ASAT 1970년대의 대위성 공격체계

[위종민]

The Space Review에 실린 1970년대 소련이 ASAT 체계와 그 대응에 대한 글입니다. 1970년대엔 주로 실시간 전송 능력에 따라, 위급상황시 바로 정보 제공이 가능한 실시간 전송 정찰위성을 최중요 보호체계로 지정했고, 킬러위성, 지상기반 고에너지 레이저, 우주기반 레이저 무기 등의 ASAT 체계에 대한 대응으로는 회피기동, 위성 자체를 강화하는 방안 등을 검토했네요. 

미국의 평가로는 SS-9에 탑재되는 킬러위성은 고도 2,500해리(=4,630km) 상공의 위성까지, 더 큰 발사체에 탑재되는 킬러위성은 정지궤도까지 요격 가능하다고 합니다. ㄷㄷㄷ

1970년대 정보위성 취약성: 우주를 둘러싼 전투
작성자 Dwayne A. Day
2026년 5월 4일 월요일

소련의 공궤도 대위성 무기는 1960년대 처음 개발되어 1970년대에 실전 배치되었다. 이 기체는 현재 러시아 박물관에 전시되어 있다. 1970년대에 이르러 소련은 추가적인 대위성 무기를 개발하고 있었다. (출처: TV Zvezda) 

1960년대 후반부터 소련은 새로운 대위성 무기체계를 시험하기 시작했다. 이 체계는 위성을 목표물 가까이 기동시킨 뒤 성형폭약을 발사해 금속 파편을 퍼붓는 방식이었다. 미국은 이러한 시험을 탐지했고, 이후 몇 년 동안 미국 위성 운용자들은 전쟁 발생 시 소련이 미국의 군사·정보 우주 자산을 무력화할 수 있다는 우려를 갖게 되었다.

미국 위성의 공격 취약성이 증가하는 데 대한 또 다른, 그리고 더 분명한 대응은 위성 자체를 덜 취약하게 만드는 것이었다.

미국 위성 취약성은 1970년대 중반 주요 우려 사항이 되었고, 1976년 7월 포드 대통령은 “핵심 미국 군사 및 정보 우주 체계의 생존성 향상”이라는 제목의 국가안보결정각서 333(NSDM 333)에 서명했다. 이 문서는 우주를 “성역(sanctuary)”으로 간주하고 위성이 공격받지 않을 것이라고 가정하던 기존 정책에서 벗어나, 궁극적으로는 소련 위성을 공격할 미국의 능력 개발로 방향을 전환시켰다. 1970년대 후반에는 우주전이 현실적 가능성이 되었다. (“To attack or deter? The role of anti-satellite weapons,” The Space Review, 2020년 4월 20일 참조.)

그러나 위성 취약성 증가에 대한 또 다른, 보다 분명한 대응은 위성을 덜 취약하게 만드는 것이었다. NSDM 333에 대응해 1976년 10월, 미국 정보위성 전력을 관리하던 국가정찰국(NRO)은 자국 위성의 공격 취약성과 이를 줄이기 위한 계획에 대한 보고서를 작성했다. 최근 기밀 해제된 이 보고서의 요약본은 1970년대 중반 미국 위성이 직면한 새로운 위협에 대한 흥미로운 통찰을 제공한다.

“생존성 향상 실행 계획(Survivability Enhancement Action Plan)”이라는 제목의 이 문서에는 소련 군 장교들이 제작한 “우주의 첩보 네트워크(The Space Networks of Espionage)”라는 1970년 삽화가 표지에 사용되었다. 요약본은 지금까지 NRO가 “정찰 위성은 위기 시 안정화 요인으로 작용하며, 따라서 정찰 우주선은 공격 금지 대상(sanctioned)”이라고 가정해왔음을 밝혔다. 즉, 안전하다고 본 것이다. 그러나 상황은 변하고 있었고, 더 이상 그런 가정을 할 수 없게 되었다.

ASAT

미국 정보위성의 생존성을 높이는 방법에 관한 1976년 연구 표지. 표지 그림은 두 명의 소련 장교가 소련 군사 저널용으로 제작했으며, 아마 허가 없이 사용된 것으로 보인다. (출처: NRO)

문서는 이어 “현재의 프로그램 목표는 일반적 생존성 목표와 노력 수준을 정의하는 것이라는 믿음 아래, NRO는 외국 위협에 대한 비용과 효과 수준이 다른 여러 대안 프로그램을 개발했다. 비용 추정에 대한 신뢰성을 확보하기 위해 각 대안은 각 체계별로 식별된 구체적 프로젝트를 기반으로 구성되었다”고 밝혔다. 연구가 신속히 진행된 탓에 비용 추정은 대략적이었으며, 상세 후속 연구가 필요했다.

이 연구는 향후 5~10년을 중점적으로 다루며, 이미 획득 단계에 있는 체계에 대한 대응책 개발에 초점을 맞췄다. 문서는 “이러한 대응책은 일반적으로 부분적 효과만 가진다. 이는 원래 생존성을 고려하지 않고 설계된 체계를 개조해야 하기 때문”이라고 지적했다. 반면 장기적으로는 더 큰 기회가 존재했다. “새로운 정찰 체계 개념은 처음부터 생존성을 주요 성능 기준으로 삼아 개발될 수 있다. 우주왕복선 같은 최근 기술 도입을 활용해 생존성을 특별히 강조한 체계도 구상할 수 있다.” NRO는 신속 대응 영상·신호정보 체계 같은 근본적으로 다른 체계도 검토할 수 있다고 밝혔다.

그러나 대응책에는 비용이 따랐다. 이는 단순한 금전적 비용만이 아니었다. 위성을 강화(hardening)하는 것은 비용이 많이 들 수 있었고, 위성 운용에도 영향을 줄 수 있었다.

연구는 기존 NRO 위성 체계를 가장 중요, 중요, 덜 중요의 세 범주로 나누었다. 가장 중요한 범주에는 1976년 12월 첫 발사를 앞둔 KH-11 KENNEN 실시간 근접 영상위성이 포함되었다. 이름이 삭제된 다른 두 체계도 포함되었는데, 이는 최근 기밀 해제된 JUMPSEAT 같은 고고도 신호정보 위성으로 추정된다. “중요” 범주에는 이름이 삭제된 여러 체계가 포함되었는데, 새로 배치된 PARCAE 해양 감시 체계와 최소 하나 이상의 고고도 신호정보 체계가 포함된 것으로 보인다.

덜 중요한 범주에는 HEXAGON과 GAMBIT 영상위성, Program 989 저궤도 신호정보 위성이 포함되었다. 이 세 체계의 공통 특징은 지상으로 데이터를 매우 빠르게 전달하지 못한다는 점이었고, 따라서 위기 상황에서 상대적으로 덜 중요했다.

국방부/정보공동체 NSDM 333 대응 실무그룹은 다음과 같은 운용 선택지를 개발했다.

평시 우주작전 유지(단, 교란 상황 포함)
미·소 위기/대치 상황의 확전 또는 긴장 완화 관리 및 통제
미국은 관여하지만 소련 또는 소련 핵심 이익이 관여하지 않는 재래식 분쟁의 확전 관리 및 통제(예: 베트남)
미국은 관여하지만 소련 또는 소련 핵심 이익이 관여하지 않는 재래식 분쟁에 대한 군사 지원 극대화(예: 베트남)
미·소 재래식 분쟁의 확전 관리 및 통제
미·소 재래식 분쟁 중 군사 지원 극대화
NATO/바르샤바조약기구 분쟁의 확전 관리 및 통제
NATO/바르샤바조약기구 분쟁 중 군사 지원 극대화
제한적 전략핵 옵션 수행 지원
전략핵전 수행 지원

1970년대 중반 미군은 미국 위성이 직면한 잠재적 위협이 단순한 실전 배치 대위성 무기뿐 아니라 고출력 레이저 같은 새로운 위협도 포함한다는 점을 파악했다. (출처: NRO)

소련의 위협

취약성 연구는 소련 위협을 다음과 같이 요약했다.

“소련의 미국 위성에 대한 ASAT 위협은 다양한 체계와 능력으로 구성된다. 소련은 파편 탄두를 사용하는 공궤도 요격 체계를 보유하고 있다. 이 체계는 개조된 SS-9 ICBM 부스터를 사용하며 최대 2,500해리 고도 표적을 요격할 수 있다. 더 큰 우주 발사체를 사용할 경우 반동기 및 정지(19,300해리) 궤도 표적도 요격할 수 있다. 이미 운용 중일 가능성이 있는 고출력 지상 기반 레이저는 개발 중인 ASAT 체계일 수 있다. 소련은 매우 고출력의 지상 기반 레이저 ASAT 체계 개발에 착수할 가능성이 높다. 소련은 전시 위성에 대한 전자전을 수행할 의도가 있으며, 실제 그런 능력을 보유한 것으로 보인다. 소련은 1980년대 초 시연 가능한 우주 기반 레이저 무기를 개발 중인 것으로 보고된다. 또한 핵탄두를 탑재한 Galosh ABM 요격기는 모스크바를 위협한다고 판단되는 위성에 대한 ASAT 역할로 사용될 것이 분명하다. 소련은 초고고도 위성 공격용 핵 요격 체계를 개발할 수 있다. 현재 그런 개발 증거는 없다. 소련은 또한 미국 및 해외 우주 체계 지상시설에 대한 은밀한 공격 능력을 보유하고 있다. 소련은 공격 효과가 불확실함에도 불구하고 고주파 손상 무기를 개발할 가능성이 매우 높다.”

NRO는 또한 자국 체계가 “비표적 핵무기에 의한 우발적 파괴와 지상시설 파괴공작에도 취약하다”고 지적했다.

보고서는 “매우 고가치의 국가정찰프로그램 수집 체계 개발은 기존 체계 또는 대체 체계가 임무를 완수할 수 있도록 생존 기술에 프리미엄을 부여하게 만들었다”고 밝혔다. 또한 “생존성 향상 분야에 적용되는 정교한 미국 우주기술은 임무 완수 능력 향상과 소련 ASAT 전력이 직면할 어려움 증가에 큰 효과를 가져올 것으로 예상된다”고 덧붙였다.

미국 정보위성에 대한 잠재적 위협과 이를 무력화할 수 있는 대응책을 보여주는 표. (확대판) (출처: NRO)

소련 위협 속 생존

요약본에는 위협과 대응책을 정리한 “주요 생존성 향상 선택지” 표가 포함되었다. 예를 들어 궤도 요격체에 대한 대응책으로는 회피 기동, 추적 센서 기만 및 재밍, 체계 분산(즉, 모든 달걀을 한 바구니에 담지 않는 것)이 포함되었다. 고출력 레이저 위협에 대해서는 레이저 기지 회피와 위성 강화가 대응책으로 제시되었다. 지상국과 발사체에 대한 물리적 공격은 보안 강화로 대응할 수 있었다.

그러나 대응책에는 비용이 따랐다. 이는 단순한 금전 문제만이 아니었다. 보고서가 지적했듯이 기동은 공격을 어렵게 만들지만, 동시에 위성의 효과성과 궤도 수명을 제한할 수도 있었다. 향후 취약성 감소가 설계 목표가 된다면, 위성은 더 많은 연료를 탑재해 수명을 늘리고 위협을 회피하기 위해 궤도를 변경할 수 있도록 설계될 수 있었다.

보고서는 암호화가 이미 여러 체계에 완전히 적용되었으며, 모든 신규 체계에 포함되고 기존 체계에도 개조 적용될 것이라고 밝혔다. “레이저 공격에 대한 최소한의 기내 검증 센서”는 HEXAGON과 KENNEN 위성에 포함되었으며, “다른 위협에도 대응하고 불확실성을 줄이기 위한 확대된 센서 구성을 포함한 보다 완전한 검증 패키지”가 가까운 미래에 개발될 예정이었다.

확실히 위성 취약성 문제는 오늘날 더욱 긴급해졌다. 더 많은 국가들이 대위성 능력에 접근할 수 있게 되었기 때문이다. 그러나 이 보고서가 보여주듯, 이러한 문제는 매우 오래전부터 존재해왔다.

18개월 전 NRO는 지상시설 강화 작업을 시작했다. 그러나 덴버 북쪽 Buckley 공군기지 지상 추적·통신기지나 캘리포니아 서니베일 우주추적센터(유명한 “Blue Cube”) 같은 시설은 매우 번화한 민간 지역 가까이에 위치해 있었다. 적 특수작전팀이 접근해 공격하는 것은 어렵지 않았다. 캘리포니아 101번 고속도로를 달리는 픽업트럭 뒤에서 RPG를 발사하는 것만으로도 가능했을 것이다. 많은 NRO 위성이 발사되던 밴덴버그 공군기지는 광활하고 개방적이며 순찰이 드문 시설이었다. 역사적으로 아마추어 로켓 애호가들, 심지어 소련 특수요원들까지 침투한 증거가 존재한다.

주요 권고 사항 중 하나는 생존성을 체계 성능 평가 기준에 포함해야 한다는 것이었다. 이는 모든 다른 성능 결정이 끝난 뒤 추가되는 요소가 아니라, 처음부터 고려되어야 했다.

요약본 자체는 아주 상세하지 않지만, NRO가 이를 기밀 해제했다는 사실 자체가 놀랍다. 오늘날 훨씬 더 많은 정부가 대위성 능력에 접근하고, 우주가 전쟁 수행자들의 완곡한 표현대로 “경쟁된 영역(contested realm)”이 된 상황에서 위성 취약성 문제는 더욱 시급해졌다. 그러나 이 보고서가 분명히 보여주듯, 이는 매우 오랫동안 사실이었다.

Dwayne Day 연락처: [zirconic1@cox.net](mailto:zirconic1@cox.net)

참고: 현재 댓글은 검토 후 게시된다. 게시까지 지연이 있을 수 있으며, 제출된 모든 댓글이 게시된다는 보장은 없다.

The Space Review: Battle for the heavens: intelligence satellite vulnerability in the 1970s

The Soviet co-orbital anti-satellite weapon was first developed in the 1960s and became operational by the 1970s. This one is in a Russian museum. By the 1970s, the Soviet Union was developing additional anti-satellite weapons. (credit: TV Zvezda)

Battle for the heavens: intelligence satellite vulnerability in the 1970sby Dwayne A. Day
Monday, May 4, 2026

Starting in the late 1960s, the Soviet Union began testing a new anti-satellite weapon system that maneuvered a satellite close to its target and then fired a shaped explosive charge at it, showering it with metal fragments. The United States detected these tests and, over the next few years, US satellite operators became concerned that in event of a war, the Soviet Union could negate America’s military and intelligence space assets.

There was another and more obvious response to the increasing vulnerability of US satellites to attack: make them less vulnerable.

American satellite vulnerability became a major concern by the mid-1970s and, in July 1976, President Ford signed National Security Decision Memorandum 333 (NSDM 333), titled “Enhanced Survivability of Critical U.S. Military and Intelligence Space Systems.” It shifted the United States from a policy of assuming space was a “sanctuary” and satellites would not be attacked, eventually to development of an American capability to attack Soviet satellites. By the late 1970s, space warfare had become a real possibility (see “To attack or deter? The role of anti-satellite weapons,” The Space Review, April 20, 2020.)

But there was another and more obvious response to the increasing vulnerability of US satellites to attack: make them less vulnerable. In response to NSDM 333 in October 1976, the National Reconnaissance Office, which managed the nation’s fleet of intelligence satellites, produced a report on the vulnerability of its satellites to attack and plans to reduce their vulnerability. The executive summary of the report was recently declassified and provides a fascinating insight into the emerging threats to American satellites in the mid-1970s.

Titled “Survivability Enhancement Action Plan,” with a clever 1970 cover illustration produced by Soviet military officers depicting “The Space Networks of Espionage,” the summary stated that, up to this point the NRO had assumed “that reconnaissance satellites are stabilizing in times of crisis, and that reconnaissance spacecraft are therefore sanctioned,” in other words safe from attack. But this situation was changing and they could no longer assume this.

The cover of a 1976 study on how to make American intelligence satellites more survivable. The cover art was produced by two Soviet officers for a Soviet military journal and probably not used with their permission. (credit: NRO)

The document added: “In the belief that the programmatic goal at this point is to define a general survivability objective and level of effort, the NRO has developed several alternative programs of graduated cost and effectiveness against the foreign threat. To assure confidence in the resulting cost estimates, these alternatives have been constructed from specific projects identified for each system.” Because of the speed of the study, the cost estimates were rough and a detailed follow-on study would be required.

The study focused on the next five to ten years, developing remedies for systems already in acquisition. It noted, “Such remedies are typically only partially effective, since they basically require retrofitting systems not initially designed for survivability. The far-term offers greater opportunity. New reconnaissance system concepts can be developed from the beginning with survivability as a major system performance criteria. Systems specifically emphasizing survivability can be conceived, taking advantage of such recent introductions as the Space Shuttle.” The NRO indicated that it might also investigate fundamentally different systems, such as quick-reaction imagery and signals intelligence systems.

Countermeasures came with costs, however. These were not only monetary—hardening a satellite could be expensive—but could affect satellite operations.

The study divided existing NRO satellite systems into three categories: most critical, critical, and least critical. In the most critical category was the KH-11 KENNEN near-real-time imaging satellite, which would have its first launch in December 1976. Two other systems with their names deleted were also included in the most critical category and these were most likely high-altitude signals intelligence satellites, such as the recently declassified JUMPSEAT satellite. Several systems with their names deleted were included in the “critical” category, probably including the newly-fielded PARCAE ocean-surveillance system and at least one other high-altitude signals intelligence system.

In the least critical category were the HEXAGON and GAMBIT imagery satellites, and the Program 989 low-orbiting signals intelligence satellites. A primary characteristic of these three systems was that they did not deliver their data to the ground very quickly and therefore were not as vital during a crisis situation.

The DoD/Intelligence Community NSDM 333 Response Working Group developed a list of operational options:

1. Maintain space operations in peacetime (but during interference)
2. Manage and control escalation or deescalation of US/Soviet crisis/confrontation
3. Manage and control escalation of a conventional conflict involving the US but not involving the Soviet Union or vital Soviet interests (e.g., Vietnam)
4. Maximize military support of a conventional conflict involving the US but not involving the Soviet Union or vital Soviet interests (e.g., Vietnam)
5. Manage and control escalation of a US/Soviet conventional conflict
6. Maximize military support during a US/Soviet conventional conflict
7. Manage and control escalation of a NATO/Pact conflict
8. Maximize military support during a NATO/Pact conflict
9. Support the conduct of limited strategic nuclear options
10. Support the conduct of strategic nuclear conflict

In the mid-1970s, the US military determined that there were multiple potential threats to American satellites from Soviet weapons, not only operational anti-satellite weapons, but also newly emerging threats like high-powered lasers. (credit: NRO)

The Soviet threat

The vulnerability study summarized the Soviet threat, noting that:

The Soviet ASAT threat to U.S. satellites consists of a variety of systems and capabilities. The Soviets have a coorbital intercept system that uses a fragmentation warhead. It uses a modified SS-9 ICBM booster and can intercept targets at up to 2,500 NM altitude. Using a larger space booster, it could intercept targets in semi-synchronous and synchronous (19,300 NM) orbits. A probable high power ground-based laser, possibly already in operation, may be an ASAT system under development. It is likely the Soviets will undertake development of a very high power ground-based laser ASAT system. The Soviets intend to conduct electronic warfare against satellites during wartime and are believed to have such a capability. The Soviets are reportedly developing a space-based laser weapon for use against satellites which could be demonstrated in the early 1980s. In addition, the nuclear-armed Galosh ABM interceptors would undoubtedly be used in an ASAT role against satellites thought to threaten Moscow. The Soviets could develop nuclear intercept systems for attack of very high altitude satellites. There is no evidence of such development. The Soviets also have the capability for covert attacks on space systems ground facilities in the U.S. and overseas. It is highly likely that the Soviets will develop radio-frequency damage weapons, in spite of the uncertainty in achieving kill inherent in such weapons.

The NRO also noted that its “systems are also vulnerable to inadvertent destruction from non-targeted nuclear weapons and sabotage of ground facilities.”

The report stated that “the development of very high value National Reconnaissance Program collection systems has placed a premium on survival techniques to allow mission completion by existing or replacement systems. The application of sophisticated U.S. space technology in the survival enhancement area is expected to provide a high payoff in mission completion and in increasing the difficulties encountered by the Soviet ASAT forces.”

A table showing potential threats to American intelligence satellites and potential countermeasures to defeat them. (larger version) (credit: NRO)

Surviving the Soviet threat

The summary included a table of “Major Survival Enhancement Options” that identified both the threat and the countermeasure. For instance, countermeasures to orbital interceptors included evasive maneuvers, homing sensor deception and jamming, as well as the proliferation of systems (i.e. not putting all the NRO’s eggs in one basket.) For a high-power laser threat, the countermeasures included avoiding the laser site and hardening the satellite. Physical attacks on ground stations and launch vehicles could be countered with increased physical security.

Countermeasures came with costs, however. These were not only monetary—hardening a satellite could be expensive—but could affect satellite operations. As the report noted, maneuvering would make an attack more difficult, but would also limit the effectiveness, and maybe the orbital lifetime, of the satellite. In the future, if decreasing vulnerability was a design goal, satellites could be designed with more fuel, increasing their lifetime and making it possible to change orbits to dodge threats.

The report stated that encryption was by then fully implemented on several systems and would be included in all new systems and retrofitted onto older ones. “Minimal on-board verification sensors for laser attack” were included on HEXAGON and KENNEN satellites, and a “more complete verification package, including an expanded sensor complement to respond to other threats and reduce ambiguities” would be developed in the near-future.

Certainly, the issue of satellite vulnerability has become more urgent today, as many more governments now have access to anti-satellite capabilities. But as the report makes clear, this has been true for a very long time.

Eighteen months earlier the NRO had started an effort to harden its ground facilities against attack. However, some of these facilities, like the ground tracking and communications station at Buckley Air Force Base north of Denver, and the Space Tracking Center in Sunnyvale, California (famously referred to as “The Blue Cube”), were located very close to busy civilian areas. It would not be difficult for an enemy special operations team to get close to them to attack, even if that only meant firing rocket-propelled grenades from the back of a pickup truck on the 101 Freeway in California. Vandenberg Air Force Base, where many NRO satellites were launched, was a sprawling facility with vast, open, lightly-patrolled spaces. Throughout its history, there is evidence that both amateur rocket enthusiasts and possibly even Soviet special operatives penetrated the base.

One of the major recommendations was that survivability should be included as a system performance eval‎uation criteria. It had to be considered from the start, not added in after all the other performance decisions were made.

Although the summary is not highly detailed, the fact that the NRO even declassified it is remarkable. Certainly, the issue of satellite vulnerability has become more urgent today, as many more governments now have access to anti-satellite capabilities, and space has become, in the euphemism of the warfighter, “a contested realm.” But as the report makes clear, this has been true for a very long time.

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Dwayne Day can be reached at zirconic1@cox.net.

[백선호]

1985년 CIA는 소련 킬러위성의 요격 성공율을 60%로 봤습니다.

https://cafe.daum.net/NTDS/5q4/811

[위종민]

군사용 위성들은 특성상 저궤도에 많이 깔려 있어서 원글에 쓰신 것처럼 F-15에 ASAT달고 쏘는 게 효과적이었을 것 같은데, 높은 곳을 나는 통신중계위성 등도 부수려고 저런 방식을 택했나 봅니다.