'Trump's possible return will be mixed bag for South Korea' ‘트럼프의복귀와 한국에 영향

[김우정]

문재인정부 외교안보 특보를 지낸 문정인 교수의 한반도 문제에 관한 견해입니다.
올해 미국대선에서 트럼프가 당선되면 북한과 협상하여 노벨상후보에 오르려고 할 것이라고 전망했습니다.
또한 한미동맹이 약화되어 한반도의 전쟁위험성이 높아질 수도 있다고 합니다.
그러나, 바이든이 재선되면 대북정책에 큰 변화는 없을 것으로 보입니다.
올해는 그 어느때보다 미국 대선의 결과가 주목되는 해입니다.
 
'Trump's possible return will be mixed bag for South Korea'
‘트럼프의 복귀 가능성은 한국에 복잡한 영향을 줄 것’

By Lee Hyo-jin 이효진 기자
Posted : 2024-05-09 15:57 Updated : 2024-05-10 13:54
Korea Times

Moon Chung-in, professor emeritus at Yonsei University and former special adviser for foreign affairs and national security during the previous Moon Jae-in government, speaks during an interview with The Korea Times at the newspaper's office in Seoul, Tuesday. Korea Times photo by Shim Hyun-chul 문재인 정부 시절 외교안보특보를 지낸 문정인 연세대 명예교수가 화요일 서울 종로구 신문로에서 가진 코리아타임스와의 인터뷰에서 발언하고 있다. 코리아타임스 사진 심현철 기자

Former security adviser expects Trump to visit Pyongyang to leave political legacy
전 안보보좌관은 트럼프가 평양을 방문해 정치적 유산을 남길 것으로 기대

The U.S. presidential election is six months away. U.S. allies worldwide, including South Korea, are closely monitoring the race, which appears to be a tight contest between the incumbent President Joe Biden and his predecessor Donald Trump.
미국 대선이 6개월 앞으로 다가왔다. 한국을 포함한 전 세계 미국 동맹국들이 예의주시하고 있어 조 바이든 현 대통령과 도널드 트럼프 전 대통령의 팽팽한 경쟁이 예상된다.

The potential return of Trump, who perceives many U.S. allies as "free-riding" on its military power, adds an extra layer of concern for South Korea. In particular, given the Yoon Suk Yeol administration's focus on strengthening its alliance with Washington and extended deterrence against North Korean threats, the return of Trump could force South Korea to recalibrate its diplomatic strategies.
많은 미국 동맹국들을 군사력에 대한 '무임승차'로 인식하는 트럼프의 잠재적 귀환은 한국에 우려를 더한다. 특히 미국과의 동맹 강화와 북한 위협에 대한 확장억제에 초점을 맞춘 윤석열 행정부의 기조를 볼 때 트럼프의 귀환은 한국으로 하여금 외교 전략을 재조정하도록 만들 수 있다.


In light of these pressing issues, The Korea Times sat down with Moon Chung-in, former special adviser for foreign affairs and national security during the previous Moon Jae-in government, Tuesday, to discuss the implications of the U.S. presidential election and foreign policy of the Yoon administration.
이런 초미의 현안을 고려해 코리아 타임즈는 지난 화요일 문정인 전 문재인 정부 외교안보 특별보좌관과 만나 미국 대선과 윤 정부의 외교 정책에 대한 시사점을 논의했다.

Below are excerpts from the interview. It has been edited for brevity and clarity.
다음은 인터뷰에서 발췌한 내용이다. 간결하고 명확하게 편집되었다.

Then-U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un talk during a meeting in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Panmunjeom in Paju, Gyeonggi Province in this June 30, 2019 photo. Joint Press Corps. 2019년 6월 30일 경기도 파주시 판문점 비무장지대(DMZ)에서 도널드 트럼프 당시 미국 대통령과 김정은 북한 국무위원장이 회담 중 대화를 나누고 있다. 공동기자단.

Q: If Trump were to be re-elected, what would his approach be toward North Korea? Would we witness another Trump-Kim bromance?
만약 트럼프가 재선된다면 대북 접근법은 어떻게 될까? 또 다른 트럼프-김 브로맨스를 보게 될까?

A: In a potential second term, Trump will prioritize solidifying his political legacy. His foreign policies would be greatly influenced by media attention and personal ego, as he values how history will remember him. Striking a "big deal" with Pyongyang and contributing to peace on the Korean Peninsula could serve as a pathway to fulfilling such an ambition, potentially earning him a Nobel Peace Prize nomination. While resolving the war in Ukraine or the Gaza crisis could also enhance his Nobel Prize prospects, negotiations with North Korea are likely to be a key agenda for Trump.
두 번째 임기에는 트럼프가 정치적 유산을 공고히 하는 것을 우선시할 것이다. 역사가 자신을 어떻게 기억할 것인가를 중시하기 때문에 그의 대외정책은 언론의 관심과 개인적 자아의 영향을 많이 받을 것이다. 북한과 '빅딜'을 하고 한반도 평화에 기여하는 것은 그러한 야망을 실현하는 통로가 될 수 있고, 그는 잠재적으로 노벨평화상 후보가 될 수 있다. 우크라이나 전쟁이나 가자지구 위기를 해결하는 것도 그의 노벨상 전망을 높일 수 있지만, 북한과의 협상은 트럼프에게 중요한 의제가 될 것 같다.

In that sense, Trump will actively engage North Korea, potentially even considering a visit to Pyongyang for a summit with Kim Jong-un, where Trump could present surprising offers. However, the success of such endeavors ultimately depends on Kim's response.
그런 의미에서 트럼프는 김정은과의 정상회담을 위해 평양을 방문하는 방안까지 고려하며 북한에 적극적으로 개입할 것이며, 이를 통해 트럼프가 깜짝 놀랄만한 제안을 할 수도 있을 것이다. 하지만 이러한 노력의 성공 여부는 결국 김정은의 반응에 달려 있다.

Q: What would Kim want from Trump? And considering that their previous attempts did not yield favorable results, does that mean they will have to start from square one?
-김 위원장이 트럼프에게 원하는 것은. -그리고 그들의 이전 시도가 좋은 결과를 얻지 못했다는 것을 고려하면, 그것은 그들이 원점에서 다시 시작해야 한다는 것을 의미하는가?

A: Kim has little to lose by fostering a close relationship with Trump, as showcasing friendship with a global leader sends a powerful message both domestically and internationally.
답: 세계적 지도자와의 우정을 과시하는 것은 국내외적으로 강력한 메시지를 전달하기 때문에, 김 위원장은 트럼프와의 긴밀한 관계를 구축함으로써 잃을 것이 별로 없다.

However, the problem is that Kim's trust in Trump was shattered when the former president did not keep his promise made during the Panmunjeom summit in June 2019. To mend that fractured trust, Trump would need to extend significant overtures this time. This could include pledges on immediate sanctions relief that would visibly improve North Korea's economy, followed by the normalization of bilateral relations between Pyongyang and Washington. Additionally, Trump might propose halting joint military exercises between South Korea and the United States, or even reducing the number of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) troops. In exchange, he could seek commitments from North Korea to cease nuclear and missile activities, along with a gradual reduction of its nuclear arsenal.
그러나 문제는 전 대통령이 2019년 6월 판문점 정상회담에서 한 약속을 지키지 않아 트럼프에 대한 김정은의 신뢰가 산산이 부서졌다는 것이다. 그 부서진 신뢰를 회복하기 위해 트럼프는 이번에 중요한 제안들을 연장할 필요가 있다. 이것은 북한과 미국 간의 양국 관계 정상화를 뒤따르는 눈에 보이는 북한의 경제를 개선할 수 있는 즉각적인 제재 완화에 대한 약속을 포함할 수 있다. 게다가, 트럼프는 한국과 미국 간의 합동 군사 훈련을 중단하거나 심지어 주한미군의 숫자를 줄이는 것을 제안할 수 있다. 그 대가로 그는 핵무기의 점진적인 감소와 함께 핵과 미사일 활동을 중단하겠다는 약속을 북한으로부터 얻을 수 있다.

Q: There are concerns here that the potential return of Trump could result in a weakened South Korea-U.S. alliance. Would his return be a curse or a blessing for South Korea?
트럼프의 복귀 가능성이 한미동맹 약화로 이어질 수 있다는 우려가 나온다. 트럼프의 복귀가 한국에 저주가 될 것인가, 축복이 될 것인가?

Moon Chung-in, professor emeritus at Yonsei University and former special adviser for foreign affairs and national security during the previous Moon Jae-in government, speaks during an interview with The Korea Times at the newspaper's office in Seoul, Tuesday. Korea Times photo by Shim Hyun-chul 문재인 정부 시절 외교안보특보를 지낸 문정인 연세대 명예교수가 화요일 서울 종로구 신문로에서 가진 코리아타임스와의 인터뷰에서 발언하고 있다. 코리아타임스 사진 심현철 기자

A: It would be both. It could prove to be a curse for the conservatives in Seoul, while progressives might see it as a chance for blessing. For conservatives, there are concerns that Trump could use the presence of USFK as a bargaining chip in negotiations over a defense cost-sharing deal. Such a move could potentially weaken the longstanding South Korea-U.S. alliance. Also, under Trump, there's a significant possibility of decreased trilateral cooperation between Seoul, Washington and Tokyo, along with a weakened U.S. security commitment to South Korea. This scenario could create a power vacuum on the Korean Peninsula, heightening the risks of war in the region.
둘 다 가능성이 높다. 보수진영에서는 트럼프의 주한미군 주둔을 축복의 기회로 여길 수도 있다. 보수진영에서는 주한미군 주둔을 방위비 분담금 협상의 카드로 활용할 수 있다는 우려가 나온다. 한미동맹을 약화시킬 가능성도 있다. 또 트럼프 집권기에는 한미일 3국 협력이 크게 위축되고 한국에 대한 미국의 안보공약도 약화될 가능성이 있다. 이런 시나리오는 한반도에 전력 공백을 초래해 한반도의 전쟁 위험성을 높일 수 있다.

On the other hand, progressives could leverage Trump's eagerness to engage North Korea, if they play their cards right. His desire to establish a political legacy might open the door to unexpected breakthroughs in inter-Korean relations. Trump's potential initiatives, such as pursuing a reduction of USFK forces and halting the deployment of U.S. strategic assets, could become useful cards for progressives in agendas such as an end-of-war declaration. This could potentially pave the way for them to form a new security architecture in the North Asian region led by South Korea.
반면에 진보주의자들은 카드를 제대로 사용한다면 북한을 끌어들이려는 트럼프의 열망을 이용할 수 있다. 정치적 유산을 만들고자 하는 그의 열망은 남북관계에서 예상치 못한 돌파구를 열어줄 수 있다. 주한미군 감축 추구와 미국 전략 자산 배치 중단과 같은 트럼프의 잠재적 계획은 종전 선언과 같은 의제에서 진보주의자들에게 유용한 카드가 될 수 있다. 이것은 잠재적으로 그들이 한국에 의해 주도되는 북 아시아 지역에서 새로운 안보 구조를 형성할 수 있는 길을 열어줄 수 있다.

Q. There is a lot of talk about the scenario of Trump's re-election. But what if Biden wins the race? Do you think he might readjust North Korea policies?
트럼프의 재선 시나리오에 대해서는 말이 많다. 그런데 바이든이 경선에서 이긴다면? 대북 정책을 재조정할 수도 있다고 보십니까?

A. I don't foresee any significant changes coming from Team Biden. His security advisers maintain a traditional approach toward North Korea, focusing on status-quo management. Their aim is to avoid provoking Pyongyang, while also refraining from pursuing major diplomatic negotiations. So their strategy involves maintaining deterrence, while keeping the door open for dialogue.
나는 바이든 팀으로부터 큰 변화가 있을 것이라고 예상하지 않는다. 그의 안보 보좌관들은 북한에 대해 전통적인 접근 방식을 유지하고 있으며, 지위 유지관리에 중점을 두고 있다. 그들의 목적은 북한을 자극하는 것을 피하고 주요 외교적 협상을 추구하는 것을 자제하는 것이다. 따라서 그들의 전략은 억제력을 유지하면서 대화의 문을 열어두는 것이다.

However, in response to criticism that the Biden administration has placed the North Korean issue on the back burner, some U.S. officials have recently floated the idea of so-called "interim steps" to revive dialogue with the North. But this suggestion was apparently rejected by the South Korean government. Nevertheless, if Biden secures another term, this agenda may be pushed further by his administration. But it would still be difficult to get a positive response from the North, especially considering the virtual absence of direct communication channels between Washington and Pyongyang. There may be a need for assistance from either Russia or China, but the likelihood of this is very low.
그러나, 바이든 행정부가 북한 문제를 뒤로 미루고 있다는 비판에 대응하여, 일부 미국 관리들은 최근 북한과의 대화를 되살리기 위한 소위 "임시조치"라는 아이디어를 내놓았다. 그러나 이 제안은 분명히 한국 정부에 의해 거절되었다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 바이든이 한 번 더 임기를 확보한다면, 이 안건은 그의 행정부에 의해 더 추진될 수 있다. 그러나 특히 워싱턴과 평양 사이에 직접적인 소통 채널이 사실상 부재하다는 점을 고려할 때, 여전히 북한으로 부터 긍정적인 반응을 얻기는 어려울 것이다. 러시아나 중국으로부터의 지원이 필요할 수 있지만, 이것의 가능성은 매우 낮다.

Q. How would you eval‎uate the Yoon Suk Yeol administration's North Korea policies? How about the Biden administration?
윤석열 행정부의 대북정책은 어떻게 평가할 것인가? 바이든 행정부는 어떤가?


A. The Yoon government views North Korea as a weak nation, even though it possesses nuclear weapons, and sees it as a regime on the brink of collapse. Consequently, they believe that applying maximum pressure — both militarily and economically — would compel North Korea to either surrender or collapse.
윤 정부는 북한이 핵무기를 보유하고 있음에도 불구하고 약소국으로 간주하고 있으며, 붕괴 직전의 정권으로 보고 있다. 따라서 군사적으로나 경제적으로나 최대한의 압박을 가한다면 북한은 항복하거나 붕괴할 수밖에 없다고 보고 있다.

However, such a belief is flawed. There is no reason to anticipate North Korea's immediate collapse. The ineffectiveness of economic sanctions have been proven. North Korea's economy, thanks to support from China and Russia, is not as weak as we think. Specifically, we should consider the strengthening partnership between North Korea and Russia. For Russia, providing food and energy to support 20 million North Koreans is a relatively minor effort.
그러나 그런 생각에는 오류가 있다. 북한이 당장 붕괴할 것이라고 예상할 이유가 없다. 경제 제재의 실효성은 이미 입증되었다. 중국과 러시아의 지원 덕분에 북한 경제는 생각보다 취약하지 않다. 구체적으로 우리는 북한과 러시아의 동반자 관계 강화를 고려해야 한다. 러시아로서는 북한 주민 2천만 명을 지원하기 위해 식량과 에너지를 지원하는 것이 상대적으로 작은 노력이다.

President Yoon Suk Yeol and his U.S. counterpart Joe Biden shake hands during a joint press conference at the White House in Washington, April 26, 2023. EPA-Yonhap 2023년 4월 26일 워싱턴 백악관에서 열린 공동 기자회견에서 윤석열 대통령과 조 바이든 미국 대통령이 악수하고 있다. EPA-연합

Q. What do you think about the deterrence strategy employed by South Korea and the U.S.? Has it proven to be effective?
한미가 구사하는 억제 전략에 대해 어떻게 생각하십니까? 효과가 입증됐습니까?

A. The deterrence strategy employed by South Korea and the U.S., ostensibly aimed at altering North Korea's behavior, has instead provoked further aggression from the North, escalating the risk of war.
표면적으로는 북한의 행동을 변화시키기 위한 한미의 억제 전략은 오히려 북한의 추가적인 공격을 유발하여 전쟁의 위험성을 높였다.

The U.S. treatment of China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran as an axis of evil has solidified their relationships on the contrary. Such development will help North Korea find ways to survive more easily. For example, crises in Ukraine or the Middle East could unexpectedly provide North Korea with a lifeline.
미국이 중국, 북한, 러시아, 이란을 악의 축으로 취급한 것은 오히려 양국 관계를 공고히 했다. 그런 전개는 북한이 좀 더 쉽게 생존할 수 있는 방법을 찾도록 도와줄 것이다. 예를 들어 우크라이나나 중동의 위기는 예기치 않게 북한에 생명줄을 제공할 수도 있다.

In that sense, the current North Korea policies adopted by the government are not achieving anything; they are only making things worse. I believe the South Korean government should consider various aspects of the rapidly changing international environment, where its policies may not always be effective.
그런 의미에서 현재 정부가 채택하고 있는 대북정책들은 아무런 성과를 거두지 못하고 있고, 상황을 더 악화시키고 있을 뿐이다. 나는 정부의 정책이 항상 효과적이지 않을 수도 있는 급변하는 국제환경의 다양한 측면을 고려해야 한다고 생각한다.

Q. Let's talk about another important neighbor of South Korea — Russia. Diplomatic relations with Russia remain tense. Moscow has warned Seoul not to cross certain redlines. What do you think these redlines are?
한국의 또 다른 중요한 이웃 국가인 러시아에 대해 이야기해보자. 러시아와의 외교 관계는 여전히 긴장 상태이다. 러시아 정부는 한국 정부에게 특정한 선을 넘지 말라고 경고했다. 여러분은 이 선들이 무엇이라고 생각하는가?

A. From Russia's perspective, providing lethal weapons to Ukraine would certainly cross the red line. If South Korea were to do so, it would be considered an enemy state by Russia. Additionally, with President Vladimir Putin expected to visit Pyongyang soon, any interference regarding Moscow's partnership with North Korea would also be viewed unfavorably. Russia's official stance is clear: exchanges with North Korea should focus on providing daily necessities and support for the energy sector, not transferring technology that could threaten South Korea's security. Russia is also concerned about Seoul’s unilateral and multilateral sanctions.
러시아 입장에서 볼 때 우크라이나에 치명적인 무기를 제공하는 것은 분명히 레드라인을 넘을 것이다. 그렇다면 러시아는 한국을 적국으로 간주할 것이다. 게다가 블라디미르 푸틴 대통령이 곧 평양을 방문할 것으로 예상되는 상황에서 러시아가 북한과 협력하는 것에 대한 간섭 역시 부정적으로 여겨질 것이다. 러시아의 공식 입장은 분명한데, 북한과의 교류는 한국의 안보를 위협할 수 있는 기술 이전이 아니라 생필품 제공과 에너지 분야 지원에 초점을 맞춰야 한다는 것이다. 또한 러시아는 한국의 일방적이고 다자적인 제재에 대해서도 우려하고 있다.

Q. What about China? Do you believe that an upcoming trilateral summit between South Korea, China and Japan can serve as a breakthrough in strained Seoul-Beijing ties?
중국은 어떤가. 다가오는 한중일 3국 정상회담이 경색된 한중관계의 돌파구가 될 수 있다고 보나?

A. China has two expilict redlines. One is the Taiwan issue, and the other trilateral military cooperation with Japan and the U.S. that threatens China’s core interests. The trilateral summit is likely to take place soon, but it's doubtful that China would see significant benefits from the trilateral talks. Instead, it may perceive South Korea and Japan as forming a united front against it. For instance, discussions on environmental issues might involve China's discontent about Japan's release of wastewater from Fukushima, which South Korea has found little problem with. In the economic security realm, both South Korea and Japan have joined the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), a U.S.-led initiative that excludes China from the global supply chain. Regarding people-to-people exchanges, the scale of interaction between South Korea and Japan is much larger than that between Seoul and Beijing or Tokyo and Beijing.
중국은 두 개의 명시적인 레드라인을 가지고 있다. 하나는 대만 문제이고, 다른 하나는 중국의 핵심 이익을 위협하는 일본 및 미국과의 3국 군사 협력이다. 3국 정상회담이 곧 열릴 것으로 보이지만, 3국 회담으로 중국이 상당한 이득을 볼 수 있을지는 의문이다. 대신, 중국은 한국과 일본이 그것에 대항하여 연합 전선을 형성하는 것으로 인식할 수 있다. 예를 들어, 환경 문제에 대한 논의는 일본의 후쿠시마 폐수 방출에 대한 중국의 불만을 포함할 수 있지만, 한국은 그것에 대해 거의 문제가 없다고 생각한다. 경제 안보 영역에서, 한국과 일본은 모두 중국을 세계 공급 사슬에서 제외시키는 미국 주도의 계획인 인도-태평양 경제 프레임워크 (IPEF)에 가입했다. 인적 교류와 관련하여, 한국과 일본 간의 상호 작용 규모는 한중 또는 일중 간의 상호 작용보다 훨씬 크다.

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