[Cover] ...What China wants

[Van!]

http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21613263-after-bad-couple-centuries-china-itching-regain-its-place-world-how-should

China

What China wants

After a bad couple of centuries, China is itching to regain its place in the world. How should America respond?

Aug 23rd 2014 | From the print edition

[1]AN ALARMING assumption is taking hold(장악하다,제어하다) in some quarters of both Beijing and Washington, DC. Within a few years, China’s economy will overtake America’s in size (on a purchasing-power basis, it is already on the cusp of (정점에,한가운데에)doing so). Its armed forces, though still dwarfed by those of the United States, are growing fast in strength; in any war in East Asia, they would have the home advantage. Thus, some people have concluded, rivalry between China and America has become inevitable and will be followed by confrontation—even conflict.

Diplomacy’s task in the coming decades will be to ensure that such a catastrophe never takes place. The question is how?

Primacy(최고,으뜸,우위) inter pares(동등한 자들간의)

[2]Some Western hawks(매,매파,강경파) see a China threat wherever they look: China’s state-owned businesses stealing a march(~를 앞질러 행동하다) in Africa; its government covering for(~을 대신하다,보호하다) autocrats in UN votes; its insatiable appetite for resources plundering the environment. Fortunately, there is scant evidence to support the idea of a global Chinese effort to upend(위아래를 거꾸로 뒤집다) the international order. China’s desires have an historical, even emotional, dimension. But in much of the world China seeks to work within existing norms, not to overturn them.

[3]In Africa its business dealings are  transactional(업무의,업무적인,거래적인) and more often led by entrepreneurs than by the state. Elsewhere, a once-reactive diplomacy is growing more sophisticated—and helpful. China is the biggest contributor to peacekeeping missions among the UN Security Council’s permanent five, and it takes part in anti-piracy patrols off the Horn of Africa. In some areas China is working hard to lessen its environmental footprint, for instance through vast afforestation(숲가꾸기,조림) schemes and clean-coal technologies.

[4]The big exception is in East and North-East Asia—one of the greatest concentrations of people, dynamism and wealth on Earth. There, both its rhetoric and its actions suggest that China is unhappy with Pax Americana. For centuries China lay at the centre of things, the sun around which other Asian kingdoms turned. First Western ravages(황폐하게 만들다,유린하다) in the middle of the 19th century and then China’s defeat by Japan at the end of it put paid to Chinese centrality(중심임,집중성). Today an American-led order in the western Pacific perpetuates(영구화하다,영국시키다) the humiliation, in the eyes of Chinese leaders. Soon, they believe, their country will be rich and powerful enough to seize back primacy in East Asia.

[5]China’s sense of historical grievance(불만,불만사항) explains a spate of (불쾌한 일의 빈발~)recent belligerence(호전성,투쟁성,전쟁). China has deployed ships and planes to contest Japan’s control of islands in the East China Sea, grabbed reefs claimed by the Philippines in the South China Sea and moved an oil rig(석유 굴착장치) into Vietnam’s claimed exclusive economic zone. All this has created alarm in the region. Some strategists say America can keep the peace only if it is firm in the face of Chinese expansionism. Others urge America to share power in East Asia before rivalries lead to a disaster.

[6]America cannot walk away without grave consequences for the region and its own standing(지위). Since the end of the second world war, American security has been the basis of Asian prosperity and an increasingly liberal order. It enabled Japan to rise from the ashes without alarming its neighbours. Indeed, China’s race to modernity could not have happened without it. Even Vietnam, America’s old foe, is clearer than ever that it wants America’s stabilising, reassuring presence.

[7]Yet, if the liberal order is to survive, it must evolve. Denying the reality of China’s growing power would only encourage China to reject the world as it is. By contrast, if China can prosper within the system, it will reinforce it. That is why the United States needs to acknowledge one increasingly awkward aspect of its leadership: American advantage is hard-wired into the system/ in ways that a rising power might justifiably resent(분하게 여기다,분개하다).

[8]For a great power to find a new equilibrium with an emerging one is hard—because every adaptation looks like a retreat. Three principles should guide America.

[9]First, it should only make promises that it is prepared to keep. On the one hand, America would be foolish to draw red lines around specks of reef in the South China Sea. On the other, if America is to count for(의지하다) anything, its allies need to know that they can depend on it. Although Taiwan is central to China’s sense of its own honour, America should leave Beijing in no doubt that it would come to the island’s defence.

[10]Second, even in security, America must make room(양보하다). China’s participation in America’s recent RIMPAC naval exercises off Hawaii was a start. China could be invited to join Asian exercises, including for disaster relief. And America should avoid a cold-war battle for the loyalty of regional powers.

[11] Lastly, America will find it easier to include China in new projects than to give ground on(기반을 내주다, 후퇴하다) old ones—and should make more effort to do so. It is nonsensical that America should be leading the formation of the region’s biggest free-trade area, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, without the inclusion of the region’s largest economy. And there is no reason to exclude China from co-operation in space. Even during the cold war American and Soviet astronauts worked together.

Let the dragon in

[12] Why should China be satisfied with a bit more engagement when primacy is what it seeks? There is no guarantee that it will be. Just now the rhetoric coming out of Beijing is full of cold-war, Manichean imagery(형상화,이미지). Yet sensible Chinese understand that their country faces constraints(제약,통제)—China needs Western markets, its neighbours are unwilling to accept its regional writ and for many more years the United States will be strong enough militarily and diplomatically to block it. And in the longer run, the hope is that the Chinese system will of itself adapt from one-party rule to some more liberal polity that, by its nature, is more comfortable with the world as it now is.

[13]Drawing China into a strengthened regional framework would not be to cede (양도하다,이양하다)primacy to it. Nor would it be to abandon a liberal order that has served Asia—and America—so well. It may, in the end, not work. But given the huge dangers of rivalry, it is essential now to try.

From the print edition: Leaders

이글의 정리는 지인이 도와주셨습니다...^^

[지미]

와 어려운 단어가 많네요..공부해야지. 잘 읽었습니다.

[melon vineux]

감사합니다^^

[Seok Ihm]

재미진 글에다
정리까지 감솨^^

[Yslee]

Rivalry => Confrontation => Conflict 하나 얻었습니다.

[나만의 꿈PD]

감사합니다~

[hyjung]

정말 잘 읽고 갑니다. 제가 좋아하는 국제 정세입니다. 감사합니다.