IMF 총재, "선진국 이미 공황" - 금융대공황 경고

[이코노미]

IMF 홈페이지(http://www.IMF.org)에서 퍼왔습니다. 시간 관계상 번역문은 싣지 않습니다.

하지만 비교적 평이한 문체로 되어 있어서 해석하시는 데 큰 어려움은 없을 듯 합니다.

IMF 총재님(도미니크 스트로스칸)이 지난 7일 말레이시아 콸라룸프르에서 열린 동남아시아 총재단 모임에서 "선진국 경제가 이미 공황에 빠져있다"고 말했다고 <블룸버그 뉴스>가 전하고 있습니다. 2월 9일자 한겨레 신문 1면에 이 기사가 눈에 띄어서 기사 원문을 직접 찾아봤습니다.

영어공부 하시는 셈 치고 한 번 읽어보시길...

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Speech By Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund
At the 44th SEACEN Governors' Conference

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, February 7, 2009

As Prepared for Delivery

It's a great honor to take part in the SEACEN Governors' Conference and in the celebrations of the 50th Anniversary of Bank Negara Malaysia. The bank's reputation as a careful policymaker and a proactive and innovative supervisor is well known. I would like to thank Governor Zeti for inviting me here today and for her longstanding leadership at Bank Negara and in the international community.

The State of the Global Economy

We are meeting at a very grave time in the world economy. Last week the IMF released projections that show that global growth will be close to zero, the worst performance in most of our lifetimes. We are forecasting recessions in most of the advanced economies. There are some prospects of a recovery in 2010, but even this will depend on strong policy action.

(우리는 세계 경제에서 매우 심각한 시간에 처해있다. 지난 주 IMF는 세계 경제성장률이 0%에 가까울 것임을 보여주는 전망치를 발표했고, 아마 우리 생애 대부분에서 가장 나쁜 경제실적이 될 것이다. 우리는 대부분의 선진국의 경제에서 경기침체를 전망한다. 2010년도에 회복될 조짐이 있기는 하지만 심지어 이러한 회복 조차도 강력한 (정부의)정책 집행의지에 달려있다)

The psychology that lies behind these forecasts is even more disturbing. Around the world, confidence is faltering. Investors have lost confidence in many companies, and especially banks, because they fear that there are further losses to be realized. Consumers are holding back from buying cars and from other big discretionary purchases, because they fear for their jobs.

Loss of confidence is now the central problem. Our central goal should be to restore it. At a global level, this means that governments and central banks need to act decisively so that investors once again feel confident about the solvency of financial institutions. And they should credibly commit to measures sufficient to eliminate the risk of a repeat of the Great Depression.

All governments need to act. Measures to clean up the banks and revive the housing market in the United States are an important part of the solution, and are needed urgently. But they are no longer enough.

This is because the crisis is now much broader, and it is having profound effects on both advanced and emerging economies. Consider what is happening here in Asia. Every day we hear dire news about exports and industrial production—mirroring the remarkable collapse in global trade and industrial activity.

We have halved our Asian growth forecast for 2009, to about 2½ percent. Why? Because Asia's open economies are especially export-dependent and therefore vulnerable to the ongoing decline in demand in the United States and Europe. So even though Asian countries did not originate this problem they are feeling its consequences intensely.

To contain this crisis we need a coordinated global response. We saw in 2008 that piecemeal responses are not enough. This does not mean that all countries should do the same things, or that there is a "one size fits all" solution. But policy responses have to take into account the interconnectedness of national economies, and the fact that decisions taken in one country can have profound effects on others. Protectionism is a clear danger. Let me give you an example.

Some countries are trying to make government support of banks conditional on their giving priority to domestic borrowers, to the detriment of financing across borders. This will hurt emerging economies, whose growth depends on access to foreign bank financing. It is protectionism in the financial markets, and its consequences could be as damaging and dangerous as the trade protectionism of the 1930s.

In fact, even without government intervention, we are already seeing a very sharp fall in financing for emerging markets.

These developments should leave no doubt that we need urgent action. We need financial market measures, in order to get credit flowing again. We need monetary and fiscal policy measures, to offset the abrupt fall in private demand. And we need liquidity support for some emerging market countries, to reduce the risk that growth in these countries grinds to a halt if key financing needs are not met. Let me take these issues in turn.

Restoring Stability to Financial Markets

Financial stability is essential to the recovery of the global economy. Policy makers have already acted to address the immediate threats to systemic stability, through massive liquidity support. They have also extended deposit insurance and other guarantees, something that we have learned from past crises, including the Asian crisis, is essential to maintain public confidence.

But more must be done to address the underlying lack of confidence in the solvency of the system, which stems from a lack of confidence that past losses have been properly recognized, and now also concern about new losses—extending well beyond real estate—as the economy turns down.

The task for governments is therefore to push the bank restructuring process forward—with an emphasis on cleansing balance sheets—using its authority to:

• Re-examine bank balance sheets on a worst-case basis, determine the viability of various institutions, and restructure them if required. Authorities need to be ready to respond as needed, including full-fledged intervention.

• Provide public support where necessary to banks that can be rehabilitated, in the form of capital, bad asset carve outs, and guarantees.

• Sell or wind-up insolvent banks quickly, depending on whether any franchise value remains.

• Establish new public resolution agencies to manage "bad assets" to maturity or sale. On this last point, the United States and Western Europe can learn from the previous experience of countries like Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and also Sweden, which set up such agencies, and often recovered a lot of public money.

Even with these measures, it will take time to restore credit growth. They will also be expensive for governments. But you know very well that the costs of banking crises increase if problems are not addressed quickly. This is not the time for hesitation.

Supporting Aggregate Demand

Fixing the financial sector is essential but it is not enough, given the damaging feedback loop from weaker growth to financial stress. To restore aggregate demand we also need supporting monetary and especially fiscal policies. I have been really impressed with the speed and determination with which central banks have acted—not just the Fed and the ECB but central banks around the world.

For example, the Monetary Authority of Singapore eased monetary policy early in the crisis, and the Reserve Bank of India and the Bank of Korea have perhaps been most aggressive in cutting interest rates. Indeed, central banks across Asia, including here in Malaysia, have been among the most alert to the risks of the crisis, and have acted decisively.

But monetary policy will not be enough to offset the disruption in financial markets and the severity of the downturn. For a year now, since I spoke at Davos last January, the Fund has advocated fiscal stimulus to restore global growth. There is now a broad consensus on this.

Of course, not every country can undertake fiscal stimulus. Some countries—both emerging and advanced economies—cannot finance higher deficits without great risk to their creditworthiness. Some will need to contract their budgets rather than expand them.

But the fact that some advanced and emerging economies cannot or should not engage in fiscal stimulus, makes it all the more important that other countries do their part.

Fiscal stimulus is one way to increase domestic demand, but of course there are others. China is an important case in point. It has room for further fiscal stimulus, and could also rebalance demand toward private consumption by improving the social safety net, and especially social insurance and pensions, so that its citizens do not need such high precautionary savings. Allowing greater flexibility for its currency to appreciate over time would also help. In doing so, China could support both domestic demand and intra-regional trade, because more domestic demand from China would mean more exports for other Asian countries.

Support for Crisis-hit Countries

All countries are affected by the current crisis, but some are affected much more than others, especially by the cut-off in new financing, and by reduced demand for their exports.

In the current crisis, the Fund has already provided substantial support to Hungary, Ukraine, Pakistan, Iceland, Latvia and Belarus. We have increased support to many low-income countries and are ready to do more.

But we are very conscious that the worst effects of the crisis on emerging economies, including Asian countries, are probably still to come, as the cuts in exports and drying up of capital flows that I talked about earlier feed through into countries' economies.

The Fund needs to be ready for this in two ways. First we need enough resources. In November last year the Fund lent more than it has in any single month in its history.

But if this crisis gets worse, the world is going to need to supply much more liquidity to affected countries. Japan has already offered to add $100 billion to the resources of the Fund. We need other countries to follow this generous example and provide the Fund with the means to address the challenges arising from this global crisis.

Second, the Fund needs to adapt to the different circumstances countries face. For example, here in Asia we have to acknowledge and get past the sense of stigma that seems to be attached to a country coming to the Fund for support. One way I see of doing this is for the Fund to collaborate very closely with regional groupings like this one, and like the ASEAN + 3, including through cofinancing.

Policies to Avoid a Future Crisis

Before closing, let me say a few words about some of the changes that we might see in global economic and financial governance.

It is now widely recognized that financial market regulation has to change. Given the globalization of financial markets, we will also need greater international coordination, and all countries—especially those with growing financial centers—must play their part in that.

The IMF has a special role in this process, because of its expertise in assessing the linkages between financial sector and financial market rules and macroeconomic outcomes. This perspective is critical for designing regulatory frameworks and conducting oversight.

Another key issue concerns early warnings. Although there was some prescient analysis before the crisis, in general the warnings were too scattered and unspecific to attract much by way of a domestic—let alone collective—policy response.

We need a less fragmented and more pointed early warning system to bring together the expertise scattered across institutions and to understand key issues well. The past year has made it very clear that risks are not confined to emerging markets. So we should look at all sources of systemic risk, in advanced and emerging market countries alike. This will require better financial and macroeconomic oversight in advanced countries and a stronger response to asset prices surges.

Another issue is how to generate action once warnings are given. Before the crisis, there was almost no international policy coordination. And during the crisis, the initial policy response was far from collaborative, let alone coordinated. For example, countries rushed to protect their own banks with guarantees, at the risk of causing runs in less protected systems in neighboring countries, while liquidity provision has been mostly directed at domestic financial institutions.

There is a need for a central body to assume leadership for responses to systemic risks in the global economy. The G-20 is beginning to play this role, but it does not represent all countries. Can the IMF play this role? I think it can, but first we would need to address deficits in ownership and efficiency. Specifically we need to implement recent agreements on rebalancing quota shares, and also to agree on a timetable for the next stage of quota reform. I hope that we will be able to do both of these things this year.

Conclusion

In concluding, let me return to our present situation. It is easy with hindsight to see some of the causes of the current crisis: the opacity of financial markets, the greed of some bankers, the complacency of regulators and policy makers. I have talked about some of the institutional changes that might make future crises less likely. But first we need to get out of the present danger. It will take clear thinking and a new willingness to cooperate. I see some hopeful signs in this meeting. For 50 years, Bank Negara Malaysia has been a tower of intellectual strength. For 40 years, SEACEN has been an example of cooperation between countries. So let me end by saying again that I am very pleased to be with you today, and I am looking forward to our discussion this morning.

Thank you very much.

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Statement by the IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn

at the Conclusion of his Visit to Malaysia

Press Release No. 09/29
February 7, 2009

Mr. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), visited Malaysia on February 6-7, 2009. He issued the following statement in Kuala Lumpur at the conclusion of his visit:

"I have had the honor to attend the 44th South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) Conference in Kuala Lumpur. I exchanged views with Governor Zeti of Bank Negara Malaysia, whom I congratulated on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of Bank Negara, other regional central bank governors, and Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak. Our discussions focused on recent global economic developments, the challenges facing the region, and how macroeconomic policies should respond to the evolving economic realities.

"We met at a difficult time for the world economy. Last week the IMF released projections that show that global growth will be close to zero, which, if realized, would be the lowest rate in the postwar period. Because Asia's open economies are especially vulnerable to falls in demand in the United States and Europe, the region's growth will be affected, while remaining positive.

"To contain this crisis we need urgent action around the world. We need financial market measures, in order to get credit flowing again. We need monetary and fiscal policy measures, to offset the abrupt fall in private demand. And we need liquidity support for some emerging market countries, to reduce the adverse effects of the widespread capital outflows triggered by the financial crisis. These policies need to be implemented in the context of preserving an open trading system.

"Asian policymakers have risen forcefully to these challenges. In all the major countries, substantial monetary and fiscal stimulus is underway, tailored to their individual circumstances and with a watchful eye to medium-term fiscal sustainability. Much improved fundamentals over the past decade give most Asian economies considerable room to mount a counter-cyclical policy response. In fact, many countries in the region have room to increase further their efforts to support growth. Macroeconomic policies are also being supplemented with measures to safeguard domestic financial systems.

"More broadly, many countries in Asia need to do more to raise domestic consumption demand over the medium term. This will lessen Asia's reliance on export-led growth and improve its resilience to external shocks. Achieving these goals would require, however, important changes in the policy mix in many countries.

"For its part, the Fund has recently stepped up its financial support for some emerging market members and many low-income countries, just as capital flows to these economies have been reversing and corporates have experienced heightened stress. And we are ready to do more.

"Asia's legendary economic dynamism and strong integration with the global trade and financial system should deliver a rapid recovery once the world economy regains its footing."

[리치파워]

자산 뻥튀기에 수익률이 따라 주지 않는 것은 너무 당연하죠. 진짜 자산이라면 수익률은 비례해서 발생합니다. 그러므로 자산 뻥튀기는 익은 밥먹고 밥값도 제대로 못하는 괜히 헛짓하는 거지요. 결국 터지게 되어 있습니다. 정크본드 대량으로 생산되겠네요. 그동안 하도 열심히 정크본드 만들기 노력해서... 이런 마당에는 달러 휴지로 생각해서 열심히 태운 쪽이 압승하겠네요. 달러 귀하게 생각해 못구해서 안달난 곳은 초상집이고...