정찰위성 중국 의존도가 높아지고 있는 러시아의 SAR 위성 정찰능력

[위종민]

현재 러시아 로스코스모스가 굴리고 있는 레이다 위성은 3대, 러시아군이 굴리는 위성은 1대뿐이고, 그로 인해 러시아의 위성 스타트업 회사들은 중국 위성에 의존해 영상을 판다고 하네요. 러시아 위성이라고 홍보하고 있지만 사실을 까보면 중국 위성이라고... 

1, 2부를 한번에 올리겠습니다. 

Flying under the radar: Russia’s tacit reliance on Chinese SAR satellites

러시아는 현재 정부가 소유한 레이더 영상 위성을 소수만 운용하고 있으며, 이로 인해 여러 민간 스타트업이 국내 원격탐사 시장의 공백을 메우기 위해 나서고 있다. 이러한 능력을 확보하기 위해 많은 기업이 중국의 상업 우주산업에 조용히 의존하고 있다. 외부에 잘 드러나지 않는 이러한 협력은 세 가지 수준에서 진행되고 있다. 궤도에 있는 중국 위성에 러시아의 위장 명칭을 붙여 자국 위성처럼 제공하는 방식, 수입한 중국산 레이더 탑재체를 수용할 수 있도록 러시아산 위성 본체를 설계하는 방식, 그리고 중국의 레이더 영상을 러시아 정부 및 상업 고객들에게 적극적으로 판매하는 방식이다.

현재 운용 중인 러시아 연방우주공사 로스코스모스의 레이더 위성은 세 대뿐이다. 2023년 5월과 2024년 11월에 발사된 콘도르-FKA-1과 콘도르-FKA-2, 그리고 2025년 12월에 발사된 옵조르-R이다. 콘도르 위성들은 기계적으로 전개되는 S대역 레이더에 의존한다. X대역으로 전파를 송신하는 옵조르-R은 능동위상배열 안테나를 탑재한 러시아 최초의 레이더 위성이다. 공식적으로는 세 위성 모두 순수한 민간 원격탐사 자산으로 소개되고 있지만, 군사정보 수집 소요도 지원할 가능성이 높다. 지난해 옵조르-R의 발사는 철저한 비밀에 둘러싸여 있었으며, 로스코스모스도 최근에야 발사 사실을 공개적으로 인정했다.

러시아군은 현재 코스모스-2550이라는 공식 명칭의 레이더 위성 한 대를 운용하고 있다. 내부적으로 피온(Pion)이라고 불리는 이 위성은 군함의 위치를 정확하게 파악하도록 설계된 특수 해양정찰위성이다. 러시아는 2022년 11월 이 위성이 공식적으로 작전 운용 상태에 들어갔다고 발표했지만, 지상에서 촬영한 고해상도 사진들은 두 개의 레이더 안테나 가운데 하나가 전개되지 못했음을 강하게 시사한다.[1] 가까운 시일 내에 후속 위성이 발사될 것으로 예상되지는 않는다. 한편 아락스-R(Araks-R)이라는 별도의 군사용 X대역 레이더 위성 계열에 대한 개발작업도 10년 넘게 진행되고 있다. 그러나 이 사업은 여러 차례 지연을 겪었으며 아직 단 한 대도 발사되지 않았다. 이러한 지연 가운데 상당수는 첨단 합성개구레이더 탑재체의 조립 등에 필수적인 방사선 내성 마이크로전자 부품의 수입을 어렵게 만든 서방의 제재 때문일 가능성이 높다.

레이더 위성의 부족을 보완하려는 민간기업 가운데 하나는 2021년 10월 설립된 모스크바 소재 스타트업 노비 코스모스(Novyy Kosmos, ‘새로운 우주’)다. 이 회사는 오쿨루스(Okulus)라는 레이더 위성을 개발해왔다. 이 플랫폼에 관한 일부 기본적인 세부사항은 회사의 공개 웹사이트와 홍보자료에서 확인할 수 있다. 위성의 무게는 448kg이며, 평균 고도 475km, 궤도경사각 97.2도의 태양동기궤도에서 운용하도록 설계됐다. X대역 레이더는 9.3\~9.8GHz 범위에서 작동하며, 스포트라이트 모드에서 2m, 스트립맵 모드에서 5m, ScanSAR 모드에서 20m의 해상도를 가진 영상을 생성할 수 있다고 홍보하고 있다. 혼란스럽게도 회사 웹사이트에는 추가적인 Ku대역 레이더 능력과 함께 최대 공간해상도가 0.4m라는 내용도 기재돼 있다.[2]

오쿨루스의 공식적인 목표는 석유·가스 송유관, 송전선, 철도 등 중요한 선형 기반시설을 전천후 고해상도 레이더로 감시하는 것이다. 첨단 합성개구레이더(SAR) 간섭측정 기술을 활용해 이러한 시설 아래의 지반침하를 최대 5mm의 정밀도로 추적하고, 채석장과 금속 물질의 집적 상태도 감시하도록 설계됐다. 또한 홍수 및 산불 관리, 농업 최적화, 북극항로의 얼음 이동 양상 지도화 등 중요한 민간 및 환경 관련 기능도 수행한다.

회사 관계자들은 위성 부품의 80%가 러시아 국내에서 생산될 것이라고 여러 차례 강조해왔다. 이는 서방의 제재로 심각한 제약을 받는 산업에서 중요한 자산이 된다. 노비 코스모스는 오쿨루스 위성 3대로 구성된 위성군을 구축할 계획이다. 2년 전 안톤 알렉세예프 최고경영자와의 인터뷰에서 공개된 기술 도면에 따르면, 프레가트 상단을 장착한 소유스-2 발사체 한 대로 위성 3대를 동시에 발사하는 방안이 검토된 것으로 보인다.

지난해 회사 경영진의 발언에 따르면 러시아 자체 제작 오쿨루스는 빨라도 2028년에야 첫 비행을 실시할 것으로 예상됐다. 사업에는 일부 초기 민간자금이 확보된 상태였으며, 예상 사업비는 10억 루블, 약 1,150만 달러였다. 위성 레이더의 공학적 설계는 최종 마무리 단계에 있는 것으로 알려졌다.[3]

따라서 지난 4월 첫 실전 운용 위성의 배치가 임박했다는 명확한 징후가 나타났을 때 관찰자들은 크게 놀랐다. 4월 12일, 로스코스모스의 드미트리 바카노프 사장이 블라디미르 푸틴 대통령과의 주목받는 회담에서 노비 코스모스를 명시적으로 언급한 지 하루 만에, 이 회사의 드미트리 마추크 회장은 회사 소셜미디어 플랫폼에 “최초의 상업용 레이더 위성에 대한 궤도상 비행시험에 착수하고 있다”고 밝혔다.[4] 같은 날 모스크바의 상업 우주산업을 소개한 세르게이 소뱌닌 모스크바 시장의 블로그 게시물에서도 오쿨루스가 그달 말 궤도에 진입할 것이라는 사실이 공개됐다.[5]

이 발표 이후 6월 중순까지 추가 소식은 나오지 않았다. 당시 회사 웹사이트에는 마추크가 첫 위성이 실제로 4월에 성공적으로 발사됐으며, “레이더 영상 분야에서 회사 제품의 추가적인 개발”에 필요한 궤도상 시험을 진행하고 있다고 확인한 발언이 게재됐다.[6] 특이하게도 마추크의 발언은 전혀 주목받지 못했으며, 러시아의 주요 언론매체 어느 곳에서도 이를 보도하지 않았다.

7월 말 회사 웹사이트에 게시된 기사에서 노비 코스모스의 안톤 알렉세예프 최고경영자는 오쿨루스를 ‘개발 중’인 사업이라고 설명해 혼란을 야기했다. 그러나 이러한 설명과 모순되게도 해당 기사에는 오쿨루스-01이라는 위성이 촬영한 것으로 표시된 스포츠 경기장의 고해상도 레이더 영상이 첨부돼 있었다.[7]

오쿨루스는 9월 초 러시아 비상사태부 관계자의 발표에서도 다시 소개됐다. 민간기업이 확보한 위성자료를 비상사태부가 활용하는 방안을 설명하면서, 이 관계자는 오쿨루스가 2026년 6월 초와 말에 촬영한 러시아 북극지역과 남서부 볼고그라드 지역의 고해상도 레이더 영상들을 공개했다.[8]

마침내 9월 22일 미하일 미슈스틴 총리와의 회담에서 로스코스모스의 드미트리 바카노프 사장은 오쿨루스 위성이 그해 초 성공적으로 궤도에 진입했으며 여러 연방 행정부처에 레이더 자료를 적극적으로 제공하고 있다고 공식 확인했다. 노비 코스모스 관계자들은 회사 플랫폼에서 열광적으로 반응하면서 이번 발사를 러시아 민간 우주산업의 중요한 이정표로 평가하고, 영상자료가 정부와 상업 고객 모두에게 제공될 것이라고 강조했다.[9]

이러한 모든 공개 발표는 분석가들에게 난제를 제시했다. 노비 코스모스와 로스코스모스는 모두 오쿨루스라는 위성이 4월에 배치돼 몇 달 만에 실제 자료를 제공하기 시작했다고 주장했다. 그러나 이는 첫 비행이 2028년 이전에는 이뤄지지 않을 것이라는 회사의 지난해 발언과 모순됐다. 게다가 4월에는 오쿨루스라는 공식 명칭을 가진 위성이 궤도에 배치된 기록이 없었다.

가장 명백한 설명은 4월 16일 플레세츠크 우주기지에서 볼가 상단을 장착한 소유스-2 로켓으로 발사된, 이름이 공개되지 않은 군사위성 6대 가운데 오쿨루스가 포함돼 있었다는 것이었다. 미 우주사령부가 코스모스-2609부터 코스모스-2614까지로 등록한 이 탑재물 가운데 5대는 5월 중순 서방의 집중적인 감시를 받게 됐다. 이 위성들이 고에너지 궤도기동을 실시해 핀란드·미국의 레이더 위성인 ICEYE-X36 및 X37과 거의 동일한 궤도면에 진입했기 때문이다.[10] ICEYE는 러시아와의 전쟁에서 우크라이나군을 지원하기 위해 레이더 자료를 제공해왔으며, 이에 따라 러시아 위성 5대가 근접검사 임무를 수행 중이거나 일종의 대위성 능력을 갖추고 있을 수 있다는 추측이 제기됐다. 오쿨루스는 여섯 번째 위성으로, 다른 위성들과 함께 발사돼 ICEYE 위성들과는 멀리 떨어진 궤도에 진입했을 가능성이 있었다.

그러나 노비 코스모스가 최근 맞춤형 원격탐사 자료를 구매하려는 고객들을 위해 개정된 사용자 안내서를 공개하면서 오쿨루스에 관한 이야기는 새로운 국면을 맞았다. 회사 플랫폼에 눈에 띄지 않게 게시된 이 문서는 노비 코스모스가 이미 궤도에서 운용 중인 오쿨루스 위성 2대의 자료를 적극적으로 제공하고 있음을 보여준다. 첫 번째 위성인 오쿨루스-01은 중심주파수 13.5GHz에서 작동하는 Ku대역 레이더를 탑재하고 있다. 두 번째 위성인 오쿨루스-02는 중심주파수 9.6GHz에서 송신하며 최대 신호 대역폭이 1,200MHz에 달하는 X대역 레이더를 탑재하고 있다. 안내서에는 고객들이 이러한 레이더 자료를 활용해 해양 유류 유출을 자동으로 탐지하고 측정할 수 있도록 하는 특수 처리 서비스도 설명돼 있다.[11]

두 위성에 대해서는 다음과 같은 성능 특성이 제시돼 있다.

문서가 작성될 당시 오쿨루스-01은 운용 중이며 상업용 자료를 공급하고 있었지만, 오쿨루스-02는 여전히 궤도상 점검을 진행하고 있었다. 두 번째 위성의 영상은 2026년 8월 1일부터 고객들에게 제공될 예정이었다. 오쿨루스-01과 오쿨루스-02는 각각 평균 고도 530km와 535km의 궤도에서 운용된다. 두 위성 모두 궤도경사각은 97.5도이며, 현지시간 오전 10시 30분에 궤도의 하강교점을 통과한다.

안내서에 명시된 궤도 요소들은 오쿨루스-01과 오쿨루스-02가 4월 16일 플레세츠크에서 발사된 위성들에 포함되지 않았음을 분명하게 보여준다. 군사 탑재물들은 이보다 약간 높은 궤도에 있으며 궤도경사각도 더 크다. 또한 군사위성들은 오후 중반에 하강교점을 통과하는 반면 오쿨루스 위성들은 오전 중반에 통과한다. 최근 몇 달 동안 발사된 다른 미확인 러시아 위성 가운데에도 오쿨루스 두 대에 대해 제시된 궤도 요소와 일치하는 위성은 없다.

더 면밀한 분석 결과, 오쿨루스-01이 실제로는 중국이 타이징-4-03(Taijing-4-03)이라는 이름으로 제작해 2024년 1월 23일 발사한 레이더 위성이라는 점에는 의심의 여지가 없다. 국제적으로 미노스페이스(MinoSpace)라는 이름으로 더 잘 알려진 베이징 웨이나 스타 테크놀로지가 제작한 이 위성은 세계 최초의 상업용 Ku대역 SAR 위성이다. 이후 발사된 다른 Ku대역 레이더 위성은 2024년 9월 발사된 중국의 에어샛-01(중커-01)과 에어샛-02(중커-02) 두 대뿐이다. 그러나 이들은 하강교점 지방시(LTDN)가 오전 6시인 약간 더 낮은 여명·황혼 궤도에 투입됐다.

타이징-4-03은 매우 작고 얇은 평판형 레이더 위성이다. 크기가 3.6×0.6m이고 무게가 80kg인 능동위상배열 안테나를 사용하며, 미노스페이스의 MN200S 플랫폼을 기반으로 제작됐다. 위성의 전체 무게는 230kg이다.

노비 코스모스 사용자 안내서에 발표된 오쿨루스-01의 궤도 요소는 2024년 1월 발사된 이후 타이징-4-03의 궤도 요소와 완벽하게 일치한다. 미 우주사령부가 물체번호 2024-016D(NORAD 번호 58823)로 등록한 이 위성은 배치 이후 어떠한 궤도 수정도 실시하지 않았으며, 그 결과 원래 고도 530km에서 약 385km까지 궤도가 낮아졌다. 이로 인해 위성의 지상 촬영범위가 좁아졌으며, 이는 오쿨루스-01에 대해 홍보되는 일부 관측폭과 공간해상도가 아래에 제시된 타이징-4-03의 제조사 제원과 약간 다른 이유를 설명할 수 있다.[12]

타이징-4-03이 발사된 지 두 달도 지나지 않아 미노스페이스는 미국 버지니아주 노퍽 해군기지에 정박한 미 해군 항공모함들을 촬영한 선명한 Ku대역 영상을 공개했다. 노비 코스모스 경영진은 미노스페이스와의 관계를 공개적으로 인정한 적이 없지만, 2025년 11월 발표한 중국 원격탐사 산업 관련 논문에서 타이징-3-04의 항공모함 추적능력을 명시적으로 높이 평가했다. 특히 이러한 자동 실시간 감시를 가능하게 하는 플랫폼에 통합된 우주 탑재 인공지능 프로세서에 주목했다.[13]

X대역 레이더 위성인 오쿨루스-02 역시 다른 중국 위성의 위장 명칭일 것이 거의 확실하지만, 정확한 위성을 식별하기는 그만큼 간단하지 않다. 타이징-4-03 이후 발사된 중국 상업용 X대역 레이더 위성 가운데 오쿨루스-02에 해당하는 궤도에 배치된 위성은 네 대다.

- 타이징-4-02A: 미노스페이스 제작, 2025년 5월 21일 발사
- 둥포-16(Dongpo-16): 미노스페이스 제작, 2026년 3월 16일 발사
- 쥔톈-1-04A(Juntian-1-04A): 베이징 쥔톈 우주기술 제작, 2026년 3월 16일 발사
- 뎬젠-1/톈이-50(Dianjian-1/Tianyi-50): 스페이스티 제작, 2026년 5월 15일 발사

중국 자료들은 이 위성들의 기본적인 레이더 운용 제원만 제공하기 때문에 어느 위성이 오쿨루스-02인지 확정적으로 식별할 수 없다. 타이징-4-02A와 뎬젠-1은 보고된 최대 관측폭이 240km에 달해 오쿨루스-02에 대해 홍보된 최대 100km보다 상당히 넓으므로 후보에서 제외할 수 있을 것으로 보인다. 또한 타이징-4-02A는 두 번째 오쿨루스가 운용 중이라고 발표된 2026년 8월보다 훨씬 이전에 궤도상 초기시험과 운용 개시 절차를 완료했을 가능성이 높다.

따라서 2026년 3월 함께 발사된 둥포-16과 쥔톈-1-04A가 가장 유력한 후보로 남는다. 두 위성 모두 최대 공간해상도가 0.5m로, 오쿨루스-02에 대해 공개된 제원과 일치한다. 현재까지 이 플랫폼들의 관측폭에 관해 공개된 수치는 둥포-16의 ‘25km 이상’이라는 값 하나뿐이며, 이는 오쿨루스-02의 스트립맵 모드에 대해 홍보되는 제원과 매우 가깝다. 두 위성 가운데 둥포-16이 훨씬 더 유력한 후보인데, 타이징-4-03(오쿨루스-01)과 정확히 동일한 미노스페이스 MN200S 위성 본체를 기반으로 제작됐기 때문이다. 기업 조달의 관점에서 노비 코스모스가 서로 경쟁하는 제조업체 두 곳보다는 중국 협력업체 한 곳과 다수의 위성에 관한 계약을 체결했을 가능성이 훨씬 높다.

미노스페이스는 러시아 우주산업과 협력사업을 추진하는 데 익숙하지 않은 기업이 아니다. 이 회사의 고해상도 광학 원격탐사 위성 가운데 적어도 두 대가 스틸샛-1(Stilsat-1)이라는 가명으로 러시아 방산업체 스틸소프트(Stilsoft)에 의해 실제 운용되고 있다는 강력한 증거가 있다. 이 위성들은 타이징-3-02와 타이징-3-04이며, 각각 타이징-4-03 및 타이징-4-02A와 함께 궤도에 투입됐다. 스틸소프트와 미노스페이스 간 협정의 정확한 상업적 세부사항은 알려지지 않았지만, 스틸소프트는 위성을 지휘하고 영상자료를 수신하기 위한 자체 지상국 기반시설을 유지하고 있다. 이러한 독립적인 운용능력은 위성들이 완전한 턴키 방식으로 러시아 기업에 인도됐음을 강하게 시사한다.[14]

이러한 턴키 운용 방식이 오쿨루스-01과 오쿨루스-02에도 적용되는지는 불분명하다. 중국 국내 원격탐사 시장에서 공개적으로 확인된 주요 고객이 없는 타이징-4-03의 경우 그 가능성을 완전히 배제할 수 없다. 반면 둥포-16과 쥔톈-1-04A는 중국 국내 기업들이 지역별 원격탐사 용도로 각각의 제조업체에 명시적으로 발주한 위성들이다.

둥포-16은 환톈 스마트 테크놀로지가 운용할 예정인 레이더·광학 복합 위성 20대 규모의 위성군에 속한다. 이 위성의 경우 운용업체는 지역 협력업체인 싱위안 스페이스와 협력해 위성의 자료 처리 및 제공능력 일부를 중국 남서부 청두시 진장구에 할당했다. 이 때문에 위성에는 진장 싱위안이라는 다른 이름도 붙어 있다. 둥포-16은 국내 활용 가치를 입증하면서 2026년 8월 중국·네팔 국경에서 발생한 대규모 빙하 붕괴의 여파를 촬영한 위성군 소속 여러 위성 가운데 하나였다. 한편 쥔톈-1-04A는 톈주-1과 호크뷰-1이라는 다른 이름으로도 알려져 있으며, 둥팡 즈위안이 운용할 예정인 SAR 위성군의 첫 번째 위성이다. 둥팡 즈위안은 2026년 8월 말 이 위성의 운용통제권을 공식적으로 인수했다.

이들 위성 가운데 하나가 실제로 오쿨루스-02로 운용되고 있다면 노비 코스모스가 직접 운용하는 위성일 수는 없다. 대신 노비 코스모스는 해당 위성이 러시아 영토 상공을 통과하면서 수집한 영상을 확보하기 위해 이들 중국 기업 가운데 하나 이상과 자료공유 협약을 체결했을 것이다. 노비 코스모스는 다른 중국 상업용 원격탐사 위성 운용업체들과도 유사한 협약을 체결한 것으로 보인다. 회사의 자체 사용자 안내서에 따르면 노비 코스모스는 중국의 하이시-1(HiSea-1) 위성이 촬영한 맞춤형 레이더 영상과 함께 중국 원격탐사 위성 지린-1 가오펀-04(GF04)가 촬영한 광학 영상자료도 적극적으로 판매하고 있다. 또한 러시아 고객들은 스틸소프트의 스틸샛-1을 통해 확보한 고해상도 영상도 주문할 수 있다.

노비 코스모스가 고객들에게 자료를 중개하는 다른 플랫폼으로는 유럽우주국의 센티널 레이더 위성 3대와 수량이 확인되지 않은 상업용 ICEYE 위성들이 있다. 센티널 영상은 공개 접근이 가능한 자료에서 확보할 수 있지만, 현재의 지정학적 상황에서 러시아 기업이 ICEYE로부터 영상을 직접 구매하는 것은 사실상 불가능하다. 이는 ICEYE 자료가 하나 이상의 제3자를 통해 노비 코스모스에 전달되고 있음을 의미할 수밖에 없다.

마지막으로 남는 의문은 노비 코스모스가 2026년 4월 오쿨루스 위성 한 대를 발사했다고 공개적으로 주장하면서, 2024년 1월과 2026년 3월에 발사된 것으로 추정되는 중국산 오쿨루스 위성 두 대의 자료를 조용히 판매하고 있는 이유다. 가능성은 낮지만, 4월 16일 플레세츠크에서 발사된 위성 6대 가운데 하나가 실제로 노비 코스모스가 자체 제작한 위성이며, 중국산 위성 두 대와는 별개로 궤도에서 운용되고 있을 수도 있다. 회사 관계자들은 자체 제작 오쿨루스에 앞서 레이더의 일부 구성요소만 탑재한 기술실증기 한 대 이상을 발사할 것이라는 모호한 암시를 한 바 있다. 그러나 이들은 회사의 아르고스 드론을 이용해 레이더 구성요소들을 시험하는 것을 가리켰을 수도 있다.

더 가능성이 높은 시나리오는 노비 코스모스가 4월에 자체 위성을 전혀 발사하지 않았으며, 대신 상업적 임대계약을 통해 중국 위성 두 대에서만 자료를 확보하고 있다는 것이다. 당연히 이를 공개적으로 인정한다면 수입 기술의 국산화 능력을 자랑해온 러시아 국내 우주산업의 명성이 훼손될 것이다. 2026년 4월과 9월 푸틴 및 미슈스틴과의 회담에서 로스코스모스의 바카노프 사장은 노비 코스모스의 사업들을 지난해 6월 푸틴이 승인한 새로운 10개년 국가 우주정책의 핵심적인 일부로 소개했다. 이 정책은 2036년까지 러시아 우주사업에서 민간기업의 기여도를 5%에서 35%로 높이는 것을 목표로 한다. 바카노프는 오쿨루스 발사를 국내의 성과로 규정함으로써 러시아가 해당 목표를 달성하는 방향으로 순조롭게 나아가고 있다는 인상을 주려 했을 가능성이 있다.

이러한 조직적인 연막은 노비 코스모스 웹사이트에 제시된 자체 제작 오쿨루스의 공학적 제원에까지 확대된 것으로 보인다. 웹사이트에서 언급된 최대 공간해상도 0.4m와 추가적인 Ku대역 레이더 능력은 노비 코스모스가 자체 제작한 오쿨루스 위성이 아니라 중국산 위성에만 적용되는 것으로 보인다. 항공우주 전시회에서 노비 코스모스가 자체 제작 하드웨어에 관해 제시한 홍보자료는 훨씬 제한적인 성능을 보여준다. 최대 해상도는 2.0m로 제한돼 있으며 Ku대역 레이더에 관한 언급도 없다.

러시아에서 제작한 오쿨루스가 결국 우주에 진입하더라도, 회사가 공식적으로 주장하는 것처럼 부품의 80%가 러시아 국내에서 조달된 것일지는 여전히 의문이다. 노비 코스모스는 400kg급 위성 본체나 레이더 탑재체를 제작한 산업적 경험이 없으며, 제조 협력업체들의 신원도 철저히 비밀로 유지하고 있다. 자체 제작 플랫폼에 탑재할 예정인 능동위상배열 레이더에는 매우 정교하고 우주 운용에 적합한 전자부품이 대량으로 필요하다. 이러한 마이크로전자 부품은 엄격한 서방의 제재와 봉쇄 대상이며 러시아 국내에서도 대량생산되지 않기 때문에, 노비 코스모스는 러시아에서 제작하는 플랫폼에 이를 통합하기 위해 앞으로도 중국 협력업체에 계속 의존할 가능성이 높다.

1. 오스트리아의 위성 관측가 펠릭스 쇠프벵커가 SeeSat 포럼에 게시한 글.
2. 노비 코스모스 웹사이트의 오쿨루스 소개 페이지.
3. 2025년 6월 17일 타스통신 보도. 2025년 8월 전시회와 2025년 10월 16일 베스트니크 글로나스 잡지에 실린 노비 코스모스 최고경영자 안톤 알렉세예프의 인터뷰.
4. 2026년 4월 12일 노비 코스모스 소셜미디어 플랫폼에 게시된 마추크의 성명.
5. 2026년 4월 12일 세르게이 소뱌닌의 블로그 게시물.
6. 2026년 6월 17일 노비 코스모스 웹사이트의 보도자료.
7. 2026년 7월 27일 노비 코스모스 웹사이트의 보도자료.
8. 2026년 9월 3\~5일 카잔에서 개최된 안보회의 발표 영상. 3시간 49분 20초 부분 참조.
9. 2026년 9월 22일 노비 코스모스 웹사이트의 보도자료. 바카노프와 미슈스틴의 회담 영상 포함.
10. G. 길링거, 「러시아가 ICEYE 위성을 위협하기 위해 궤도기동을 하고 있는가?」, Integrity News Flash, 2026년 5월 22일.
11. 노비 코스모스 웹사이트의 사용자 안내서.
12. W. 옌 외, 「Ku대역 위상배열 합성개구레이더 탑재체 시스템의 설계와 궤도상 성능」, MDPI Sensors, 2024년 10월 12일.
13. A. 알렉세예프, D. 마추크, 「위성을 이용한 지구 원격탐사: 세계적 동향과 중국의 경험」(러시아어), Universum, 2025년 11월.
14. B. 헨드릭스, 「스틸샛-1: 우크라이나를 감시하는 러시아 소유의 중국산 위성」, The Space Review, 제1부(2025년 11월 3일), 제2부(2025년 11월 10일).

바르트 헨드릭스는 오랫동안 러시아 우주개발 사업을 관찰해온 전문가다.

참고: 현재 댓글을 사전 검토하고 있다. 따라서 댓글이 게시되기까지 시간이 걸릴 수 있으며, 제출된 모든 댓글이 게시된다는 보장은 없다.

앞서 제1부에서 설명했듯이 러시아의 스타트업 노비 코스모스(Novyy Kosmos)는 자사 웹사이트의 사용자 안내서에서 오쿨루스-01과 오쿨루스-02라는 이름으로 식별한 위성 두 대의 레이더 영상을 판매하고 있다. 보다 면밀한 분석 결과, 이러한 명칭은 실제로 중국 레이더 위성 두 대의 정체를 숨기기 위한 위장 명칭인 것으로 드러났다. 지난주 The Space Review에 기사가 게재된 직후 노비 코스모스는 사용자 안내서를 수정본으로 교체했다. 수정본에서는 오쿨루스-01에 관한 모든 정보가 완전히 삭제됐으며, 오쿨루스-02의 레이더 성능 제원도 제거됐다.[1] 이는 위성들의 실제 정체가 폭로된 이후 회사가 공개 문서를 수정하기로 결정했다는 데 의심의 여지를 거의 남기지 않는다. 그런데 밝혀진 바에 따르면 중국의 우주 자산에 대한 의존을 감추기 위해 위장 명칭을 사용하는 러시아 기업은 노비 코스모스만이 아니다.

2026년 9월 열린 안보회의에서 러시아 비상사태부가 실시한 발표에는 오쿨루스 위성 가운데 하나가 촬영한 여러 영상이 포함됐다. 같은 발표에서는 2025년 5월 설립된 L5라는 또 다른 러시아 스타트업이 확보한 레이더 사진 여러 장도 공개됐다. 사진들은 러시아 남부 크라스노다르 지역의 침수지역과 연안 해역의 수질오염, 흑해에 흩어진 선체 파편들을 보여줬다. 러시아 지구운용감시센터의 자료실에서 확보한 오쿨루스 영상과 달리, 이 영상들은 짧은 요청 기간에 맞춰 비상사태부에 직접 제공됐다. 2026년 6월 촬영된 영상의 출처는 IL5와 TY39라는 두 가지 명칭을 가진 위성으로 표시돼 있었다.[2]

같은 행사에 참석한 L5의 최고경영자 드미트리 모나호프는 자체 위성군을 구축하려는 회사의 계획을 설명하는 동시에, 회사가 이미 궤도에 위성 한 대를 보유하고 있음을 확인하는 발표자료도 공개했다. 그곳에서 엘샛-1(Elsat-1)로 식별된 이 위성은 극궤도에서 운용되며, 스포트 모드에서는 1m의 해상도, ScanSAR 모드에서는 170km의 관측폭을 제공한다. 영상은 촬영 후 3\~4시간 이내에 고객에게 전달할 수 있다.[3]

모나호프는 엘샛-1에 관해 자세히 설명하지 않았으며, 따라서 이 위성이 언제 어디에서 발사됐는지는 의문으로 남았다. 이 위성은 비상사태부의 별도 발표에서 TY39와 IL5로 명명된 위성과 동일한 위성이라고 추정해야 한다. 이러한 이름으로 공식 등록된 위성은 없지만, TY는 국제적으로 스페이스티(Spacety)라는 이름으로도 알려진 중국 기업 톈이 스페이스(Tianyi Space)가 제작한 광학 및 레이더 원격탐사 위성 계열의 제조사 지정번호다.

스페이스티와 러시아의 위성자료 유통업체 테라테크(TerraTech)는 상업용 레이더 자료가 우크라이나에서 러시아 용병조직 바그너그룹의 전투작전을 지원하는 데 전달되고 있다는 정보가 공개된 이후, 2023년 초 미국의 제재 대상에 올랐다. L5는 엘샛-1이라는 위장 명칭을 사용함으로써 제재 대상에 오른 중국 제조업체에 대한 의존을 감추려는 것으로 보인다. 그러나 다른 발표에서 TY라는 제조사 지정번호가 공개되면서 이러한 시도는 무력화됐다.

스페이스티가 제작한 C대역 레이더 위성 가운데 L5의 발표자료에 나타난 제원과 일치하는 위성은 네 대다.

- 차오후-1(Chaohu-1): 2022년 2월 27일 발사
- 푸청-1(Fucheng-1): 2023년 6월 7일 발사
- 선치-01/TY41(Shenqi-01/TY41): 2024년 9월 24일 발사
- 선치-02/TY42(Shenqi-02/TY42): 2025년 5월 17일 발사

TY 번호의 순서를 보면 차오후-1과 푸청-1의 제조사 지정번호가 각각 TY39와 TY40임을 알 수 있다. 스페이스티는 이 두 위성과 해당 번호의 관계를 공개적으로 밝힌 적이 없지만, 이 명칭들은 러시아 기업 스카넥스(SCANEX)가 지난해 말까지 공개했던 궤도요소 집합(Two-Line Elements, TLE) 목록에 나타난다. 스카넥스는 러시아와 해외 원격탐사 위성의 영상을 수신하기 위한 지상국 네트워크를 운용하며, 이러한 영상 가운데 일부를 판매하는 기업이다. TY39와 TY40의 궤도요소에 포함된 국제식별번호인 2022-019J/51832와 2023-081A/56846은 이들이 각각 차오후-1과 푸청-1이라는 사실을 확인해준다.[4]

두 위성은 스카넥스가 2025년에 실시한 발표에서도 차오후-1과 TY40이라는 이름으로 언급됐다. 스카넥스는 자체 지상국 네트워크를 통해 이 두 위성이 수집한 자료를 판매한다고 명시했으며, 자료 수신 후 불과 4시간 만에 고객에게 전달할 수 있다는 점을 강조했다.[5]

따라서 2026년 9월 발표에서 TY39, IL5, 엘샛-1이라는 이름으로 불린 위성이 실제로는 중국의 차오후-1 레이더 위성이라는 결론은 명백하다. 차오후-1이 수집한 영상은 스카넥스뿐 아니라 여러 다른 기업을 통해서도 러시아 시장에 유통돼왔다. 이는 L5가 차오후-1의 임무에서 정확히 어떤 역할을 수행하는지에 관한 의문을 제기한다. 2025년 12월 L5 관계자는 회사가 그달 초 “중국 위성에 대한 권리를 확보했으며” 이미 고객들에게 영상을 판매하고 있다고 확인했다.[6] 2026년 5월 모나호프 최고경영자는 L5가 그해 7월 “해외 위성의 통제권을 인수할” 것으로 예상한다고 밝혔다.[7]

가능한 해석 가운데 하나는 L5가 2025년 말 차오후-1 자료에 대한 독점적인 접근권을 처음 부여받아, 이전에 다른 러시아 기업들이 담당했던 자료 유통 역할을 넘겨받았다는 것이다. 이후 2026년 여름에는 위성의 직접적인 운용통제권까지 인수했을 가능성이 있다. 그렇다면 L5는 자체 임무통제센터에서 위성을 감시하고 러시아 국내 지상국을 통해 자료를 직접 수신하는 완전한 턴키 방식으로 위성을 운용하고 있다는 뜻이다. 이 과정에서 스카넥스의 기반시설을 이용하고 있을 가능성도 있다. 이와 유사하게 러시아 방산업체 스틸소프트(Stilsoft)는 스틸샛-1(Stilsat-1)이라는 위장 명칭으로 중국산 고해상도 광학영상 위성 한 대 이상을 운용하고 있다.[8] 두 기업 사이에는 분명한 조직적 연계가 존재한다. L5 웹사이트는 스틸소프트를 기업 협력업체로 명시하고 있으며, 모나호프 자신도 인터뷰에서 2022년부터 스틸소프트와 적극적으로 협력해왔다고 확인했다.[9]

L5의 정확한 역할이 무엇이든, 차오후-1은 2026년 8월에도 중국 고객들에게 자료를 제공하고 있었다. 당시 이 위성은 중국·네팔 국경에서 발생한 빙하 붕괴의 여파를 촬영한 여러 스페이스티 레이더 위성 가운데 하나로 보도됐다.[10] 또한 L5가 웹사이트에 서로 다른 두 위성이 촬영한 것으로 표시된 레이더 영상을 게시했다는 점에도 주목할 필요가 있다. 두 위성 모두 스페이스티의 TY39/40/41/42 계열과 일치하는 레이더 성능 제원을 보여준다.[11]

L5의 목표는 중국 레이더 플랫폼을 활용하는 데 그치지 않는다. 이 회사는 다양한 탑재물을 수용할 수 있도록 설계된 A-100이라는 자체 제작 위성 본체를 적극적으로 개발하고 있다. 목표 발사질량이 약 100kg인 이 위성 본체는 광학 및 레이더 영상촬영, 사물인터넷(IoT) 데이터 중계, 통신, 과학연구, 기술실증 임무용으로 제시되고 있다. L5는 자체 개발 위성의 첫 발사를 공식적으로 2027년으로 예상하고 있다.

2026년 9월 행사에 참석한 또 다른 발표자는 2025년 3월 설립된 노비 스타트(Novyy Start, ‘새로운 출발’)라는 스타트업을 대표하는 예고르 나자로프였다. 나자로프는 노비 스타트가 스타트-1M(Start-1M)이라는 고체연료 발사체를 이용해 궤도에 배치하려는 소형 레이더 및 광학 원격탐사 위성군의 계획을 소개했다. 스타트-1M은 퇴역한 토폴-M 대륙간탄도미사일을 우주발사체로 개조한 것으로, 노비 스타트는 이 미사일의 원설계업체인 모스크바 열공학연구소(MIT Corporation)와 협력해 개조작업을 진행하고 있다. 러시아 극동의 보스토치니 우주기지에는 스타트-1M 로켓 발사를 위한 기반시설이 건설되고 있다. 이 로켓은 러시아 북서부 플레세츠크 발사장에서도 발사될 가능성이 있다.

스펙터(Spectre)라는 이름의 노비 스타트 위성군은 리플렉시오(Reflexio) 광학 원격탐사 위성과 루미니오(Luminio), 에미시오(Emissio)라는 서로 다른 두 종류의 레이더 영상 위성으로 구성될 예정이다. 루미니오와 에미시오 모두 0.5\~25m 범위의 공간해상도를 가진 영상을 제공할 계획이다. 지상 관측폭은 루미니오가 7\~200km, 에미시오가 10\~200km에 이를 예정이다. 발표 중 나자로프는 회사가 초기에는 SAR 위성에 중국산 능동위상배열 레이더 안테나를 사용할 것이라는 사실을 솔직하게 인정했다. 청중들이 당혹스러워하는 반응을 보이자 그는 후속 위성들에서는 러시아 국내에서 생산한 레이더체계로 전환할 것임을 암시했다.[12]

스펙터 사업의 첫 발사는 2027년으로 계획돼 있다. 2026년 5월의 미확인 보도에 따르면, 우주사업을 축소하고 있는 러시아 가스프롬은 올해 말 이전에 자사의 위성 제조시설과 임무통제센터를 노비 스타트에 매각할 것으로 예상된다. 이러한 인수는 스타트업의 위성 조립 일정을 상당히 앞당길 수 있다.[13]

러시아는 2025년 8월 항공우주 훙투(Aerospace Hongtu)가 체결한 대규모 계약에도 관여했을 가능성이 있다. 국제적으로 파이샛(PIESAT)이라는 이름으로도 알려진 이 기업은 현재 고해상도 X대역 SAR 위성 16대로 구성된 누와(Nuwa)라는 상업용 레이더 위성 네트워크를 운용하고 있다. 갤럭시스페이스(GalaxySpace)가 제작한 이 위성들 가운데 일부는 간섭측정 자료를 제공하는 데 최적화된 허브 앤드 스포크 방식의 ‘회전목마(cartwheel)’ 편대궤도에서 지구를 돌고 있다.

2025년 8월 29일 파이샛은 처음에는 ‘고객 A’로만 식별된 구매자와 1억 3,800만 달러 규모의 수출계약을 체결했다. 이 계약은 위성 한 대와 관련 지상 기반시설의 조달을 포함했으며, 1,200일 이내에 이행하도록 규정됐다. 파이샛은 이번 거래가 해외 고객에게 궤도상 위성 서비스를 제공하는 첫 사례라고 밝히면서 계약금액이 기록적인 규모라는 점을 명시적으로 강조했다. 2025년 9월 5일 회사는 계약에 관한 추가 정보를 제공하면서 사업의 실제 인도 장소가 아프리카의 한 국가라고 공개했다. 그러나 회사는 “외부 거시경제 환경의 중대한 변화, 관련 국가정책의 변화, 고객 수요의 변화, 기타 예측하지 못한 사건이나 불가항력적 상황”으로 인해 계약이 예정대로 또는 전부 이행되지 않을 가능성도 경고했다.

이 계약은 러시아 고위급 대표단이 베이징에 있는 파이샛 본사를 두 차례 방문한 지 불과 며칠 만에 체결됐다. 첫 번째 방문은 8월 23일 러시아 산업통상부 차관이 실시했으며, 두 번째는 8월 26일 안톤 알리하노프 산업통상부 장관이 실시했다. 러시아 언론은 추가적인 세부사항 없이 알리하노프의 방문만 간략하게 언급했지만, 중국 자료들은 더 많은 맥락을 공개했다. 8월 23일 회의는 특정되지 않은 사업에 관한 “세부사항과 관련 협정을 더욱 구체화한” “고위급 의사결정 회의”로 설명됐다. 해당 사업의 “인도 물량과 계약 규모”는 업계 기록을 세울 것으로 예상됐다. 이어 8월 26일 알리하노프의 방문 당시 파이샛은 “위성 궤도상 인도 및 발사 서비스, 무인항공기 기술협력, 누와 위성군 자료 판매 및 서비스, 산업 응용 서비스 등의 분야에서 제품과 서비스”를 제안했다. 특히 이러한 중국 자료들은 양측이 이미 “회의 이전의 충분한 의사소통을 바탕으로 협력 내용과 관련 협정을 확정했다”는 점도 강조했다.[14]

이러한 내용을 종합해보면 러시아 대표단의 방문은 주로 8월 29일 체결된 계약의 최종 세부사항을 조율하기 위한 것이었던 것으로 보인다. 최종 인도 장소가 아프리카 국가라고 명시된 사실은 러시아 아프리카군단(Africa Corps)의 작전 소요를 지원할 수 있는 정교한 대리조달 방식의 가능성을 시사한다. 아프리카군단은 바그너그룹의 용병 네트워크가 사헬 지역 전역에 남긴 조직들을 흡수하고 제도권에 편입하기 위해 2023년 러시아 국방부가 설립했다. 바그너그룹 자체는 2023년 6월 러시아 정부를 상대로 한 단기간의 반란 이후 해체됐다. 구매를 아프리카 국가 고객을 통해 진행함으로써 러시아와 파이샛은 서방의 제재와 수출통제에 따른 즉각적인 위협을 피하려 했을 가능성이 있다. 이러한 제재는 2025년 내내 기업 부채 증가와 심각한 내부 임금 분쟁에 시달렸던 파이샛에 특히 치명적이었을 것이다. 회사는 국제적인 경제적 제한의 위험보다 당장의 기업 안정성을 확보하는 데 필요한 조치로 1억 3,800만 달러 규모의 계약을 취급한 것으로 보인다.

노비 코스모스, L5, 노비 스타트와 같은 러시아 기업들이 중국 기업과의 협력을 독자적인 위성군 구축을 위한 발판으로 보는 반면, 다른 러시아 기업들은 중국의 레이더 및 광학 원격탐사 위성이 확보한 자료를 처리하고 유통하는 역할만을 수행하고 있다. 이 가운데 여섯 기업은 다음과 같은 중국 레이더 위성의 자료를 판매하고 있다.

- 스카넥스(SCANEX): 가오펀-3, 하이시-1, 차오후-1, 푸청-1, 루디 탄처, 슈퍼뷰 네오-2 01/02[15]
- 테라테크(TerraTech): 하이시-1, 차오후-1[16]
- 라쿠르스(Rakurs): 가오펀-3, 차오후-1, 푸청-1[17]
- 소브존드(Sovzond): 가오펀-3, 가오펀-12, 가오펀-12, 가오펀-12-2[18]
- 이노테르(Innoter): 가오펀-3, 하이시-1, 차오후-1, 루탄-1A, 루탄-1B, 파이샛[19]
- 프라임 그룹(Prime Group): 선치-01/TY41, 선치-02/TY42[20]

일곱 번째 기업인 MT-LAB도 중국의 광학 및 레이더 위성 영상을 유통하고 있다고 확인했지만, 구체적인 위성 이름은 밝히지 않았다.[21] MT-LAB는 러시아에서 제작한 원격탐사 위성 세 종류인 KOEN, EOS-O, EOS-R의 운용과 자료 유통도 담당할 예정이다. 스틸소프트가 개발한 광학영상 위성 KOEN은 스틸샛-1에 탑재된 것과 유사한 중국산 광학 탑재체를 수입해 러시아산 위성 본체에 장착한 것으로 알려져 있다. 이 위성은 2026년 말 또는 2027년 초 보스토치니 우주기지에서 발사될 예정이다.

EOS-O와 EOS-R은 러시아 기업 NPK 바를(NPK Barl)이 제작하는 광학 및 레이더 위성이다. EOS-R은 최대 해상도가 0.5m라고 주장되는 C대역 레이더를 탑재하도록 설계됐다. 이 장비와 중국 우주산업 사이의 산업적 연계가 공식적으로 인정된 적은 없지만, 주목할 만하게도 NPK 바를은 EOS-R 플랫폼의 잠재적인 능력을 보여주기 위해 미노스페이스의 타이징-4-01 위성이 촬영한 두바이의 레이더 영상을 사용했다.[22]

2026년 8월 공개된 러시아 원격탐사 산업의 공식 조직도에 따르면 국내 기업들이 처리하는 모든 원격탐사 자료의 50\~70%가 이른바 ‘보안기관(silovye vedomstva)’을 포함한 정부 고객들에게 전달된다. 보안기관이라는 용어에는 국방부, 내무부, 국가근위대, 연방보안국(FSB)이 포함된다.[23] 러시아 국방부는 전용 정찰위성을 비교적 적은 수량만 운용하고 있기 때문에, 자체 위성들이 수집한 정보를 보완하기 위해 상업용 원격탐사 플랫폼의 고해상도 영상에 체계적으로 의존하고 있는 것으로 보인다.

이러한 보충적인 지리공간정보의 상당 부분은 중국의 우주 자산에서 직접 제공될 가능성이 높다. 2025년 9월 열린 원격탐사 산업회의에서 프라임 그룹 관계자는 2025년 러시아 상업 시장에 유통된 1m 미만 해상도의 위성영상 가운데 80% 이상이 창광위성기술(Chang Guang Satellite Technology)이 제작한 지린-1 가오펀 광학영상 위성에서 나온 것이라고 밝혔다. 이 계열에서 가장 발전된 위성인 지린 가오펀-04와 지린 가오펀-05는 최대 공간해상도가 0.20\~0.30m에 달한다. 발표 당시 중국 정부는 러시아 기업들에 이러한 정찰위성급 영상의 상업적 유통을 공식적으로 허가하지 않은 상태였지만, 프라임 그룹 관계자는 가까운 시일 내에 규제 승인이 이뤄질 것으로 예상된다고 밝혔다.[24]

중국 상업위성에서 확보한 레이더 및 광학 영상의 상당 부분이 우크라이나에서 러시아의 전투작전을 지원하는 데 체계적으로 활용되고 있다는 점에는 의심의 여지가 거의 없다. 이미 여러 중국 및 러시아 기업이 바로 이러한 이유로 국제 제재 대상에 올랐다. 앞서 언급했듯이 스페이스티와 테라테크는 바그너그룹과의 거래 관계가 공개된 이후 2023년 초 미국의 제재 대상에 추가됐다. 중국의 주요 상업용 원격탐사 자료 유통업체인 HEAD 에어로스페이스 역시 바그너 관련 조직들에 우크라이나 지역의 위성영상을 제공하고, 라쿠르스를 통해 러시아군 총참모부에 고정밀 지형자료를 공급했다는 이유로 2023년과 2024년 미국과 유럽의 제재를 받았다. 또한 바그너그룹은 일반적인 국가 조달 경로를 우회해 윈쩌 테크놀로지(Yunze Technology Co., Ltd.)에서 중국의 고해상도 광학영상 위성 두 대, 즉 지린-1 가오펀-03D12와 가오펀-03D13을 직접 구매했다. 이 중개업체는 실제 위성 제조업체인 창광위성기술과 함께 2023년 12월 미국의 제재 대상에 추가됐다.

다른 중국 위성 제조업체들 역시 공급경로를 감추기 위해 유사한 중개 구조를 활용하고 있을 가능성이 높다. 프라임 그룹은 쿤밍 서니(Kunming Sunny)라는 협력업체를 통해 스페이스티의 선치-1과 선치-2 레이더 위성에 영상 주문을 넣는다고 공개적으로 밝히고 있다. 이 회사는 스카넥스 웹사이트에서도 ‘서니(Sunny)’라는 약칭으로 스페이스티의 하이시-1 레이더 위성 운용업체로 지정돼 있다.[25] 인터넷에서 쿤밍 서니에 관한 정보가 사실상 존재하지 않는다는 점은 이 회사가 조달경로를 감추고 추가적인 제재를 우회하도록 설계된 특수 목적의 페이퍼컴퍼니 역할을 수행하고 있음을 시사한다.[26]

러시아와 중국은 모두 우크라이나 영토에 대한 위성정찰 수행 과정에서 양국이 고위급 협력을 하고 있다는 주장을 공식적으로 부인했다. 2025년 10월 이러한 의혹에 대응하면서 크렘린궁 대변인 드미트리 페스코프는 러시아가 위성을 포함한 자체 능력만으로 전장에서 필요한 모든 것을 충족한다고 주장했다. 중국 외교부는 그러한 협력에 관해 아는 바가 없다고 답하면서 우크라이나 분쟁에서 중국의 중립적인 입장을 강조했다.[27]

그러나 이러한 공식 주장은 협력사업에 참여한 일부 기업 경영진의 발언과 직접적으로 모순된다. 스틸소프트 관계자들은 중국산 스틸샛 광학영상 위성의 구매를 우크라이나 전쟁과 직접 연결해 설명했다.[28] 마찬가지로 노비 코스모스 경영진도 두 차례에 걸쳐 자사의 오쿨루스 위성군을 핀란드·미국의 ICEYE 레이더 위성 전력이 수행하는 정보수집 활동에 대한 전략적 대응의 일부로 보고 있음을 암시했다.[29]

요약하면, 여기에서 분석한 조달 양상은 러시아 원격탐사 산업이 중국의 우주 자산에 상당히 의존하고 있음을 드러낸다. 이러한 작전상의 의존은 중국 플랫폼에 러시아의 위장 명칭을 붙여 운용하는 방식부터 러시아 위성에 중국산 하드웨어 부품을 통합하는 방식, 군사작전 지원 등을 위해 러시아 시장에 중국의 원격탐사 자료를 대규모로 유통하는 방식에 이르기까지 광범위하다. 외교적·기업적 수사에서는 기술적 자립이라는 이야기를 유지하고 있지만, 더욱 심층적인 분석은 현대 러시아 원격탐사 산업이 핵심 작전능력을 유지하기 위해 중국 기술의 광범위한 지원을 받고 있음을 보여준다.

1. 사용자 안내서의 원본은 NASA Spaceflight Forum의 해당 게시글에서 내려받을 수 있다. 수정본은 노비 코스모스 웹사이트에 게시됐다. 또한 노비 코스모스 웹사이트에서는 자체 제작 오쿨루스 위성의 Ku대역 능력에 관한 언급도 삭제됐다. 이 능력은 타이징-4-03으로 식별되는 중국산 오쿨루스-01 위성에만 적용되는 것으로 보인다.
2. 2026년 9월 3\~5일 카잔에서 개최된 안보회의 발표 영상. 3시간 48분 40초 부분 참조.
3. 참고문헌 2 참조. 4시간 7분 부분.
4. TY39와 TY40의 궤도요소를 포함한 스카넥스의 과거 TLE 목록은 웹 아카이브에서 확인할 수 있다.
5. 스카넥스 발표자료, 2025년.
6. 2025년 12월 10일 L5의 유리 테빈 인터뷰.
7. 2026년 5월 25일 L5의 드미트리 모나호프 인터뷰.
8. B. 헨드릭스, 「스틸샛-1: 우크라이나를 감시하는 러시아 소유의 중국산 위성(제1부)」, The Space Review, 2025년 11월 3일.
9. 참고문헌 7 참조.
10. 2026년 8월 31일 중국 언론 보도.
11. L5 웹사이트의 레이더 위성 소개 페이지.
12. 참고문헌 2 참조. 3시간 58분 5초 부분.
13. 2026년 5월 26일 코메르산트 웹사이트에 게재된 기사.
14. 2025년 8월 30일 ‘China in Space’ 웹사이트에 게재된 기사와 2025년 8월 26일 및 9월 5일 중국 언론매체에 게재된 기사들.
15. 스카넥스 웹사이트의 위성 소개 페이지 및 2025년 스카넥스 발표자료.
16. 테라테크 웹사이트의 레이더 위성 소개 페이지.
17. 라쿠르스 웹사이트의 레이더 위성 소개 페이지.
18. 소브존드 웹사이트의 레이더 위성 소개 페이지.
19. 이노테르 웹사이트의 위성 소개 페이지.
20. 프라임 그룹 웹사이트의 2025년 2월 17일 및 11월 10일 보도자료.
21. MT-LAB의 알렉산드르 미노프가 실시한 발표.
22. 타이징-4-01이 촬영한 두바이의 레이더 영상은 미노스페이스와 NPK 바를 양측의 웹사이트에서 확인할 수 있다.
23. 2026년 8월 25일 Habr 웹사이트에 게재된 기사.
24. 프라임 그룹의 스타니슬라프 코뉴코프가 실시한 발표.
25. 참고문헌 19 및 스카넥스 웹사이트의 하이시-1 소개 페이지 참조.
26. 쿤밍 서니에 관한 정보를 제공하는 유일한 온라인 자료는 해당 기업정보 페이지다.
27. 2025년 10월 6일 로이터통신 및 United24 Media 보도.
28. 참고문헌 8 참조.
29. 노비 코스모스 웹사이트의 2025년 7월 24일 및 12월 21일 보도자료.

바르트 헨드릭스는 오랫동안 러시아 우주개발 사업을 관찰해온 전문가다.

참고: 현재 댓글을 사전 검토하고 있다. 따라서 댓글이 게시되기까지 시간이 걸릴 수 있으며, 제출된 모든 댓글이 게시된다는 보장은 없다.

The Space Review: Flying under the radar: Russia’s tacit reliance on Chinese SAR satellites (part 1)

The Space Review: Flying under the radar: Russia’s tacit reliance on Chinese SAR satellites (part 1)

Taijing-4-03, a Chinese radar satellite flying under the Russian cover name Okulus-01. Source

Flying under the radar: Russia’s tacit reliance on Chinese SAR satellites (part 1)by Bart Hendrickx
Monday, October 12, 2026

Russia currently operates only a handful of government-owned radar imaging satellites, prompting several private startups to step in to fill this gap in the domestic remote sensing market. To secure these capabilities, many of these entities have discreetly turned to China’s commercial space industry. This low-profile cooperation is unfolding across three distinct levels: white-labeling orbiting Chinese satellites under Russian cover names, engineering domestic satellite buses to house imported Chinese radar payloads, and actively marketing Chinese radar imagery to Russian state and commercial consumers.

The current status of Russian radar satellites

Only three Roscosmos radar satellites are currently operational: Kondor-FKA-1 and Kondor-FKA-2 (launched in May 2023 and November 2024) and Obzor-R (launched in December 2025). The Kondor satellites rely on mechanically deployable S-band radars. Obzor-R, transmitting in the X-band, is the first Russian radar satellite to be equipped with an active phased array antenna. While officially billed as purely civilian remote sensing assets, all three platforms probably also support military intelligence requirements. Last year’s launch of Obzor-R was heavily shrouded in secrecy and not publicly acknowledged by Roscosmos until recently.

Statements made by corporate executives last year indicated that the home-built Okulus was not expected to fly until 2028 at the earliest. It therefore came as a complete surprise when clear indications emerged last April that the deployment of the first operational satellite was imminent.

The Russian military currently operates a single radar satellite under the official name Kosmos-2550. Internally known as Pion, it is a specialized ocean reconnaissance satellite designed to accurately pinpoint the location of military vessels. Although officially declared operational by Russia in November 2022, high-resolution ground-based photographs of the satellite strongly suggest that one of its two radar antennas failed to deploy. [1] No follow-on satellite is expected to be launched in the near future. Meanwhile, work has been underway for over a decade on a separate series of military X-band radar satellites called Araks-R, but the project has suffered numerous delays and has still not seen a single launch. Many of these delays are likely caused by Western sanctions that have hampered the import of radiation-hardened microelectronics, which are critical, among other things, for the assembly of advanced synthetic aperture radar payloads.

Novyy Kosmos’ Okulus project

One of the private companies aiming to compensate for the lack of radar satellites is Moscow-based Novyy Kosmos (“New Space”), a startup founded in October 2021 which has been working on a radar satellite called Okulus. Some basic details regarding the platform are available from the company’s public website and promotional materials. The spacecraft weighs 448 kilograms and is intended to operate in a 97.2° inclination Sun-synchronous orbit at an average altitude of 475 kilometers. Its X-band radar operates within the 9.3–9.8 gigahertz range and is advertised to produce images with resolutions of 2 meters in spotlight mode, 5 meters in stripmap mode, and 20 meters in ScanSAR mode. Confusingly, the company’s website also lists a 0.4-meter maximum spatial resolution alongside an additional Ku-band radar capability. [2]

Basic parameters of Okulus on the Novyy Kosmos website. Source

Model of Okulus. Source

The stated goals of Okulus are to provide all-weather, high-resolution radar monitoring of critical linear infrastructure, including oil and gas pipelines, power lines, and railways. Utilizing advanced synthetic aperture radar (SAR) interferometry, the platform is designed to track ground subsidence under these structures with a precision of up to 5 millimeters, while also monitoring quarries and metallic accumulations. Furthermore, it serves vital civil and environmental functions, including flood and forest fire management, agricultural optimization, and mapping ice dynamics along the Northern Sea Route.

Company officials have frequently emphasized that 80% of the satellite’s components will be manufactured within Russia—a crucial asset in an industry heavily restricted by Western sanctions. Novyy Kosmos aims to field a constellation of three Okulus satellites. A technical schematic displayed during an interview with the company’s CEO Anton Alekseyev two years ago suggests that plans have been considered to launch all three spacecraft simultaneously aboard a single Soyuz-2 carrier rocket equipped with a Fregat upper stage.

Soyuz-2 payload shroud configured to house three Okulus satellites. Source

The surprise launch of Okulus

Statements made by corporate executives last year indicated that the home-built Okulus was not expected to fly until 2028 at the earliest. Some early private funding had been secured for the project (expected to cost 1 billion rubles or roughly $11.5 million), while engineering designs for the satellite's radar were reportedly being finalized. [3]

It therefore came as a complete surprise to observers when clear indications emerged last April that the deployment of the first operational satellite was imminent. On April 12, just a day after Roscosmos chief Dmitriy Bakanov explicitly mentioned Novyy Kosmos during a high-profile meeting with President Vladimir Putin, the company’s chairman, Dmitriy Matsuk, noted on the company’s social media platform that the firm was “getting down to on-orbit flight tests of its first commercial radar satellite.” [4] On the same day, a blog post by Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin highlighting the city's commercial space sector revealed that Okulus would be placed into orbit later that month. [5]

The document reveals that Novyy Kosmos is actively offering data from two operational Okulus satellites already in orbit.

Following this announcement, no further updates surfaced until mid-June, when Matsuk was quoted on the company's website confirm‎ing that the first satellite had indeed been successfully launched in April and was undergoing the in-orbit tests necessary for “the further development of the company’s products in the field of radar imaging.” [6] Curiously, Matsuk’s statement went entirely unnoticed and was not picked up by any mainstream Russian media outlets.

In a news report published on the company’s website in late July, Novyy Kosmos CEO Anton Alekseyev sowed confusion by describing Okulus as a project "under development." Contradicting this statement, however, the report was accompanied by a high-resolution radar image of a sports stadium credited to a satellite called Okulus-01. [7]

Radar picture credited to Okulus-01. Source

Okulus was showcased again during a presentation given by an official from Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations in early September. Speaking about the ministry’s use of satellite data obtained by private companies, he displayed high-resolution radar strips of Russia’s Arctic region and the southwestern Volgograd region captured by Okulus in early and late June 2026. [8]

Pictures taken by Okulus in June 2026. Source

Finally, during a meeting with Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on September 22, Roscosmos chief Dmitriy Bakanov officially confirmed that the Okulus satellite had been successfully orbited earlier in the year and was actively furnishing radar data to several federal executive agencies. Novyy Kosmos officials responded enthusiastically on their corporate platform, framing the launch as a major milestone for Russia’s private space sector and underlining that its imagery would serve both government and commercial clients. [9]

All these public disclosures presented analysts with a conundrum. Announcements from both Novyy Kosmos and Roscosmos claimed a satellite named Okulus was deployed in April and delivering active data within months, despite statements by the company last year that the first flight was not expected until 2028. Furthermore, no satellite officially bearing the name Okulus had been placed into orbit in April.

The most obvious explanation was that Okulus was tucked inside a cluster of six unnamed military satellites launched from the Plesetsk cosmodrome on April 16 by a Soyuz-2 rocket with a Volga upper stage. Registered by US Space Command as Kosmos-2609 to 2614, five of these payloads triggered intense Western scrutiny in mid-May when they executed high-energy maneuvers to lock themselves into orbits that were nearly coplanar with those of the Finnish-American radar satellites ICEYE-X36 and X37. [10] ICEYE has provided radar data to support Ukraine’s armed forces in the war against Russia, raising speculation that the five Russian satellites might be on an inspection mission or have some type of anti-satellite capability. Possibly, Okulus was the sixth satellite, hitching a ride into an orbit far away from that of the ICEYE satellites.

The Chinese connection of Okulus

The Okulus story took a new turn when Novyy Kosmos recently released an updated user guide for customers wishing to purchase customized remote sensing data. Published inconspicuously on the company’s platform, the document reveals that Novyy Kosmos is actively offering data from two operational Okulus satellites already in orbit. The first, named Okulus-01, carries a Ku-band radar operating at a center frequency of 13.5 gigahertz. The second, named Okulus-02, houses an X-band radar transmitting at a center frequency of 9.6 gigahertz with an expansive 1,200 megahertz maximum signal bandwidth. The guide details a specialized processing service that enables customers to use these radar datasets to automatically detect and measure marine oil spills. [11]

The following performance characteristics are given for the two satellites:

Okulus-01(Ku-band)

ModeResolutionGround swathSliding spotlight 1Sliding spotlight 2StripmapScanSAR

0.5 m	5x5 km
0.5 m	20x10 km
2 m	15 km
18-20 m	150 km

Okulus-02 (X-band)

ModeResolutionGround swathSpotlight 0.5mSliding spotlight 1Sliding spotlight 2Sliding spotlight 3StripmapScanSAR 1ScanSAR 2

3x3 km
0.5 m	8x20 km
0.5 m	10x30 km
1 m	10x100 km
2.5 m	25 km
7 m	45 km
15-20 m	100 km

At the time the document was compiled, Okulus-01 was operational and supplying commercial data, while Okulus-02 was still undergoing in-orbit check-outs. Imagery from the second satellite was expected to become available for customers on August 1, 2026. Okulus-01 and 02 are in orbits with an average altitude of 530 and 535 kilometers respectively. They both have an inclination of 97.5° and cross the descending nodes of their orbits at 10:30 am local time.

Closer analysis leaves no doubt that Okulus-01 is, in fact, a radar satellite built and launched by China on January 23, 2024, under the name Taijing-4-03.

The orbital parameters detailed in the guide make it clear that Okulus-01 and 02 were not among the satellites launched from Plesetsk on April 16. The military payloads are in slightly higher orbits with more elevated inclinations. In addition to that, they cross the descending nodes of their orbits in the mid-afternoon, whereas the Okulus satellites do so in the mid-morning. Neither are there any other unidentified Russian satellites launched in recent months that match the orbital elements given for the two Okulus satellites.

Closer analysis leaves no doubt that Okulus-01 is, in fact, a radar satellite built and launched by China on January 23, 2024, under the name Taijing-4-03. Manufactured by Beijing Weina Star Technology (better known by its international name MinoSpace), it is the world’s first commercial Ku-band SAR satellite. Only two other Ku-band radar satellites have been launched since—specifically China’s Airsat-01 (Zhongke-01) and Airsat-02 (Zhongke-02) in September 2024—but these were inserted into slightly lower dawn-dusk orbits with a Local Time of Descending Node (LTDN) of 6:00 am.

Taijing-4-03 is a highly compact, ultra-thin flat-panel radar satellite. Utilizing an 80-kilogram active phased array antenna measuring 3.6x0.6 meters, it is based on Minospace’s MN200S platform and has an overall mass of 230 kilograms.

Taijing 4-03. Source: Minospace.

The orbital parameters published for Okulus-01 in the Novyy Kosmos user guide perfectly match those of Taijing-4-03 following its launch in January 2024. Catalogued by US Space Command as Object 2024-016D (NORAD number 58823), the satellite has not executed any orbital corrections since its deployment and has consequently decayed from the original 530 kilometers altitude down to approximately 385 kilometers. This has compressed the satellite’s ground footprint, which could explain why some of the swath widths and spatial resolutions marketed for Okulus-01 slightly differ from Taijing-4-03’s factory specifications seen below. [12]

Radar performance data for Taijing-4-03. Source

Less than two months after the launch of Taijing-4-03, MinoSpace released a sharp Ku-band capture of US Navy aircraft carriers moored at Naval Station Norfolk in Virginia. Although Novyy Kosmos executives have never openly acknowledged their ties with MinoSpace, they explicitly praised the aircraft carrier tracking capability of Taijing-3-04 in a paper on China’s remote sensing industry published in November 2025. More particularly, they singled out the platform's integrated, spaceborne AI processors that enable such automatic, real-time monitoring. [13]

US Navy aircraft carriers imaged by Taijing-4-03. Source: Minosat.

Okulus-02, an X-band radar satellite, is almost certainly a cover name for another Chinese satellite, but its identification is not as straightforward. There are four Chinese commercial X-band radar satellites launched after Taijing-4-03 that have been placed into an orbit corresponding to that of Okulus-02:

• Taijing-4-02A (built by MinoSpace), launched on May 21, 2025
• Dongpo-16 (built by MinoSpace), launched on March 16, 2026
• Juntian-1-04A (built by Beijing Juntian Space Technology), launched on March 16, 2026
• Dianjian-1/Tianyi-50 (built by Spacety), launched on May 15, 2026

Chinese sources offer only baseline radar operating parameters for these platforms, making it impossible to positively identify any of them as Okulus-02. Taijing-4-02A and Dianjian-1 can likely be ruled out because their reported maximum swath widths of 240 kilometers significantly exceed the tighter 100-kilometer limit advertised for Okulus-02. Furthermore, Taijing-4-02A is likely to have completed its on-orbit shakedown and commissioning phases long before August 2026, when the second Okulus was declared operational.

This leaves Dongpo-16 and Juntian-1-04A—launched together in March 2026—as the most probable candidates. Both feature a maximum spatial resolution of 0.5 meters that matches the specifications published for Okulus-02. To date, only a single swath width has been publicly disclosed for these platforms, namely “more than 25 kilometers” for Dongpo-16, which closely aligns with the parameters marketed for Okulus-02 in stripmap mode. Between the two, Dongpo-16 is a significantly more plausible candidate because it is built on the exact same MinoSpace MN200S satellite bus as Taijing-4-03 (Okulus-01). From a corporate procurement standpoint, Novyy Kosmos is far more likely to have secured a multi-satellite agreement with a single Chinese partner than with two competing manufacturers.

Juntian-1-04A. Source: Juntian Space Technology.

Dongpo-16. Source: MinoSpace

MinoSpace is no newcomer to cooperative ventures with the Russian space industry. There is strong evidence that at least two of its high-resolution optical remote sensing satellites are actively being operated by the Russian defense contractor Stilsoft under the pseudonym Stilsat-1. These platforms, Taijing-3-02 and Taijing-3-04, were orbited together with Taijing-4-03 and Taijing-4-02A, respectively. While the exact commercial details of the arrangement between Stilsoft and MinoSpace remain unknown, Stilsoft maintains its own ground station infrastructure to command the satellites and downlink imagery. This independent operational capability strongly indicates that the assets have been turned over to the Russian firm on a complete turnkey basis. [14]

Taijing-3-02 and Taijing-4-03 prior to launch. Source

Whether this turnkey operational model also applies to Okulus-01 and Okulus-02 remains unclear. The possibility cannot be entirely ruled out for Taijing-4-03, which has no publicly identified anchor customers within the Chinese domestic remote sensing market. Conversely, Dongpo-16 and Juntian-1-04A were explicitly ordered from their respective manufacturers by domestic Chinese enterprises for localized remote sensing applications.

Dongpo-16 forms part of a planned 20-satellite hybrid radar and optical constellation operated by Huantian Smart Technology. For this specific spacecraft, the operator teamed up with a regional partner, Xingyuan Space, to dedicate a portion of the platform's data capacity to the Jinjiang district of the city of Chengdu in southwestern China. This is why the satellite also bears the alternative name Jinjiang Xingyuan. Proving its domestic utility, Dongpo-16 was one of several satellites of the constellation to image the aftermath of the catastrophic glacier collapse on the China-Nepal border in August 2026. Meanwhile, Juntian-1-04A (also known by the alternative names Tianzhu-1 and Hawkview-1) is the first satellite in a planned SAR constellation operated by Dongfang Zhiyuan, which officially assumed operational control of the satellite in late August 2026.

By characterizing the launch of Okulus as a domestic accomplishment, Bakanov possibly sought to create the impression that Russia is well on its way to achieving a goal to boost the contribution of private companies to Russia’s space program.

If either of these platforms is indeed operating as Okulus-02, Novyy Kosmos cannot be its direct operator. Instead, the firm must have concluded a data-sharing agreement with one or more of these Chinese enterprises to obtain imagery gathered by the satellite during its overflights of Russian territory. Novyy Kosmos appears to have established similar arrangements with other Chinese commercial remote sensing operators. According to its own user guide, the company actively markets customized radar imagery from China’s HiSea-1 satellite, alongside optical datasets captured by the Chinese remote sensing satellite Jilin-1 Gaofen-04 (GF04). Furthermore, Russian customers can order high-resolution imagery obtained via Stilsoft’s Stilsat-1.

Other platforms from which Novyy Kosmos routes data to its customers are three Sentinel radar satellites of the European Space Agency as well as an unidentified number of commercial ICEYE satellites. While the Sentinel imagery is available from open-access datasets, the current geopolitical context makes it is absolutely impossible for a Russian company to directly purchase imagery from ICEYE. This can only mean that the ICEYE data is being forwarded to Novyy Kosmos by one or more third parties.

One final question is why Novyy Kosmos openly claims to have launched a single Okulus satellite in April 2026 while it is quietly marketing data from two (Chinese-built) Okulus satellites launched in January 2024 and (probably) March 2026. One remote possibility is that one of the six satellites launched from Plesetsk on April 16 is indeed a product of Novyy Kosmos itself, operating in orbit independently from the two Chinese-built satellites. Company officials have given some vague hints that the domestically produced Okulus would be preceded by one or more technology demonstrators carrying only sections of the radar. However, they may also have been referring to tests of these radar sections with the company’s Argos drones.

A more likely scenario is that Novyy Kosmos did not launch its own satellite in April at all and is instead gathering data exclusively from the two Chinese satellites through commercial lease agreements. Naturally, any open admission of this would tarnish the reputation of Russia’s domestic space industry, which prides itself on its capability to substitute imported technology. In his meetings with Putin and Mishustin in April and September 2026, Roscosmos chief Bakanov portrayed Novyy Kosmos’ projects as an integral part of a new ten-year national space policy approved by Putin in June last year. This policy aims to boost the contribution of private companies to Russia’s space program from 5% to 35% by 2036. By characterizing the launch of Okulus as a domestic accomplishment, Bakanov possibly sought to create the impression that Russia is well on its way to achieving that goal.

The organizational smokescreen even seems to extend to the engineering specifications for the home-built Okulus given on the website of Novyy Kosmos. The 0.4-meter maximum spatial resolution and the additional Ku-band radar capability mentioned there appear to apply only to the Chinese-built satellites, rather than to Novyy Kosmos’ own Okulus satellites. At aerospace exhibitions, Novyy Kosmos’ promotional materials for the home-built hardware present a far more modest capability, restricting the maximum resolution to 2.0 meters and omitting any mention of a Ku-band radar.

Even if the Russian-built Okulus eventually makes it into space, it remains doubtful that it will consist of the 80% domestically sourced components officially claimed by the company. Novy Kosmos possesses no prior industrial experience in fabricating 400-kilogram-class satellite buses or radar payloads, and it has kept the identities of its manufacturing partners strictly classified. The active phased array radar planned for the domestic platform demands a vast quantity of highly sophisticated, space-qualified electronic components. Because these microelectronics face stringent Western sanctions blockades and are not mass-produced within the Russian Federation, Novyy Kosmos may well continue to rely on its Chinese partners to incorporate them into the Russian-built platforms.

References

1. Post by Austrian satellite watcher Felix Schöfbänker on the SeeSat forum.
2. Okulus page on the Novyy Kosmos website.
3. TASS report, June 17, 2025 ; Interviews with Novyy Kosmos CEO Anton Alekseyev during an exhibition in August 2025 and in Vestnik Glonass magazine, October 16, 2025.
4. Statement by Matsuk on Novyy Kosmos’ social media platform, April 12, 2026.
5. Blog post by Sergei Sobyanin, April 12, 2026.
6. Report on the Novyy Kosmos website, June 17, 2026.
7. Report on the Novyy Kosmos website, July 27, 2026.
8. Video of presentations given during a security conference in Kazan, September 3-5, 2026 (see 3:49:20).
9. Report on the Novyy Kosmos website, September 22, 2026 (includes video of the meeting between Bakanov and Mishustin).
10. G. Gillinger, Is Russia maneuvering to threaten an ICEYE satellite?, Integrity News Flash, May 22, 2026.
11. User guide on the Novyy Kosmos website.
12. W. Yan et al, Design and on-orbit performance of Ku-band phased-array synthetic-aperture radar payload system, MDPI Sensors, October 12, 2024.
13. A. Alekseyev, D. Matsuk, Satellite remote sensing of the Earth: global trends and China’s experience (in Russian), Universum, November 2025.
14. B. Hendrickx, Stilsat-1: a Russian-owned and Chinese-built satellite watching Ukraine, The Space Review, part 1 (November 3, 2025), part 2 (November 10, 2025).

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Bart Hendrickx is a longtime observer of the Russian space program.

The Space Review: Flying under the radar: Russia’s tacit reliance on Chinese SAR satellites (part 2)

The Space Review: Flying under the radar: Russia’s tacit reliance on Chinese SAR satellites (part 2)

China’s Chaohu-1 radar satellite, now flying under the Russian cover name Elsat-1. (credit: Spacety)

Flying under the radar: Russia’s tacit reliance on Chinese SAR satellites (part 2)by Bart Hendrickx
Monday, October 19, 2026

As outlined in part 1, the Russian startup Novyy Kosmos is marketing radar imagery from two satellites that it identifies as Okulus-01 and Okulus-02 in a user guide on its website. Closer analysis has revealed that these are actually cover names for two Chinese radar satellites. Shortly after the article appeared on The Space Review last week, Novyy Kosmos replaced the user guide with an edited version from which all information on Okulus-01 has been completely erased and the radar performance characteristics of Okulus-02 have been removed as well. [1] This leaves little doubt that the company decided to modify its public documentation after the true identity of the satellites had been exposed. As it turns out, Novyy Kosmos is not the only Russian company that is using cover names to obscure its reliance on Chinese space assets.

The L5 company

Several images taken by one of the Okulus satellites were shown during a presentation by Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations at a security conference in September 2026. Also displayed during that presentation were several radar pictures obtained by another Russian startup called L5, established in May 2025. They show a flooding zone and coastal water pollution in Russia’s southern Krasnodar region as well as scattered hull fragments in the Black Sea. Unlike the Okulus images, which had been retrieved from the archives of Russia’s Center for Operational Monitoring of the Earth, these had been directly supplied to the ministry on short notice. The imagery, captured in June 2026, was credited to a satellite named both IL5 and TY39. [2]

Pictures made by the IL5/TY39 satellite. Source

Appearing during the same event, L5’s CEO Dmitriy Monakhov outlined the company’s plans to build its own fleet of satellites, but also showed a slide confirm‎ing that the company already has a satellite in orbit. Identified there as Elsat-1, it operates in a polar orbit and has a resolution of one meter in spot mode and a swath width of 170 kilometers in ScanSAR mode. Imagery can be delivered to customers within three to four hours of collection. [3]

L5 slide on Elsat-1. Source

Monakhov did not elaborate on Elsat-1, leaving open the question of when and where the satellite was launched. It must be assumed that this is the same satellite designated as TY39 and IL5 in the parallel presentation by the Ministry of Emergency Situations. While no satellites have been officially cataloged under any of these names, TY is the factory designator for a series of optical and radar remote sensing satellites manufactured by the Chinese company Tianyi Space, also known under the international name Spacety.

As it turns out, Novyy Kosmos is not the only Russian company that is using cover names to obscure its reliance on Chinese space assets.

Spacety and the Russian satellite data distributor TerraTech were placed on the US sanctions list in early 2023 following intelligence disclosures that their commercial radar datasets were being routed to assist the combat operations of Russia’s mercenary Wagner Group in Ukraine. By utilizing the cover name Elsat-1, L5 is apparently attempting to hide its reliance on a blacklisted Chinese manufacturer—an effort compromised by the disclosure of the TY designator during the other presentation.

There are four C-band radar satellites manufactured by Spacety that have parameters corresponding to those seen in the L5 slide:

• Chaohu-1 (launched on February 27, 2022)
• Fucheng-1 (launched on June 7, 2023)
• Shenqi-01/TY41 (launched on September 24, 2024)
• Shenqi-02/TY42 (launched on May 17, 2025)

The TY numbering sequence indicates that Chaohu-1 and Fucheng-1 carry the factory designators TY39 and TY40. Even though Spacety never openly linked these to the two satellites, they do appear in lists of Two-Line Elements published until late last year by SCANEX. This is a Russian company that operates a network of ground stations to capture imagery from both Russian and foreign remote sensing satellites and also markets some of that imagery. The international designators embedded within the orbital elements for TY39 and TY40 (2022-019J/51832 and 2023-081A/56846) confirm‎ their identity as Chaohu-1 and Fucheng-1. [4]

Two-Line Elements for TY-39 and TY-40 published on the SCANEX website last year. Source.

The two satellites are also mentioned under the names Chaohu-1 and TY40 in a presentation given by SCANEX in 2025. The company explicitly states that it markets data collected from these two platforms via its own ground station network and boasts a delivery turnaround time of just four hours after downlinking. [5]

Slide showing the operating modes of Chaohu-1/TY39 and Fucheng-1/TY-40 and the location of SCANEX ground stations picking up imagery from them. Source

The obvious conclusion is that the satellite called TY39, IL5, and Elsat-1 in the September 2026 presentations is actually China’s Chaohu-1 radar satellite. Imagery collected by Chaohu-1 has been distributed within the Russian market not only by SCANEX, but by several other companies as well. This raises the question of exactly what role L5 plays in Chaohu-1’s mission. In December 2025, a company representative confirmed that L5 had “acquired the rights for a Chinese satellite” earlier that month and was already selling its imagery to customers. [6] In May 2026, company CEO Monakhov stated that L5 expected to “assume control of a foreign satellite” that July. [7]

One possible interpretation is that L5 was initially granted exclusive access to Chaohu-1 data in late 2025, taking over the distribution roles previously held by other Russian companies. The company may subsequently have assumed direct operational control of the spacecraft in the summer of 2026. This would mean that L5 is operating the satellite on a turnkey basis, monitoring the platform from its own mission control center and downlinking data directly via domestic ground stations, potentially using SCANEX's infrastructure. In a similar fashion, the Russian defense contractor Stilsoft is operating one or more Chinese-built high-resolution optical imaging satellites under the cover name Stilsat-1. [8] There clearly are structural ties between the two entities. The L5 website lists Stilsoft as a corporate partner, and Monakhov himself confirmed in an interview that he has actively cooperated with Stilsoft since 2022. [9]

Whatever L5’s exact role, Chaohu-1 was still providing data to Chinese customers in August 2026, when it was one of several Spacety radar satellites reported to have imaged the aftermath of the glacier collapse on the China-Nepal border [10]. It should also be noted that L5 has published radar imagery on its website that it attributes to two separate satellites. Both of these exhibit the radar performance specifications of Spacety’s TY-39/40/41/42 series. [11]

L5’s ambitions extend beyond the use of Chinese radar platforms. The firm is actively developing a domestically built satellite bus called A-100, designed to accommodate a diverse array of payloads. With a target launch mass of approximately 100 kilograms, this bus is being pitched for optical and radar imaging, Internet-of-Things (IoT) routing, telecommunications, scientific research, and technology demonstration missions. L5 officially projects the launch of its first home-grown satellites for 2027.

Novyy Start

Another speaker at the September 2026 event was Yegor Nazarov, representing a startup named Novyy Start (“New Start”) that was founded in March 2025. Nazarov presented a planned constellation of small radar and optical remote sensing satellites that Novyy Start intends to orbit using solid-fuel launch vehicles called Start-1M. These are decommissioned Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles that Novyy Start is converting into space launch vehicles in cooperation with the missile’s original designer, the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MIT Corporation). Infrastructure for the launch of Start-1M rockets is being built at the Vostochnyy cosmodrome in Russia’s Far East. The rocket may also fly from the Plesetsk launch site in northwestern Russia.

The obvious conclusion is that the satellite called TY39, IL5, and Elsat-1 in the September 2026 presentations is actually China’s Chaohu-1 radar satellite.

Novyy Start’s satellite fleet, named Spectre, will consist of optical remote sensing platforms (Reflexio) alongside two distinct variants of radar imaging satellites (Luminio and Emissio). Both Luminio and Emissio are projected to provide imagery with a spatial resolution ranging from 0.5 to 25 meters. The ground swath will span between 7 and 200 kilometers for Luminio, and between 10 and 200 kilometers for Emissio. During his presentation, Nazarov bluntly acknowledged that the company will initially rely on Chinese-built active phased array radar antennas for its SAR satellites. Reacting to apparent consternation from the audience, he hinted that subsequent iterations of the satellites would transition to domestically produced radar systems. [12]

The inaugural launches under the Spectre project are planned for 2027. According to an unconfirmed report from May 2026, Russia’s Gazprom corporation, which is scaling back its space operations, is expected to sell its satellite manufacturing facility and mission control center to Novyy Start before the end of the year, an acquisition that could significantly accelerate the startup’s assembly timelines. [13]

The Spectre constellation of Novyy Start. Source

PIESAT

Russia also may have been involved in a major deal signed in August 2025 by Aerospace Hongtu, also known under the international name PIESAT. This company operates a commercial radar satellite network known as Nuwa currently consisting of 16 high-resolution X-band SAR satellites. Manufactured by GalaxySpace, some of them orbit the Earth in a hub-and-spoke “cartwheel” formation optimized to provide interferometric data.

PIESAT satellites. Source

On August 29, 2025, PIESAT secured a $138 million export contract with a buyer initially identified only as “Customer A”. The contract called for the procurement of a satellite and related ground infrastructure, to be executed over a 1,200-day window. PIESAT stated that the transaction marked its first delivery of on-orbit satellite services to an international client and explicitly noted the contract’s record value. On September 5, 2025, the company provided additional information regarding the deal, revealing that the project’s physical delivery location was an African country. However, it also cautioned that the contract might not be fulfilled on schedule or in full due to “significant changes in the external macroeconomic environment, changes in relevant national policies, changes in customer demand, and other unforeseen or force majeure events.”

Other domestic firms operate exclusively as processors and distributors of data acquired by Chinese radar and optical remote sensing satellites.

The deal was signed just days after two high-level Russian diplomatic visits to PIESAT’s Beijing headquarters: one by Russia’s Minister of Industry and Trade, Anton Alikhanov, on August 26, and another by Alikhanov’s deputy on August 23. While Russian media briefly mentioned only Alikhanov’s visit (without providing additional details), Chinese sources disclosed more context. The August 23 meeting was described as a “high-level decision-making meeting” that “further solidified details and related agreements” concerning an unspecified project whose “delivery volume and contract size” were expected to set industry records. During Alikhanov’s subsequent visit on August 26, PIESAT proposed “products and services in areas such as satellite on-orbit delivery and launch services, UAV technology cooperation, sales and services of Nuwa constellation data, and industry application services.” Notably, these Chinese sources also emphasized that the two parties had already “finalized the content of cooperation and related agreements based on thorough communication prior to the meeting.” [14]

Russian delegation led by Anton Alikhanov visiting PIESAT headquarters on August 26, 2025. Source: PIESAT.

Reading between the lines, it would seem that the visits by the Russian delegations were primarily intended to hammer out the final details of the contract signed on August 29. The explicit designation of an African country as the ultimate delivery location may point to a sophisticated proxy procurement scheme that could potentially support the operational requirements of Russia’s Africa Corps. This was established by the Russian Ministry of Defense in 2023 to absorb and institutionalize the remnants of the Wagner Group’s mercenary network across the Sahel (Wagner itself was disbanded following its short-lived mutiny against the Russian government in June 2023). By routing the purchase to an African state client, both Russia and PIESAT may have attempted to deflect the immediate threat of Western sanctions and export controls. Such sanctions would be particularly devastating for PIESAT, which battled mounting corporate debt and intense internal salary disputes throughout 2025. The $138 million contract appears to have been treated by the company as a necessary step for immediate corporate stability, outweighing the risks of international economic restrictions.

Other Russian distributors of Chinese remote sensing data

While Russian enterprises such as Novyy Kosmos, L5, and Novyy Start view their cooperation with Chinese entities as a steppingstone toward deploying independent satellite constellations, other domestic firms operate exclusively as processors and distributors of data acquired by Chinese radar and optical remote sensing satellites. Six of these companies market data from the following Chinese radar satellites:

• SCANEX: Gaofen-3, HiSea-1, Chaohu-1, Fucheng-1, Ludi Tance, SuperView Neo-2 01/02 [15]
• TerraTech: HiSea-1, Chaohu-1 [16]
• Rakurs: Gaofen-3, Chaohu-1, Fucheng-1 [17]
• Sovzond: Gaofen-3, Gaofen-12, Gaofen-12, Gaofen-12-2 [18]
• Innoter: Gaofen-3, HiSea-1, Chaohu-1, LuTan-1A, LuTan-1B, PIESAT [19]
• Prime Group: Shenqi-01/TY41, Shenqi-02/TY42 [20]

A seventh company, MT-LAB, has confirmed that it distributes imagery from Chinese optical and radar satellites, but without specifically identifying them [21]. MT-LAB will also act as the operator and data distributor for three types of Russian-built remote sensing satellites: KOEN, EOS-O, and EOS-R. KOEN, an optical imaging satellite developed by Stilsoft, is believed to feature a domestic Russian bus outfitted with an imported Chinese optical payload similar to the one flown on Stilsat-1. The satellite is scheduled for launch from the Vostochny cosmodrome in late 2026 or early 2027.

EOS-O and EOS-R are optical and radar satellites manufactured by the Russian company NPK Barl. EOS-R is designed to carry a C-band radar with a claimed maximum resolution of 0.5 meters. While there is no officially acknowledged industrial connection between this hardware and the Chinese space sector, NPK Barl notably utilized a radar image of Dubai produced by MinoSpace’s Taijing-4-01 satellite to demonstrate the potential capabilities of the EOS-R platform. [22]

Military use of Chinese remote sensing data

According to an official organizational chart of Russia’s remote sensing industry published in August 2026, between 50% and 70% of all remote sensing data processed by domestic enterprises is channeled to government clients, including the so-called “security agencies” (silovye vedomstva), a term encompassing the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Guard, and the Federal Security Service (FSB). [23] Because the Russian Ministry of Defense operates only a relatively modest fleet of dedicated reconnaissance satellites, it appears to systematically rely on high-resolution imagery from commercial remote sensing platforms to supplement the intelligence collected by its own satellites.

A substantial portion of this supplemental geospatial intelligence is likely to come directly from Chinese space assets. At a remote sensing industry conference held in September 2025, a representative from Prime Group disclosed that over 80% of the sub-meter resolution satellite imagery distributed on the Russian commercial market in 2025 originated from the Jilin-1 Gaofen optical imaging satellites manufactured by Chang Guang Satellite Technology. The most advanced satellites in this series, Jilin Gaofen-04 and Jilin Gaofen-05, possess a maximum spatial resolution of 0.20 to 0.30 meters. While the Chinese government had not yet formally authorized the commercial distribution of this spy-satellite-grade imagery to Russian enterprises at the time of the presentation, the Prime Group official noted that regulatory clearance was anticipated in the near term. [24]

The procurement patterns analyzed here expose a significant reliance of Russia’s remote sensing industry on Chinese space assets.

There can be little doubt that a significant portion of the radar and optical imagery obtained from Chinese commercial satellites is being systematically utilized to support Russia’s combat operations in Ukraine. Several Chinese and Russian enterprises have already been placed under international sanctions for exactly this reason. As already mentioned, both Spacety and TerraTekh were added to the US sanctions list in early 2023 following disclosures concerning their transactional ties with the Wagner Group. HEAD Aerospace, a prominent Chinese commercial distributor of remote sensing data, similarly came under US and European sanctions in 2023 and 2024 for supplying satellite imagery of Ukrainian locations to Wagner entities, as well as providing high-accuracy topographic datasets to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation via the company Rakurs. Furthermore, the Wagner Group bypassed conventional state procurement lines to directly purchase two Chinese high-resolution optical imaging satellites—Jilin-1 Gaofen-03D12 and Gaofen-03D13—from Yunze Technology Co., Ltd. This intermediary entity was added to the US sanctions list in December 2023 alongside Chang Guang Satellite Technology, the satellites’ actual manufacturer.

Other Chinese satellite manufacturers may well be utilizing similar intermediary structures to conceal their supply lines. Prime Group openly claims that it places orders for imagery from Spacety’s Shenqi-1 and Shenqi-2 radar satellites through a partner entity named Kunming Sunny. This company is also designated as the operator of Spacety’s HiSea-1 radar satellite (under the abbreviated label “Sunny”) on the website of SCANEX. [25] Kunming Sunny’s virtual absence on the Internet indicates that it functions as a specialized shell company designed to mask the procurement pipeline and bypass further sanctions. [26]

Both Russia and China have officially denied allegations of high-level cooperation in conducting satellite reconnaissance of Ukraine’s territory. Reacting to such accusations in October 2025, Kremlin spokesman Dmitriy Peskov claimed that Russia covers all its needs on the battlefield with its own capabilities, including satellites. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded it was not aware of any such cooperation, emphasizing the country’s neutral stance in the Ukrainian conflict. [27]

However, these official claims have been directly contradicted by statements from some corporate executives involved in these cooperative ventures. Officials of Stilsoft have directly linked the purchase of the Chinese-built Stilsat optical imaging satellites to the war in Ukraine. [28] Similarly, executives from Novyy Kosmos have hinted on two occasions that they view their Okulus constellation at least partly as a strategic response to the intelligence applications of the Finnish-American ICEYE radar satellite fleet. [29]

In summary, the procurement patterns analyzed here expose a significant reliance of Russia’s remote sensing industry on Chinese space assets. This operational dependency spans from the deployment of white-labeled Chinese platforms and the integration of Chinese hardware components on Russian satellites to the large-scale distribution of Chinese remote sensing data on the Russian market, among other things to support military operations. While diplomatic and corporate rhetoric maintains a narrative of technological self-reliance, a deeper analysis establishes that Russia’s contemporary remote sensing industry is extensively supplemented by Chinese technology to sustain its primary operational capabilities.

References

1. The original version of the user guide is available for download in this thread on the NASA Spaceflight Forum. The edited version has been published on the Novyy Kosmos website here. Also removed from the Novyy Kosmos website was a reference to the Ku-band capability of the company’s domestically built Okulus satellites. This capability most likely applies only to the Chinese-built Okulus-01 satellite, which can be identified as Taijing-4-03.
2. Video of presentations given during a security conference in Kazan, September 3-5, 2026 (see 3:48:40).
3. See reference 2 (4:07:00).
4. An archived list of TLEs published by SCANEX (including those for TY39 and TY40) is available here.
5. ScanEx presentation, 2025.
6. Interview with L5’s Yuriy Tebin, December 10, 2025.
7. Interview with L5’s Dmitriy Monakhov, May 25, 2026.
8. B. Hendrickx, Stilsat-1: a Russian-owned and Chinese-built satellite watching Ukraine (part 1), The Space Review, November 3, 2025.
9. See reference 7.
10. Chinese press report, August 31, 2026.
11. Radar satellite page on the L5 website.
12. See reference 2 (3:58:05).
13. Article published on the Kommersant website, May 26, 2026.
14. Article published on the “China in space” website, August 30, 2025 ; Articles published by Chinese news outlets on August 26, 2025 and September 5, 2025.
15. Satellite page on the SCANEX website ; ScanEx presentation, 2025.
16. Radar satellite page on the TerraTekh website.
17. Radar satellite page on the Rakurs website.
18. Radar satellite page on the Sovzond website.
19. Satellite page on the Innoter website.
20. Reports on the Prime Group website, February 17, 2025 and November 10, 2025.
21. Presentation by MT-LAB’s Aleksandr Minov.
22. A radar image of Dubai taken by Taijing-4-01 is seen on the websites of both Minospace and NPK Barl.
23. Article on the Habr website, August 25, 2026.
24. Presentation by Prime Group’s Stanislav Konyukov.
25. See reference 19 ; HiSea-1 page on the SCANEX website.
26. The only online source providing information on Kunming Sunny is here.
27. Report by Reuters, October 6, 2025 ; Report by United24 Media, October 6, 2025.
28. See reference 8.
29. Reports on the Novyy Kosmos website on July 24, 2025 and December 21, 2025.

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Bart Hendrickx is a longtime observer of the Russian space program.

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