to 2020.

The South Korean government estimates that North Korea needs to annually produce 5.5 million tons of grain, which means North Korea’s agricultural sector is regularly falling about 990,000 tons short. For the period between 2000 and 2009, South Korea’s RDA estimated that North Korea produced an average of 4.16 million tons of food annually. The estimated output for 2022 (4.51 million tons) represents a sizable increase in production.

It is also worth remembering that the North Korean government has ordered all production units to cultivate their own gardens as part of the country’s economic “self-reliance” strategy. Many ordinary citizens also grow vegetables in gardens at home or out in the mountains to supplement their food supplies. In other words, there are likely more “invisible” sources of food than one might expect.

How Do Reports of Mass Starvation Go From “Rumors” to “Facts?”

In the beginning of 2023, some news media outlets reported the outbreak of mass starvation in North Korea based on "sources" inside the country, but the Unification Ministry initially responded cautiously. In February 2022, for example, then-Unification Minister Kwon Young-se expressed caution about the reports at the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee saying, "While there are reports of starvation in North Korea, the situation does not appear to have reached the same level as the Arduous March yet."

However, just a few days later that same February, a Ministry of Unification spokesperson undermined this cautionary approach when he claimed, without specific evidence, that “repeat incidents of residents starving to death suggest dire food insecurity in some areas.” Soon after, these remarks were lumped together with other rumors and starvation in North Korea became “fact.”

These remarks from the Ministry of Unification soon entered the South Korean news cycle and beyond. Foreign media such as CNN began to report on the possibility of mass starvation North Korea as based on news “announced by the South Korean government.” However, some defectors with their own “sources” in North Korea have interpreted this news differently. Some asserted that North Korea's food insecurity is a chronic phenomenon, and that starvation is not a new problem for North Korea’s kkotjebi (homeless people, historically primarily children) and other vulnerable groups.

We are constantly exposed to the media stories about crisis in North Korea with reports of North Korea's food problems and starvation being particularly prone to exaggeration and receive lots of attention. However, it is quite exceptional for a government official to announce this kind of news without offering concrete evidence, and this could potentially end up undermining the government’s credibility.

Emphasizing Proactive, Systematic Understanding Over Reactive “Hot Topic” Analysis

South Korea's Unification Ministry has invested more than 20 billion won in informational analysis of North Korea since 2021. This includes projects such as collecting in-depth information on North Korea's economy and society, strengthening analysis capabilities, setting up “big data” and artificial intelligence-based approaches, and operating a comprehensive North Korea database. The ministry also continues to share information on North Korea with the National Intelligence Service (NIS). Cooperation with the relevant US agencies might also contribute to improving our analysis of events and developments on the Korean Peninsula.

The South Korean government needs to take care to provide clear analysis and solid evidence when discussing and publicizing their findings on issues like mass starvation out of consideration for the sensitivity and close relationship between food security and the North Korean regime’s security. We cannot afford to simply judge North Korean against South Korea’s own standards or make judgements and generalizations based on testimonies from a small handful of defectors or unverifiable sources inside North Korea.

For example, we need a detailed analysis of how the current food shortage under Kim Jong Un differs from famine under the Kim Jong Il regime. Under Kim Jong Il, many of the deaths were directly attributable to the collapse of national central supply economy and public food distribution system. Unlike then, modern North Koreans are well accustomed to solving their food problems through the market. Even if widespread starvation broke out again, the North Korean regime could potentially respond more effectively than it did in the past.

We also need to avoid overly simplistic analyses and getting lost in simple fluctuations in rice and corn prices. We should instead focus on observing the domestic dynamics and market trends to consider a range of possible interpretations and explanations behind price changes. For example, a sudden jump in grain prices could be caused by a “patriotic rice” campaign, in which the North Korean authorities mandate households to contribute a fixed amount of rice and thus drive a sudden increase in demand for rice in the private market. 

I believe that rather than focusing on North Korea’s latest “crisis,” more attention needs to be devoted to understanding the characteristics of the regime that lead to chronic issues like North Korea’s food insecurity. Not just South Korea, but the United States could also stand to benefit from consistent and in-depth analysis of developments on the peninsula.

*IL-Young Jeong is a research professor at Sogang University in Seoul. His key research interests include North Korea's social control system, inter-Korean relations, and peace on the Korean Peninsula.