푸틴 대통령의 기묘하게도 핵심을 찌르는 북한에 대한 분석.

[청량산]

Here’s Vladimir Putin’s weirdly on-point analysis of North Korea

The Russian president’s view is very different from Trump’s — but similar to what you hear from American experts.

푸틴 대통령의 기묘하게도 핵심을 찌르는 북한에 대한 분석.

러시아 대통령의 견해는 트럼프의 그것과는 매우 다르다-하지만 여러분들이 미국의 전문가들로부터 들은 것과 비슷하다.

Sep 8, 2017, 2:00pm

It’s strange to think of Russian President Vladimir Putin as a reliable source when it comes to geopolitical analysis. Yet when Putin talked about the US-North Korea nuclear standoff in a press conference on Thursday night, his assessment of the situation matched far more closely with what you hear from US experts on North Korea than anything that the Trump administration has said.

지정학적 분석에 있어 러시아 대통령 블라드미르 푸틴을 믿을만한 소스로 생각하는 것은 이상하다. 하지만 푸틴이 목요일 저녁 기자회견에서 북미간의 핵 교착상태에 대해 말했을 때, 그  상황에 대한 그의 평가는 트럼프 행정부가 말해왔던 어떤 것보다 훨씬 더, 미국의 북한 전문가들로부터 여러분이 들은 것과 비슷했다.

Putin’s core point is that the central strategy of US policy under Trump, Obama, and Bush — attempting to pressure North Korea into giving up its nuclear program — has now conclusively failed. North Korea now believes that its nuclear arsenal is its best deterrent against an American invasion, and hence will not give it up no matter how much the United States tries to push them.

푸틴이 말한 핵심은, 트럼프, 오바마, 그리고 부시 행정부 하의 미국정책의 중심전략-북한을 압박해서 핵프로그램을 포기시키는 것-은 결론적으로 실패했다는 것이다. 북한은 자신의 핵무기가 미국의 침입에 대한 최상의 억제책이라고 믿고 있고, 따라서 미국이 그들을 아무리 많이 압박하려고 하더라도 핵무기를 포기하지 않을 것이라는 것이다.

“They see nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction as the only way for them to protect themselves,” the Russian president said during the Thursday presser, held at an economic forum in Vladivostok, Russia.

That isn’t the Trump administration’s view. Just this week, UN Ambassador Nikki Haley called for “the strongest sanctions” to pressure North Korea into giving up nukes “before it's too late.” Yet the consensus position among America’s North Korea experts is that it is, in fact, too late: that nothing the US can do to Kim Jong Un could offset the deterrent value of his nuclear weapons.

이것은 트럼프 행정부의 견해는 아니다. 이번 주에 유엔 대사 니키 헤일리는 " 너무 늦기 전에" 북한을 압박하여 핵무기를 포기하도록 가장 강한 제재를 요구했다. 하지만 미국의 북한 전문가들 사이에 일치된 입장은 사실 너무 늦었다는 것이다: 미국이 북한 김정은위원장에게 할 수 있는 것 아무 것도 북한 핵무기의 억지적 가치를 상쇄할 수 없을 것이라는 것이다.

“There is very little chance that we are ever going to talk this guy out of his weapons, and none of us who have been watching the situation closely for years really thought we were going to,” as Mira Rapp-Hooper, a scholar at Yale Law School who studies North Korea, put when I spoke to her this week.

" 말로 해서 이 사람이 핵무기를 포기하도록 할 가능성은 거의 없다. 그리고 북한 핵 문제를 수년에 걸쳐 지켜봐온 우리들 중 아무도 그렇게 되리라 생각하지 않는다."고 북한을 연구하는 예일대 법학대학원의 미라 랩후퍼는 이번주 인터뷰에서 말했다. 

Putin also noted that harsh American rhetoric — like Trump’s promise to respond to inflict “fire and fury like the world has never seen” on the North — serves only to escalate the situation. “It’s counterproductive to inflate this military hysteria. This leads nowhere,” he said.

푸틴은 또한 귀에 거슬리는 미국의 수사- 북한에 대해 세계가 본 적이 없는 종류의 "화염과 분노"로 대응하겠다고 한 트럼프의 경고 같은-는 상황을 악화시키는데 기여할 뿐이라고 말했다. " 그것은 군사적 히스테리를 증폭하는 역효과를 낳는다. 아무데도 도달할 수 없다"고 푸틴은 말했다.

This, once again, dovetails with what American experts told me in interviews. They believe that threats tend to inflame the North’s fears of invasion, causing them to respond with provocations and further development of their nuclear program.

이는 다시 한번 미국의 전문가들이 인터뷰에서 나에게 말했던 것과 딱 들어맞는다. 그들은 위협은 침입에 대한 북한의 두려움을 증폭하는 경향이 있으며, 북한으로 하여금 도발로 대응하도록, 핵프로그램을 더욱 개발하도록 만든다고 믿고 있다.

“They’re responding to our threats, it’s tit-for-tat,” Dave Kang, the director of the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California, says. “Our policies are designed precisely to provoke the outcome we’re trying to avoid.”

" 그들은 우리(미국)의 위협에 대응하고 있다. 치고 받고 있는 것이다"고 남가주대학 한반도 연구소장 데이브 강은 말한다 " 우리(미국)의 정책들은 정확히 우리가 피하고자 노력하는 결과를 유발하게 만들어져 있다"

Finally, Putin argued that the best way to handle the nuclear crisis going forward is through negotiations — for the US and North Korea to develop better lines of communication in order to avoid a crisis escalating into a war that no one wants.

마지막으로, 푸틴은 앞으로 핵 위기를 다룰 수 있는 최선의 길은 협상-미국과 북한이 위기가 아무도 원치 않는 전쟁으로 악화되는 것을 피하도록 더 나은 연락선들을 개발하는-을 통해서라고 주장했다.

“All the competing sides have enough common sense and understanding of their responsibility. We can solve this problem through diplomatic means,” the Russian president said.

" 모든 대립되는 국가들은 충분한 상식이 있고, 책임에 대한 충분한 이해가 있다. 우리는 외교적 수단을 통해 이 문제를 풀 수 있다"고 러시아 대통령은 말했다.

If you guessed that this is what most North Korea experts believe, then congratulations, you’ve got the pattern.

"만약 이것이 대부분의 북한 전문가들이 믿고 있는 것이라고 알아맞췄다면, 축하한다. (전문가들이 생각하는) 패턴을 알게되었다.

“This is one of those areas where we should be able to have negotiation because 1) we don’t want a nuclear war, and 2) North Korea shares that interest,” Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, told me. The US should, he says, “talk to [the North] about stability, about crisis coordination.”

"이것은 우리가 협상할 수 있는 영역들 중의 하나이다. 왜냐하면 1) 우리는 핵전쟁을 원치 않는다 그리고 2) 북한도 이 이해를 공유한다."고  미들베리 국제문제 연구소의 동북아 비확산프로그램 소장이 제프리 루이스는 나에게 말했다. 미국은 " [북한에] 안정에 대해 , 위기 조율에 대해 말"해야 한다고 그는 말했다

Again, this does not prove that Vladimir Putin is some kind of genius about international affairs. It certainly does not wipe away the violence perpetrated by his government in places like Ukraine and Syria.

What it does show, though, is that the United States has somehow managed to back itself into a pretty obvious corner. The aim of denuclearizing North Korea is mostly out of reach, which is tough to admit when America has spent decades warning of the consequences of Pyongyang’s program. Conceding defeat is very hard for anyone, and especially hard for people making policy for the world’s most powerful country.

하지만 이것이(푸틴의 견해가 미국의 북한 전문가들과 의견이 거의 일치하는 것) 보여주는 것은 미국은 왠지 매우 분명한 구석(corner)으로 자신을 뒷걸음치도록 애썼다는 것이다. 북한을 비핵화시킨다는 목표는 대체로 도달할 수 없다. 그리고 이는 미국이 북한의 핵 프로그램의 결과를 경고하는데 수십년을 보냈다는 것을 생각하면 받아들이기 힘든 사실이다. 패배를 인정하는 것은 누구에게나 매우 어려운 것이다. 특히 세계에서 가장 강력한 국가의 정책을 만드는 사람들에게는 특히 힘든  것이다.

But it might be necessary. Pronouncements like Trump’s and Haley’s just make the US look out of touch with reality — and cede the most reasonable-sounding policy ground to Putin, of all people.

하지만 그것은 필요할 지 모른다. 트럼프나 헤일리의 선언들은 단지 미국을 현실과 동떨어진 것으로 보이게 만든다.-그리고 모든 사람들 중에 가장 합리적으로 들리는 정책 기반을 푸틴에게 양도할 뿐이다.

https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/8/16276122/north-korea-putin-trump-comments

The case for letting North Korea keep its nukes

Sep 8, 2017, 8:30am EDT

The official position of the US government is that North Korea’s nuclear program is unacceptable and that Pyongyang has to give up all of its nuclear weapons. This was the goal of US policy under President George W. Bush, it was the goal of US policy under President Barack Obama, and it is now the goal of US policy under President Donald Trump.

But US policy has utterly failed at accomplishing that goal. North Korea has built as many as 60 nuclear weapons, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency, and has developed missiles that are in theory capable of hitting the East Coast of the United States. North Korea tested its most powerful bomb yet — seven times the size of the one America dropped on Hiroshima — just this Sunday.

These developments, according to experts on the Kim Jong Un regime, underscore an awkward truth: America’s long-running campaign to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear program has ended in a dismal failure.

“There is very little chance that we are ever going to talk this guy out of his [nuclear] weapons, and none of us who have been watching the situation closely for years really thought we were going to,” says Mira Rapp-Hooper, a scholar at Yale Law School who studies North Korea.

It’s high time, these experts say, for the US government to admit defeat. By sticking with a policy that no longer reflects reality, America is making the risk of a war that kills millions higher than it needs to be.

There is a better way. Instead of trying to get North Korea to give up its nuclear program, they argue that the US needs to shift to a different policy: containment.

The term “containment” itself comes from Cold War diplomat George Kennan, who helped set the course of US policy toward the Soviet Union. Kennan’s approach was not to confront the Soviet Union directly, but to limit the spread of its influence abroad through alliances and military deterrence. To contain the threat rather than attempt to eliminate it entirely. ( 이 부분은 미국의 향후 대북 대응정책의 모습을 짐작할 수 있습니다)

This strategy helped win the Cold War. It could be adapted, with minimal effort, to North Korea. A policy of containment in North Korea would aim to minimize the danger of North Korea’s nuclear program, through negotiations and the deterrent power of the US military, rather than attempting to end it.

It comes with risks — but so does the status quo. And, to hear the experts tell it, containment is a heck of a lot less dangerous than what America is doing right now.

Give deterrence a chance

The most fundamentally important fact about North Korea’s nuclear program is that it is born out of fear — fear, specifically, of the United States.

The Korean War began in 1950 when North Korea invaded the South and nearly conquered all of it. The only reason it didn’t was intervention by a US led-coalition, which in turn nearly took the entire North, stopped only by a Chinese counterintervention. After the war ended in an armistice in 1953, the US pledged to defend South Korea against future attack and left thousands of US troops deployed there — a constant reminder to Pyongyang that the world’s strongest military power was its enemy.

Put another way, North Korea’s entire foreign policy and national identity has evolved around the threat of war with America. As a result, they’ve always been trying to improve their military capabilities in order to deter the US from invading.

“They’re hyper-focused on our military and what we can do,” explains Dave Kang, the director of the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California.

The nuclear program, which began in the 1950s, was designed to be the ultimate answer to this problem. The thinking among three generations of Kims was that if North Korea had nuclear weapons, they could inflict unacceptable costs on the US if it were to invade the North. Nuclear weapons, in other words, would be the ultimate deterrent against regime change.

This explains why North Korea has invested so many resources, and been willing to accept crushing international sanctions, in order to develop a nuclear bomb and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that could hit the US mainland.

“There’s pretty broad agreement that Kim Jong Un wants a nuclear arsenal, including a nuclear-armed ICBM that could put cities and targets in the United States at risk, to deter an attack and to ensure survival and prevent regime change,” says Kingston Reif, the director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association.

What this brief history suggests is that North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear missiles is fundamentally rational. North Korea is not a suicidal state; there is no evidence that it wants to blow up an American city and invite regime-ending retaliation. Its goal, according to every piece of evidence we have, is the opposite: to avoid war at all costs.

Members of the Trump administration have, somewhat strangely, denied this. Even H.R. McMaster, Trump’s highly regarded national security adviser, went on TV in August and insisted that North Korea could not be deterred in the way the Soviet Union was.

“The classical deterrence theory, how does that apply to a regime like the regime in North Korea?” McMaster asked. “A regime that engages in unspeakable brutality against its own people? A regime that poses a continuous threat to the its neighbors in the region and now may pose a threat, direct threat, to the United States with weapons of mass destruction?”

Of course, you could make the same arguments about the Soviet Union and China under Mao Tse-Tung — both of which were about as brutal toward their own people as the Kim regime is. Yet that domestic repression did not translate into suicidal wars against the United States.

“OUR POLICIES ARE DESIGNED PRECISELY TO PROVOKE THE OUTCOME WE’RE TRYING TO AVOID”

What’s more, North Korea has been hyper-repressive for its entire existence — and yet it still hasn’t launched a full-scale attack against the South. The fact that the North has nuclear weapons doesn’t change the fact that it would still likely be annihilated in an outright war with the United States.

“I am absolutely convinced that North Korea is not going to attack us first,” says Kang. “We have 64 years of evidence that deterrence works.”

The fact that North Korea is believed to be both rational and deterrable means that that the United States may be able to live with a nuclear-armed North Korea — much in the same way that it has learned to live with a nuclear-armed China and Russia. But it also explains why the goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula is now impossible.

North Korea saw what happened to Saddam Hussein in 2003 and Muammar Qaddafi in 2011. Both dictators once had nuclear programs and gave them up; both were swiftly toppled by the American military when US policymakers decided they were threats.

Kim Jong Un (and his father before him) seems to have internalized those lessons and concluded that the United States cannot be trusted not to invade rogue regimes when it wants to. The ability to nuke an American city is the best way for Kim Jong Un to ensure that he doesn’t share Saddam and Qaddafi’s fates.

“North Koreans always point those examples out,” says Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. “Short of giving them South Korea and a pile of money and eliminating our nuclear weapons,” he says, “I can’t see them giving [their nuclear weapons] up.”

Trying to roll back North Korea’s nuclear program makes war more likely

Lewis describes current US policy toward the North as “unremitting yet understandable hostility”: The US refuses to accept that North Korea will keep its nuclear weapons, and uses economic sanctions and the threat of force as sticks to try to get the North to give them up.

The Trump administration has innovated on this strategy by adding in a level of rhetorical bluster that didn’t exist under George W. Bush or Barack Obama. Most notably, President Trump personally said the North would face “fire and fury like the world has never seen” if it didn’t stop threatening the US.

The thinking here, as far as we can tell from the outside, is that you need to threaten North Korea with a credible military option in order to convince them to negotiate.

“There is a military option at last resort. I don’t want to use it, but it’s got to be on the table because without that there will never be a diplomatic end to this,” Sen. Lindsey Graham said in a September 6 TV appearance.

But this appears to be making things worse, not better. By pursuing denuclearization in such an aggressive fashion, Trump may be making an already unstable situation worse.

“WE TREAT NORTH KOREA LIKE IT’S A PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED, [BUT] IT’S A COUNTRY WE HAVE TO LIVE WITH”

Historically, American threats tend to feed the paranoia about a US invasion that underpins the nuclear program itself. They lead the North not to abandon their nuclear program, but to double down on it — as they believe it’s their best deterrent against such an attack. You can see this dynamic at work in part right now, as the North Korean response to Trump’s “fire and fury” comment was to fire a missile over Japan and to test its largest nuclear bomb ever.

“They’re responding to our threats, it’s tit-for-tat,” Kang says. “Our policies are designed precisely to provoke the outcome we’re trying to avoid.”

In the absolute scariest scenario, North Korea could misinterpret Trump’s rhetorical bluster as an actual sign that the US is about to attack — and strike first.

Because the US and South Korea militarily outmatch the North, Lewis says, its military doctrine aims to avoid a protracted conflict and instead strike a devastating early blow. The idea is that the US would abandon the war before it could redeploy its vast military assets currently scattered around the world to the Korean peninsula. This doctrine gives North Korea an incentive to strike first if it believes war is imminent.

“The only situation in which Kim Jong Un would rationally use nuclear weapons first is one in which he believes his regime’s survival is at stake,” says Rapp-Hooper. “You could have both of us be perfectly rational actors who are trying to practice deterrence very well — and miscalculation could still occur.”

Some of the problem here is the president’s personal penchant for bluster. But the real root of it is the idea that the US has to denuclearize North Korea at all.

Once you make that assumption, as virtually every US policymaker seems to, then threatening North Korea with force starts to make much more sense — as both negotiations and sanctions have failed to stop their program. That’s why you hear people like Sen. Graham making even more grandiose threats than the president.

“He’s not going to allow — President Trump — the ability of this madman [Kim Jong Un] to have a missile that could hit America,” Graham said in early August. “If there’s going to be a war to stop him, it will be over there. If thousands die, they’re going to die over there.”

Instead of this kind of bluster, US officials need to admit that their influence over North Korea is limited at best — and that, as powerful as the US military and economy are, it can’t achieve whatever it wants.

“We vastly overestimate our ability to dictate outcomes” to North Korea, Kang says. “The first thing is to stop making things worse.”

Abandoning denuclearization could make deterrence work better

So what would an alternative policy actually look like?

The first thing to do, experts say, is to actually take the threat of preventive force off the table and admit that North Korea’s nukes are a reality that the US will have to live with, at least for the foreseeable future. After that, there are several concrete steps Washington could take to reduce the threat those weapons actually pose.

One idea is to take a page from the Cold War playbook.

The US and Soviet Union faced a number of situations — most notably the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis — where one side had reason to believe the other was preparing for a nuclear first strike. The most important reason these crises didn’t escalate is that the US and Soviet Union had a lot of different ways to communicate and reassure each other that they weren’t about to attack.

The most famous example is the Moscow-Washington hotline, often (inaccurately) called the red phone: A messaging system that allowed the American president and Soviet premier to communicate with each other directly.

The US doesn’t have anything like that with North Korea right now. There is currently only one publicly known channel of communication between the US and the North: through North Korea’s UN office in New York. That’s it. Which means that in the event of a crisis, it would be hard for the two sides to communicate to each other that they aren’t about to launch a nuclear strike.

The US should “focus on miscalculation and unintended escalation — almost like a hotline approach,” says Reif. “This was part of the approach during the Cold War, and absolutely needs to be part of the approach now.”

Another complimentary idea is to keep talking with North Korea about its nuclear program — but with the aim of freezing it rather than eliminating it entirely.

Reif and others think North Korea might be willing to agree to stop building more missiles and bombs, as well as testing what it already has, in exchange for some kind of trade (like limited sanctions relief). This would limit the damage North Korea’s nuclear arsenal could theoretically do, particularly by constraining its ability to strike the US mainland.

These kinds of negotiations and communication are technically and politically feasible. North Korea has, in the past, shown real interest in direct negotiations with the United States. The biggest barrier is the US’s reluctance to focus talks on anything other than denuclearization.

“This is one of those areas where we should be able to have negotiation because 1) we don’t want a nuclear war, and 2) North Korea shares that interest,” Lewis says. “Abandonment of denuclearization as a near-term goal [would allow the US] to talk to them about stability, about crisis coordination.”

Third and finally, the US needs to make it crystal clear to the North Koreans that any attack on South Korea or Japan would be met with force. The best way to do this isn’t loud bluster, but rather by concrete steps to coordinate with allies.

When the North stages provocations like missile tests, the US needs to respond with unmistakable shows of support — US warplanes overflying South Korea, for example, or promises to send over advanced military technology. In between incidents, the US should continue staging joint military exercises — and, more importantly, send constant reassurances through diplomatic channels that the alliance commitment is still there.

Such steps would help convince the North to avoid anything to provocative, while simultaneously convincing allies not to respond on their own in a way that could escalate the situation.

“This problem requires a serious summoning of political will and commitment of diplomatic resources,” Rapp-Hooper says. “More than it even matters to fly a B-1 over the Korean peninsula at any given time, it matters to have an ambassador in Seoul and assistant secretaries of State and Defense who are constantly meeting with their counterparts and explaining to them what the United States will do to provide for their security in all manner of contingencies and how that’s going to work.”

Yet the Trump administration doesn’t even have anyone appointed to those positions — something it could fix quickly if it so chose. (Reports suggest it plans to nominate Victor Cha, a widely respected Georgetown professor, to be ambassador to South Korea.) Another easy step to improve things here would be to stop doing things that alienate allies, like threatening to withdraw from the South Korea-US free trade agreement or calling the South Korean president an appeaser on Twitter.

What unites all of those different policy measures is a single strategic objective: preventing war on the Korean peninsula by managing the inherent tensions created by a nuclear North Korea.

That means convincing everyone in the region — North and South Korea, China, and Japan — that US intentions are purely defensive: that it has no interest whatsoever in bombing North Korea to stop its nuclear program, but would respond with overwhelming force if the North shot first. Diplomacy and deterrence, rather than economic sanctions and threats of war, would be the principal tools by which the US would handle the Kim regime from here on out.

This will require some ugly compromises — most notably, negotiations and high-level contacts with what’s arguably the most evil government on earth. And there’s always a risk that it goes wrong: that deterrence fails and the US gets embroiled in a horrifying war.

But that will be true as long as North Korea exists. Better to acknowledge the reality of a nuclear North Korea and plan around it openly than to stick our head in the sand. Managing North Korea’s nuclear program may be a bad option, but much of the expert community is convinced that the alternatives are worse.

“There is no combination of sticks and carrots, sanctions and blah blah blah that mean North Korea is just going to cave and do exactly what we want them to do,” Kang says. “We treat North Korea like it’s a problem to be solved, [but] it’s a country we have to live with.”

https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/8/16256880/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-test-containment

[안동는사내]

가만히 보니까 청량산님이 한국말 어휘가 매우 뛰어나군요
영어를 한국말로 옮길때 아주 적절한 단어를 선택하는 능력이 탁월하군요.

[매니져]

잘 읽었습니다^^

[역사나무]

"이번 주에 유엔 대사 니키 헤일리는
" 너무 늦기 전에" 북한을 압박하여 핵무기를
포기하도록 가장 강한 제재를 요구했다.
하지만 미국의 북한 전문가들 사이에
일치된 입장은 사실 너무 늦었다는 것이다:

미국이
북한 김정은위원장에게
할 수 있는 것 아무 것도
북한 핵무기의 억지적 가치를
상쇄할 수 없을 것이라는 것이다."
====

미국을..
실제로 움직이는게 위 전문가라면..
북핵 문제는 벌써 해결 되었겠죠.
미국이 스스로 변화 함으로써..

그러나 미국을 움직이는건..
서세 양키 대자본 가 쉐이들 이고..
그 자본가 쉐이들은 위 전문가들을..
노예 정도로 인식 하고 있기에..
지들 이익될것만 내놓으라고..
지랄발광 중..^^

[조광제]

조선의 핵무기 개발을 문제 삼아 이 지역의 불안정을 지속시킴으로써 지금도 미국의 이익과 중국 및 러시아에 대한 압박을 지속적으로 챙기고 있는 중입니다
미국은 핵무기를 많이 갖고 있는 중국이나 러시아도 두려워하지 않으며 조선 핵개발은 몇십년 동안 잘 알고 관리되어온 사항입니다
우리는 미국에 대하여 많이 공부하지 않으면 자중지란으로 자멸하게 됩니다^^
조선은 핵개발로 내부단결을 성취하였고 미국은 한국 일본에 비싼 무기를 사갈 수 있도록 윤허한다고 합니다
중국과 러시아는 혹이 하나 더 생긴 셈입니다^^

[all1004]

조선과 미는 전쟁중입니다
핵개발이 관리 되어 왔다는게 성립 되는건가요??

[노송]

청량산: 앞서의"남정욱"이란 어느 대학교수의 글(조선일보기사)을 읽었으면 푸틴의 정확한 판세판단이나, 남정욱이 쓴 김정은의 말이나 다른 데가 있습니까?
2천만 인민을 꿂겨가며,동원해서 최첨단 핵무기. 투발수단을 만든 것은 최후의 결단아니겠소?
내가 보기에는 미국은 북한을 건드릴 수가 없어요. 1960년대 미국의 첩보수집함 [푸에불로호]를 생채로 잡아서 항복(미국정부의 항복)을 받아낸 그 용기를 어떻게 평가합니까?
한국(조선)역사상 거대국가를 제압한 일로 평가할 수 있어요.
미련한 仁祖는 金에게 항거하다가 "이마가 깨지도록" 三田渡에서 빌고 그 碑石이 강동구 석촌동에 있어요.